DRC-2011-008656 - 0901a06880b03203

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Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
OTTTCE OF TTIE GENEMT COTLNSEL
PO. Box 128
Towaoq, CO 81354-0128
(970) 564:5641
(97o) 565'o75o Fax
December 16,20ll
Rusty Lundberg
Director
Utah Division of Radiation Control
195 N. 1950 W.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
[e-mail]
VIA U.S. MAIL AND EMAIL
Comments Regarding Denison Mines (USA) Corp. Radioactive Materials License Renewal
DRC-045
Dear Mr. Lundberg:
The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe ("Tribe") submits the following comments regarding the
above-noted Radioactive Materials License Renewal ("RML Renewal") and the Safety Evaluation
Report for The Denison Mines White Mesa Mill2007 License Renewal Application ("SER"). The
Tribe notes that it is in the process of engaging the State of Utah (including the Utah Department of
Environmental Quality ("DEQ") and its Divisions) in government-to-government consultation
regarding the Tribe's concems with Denison Mines (USA) Corp.'s ("DUSA") operation of the
White Mesa Mill ("WMM"). See, e.g., Exhibit A ("Government-to-Government Correspondence,
UMUT/DEQ'). The Tribe submits these comments as public comments pursuant to Utah Admin.
Code R3 13-17 -2 and R305-6- I 05(2)(a).
. The Tribe has organized its comments into five major sections. Section I provides Division
of Radiation Control ("DRC") a quick overview of the Tribe's background and connection with the
WMM facility. Section II addresses the three broad concerns (and legal deficiencies) identified by
the Tribe in the RML Renewal and associated documentation: (A) the RML Renewal fails to
ensure the maximum protection of public health and safety to persons hear the WMM facility; (B)
the RML Renewal fails to provide adequate Utah state regulatory oversight over the WMM facility;
and (C) the RML Renewal denies the public (and the Tribe) a full opportunity to comment on all
aspects of the RML Renewal. Section III provides specific comments on known contamination and
violation issues, including: (A) groundwater contamination; (B) air deposition/surface
contamination; and (C) special contamination issues with alternative feed materials. Section IV
details the deficiencies in the RML Renewal's approach to the WMM facility's reclamation plan
and surety estimate. Section Y organizes the Tribe's specific demands into a table to facilitate DRC
action and response to the Tribe's comments.
Chief tack House, Last Tralitional Chief 1886-1972
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I. OVERVIEW OF TRIBAL BACKGROUND AND CONNECTION WITH THE WMM
FACILITY
The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe is a federally-recognized Indian tribe with lands located in
southwestern Colorado, northwestern New Mexico, and southeast Utah. There are two Tribal
communities on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation: Towaoc, in southwestern Colorado, and White
Mesa, which is located in Utah within three miles of the WMM facility. The lands comprising the
White Mesa community are held in trust for the Tribe and for other individual Tribal member
owners. The Tribe has jurisdiction (as a federally-recognized tribal government) over Tribally-
owned lands, Tribal member-owned lands, and members of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe who live in
the White Mesa community. Under the Tribe's Constitution, the Tribal Council is responsible for,
among other things, the management and protection of Tribal lands and for the protection of public
peace, safety, and welfare.
Ute Mountain Ute Tribal Members ("UMU Tribal Members") have lived on and around
White Mesa for centuries and intend to do so forever. The community of White Mesa depends on
groundwater resources buried deep in the Navajo aquifer for its municipal (domestic) needs. UMU
Tribal Members continue traditional practices, which include hunting and gathering and using the
land, plants, wildlife and water in ways that are integral to their culture. It is reasonable to expect
that those resources are not contaminated with hazardous materials that have blown in the wind or
traveled through the groundwater from facilities regulated by DEQ.
The Tribe has serious concerns about the manner in which the WMM is currently operated
and regulated. The Tribe has long expressed concern that the WMM operations (in particular,
management practices that have allowed continued contamination of surface resources, groundwater
resources, and surface water resources) pose serious threats to the health of the land and the natural
and cultural resources within and around the Tribe's White Mesa community and to the health and
welfare of its Tribal members and their future generations. The Tribe has also expressed concern
that the poor quality of DUSA's reclamation planning and surety estimations for the WMM facility
will ultimately result in a legacy of environmental contamination and blight both in the White Mesa
community and in surrounding communities. The Tribe submits these comments to identiff the
deficiencies in the RML Renewal and SER and in DUSA's operation of the WMM facility and to
request that DRC take appropriate regulatory action to protect the health and safety of the public,
UMU Tribal members, and the environment.
