DRC-2013-002917 - 0901a068803ae548

Energy Fuels Resources (USA) Inc.
225 Union Blvd. Suite 600
Lakewood, CO, US, 80228
303 974 2140
"DRC-2013-002917" www.energyfuels.com
VIA EMAIL AND OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
August 6, 2013
Mr. Rusty Lundberg
Director of the Utah Division of Radiation Control
State of Utah Department of Environmental Quality
195 North 1950 West
P.O. Box 144850
Salt Lake City, UT 84116-4850
Re: Inspection Conducted June 13,2013; Notice of Violation: Radioactive Materials License
Number UT1900479
Dear Mr. Lundberg:
This letter responds to the above-referenced Notice of Violation ("NOV"), received by Energy Fuels
Resources (USA) Inc. ("EFRI") on July 8, 2013, which lists two violations of the Utah Radiation
Control Rules, based on an inspection of the White Mesa Mill (the "Mill") conducted by representatives
of the Utah Division of Radiation Control ("DRC") on June 13, 2013.
The NOV requires EFRI to provide a written response within 30 days after receipt of the Notice,
including:
• The corrective actions which have been taken and the results achieved;
• The corrective steps which have been taken to prevent recurrence; and
• The date full compliance will be achieved.
EFRI is also aware that R313-18-1 l(l)(d) requires that EFRI post a copy of the NOV in a conspicuous
place.
The specific violations listed in the NOV and EFRI's response to each, are discussed below.
Violation 1
The Mill's Security Program, Section 1.4, Reagent and Ore Carriers, states:
"Truck drivers hauling reagent and ore into the restricted area of the facility are to receive documented site
safety and radiation protection training prior to access to the site. Access is limited by controlling and
documenting gate access. Safety and radiation training consists of appropriate training for the activity
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August 6, 2013
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involved. "
Contrary to the above requirement, the DRC inspector found that an ore delivery driver inside of the Mill's
Restricted Area was present without the proper site safety and radiation protection training. An identical
violation was identified during a previous inspection on December 15, 2011 and a Severity Level IV Notice
of Violation was issued on January 25, 2012.
The violation of the Mill's Security Program identified during the June 13, 2013 inspection has been
characterized as Severity Level TV. The base penalty for this Severity Level is $750. Level IV Violations are
of more than a minor concern; however, if left uncorrected, could lead to a more serious concern. In this
case, drivers have continued to be allowed access to the Restricted Area without awareness of the potential
radiological and safety hazards. Therefore, a civil penalty of $750 is proposed.
EFRI Response
Following the DRC inspection of December 15 and 16, 2011, as described in the response letter of
February 27, 2012, the Mill implemented corrective actions to enforce gate house and scale house
personnel checking and/or providing radiation training to all drivers. Specifically, the Mill:
a. sent a notice to all delivery companies regarding the requirement for training as a condition of
access to the restricted area,
b. developed a spreadsheet tabulating all driver training records, and
c. retrained the scale house operator, radiation technicians, shifters and A-operators who were
responsible for delivery driver training.
Root Cause of Noncompliance
These measures provided a periodic check of compliance with the Mill's Security program, but did not
provide a real-time (shift-by-shift) monitoring of drivers and driver training needs. The root cause of
the violation was twofold:
1. A scalehouse operator consistently did not check the spreadsheet and therefore did not
recognize that the driver in question did not have current training and
2. The previous corrective action did not provide real-time monitoring so that every infraction
would be identified within one shift of its occurrence, and so that personnel corrective action
and/or disciplinary action could be applied as needed.
Corrective Actions Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
The Mill has investigated all records of shipments from January 1, 2013 to the present to identify:
1. Which drivers have one or more dates of entry without training; and
2. Which guard house or scale house personnel have admitted the drivers without training.
The Mill has also added the following daily inspection procedure described below, which was initiated
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August 6, 2013
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on July 8, 2013. The investigation and new procedure have resulted in no incidents of drivers without
training on site since July 8, 2013.