II. BROAD CONCERNS AND LEGAL DEFICIENCES IN THE RML RENEWAL
r A. THE RML RENEWAL FAILS TO ENSURE, THE MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF
T PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY TO PERSONS NEAR THE WMM FACILITY
Under Utah Admin. Code P.3l3-12-12, the Radiation Control Board has authority and
responsibility to "ensure the maximum protection of the public health and safety to all persons at, or
in the vicinity of, the place of use, storage, or disposal." Utah Admin Code R3l3-22-33(d) requires
the Executive Secretary of the DRC to determine that: "the issuance of the license will not be
inimical to the health and safety of the public" before approving a license or a license renewal. The
DRC's SER demonstrates that DRC staff and the Executive Secretary are aware of at least two
significant threats to public health and safety at the WMM: (1) inadequate disposal and fugitive
dust control of alternative feed material, see SER at9-12 and Sections III(C)(l)-(2), infra; and (2)
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groundwater contamination (chloroform and nitrate plumes) indicating liner failure in Tailings Cells
l,2,and3,see SERat3l-35andSectionIII(A), infra. Inaddition,theTribehasidentifiedfor
DRC a significant problem with off-site migration of uranium and vanadium that has contaminated
adjacent surface resources, see Section III(B), infra, and an additional groundwater contamination
issue in southern monitoring wells, see Section III(A)(l)(a), infra.
The conditions contained in the current RML Renewal are inadequate to ensure that
DUSA's operation of the WMM over the next five years will not be inimical to the health and
safety of the public, and in particular, of the UMU Tribal Members living within three miles of the
WMM. First, the RML Renewal does not contain sufficient terms and conditions to ensure that
DUSA corrects the immediate and known threats to public health and safety as it enjoys the
protection of its license renewal. For example, and as explained in detail below, the RML Renewal
temporarily prohibits the receipt of alternative feed materials from new sites until DUSA
demonstrates adequate disposal capacity and operation, but does not place any timeline for DUSA
to demonstrate such capacity, does not allow DRC to revoke the RML Renewal for failure to meet
such a timeline, and most importantly, does not prohibit DUSA from receiving alternative feed
material from existing sites or placing existing alternative feed material in leaking disposal cells.
See Section III(CXI), infra. Similarly, the RML Renewal fails to set any firm deadlines for DUSA
to address the known groundwater contamination (and leaking tailing cell liners) and does not allow
DRC to revoke the RML Renewal for failure to meet such a timeline. See Section III(/I), infra.
The RML Renewal does not even address the known surface contamination issues associated with
off-site migration of Radioactive Material, see Section III(B), infra, or associated with Monitoring
Well22, see Section III(A)(1)(a), infra.
The RML Renewal also contains insufficient terms and conditions to ensure the long-term
health and safety of UMU Tribal Members and the public. The RML Renewal requires DUSA to
revise its interim increase in its surety, but the RML Renewal does not contain any timelines for
DUSA to finalize its surety estimate revision or to provide the additional surety, and the Renewal
does not allow DRC to revoke the RML Renewal for failing to meet such a timeline. See Section
IV(B), infra. The RML Renewal also fails to include a final reclamation plan for the facility. The
Tribe has significant concerns with Reclamation Plan 5.0, see section IV(A), infra, and is concerned
that the RML Renewal fails to set any firm deadlines for having an approved reclamation plan in
place and that DRC has no ability to revoke the RML Renewal for failure to meet such deadlines.
Therefore, the Tribe now asserts as a general statement that the current conditions in the RML
Renewal fail to ensure that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the health and safety of
UMU Tribal Members.
B. THE RML RENEWAL FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE UTAH STATE
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OVER THE WHITE MESA MILL FACILITY
Under the "Agreement Between the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
State of Utah for Discontinuance of Certain Commission Regulatory Authority and Responsibility
Within the State Pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended"
("NRC/Utah Primacy Agreement"), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recognized that the State
of Utah 'ohas a program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public health and
safety" with respect to both "source material" and "by-product material" (as defined by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, and hereinafter "Radioactive Material"). The State has delegated its authority
and responsibility for the regulation of Radioactiv.e Material to the DRC. See, e.g., U.C. $ 19-3-
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104(4). The Radiation Control Board has exercised its authority to regulate the use of Radioactive
Material "to ensure the maximum protection of the public health and safety to all persons at, or in
the vicinity of, the place of use, storage, or disposal." Utah Admin. Code R313-12-2. Thus, under
both the Utah Code and under the DRC's own rules, the DRC maintains primary responsibility for
regulating Radioactive Material to protect public health and safety.