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken to Prevent Recurrence
The Mill has added the following procedure to prevent a recurrence of the violation. Each
morning the Radiation Safety Officer ("RSO") or his designee collects the previous day's scan-out
documents from the gate house and scale house. The scan-out documents provide a record of all
trucks, and all drivers, which have entered the Mill property within the past 24 hours. The RSO or
his designee compares the names on the scan-out documents to the list of drivers who have
received hazard recognition and contractor site-specific training. If any drivers detected via the
scan-out records are missing the requisite training:
a. The Mill personnel who admitted the driver will be contacted immediately for re-training, or
other personnel disciplinary action as required, and
b. The name of the untrained driver will be added to a notice list of which drivers may not enter
the Mill site until they receive missing training. The driver's name will remain on a notice
posted at the Mill's entry points until the missing training is corrected. The RSO or his
designee will verify during his daily reviews that drivers on the notice list have not entered the
Mill or have received their training.
Date Full Compliance Will Be Achieved.
Compliance was achieved on July 8, 2013. There have been no incidents of untrained drivers on site
since that date.
Violation 2
10 CFR 20 Appendix B, Radionuclide Table lists the Effluent Concentration Limit, Annual Limit of
Intake and Derived Air Concentration for radionuclides. Each radionuclide listed includes three (3)
tables: Table 1, Occupational Values; Table 2, Effluent Concentrations (air and water); and Table 3,
Releases to Sewers.
Utah Rule R313-15-1 003, Disposal by Release into Sanitary Sewerage states, in part:
"(1) A licensee or registrant may discharge licensed or registered material into sanitary sewerage if
each of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) The material is readily soluble, or is readily dispersible biological material, in water;
and
(b) The quantity of licensed or registered radioactive material that the licensee or registrant releases
into the sewer in one month divided by the average monthly volume of water released into the sewer by
the licensee or registrant does not exceed the concentration listed in Table III of Appendix B of 10 CFR
20.1001 to 20.2402,(201 0), which is incorporated by reference"
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August 6,2013
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Utah Rule R313-15-50L Surveys and Monitoring - General states, in part:
"(I) Each licensee or registrant shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that:
(a) Are necessary for the licensee or registrant to comply with Rule R313-15; and
(b) Are necessary under the circumstances to evaluate:
(i) The magnitude and the extent of radiation levels; and
(H) Concentrations or quantities of radioactive material; and
(iii) The potential radiological hazards. "
Contrary to the above requirements, the DRC inspector found, based on a records review, that on
March 1, 2013, a contractor had entered the Mill's Restricted Area (RA) to pump out the Office
Building's Sewage Vault. Although the vault's contents are from the rest rooms located outside of the
RA, the vault itself resides inside of the RA. A review of the release form for this event entitled the
'Radiation Survey of Equipment Released for Unrestricted Use' shows that the contents that were
removed from the vault and pumped into the contractor's truck were only surveyed for dose rate. The
release form contains a comment that reads, "Material was wet, did not take an alpha reading. The
inspector agrees that since the material was volumetric in nature, (i.e., liquid, sludge and/or soil-like
material), an alpha scan or swipe sample would not be an appropriate survey method. However, this
type of material would necessitate bulk sampling and analysis to determine its isotopic concentrations.
The truck was released with an external alpha survey and documented on the form entitled 'Daily
Vehicle Scan for Vehicles Leaving the Restricted Area'. Although process knowledge would assume that
the material inside the truck was radiologically releasable, radioanalysis of the material was not
conducted to confirm this prior to it being released from the RAfor unrestricted use.
As a follow up, I asked a member of Energy Fuels' staff to contact the contractor to determine where the
material was taken. Via email from the Energy Fuels' staff member on June 19, 2013, the DRC was
informed that the material was taken, "directly to the sewer lagoons." This would confirm that the
material was released to sanitary sewerage which is defined by 10 CFR 20.1003 as, "a system of public
sewers for carrying off waste water and refuse, but excluding sewage treatment facilities, septic tanks,
and leachfields owned or operated by the licensee.