The RML Renewal and the SER indicate that the DRC has failed to provide adequate
regulatory oversight over the WMM facility. The Tribe has three general concerns about oversight
of the facility. First, the Tribe is concerned that confusion over DRC responsibilities for regulatory
oversight for the WMM has lead to regulatory gaps for the facility. Here, the Tribe notes, for
example, that DRC staff relies on DUSA's Division of Air Quality ("DAQ") Air Approval Order to
address concerns about wind dispersal of alternative feed material, see SER at 9, but that the DAQ
has not set forth any binding fugitive dust management procedures in the cited air approval order or
mandated that DUSA take any additional measures to control airbome dispersal of Radioactive
Material. See Exhibit B, "Request for Agency Action" ("RAA"); see also Section III(B), infra
(addressing air dispersal/surface contamination issues). The DRC must ensure that no such
regulatory gaps exist as it evaluates and issues the RML Renewal for the facility.
The Tribe's second concern with Utah state regulatory oversight is that the DRC (along with
DAQ) has repeatedly allowed DUSA long timelines and extensions of those long timelines to
address problems at the WMM facility. The Tribe is, for example, very concerned that, when faced
with clear evidence of groundwater contamination, DRC allowed DUSA more than three years to
put forth an alternate "theory" of the source of the nitrate plume and that DRC has not yet mandated
specific work or timelines for DUSA to stop contaminating the groundwater or to implement a
functional leak detection system. See Section III(A), infra. The Tribe asserts that the DRC has a
responsibility in the RML Renewal process to mandate that DUSA implement cleanup actions and
adhere to timelines to avoid catastrophic water and resource contamination resulting from known
sources of contamination.
The Tribe's third concern with DRC's oversight is that DRC has failed to impose
requirements upon DUSA that could compensate for the lack of DEQ resources to provide adequate
staff time to regulate the WMM facility. The SER indicates, for example, that the DRC lacks
resources "to complete the work needed to resolve the compliance status of the Reclamation Plan,
Revision 4.0, and ICTM Report." SER at 28. DRC (along with DAQ) also appears to lack the
resources to locate staff near the WMM facility, which means that DEQ fails to maintain a regular
physical and inspection presence at the facility. The Tribe believes that the DRC could compensate
for the lack of staff resources by: (l) setting forth clear license conditions requiring additional
quality control measures, standard operating procedures, and more specific monitoring
requirements; and (2) providing clear instructions and hard deadlines for DUSA to accomplish
monitoring, licensing, and cleanup and remediation work. However, DRC's "ad-hoc" or flexible
approach to monitoring and cleanup efforts, see, e.g., SER at p.32, implemented by an
overburdened regulatory staff, has allowed DUSA to operate the WMM facility in a way that
threatens the long-term health and well being of the public, UMU Tribal Members, and the
environment.
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C. THE RML RENEWAL DENIES THE PUBLIC (AND THE TRIBE) A FULL
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE RML RENEWAL
The RML Renewal denies the public and the Tribe a full opportunity to comment on
important aspects of DUSA's license. There are two general public comment deficiencies with the
RML Renewal. First, the RML Renewal fails to give opportunity for additional public comment on
the unresolved environmental contamination and reclamation issues identified in the SER. Here,
the SER guarantees opportunity for additional public comment before authorizing the receipt of
alternative feed materials from new sites, SER at p. I l, but the SER and the RML Renewal provide
no such public review and comment capacity on the final license conditions addressing groundwater
cleanup and remediation issues, the revised surety amount, or the reclamation plan. Without such
guaranteed public comment periods, the DRC will effectively deny the public the opportunity to
participate in important licensing conditions involving public health and safety.
The RML Renewal also fails to provide the Tribe an opportunity to review and comment on
the DRC's analysis of DUSA's environmental report. Under Utah Admin. Code R3l3-24-3(3),
DRC is required to provide written analysis of the environmental report and to provide an
opportunity for public notice and comment. The DRC has not provided a.ry stand-alone analysis of
the environmental report, but has provided some environmental analysis in the SER. The Tribe is
concerned that DUSA's 2007 Environmental Report, which is now over four years old, failed to
present the full extent of groundwater contamination, seeUtah Admin. Code R313-24-3(l)(b),
failed to assess impacts to public health, see Utah Admin. Code R3l3-24-3(l)(a), and failed to
address reclamation at the site, see Utah Admin. Code R3 l3-24(3X1Xd). In particular, the Tribe is
concerned that DRC and DAQ have failed to assess and address the evidence of off-site migration
of uranium and vanadium (and the known contamination of surface resources). See Section III(B),
infra. Accordingly, the Tribe now asserts that DRC has failed to provide the opportunity for
comment as required under R-313-24-3(3).
III. TRIBAL CONCERNS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF KNOWN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTAMINATION AND VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Section lI, supra explains the overarching legal deficiencies with the RML Renewal.
Section III of the Tribe's comments provides specific comments and demands on specific issues of
known environmental contamination and violations of state and federal law. To facilitate DRC
review regarding these specific contamination issues, the Tribe will present each issue with an
identification of the problem and a list of demands for DRC.
A. GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION
1.The DRC Must Immediately Require DUSA to Remediate and Prevent Groundwater
Contamination at the WMM Facility
Issue Identification
On pages 31-32 of the SER, DRC staff explains the 1999 chloroform investigation and the
current nitrate investigation at the WMM facility. The SER provides information on the Ground
Water Corrective Action Order that has been in place since 1999 for chloroform contamination in
the shallow aquifer in well MW-4. The SER also explains that, in 2008, DRC staff identified a
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nitrate/chloride plume at a number of wells on the WMM facility. Since 2008, DRC and DUSA
have engaged in an investigation of DUSA's "theory" that the nitrate and chloride contamination
arose from natural sources. Now, in20l l, DRC and DUSA have agreed to formulate a corrective
action plan to address the nitrate plume.
The SER does not address an additional groundwater contamination problem in one of
DUSA's monitoring wells. In 2010, DUSA identified excessive levels of chloride, fluoride,
uranium, cobalt, cadmium, molybdenum, nickel and manganese, as well as excessive hydronium
ion (low pH), in Monitoring Well22. Exhibit C (describing the "Background Groundwater Quality
Report for Wells M-20 and MW-22 for Denison Mines (USA) Corp.'s White Mesa Mill Site, San
Juan County, Utah"). This contamination problem greatly concerns the Tribe, as Monitoring Well
22 islocated south of the facility (between the Tailings Cells and the White Mesa community) and
as DUSA's report indicates the presence of tailings leachate inMW-22. Exhibit C. DRC accepted
DUSA's erroneous conclusion that there is no possibility of WMM-caused pollution of the wells
because of the distance from the facility. See Exhibit C (explaining how DUSA's groundwater
travel time of 0.33-0.43 feet per year is not scientifically supportable due to indications of modern
water in the well). DRC has not required DUSA to address the groundwater contamination in MW-
22,whrch is likely linked to leaks from Tailing Cells 7,2 and 3. Exhibit C.
The Tribe is concerned at the amount of time it has taken DRC to seek corrective action
from DUSA on known instances of groundwater contamination. For the nitrate plume identified in
the SER, the Tribe is troubled that it has taken DRC more than three years to begin the process of
seeking a corrective action plan from DUSA. For more than a decade, DRC has documented its
concerns about groundwater contamination resulting from potential seepage from the tailings
impoundments at the WMM. See Exhibit D, "February l l, 1999 Letter to David C. Frydenlund"
(hereinafter "Frydenlund Letter"). DUSA has also repeatedly documented to DRC that nitrate,
nitrite, and chloride found in groundwater at the WMM facility are all "smoking gun" or "primary"
indicators of tailing cell leakage. See Frydenlund Letter at p. 3 (expressing DRC's concern that
DUSA was not using "smoking gun" leakage parameters such as'oammonia, nitrate, nitrite,
molybdenum and sulfate" during the groundwater monitoring (emphasis supplied)); see also Exhibit
E, "Chloride Citations" (providing numerous citations submitted to DRC by DUSA that chloride,
nitrate, and nitrite are primary indicators of tailing cell leakage). DRC has expressed concern about
the design of the leak detection systems in Cells 1,2, and 3, stating that "only the largest
catastrophic leaks will be detected by the current leak detection systems for these cells," and that
non-catastrophic leaks will likely be detected only after traveling vertically and reaching the
groundwater monitoring wells. Frydenlund Letter; see also Exhibit F, "June 27 ,2000 Memo to
Dane Finerfrock" (hereinafter "Finerfrock Memo") at p. 1 (noting that it is unlikely that any leak
detection system exists under Cell I and stating that the system under Cells 2 and 3 is "grossly
inadequate").
The Frydenlund Letter, the Finerfrock Memo, and the documents cited in Exhibit E
demonstrate that DRC understands that, given the design of the leak detection system ("LDS") in
Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3, evidence of chloride, nitrate, and nitrite in the groundwater monitoring
system is a "smoking gun" or o'primary" indicator that the cell liners in Tailings Cells 1, 2, and 3 are
leaking (and that these cells likely were leaking for years before the nitrate plume was identified).