The violations of Utah Rule R313-15-501, Utah Rule R313-15-1003 and 10 CFR 20 Appendix B
identified during the June 13, 2013 inspection have been characterized as Severity Level TV. The base
penalty for this Severity Level is $750. Level TV Violations are of more than a minor concern; however,
if left uncorrected, could lead to a more serious concern. In this case, the DRC does not believe that
radioactive material had been released for unrestricted use. However, the Mill made no effort to verify
that the material was suitable for release. If left uncorrected, similar materials that contain significant
radioactive concentrations may unknowingly be released to the general public.
EFRI Response
A review of the circumstances indicates that pumping of the main office leachfield was a singular
event in the Mill's history to date. The event observed by DRC on March 1, 2013 was the first and
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August 6, 2013
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only time in the 33-year history of the Mill that the main office septic leachfield required pumping out
by vaccuum truck. It is not anticipated that this action will be required for decades, and may
potentially not be required for the remainder of the Mill's life cycle.
Because the Mill operates on-site septic leach systems which have never required either discharge of
sewage to a municipal system, or pumping of the sewage vaults, the monthly quantity of licensed or
registered radioactive material and the average monthly volume of water that the Mill releases into the
public sewer system in one month have been zero for the 399 consecutive months of the Mill's life
prior to March 1,2013.
Although the Main Office septic system (sewage vault and leachfield) are within the Restricted Area
("RA"), two lavatories associated with the Main Office septic system are in the main office building
outside the RA. The contents of this septic system come from individuals who have either not entered
the RA, or have scanned out to leave the RA.
R313-15-501 states that:
"Each licensee or registrant shall make, or cause to be made, surveys that:
(b) Are necessary under the circumstances to evaluate:
(i) The magnitude and the extent of radiation levels; and
(ii) Concentrations or quantities of radioactive material; and
(iii) The potential radiological hazards." [Emphasis added]
EFRI believes that surveys of the sewage material were not necessary to determine the magnitude and
extent of radiation levels for the following reasons.
1. As mentioned above, the contents of this septic system come from individuals who have either
not entered the RA, or have scanned out to leave the RA.
2. The Mill's ongoing bioassay program, which has provided decades of urinalysis data, indicates
that the radionuclide levels in urine samples over the past 33 years have been low enough that
the anticipated level of radionuclides in the main office sewage, which contains sewage both
from individuals who do and do not enter the RA or have access to radiological materials,
would be immeasurably small.
3. The Mill is not licensed for the extraction of thorium from source material. Fecal bioassays for
intestinal uptake and concentration of thorium are not required and not appropriate at the Mill.
4. It was anticipated that the need for sewage removal and offsite disposal from the main office
vault would not occur more than once or twice over in Mill's entire life cycle, if at all.
5. The only wastewater sources supplying the sewage vault are the Main Office building
restrooms. The only access to the sewage vault is a covered manhole, which cannot readily be
opened. No laboratory, process, or floor drains enter the sewage vault, as those types of
wastewaters are piped either to Cell 1 or to be recycled into the Mill circuit. That is, there are
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August 6, 2013
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no plausible sources of radiological contamination to the sewage vault other than human waste,
whose radionuclide content is monitored through the bioassay program.
6. The volume of sewage removed during the March 2013 single event was approximately 1,500
gallons or 5,700 liters (the capacity of the single sewage truck).