However, instead of immediately taking action to prepare a corrective action plan to identiff the
source of the nitrate plume and implement groundwater pumping and other remediation measures,
DRC has allowed DUSA more than three years to put forth its "theory" of natural source
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contamination. DRC also appears to be allowing DUSA unlimited time to identify the source of the
contamination present in MW-22. The Tribe asserts that DRC should not allow DUSA long periods
of time to identifu the sources of contamination and that DRC should, in these types of situations,
order immediate remediation work. I
The Tribe is also concerned that DRC will not, through the current corrective action plan
process, force DUSA to address the likely source of the nitrate groundwater contamination (which
is leaking liners in Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3). The most recent corrective action plan, submitted by
DUSA to DRC on November 29,2011, fails to consider the Tailings Cells as a source of the nitrate
and chloride contamination, and therefore fails to consider any action associated with the cells or
the cell liners. See Exhibit G (providing EPD Review of CAP).
The Tribe asserts here that the nitrate, nitrite, and chloride contamination provides strong
evidence that the liners in Tailings Cells 1, 2, and 3 have passed their useful life. The thin, 30-mil
polyvinyl chloride ("PVC") liners on Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3 were not best available technology
when they were installed in the late 1970s. See Exhibit H, Letter Re: Review of Containment and
Closure Issues Denison USA/White Mesa Uranium Mill, Relicensing Application, Revision 5.0,
Sept 201l, $ 2.1 (Dec. 1, 2011) (hereinafter "RRD Letter"). The Tribe's experts have found that,
particularly in this industry, this type of thin PVC liner cannot last 30 years in an acidic
environment. RRD Letter $$ 2.2, 2.3; see also Finerfrock Memo at p. 15-18. The Tribe's experts
are also concerned (as DRC was in 1999 and as DRC has indicated in the SER) that the liners in
Tailings Cells 1, 2, and 3 have been further compromised by the placement of incompatible
alternative feed material in the cells. RRD Letter $ 2.3; Section III(CXI), infra. This means that,
given the evidence of chloride, nitrate, and nitrite contamination, it is likely that the liners of
Tailings Cells 1 ,2, and 3 are currently leaking and that there is a risk of catastrophic liner failure in
each ofthese cells.
The Tribe asserts here that, given the significant risk of liner failure in Tailings Cells 1, 2,
and 3, and given that each of these cells have passed their useful life, the appropriate course of
action would be for DRC to require DUSA to immediately take these three cells out of service. See
RRD Letter $ 2.5. However, due to concerns with the reclamation plan at the facility, the Tribe
makes the following recommendations.
i. DRC Should Require DUSA to Close, De-Water, and Place Final Caps on Cells 2 and3
The Tribe recommends placing Cells 2 and 3 in final closure. RRD Letter $ 2.5. DRC staff
has indicated to the Tribe that Cell 2 is full and that Cell 3 is nearly full (but is still receiving in situ
leachate waste ("ISL Waste"). Once DUSA closes, de-waters, and places final caps on these cells,
there will be significantly less risk of liner leakage and resulting groundwater contamination.
I Here, the Tribe recognizes that identifuing DUSA as the source of groundwater contamination has been significantly
complicated by the effects of groundwater mounding around DUSA's wildlife ponds. Public Participation Summary
Modification to Groundwater Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004,p. 12-13 (January 20,2010). However, DUSA's
groundwater discharge permit has already addressed this issue and requires corrective action for groundwater
contamination in excess of the criteria enforced in the permit by Utah Admin. Code R3l7-6-6.15. Permit UGW370004
1.C.1,p.2. Thus, there is no excuse for DRC to allow DUSA three years to concede responsibility for groundwater
contamination.
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The Tribe's first concern with DUSA's management of Cells 2 and 3 is that any temporary
caps designed to meet NESHAP (radon emissions) standards will be insufficient, during the
working life of the WMM facility, to protect against additional infiltration into and leakage from the
cell liners. RRD Letter $ 2.5. Given that DUSA has not specified a closing date for the facility, and
given that DUSA, DRC, and the Department of Energy have indicated that the facility may be in
operation until at least2025, see Exhibit I (stating that the Department of Energy is not scheduled to
receive the WMM facility until 2035-which likely includes a l0-year period of monitoring for
DUSA after final reclamation), leaving Tailings Cells 2 and 3 without sufficient caps until final
reclamation will pose a significant and long-term risk of catastrophic groundwater contamination.
Because of the risk of leakage from Tailings Cells 2 and 3, DRC should not allow DUSA to defer
final capping of the cells until final reclamation, and DRC should instead require DUSA to practice
concurrent closure and to place adequate final caps on Tailings Cells 2 and 3 as it takes those cells
out of service. See Finerfrock Memo at pp. 1-2 (indicating DRC recommendation for phased or
concurrent closure). The Tribe also asserts that DRC should prohibit DUSA from disposing of any
other waste (and in particular, liquid ISL Waste2) in Cells 2 and,3. Even incidental disposal of
wastes into those cells will add to the total contaminate load available to seep through the liners in
those cells, and the Tribe asserts that those cells should immediately be closed, de-watered, and
permanently capped. RRD Letter $2.5.
The Tribe notes that concurrent closure practices can reduce current environmental footprint
and contamination risks, which should reduce the liability transferred to the agency at abandonment
and which should reduce some aspects of DUSA's surety estimate, see Section IV(B), infra. RRD
Letter $ 2.5. The Tribe also notes that DRC may need to give DUSA direction regarding concurrent
closure of Cells 2 and 3 before the Reclamation Plan is finalized. Here, DRC should instruct DUSA
to modify the cap design to allow phased closure of Tailings Cells 2 and 3. See also Section IV(A),
infra (containing comments on the inadequacy of the tailings cell cover design).
ii. DRC Should Require DUSA to Close, Clean, and Re-Line Cell 1 (Or Close Cell 1 and
Change Stormwater Management off the Mill Yard)
Because of the threat of serious groundwater contamination from leaking PVC liners, the
Tribe's expert has recommended closure of Cell 1. RRD Letter $ 2.5. However, the Tribe is
concerned that necessary revisions to Reclamation Plan 5.0 and the Storm Water Best Management
Practices Plan ("Stormwater Plan") may require a liquids disposal cell in the current Cell I location
to catch stormwater runoff from the Mill Yard and prevent the discharge and dispersion of
Radioactive Material, alternative feed material, and other chemicals in the washes and creeks west
of Cell 1. See Section IV(AXI), infra. Accordingly, the Tribe has identified two options to address
the threat of groundwater contamination from Cell l. First, DUSA could close, de-water, clean, and
re-line Cell l. Here, the Tribe asserts that DRC should require DUSA to dispose of waste and the
current Cell I liner in a disposal cell designed to the standards used for Cells 4,A. and 48. See
Section IV(AX1), infra (explaining why DRC cannot approve the proposed"area for contaminated
' RML Renewal License Condition 10.5(C) states that Cell 3 is the only cell approved for the receipt of the ISL Waste.
The Tribe's understanding from DRC staff is that DRC currently only allows disposal of the ISL Waste in Cell 3
because DUSA has not yet received approval from DRC to place this material in Cells 4,4. and 48 because of concems
about damaging the liners in the new cells. The Tribe comments here that, although it appreciates DRC's intent to keep
the liners in Cells 4A and 48 intact, DRC is creating a risk of significant environmental contamination by placing the
liquid ISL Waste in Cell 3, which is at significant risk for catastrophic liner failure and which has an insufficient leak
detection system in place.
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materials"). The Tribe also insists that DRC require DUSA to install a new liner system into Cell 1
that meets BAT/BACT in 2011 (which will, at a minimum, include a compacted clay base and two
60-mil HDPE liners). The Tribe also asserts that DRC should require DUSA to install a functional
leak detection system in the re-lined Cell 1.
An altemative option to address the threat of contamination from Cell 1 would be to close
and de-water the cell and move any remaining contents and the Cell I liner into a disposal cell with
a liner designed to the standards used in Cells 4A' and 48. See Section IV(AXI), infra, (explaining
why DRC cannot approve the proposed "area for contaminated materials"). Here, DRC must also
require DUSA to modify the stormwater management at the facility to prevent the planned
discharge of Radioactive Material from the Mill Site to the west of the Cell I location. See Section
IY(A)(l), infra.
b. List of Tribal Demands (Known Groundwater Contamination)
* The Tribe supports DRC's movement from evaluation to the corrective action plan that will
address the nitrate contamination.
The Tribe supports DRC's new language in License Condition 9.5 requiring DUSA to
include remediation for groundwater contamination in its surety estimate. See further
discussion in Section IV(B), infra, regarding DUSA's surety estimate.
The Tribe supports deadlines put forth in the License and in the SER to require DUSA to
submit a corrective action plan by November 30,2011 and to have the surety estimate
include groundwater remediation by March 4,2012. Given the history of relaxed timelines
for DUSA to address this issue, DRC must put deadlines on DUSA to complete the
remediation work. Here, the Tribe suggests that DRC either: (1) amend the RML Renewal
in December 201I to place the deadlines in the renewal document; or (2) amend the RML
Renewal to place a hard deadline for DUSA to implement the work outlined in the CAP.
The Tribe does not support the deadline put forth in the Amended Stipulated Consent
Agreement requiring completion of groundwater remediation at the time of transfer to
federal authority. See Exhibit J, "Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement" at p. 8,
September 30,2011. The Tribe does not support the amount of time DRC has allowed
DUSA between the identification of groundwater pollution and the corrective action plan.
Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement at pp. 1-4. DRC must add a provision to the RML
Renewal that allows DRC to revoke the RML License if DUSA fails to perform prompt
remediation of the nitrate plume and other obligations under the CAP.