A worst case, overly-conservative estimate of U-nat activity level in the sewage vault based on historic
urinalysis data is provided in Attachment 1. Comparison of the result to the 10 CFR 20 Appendix B
Table 3 levels for Releases to Sewers demonstrates that the overly conservative estimate of 7.25E-8
uCi/ml of U-nat in the sewage is 40 times lower than the Table 3 limit of 3E-6 uCi/ml of U-nat. Since
U-nat is well below its limit in Table 3, it can be assumed that individual uranium isotopes, would be
below their respective isotopic activity limits. Since uranium is the primary constituent of concern in
the Mill's bioassay program, it can be assumed that other radionuclides are also below their respective
isotopic activity limits. EFRI therefore asserts that surveys or analyses were not "necessary under the
circumstances."
The Mill believes this estimation approach is especially appropriate when considering the potential
health risks associated with, and limited number of qualified individuals and laboratories available for,
the collection, handling, radiological analysis, and disposal of human waste material samples.
Root Cause of Noncompliance
EFRI believes that based on the conservative estimate discussed above, the Mill has not exceeded the
limits in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B. Therefore, EFRI contends that there has been no non-compliance
situation.
Corrective Actions Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved
As discussed above, EFRI has provided a conservative estimate of radioactivity of the vault sewage to
demonstrate that that measurement was not "necessary under the circumstances."
Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken to Prevent Recurrence
As discussed above, EFRI has provided a conservative estimate of radioactivity of the vault sewage to
demonstrate that that measurement was not "necessary under the circumstances."
EFRI does not expect that the sewage vault will be pumped again for the remainder of the Mill's life.
However, the Mill will maintain the attached calculation on file in the event that pumping is required,
to demonstrate that measurement was not "necessary under the circumstances." The Mill will update
the calculations, if circumstances, such as a significant increase in worker population, a significant
increase in bioassay results, or a change in facility piping, indicate a revision is warranted.
Date Full Compliance Will Be Achieved.
As discussed above, EFRI believes that the Mill is in compliance with the requirements cited in this
violation.
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August 6, 2013
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A copy of the NOV has been posted in the Administration Building, in accordance with R313-18-
1 l(l)(d). EFRI therefore requests that Violation 2 be rescinded.
Please contact me if you have any questions or require any further information.
Yours very truly,
ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES (USA) INC.
Jo Ann Tischler
Manager, Compliance and Licensing
cc David C. Frydenlund
Phil Goble, Utah DRC
Dan Hillsten
Kevin Carney, Utah DRC
Ronnie Nieves
Harold R. Roberts
David E. Turk
Kathy Weinel
Attachments
4
Attachment 1
Estimate of Radioactivity of Sewage Vault
Assumptions:
1 to 2 liters per 24 hour day (assume 0.67 L per 8 hours)
150 humans using office bathrooms
365 days/yr
33 yrs
no radiaoctive decay of any isotope (all activity conserved)
1500 gallon vac truck (5700 L)
action limit of 15ug/L Unat in urine
1 sample in 150 per month have detectable Unat in urinalysis (>0).
is 7.5 ug/L (0.0075ug/ml)- halfway between ND and action level
Estimated maximum Unat in sewage if all radionuclides in 33 years were hauled in one truckload
670 ml/person-day x l*personx 365 days/yr x 33 yrs x 0.0075 **ug/ml Unat
60,526 ug Unat total removed in one 5700 L truck volume
11 ug/L concentration in 5700 L truckload
0.011 ug/ml
Basis: per World Information Service on Energy ("WISE") U data updated 20 Sep. 2012
25,280 Bq in 1 g Unat (total activity U234+U235+U238)
lg = 25,280 Bq x 0.00027 uCi per Bq =
6.83 uCi Unat per g Unat
0.00000683 uCi/ug U nat
Estimated maximum activity concentration of truck contents:
0.011 ug Unat/ml x 6.830E-06 uCi/ug Unat = 7.25E-08 uCi/ml
* One person per 150 who have any detectable uranium in the bioassay
** The majority of persons who have detectable Unat in urinalysis have results near the detection level,
or have retest results near the detection level, indicating the elevated sample was incorrect.
For conservatism, it has been assumed that every detection was halfway to the action level,
instead of near the detection level.