The Tribe does not support DUSA's lack of attention to theMW-22 contamination. DRC
must revisit the status of MW-20 and MW-22 and conduct a source identification
assessment of these wells, as described in Permit UGW370004 Part IE.2,page 5.
DRC must designate MW-20 and MW-22 as Point of Compliance Wells and immediately
require DUSA to implement the concurrent closure and other groundwater protection
measures necessary to protect human health and the environment.
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.8. DRC must provide an additional opportunity to review and comment on the nitrate plume
corrective action plan and to suggest and comment on any amendments to the RML
Renewal addressing the CAP. Here, the Tribe puts forth its preliminary comments on the
corrective action plan.
DRC must:
contamination.
Require DUSA to permanently close Tailings Cell2.
Require DUSA to cease putting any additional material into Tailings Cell 3
(including ISL Waste) and to permanently close Tailings Cell 3.
Require that DUSA place adequate permanent cap systems on Tailings Cells 2 and 3.
See Section IV(AX2), infro (detailing demands for improvement to the tailings cell
cover design).
Require DUSA to cease putting any additional material (liquid or otherwise) into
Tailings Cell 1. Here, the Tribe recommends that DRC require DUSA to re-line
Tailings Cell 1 with a liner that meets BATiBACT for 2011 so that the WMM has a
functional liquids disposal cell for the life of the facility and to provide an adequate
stormwater catchment basin during reclamation of the facility. See Section IV(AXl),
infra (describing problems with liquid disposal and stormwater runoff in
Reclamation Plan 5.0). In the alternative, DRC could require DUSA to close and de-
water Cell l, place the remaining contents of Cell 1 in a disposal cell, and re-route
stormwater from the Mill Yard.
The DRC Must Require DUSA To Install a Leak Detection System that Allows DUSA to
Detect and Clean Up Future Leaks Before the Leaks Cause Groundwater Contamination
Issue Identification
Pages 33-35 of the SER describe recent problems with the leak detection system ("LDS")
for Tailings Cells 1,2, and 3, and the RML Renewal contains new License Condition 11.3 to
improve the LDS monitoring, operation, and maintenance. The SER and the RML Renewal do not,
however, address DRC's fundamental problems with the LDS for Tailings Cells 1,2, and 3: that
there is no secondary low-permeability barrier below the primary low-permeability liner to
accumulate leakage to the leak collection pipe and that the long horizontal distance to reach the
collection pipe poses a risk of vertical seepage losses. See Frydenlund Letter. These two problems
with the LDS pose a serious risk that non-catastrophic leaks will not be detected until groundwater
contamination has occurred and that there is no secondary liner to keep catastrophic or non-
catastrophic leaks from resulting in groundwater contamination.
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List of Tribal Demands (LDS)
* See list of demands in Section III(A)(1), supra. Closure of Tailings Cells 2 and 3 with
adequate permanent caps will reduce the likelihood of catastrophic groundwater
contamination caused by leaking liners and a flawed LDS. The same is true of Cell 1;
however, if DUSA re-lines Cell 1, DUSA must design a new LDS that has a collection
system that does not allow for vertical migration of leaks.
The DRC Must Require DUSA to Identif.v and Promptly Minimize Contamination Pathways
to Tribal Resources
Issue Identification
Page 6 of the SER describes the new land use survey report requirement added to the RML
Renewal as License Condition 12.3. The SER states that "[t]his report will also identifu any
potential routes of exposure of contaminates and dose to the general public." SER at pp. 6-7. This
indicates that DRC has imposed the land survey requirement so DUSA and DRC can identify
contamination pathways between WMM facilities and resources used by the public and by UMU
Tribal Members.
The Tribe commends DRC for adding the land use survey condition to the RML Renewal,
but asserts that the language provided in License Condition 12.3 of the RML is not suffrcient to
require DUSA to assess or correct potential routes of exposure between WMM facilities and UMU
Tribal groundwater resources. To begin, the language of License Condition 12.3 only requires
DUSA to conduct an annual survey of off-site land use; it does not require DUSA to conduct an on-
site survey of contamination pathways. Here, the Tribe notes that DEQ Divisions have already
identified at least two important on-site pathways of contamination to UMU Tribal groundwater
resources. First, more than a decade ago, DRC identified that vertical pathways to the groundwater
aquifers potentially exist in the bedrock beneath the tailings cells. Finerfrock Memo at p. 2. The
Tribe has also collected proof that groundwater to the east of the mill site at Entrance Seep and to
the West of the WMM at Cottonwood Spring is less than fifty years old. USGS Report, Table l0
(explanation and citation for USGS Report noted below in Section III(B)(1)(a)). This evidence,
along with the considerable spatial extent of existing groundwater contamination at the site,
advances the Tribe's concern that contamination in the shallow groundwater may travel into Tribal
groundwater resources much more quickly than anticipated by DUSA.
Second, DUSA has at least one well (the "Deep Supply Well") that reaches into the Navajo
aquifer, which supplies drinking water for UMU Tribal Members living in White Mesa. See Exhibit
K (describing the UMU Tribal drinking water infrastructure at White Mesa). DRC has also
identified at least seven wells inside the Cell 3 footprint and at least one well inside the Cell4
footprint that could form vertical conduits for groundwater pollution from these cells. Finerfrock
Memo at pp. ll-12. The Tribe is concemed that DRC has not required DUSA to fully evaluate or
promptly remove these known potential vertical pathways for contamination into the Tribe's
drinking water supply.
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List of Tribal Demands (Groundwater Contamination Vectors)
The Tribe supports DRC's addition of the land use survey.
DRC must amend License Condition 12.3 to require DUSA to identify, assess, and promptly
minimize potential routes of exposure on its facility to land uses on adjacent lands.
DRC must add the Deep Supply Well and other wells under Cells 3 and 4 as potential routes
for exposure of contaminates and dose to the general public and to UMU Tribal Members.
DRC must put a firm and short deadline (no longer than 60 days from the Jarnary 2012
assessment deadline in the GWDP) on DUSA to correct any deficiencies on the well casing
for the Deep Supply Well.
AIR DEPOSITION/SURFACE CONTAMINATION AND VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL LAWS
The DRC Must Require Immediate Cleanup of Known Air Deposition/Surface
Contamination and Take Action to Prevent Future Air Deposition/Surface Contamination at
the WMM Facility
Issue Identification
Under the NRCAJtah Primacy Agreement, the Utah Code, and DRC regulations, DRC
maintains primary responsibility for regulating both "source material" and "by-product material" to
protect public health and safety. See Section II(B), supra. As described in Section III(A), supra,
the DRC has exerted some of its power as the primary Utah State regulator of Radioactive Material
to regulate DUSA's impact on groundwater resources. In that context, DRC has monitored
DUSA's groundwater discharge permit, included significant discussion of groundwater
contamination issues in the SER, and included License Conditions in the RML addressing
groundwater contamination. See SER at p. 3l-35, RML Renewal License Conditions 9.5, 70.20,
ll.3; but see Section III(A) (addressing deficiencies in DRC's groundwater regulation). The DRC
has also taken the lead in the corrective action plan process for groundwater remediation at the
WMM facility. SER at p.3l-32. The DRC has not, however, exerted the same regulatory power
with regard to the regulation of DUSA's impact on both air resources and surface contamination
resulting from the airborne deposition of Radioactive Material. Indeed, the SER and the RML
Renewal contain only passing references to air quality and air deposition contamination issues at the
WMM.
The Tribe asserts that DRC is failing in its duty to protect the public and UMU Tribal
Members from air contamination and surface contamination caused by airbome deposition of
Radioactive Material. The Tribe first notes that DAQ is not regulating the WMM facility to ensure
maximum public health and safety as contemplated under Utah Admin. Code R3l3-12-2. The
Tribe, through its Environmental Programs Department, has for years been concemed about the
migration of Radioactive Material from the WMM facility via stackhouse emissions and via fugitive
dust blowing off ore storage areas and stockpiles of ore and altemative feed materials at the WMM.
The Tribe has engaged DAQ several times to express its concern about surface contamination
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caused by airborne deposition of Radioactive Material. See RAA $III (A), describing September 4,
2007 Letter and other Tribal engagement of DAQ.
In2007, the Tribe's Environmental Programs Department began working in cooperation
with the United States Geologic Survey ("USGS") to assist the USGS with a Scientific
Investigations Report ("USGS Report") concerning environmental conditions around White Mesa
and the WMM. Pertinent figures from a draft of this USGS Report were provided to DAQ during
the Air Approval Order ("AAO") comment period in 2010, and a full copy has been provided to
DRC staff and is provided again now for DRC review as Exhibit L. This study shows that
Radioactive Material (uranium and vanadium) has migrated east of the WMM facility. USGS
Report Figures 29-41. The study indicates that the off-site migration begins with airborne
deposition of Radioactive Material (through stackhouse emission and through fugitive dust) and
then spreads when it is washed down drainages. USGS Report "Sediment," p. 95-103. The Tribe is
concerned that the airborne deposition of Radioactive Material has resulted in the contamination of
surface water, soils, and vegetation, and it may be indirectly contaminating livestock, wildlife
resources, and other indirect pathways that impact human health, see Exhibit M. The Tribe is
concerned that the lack of regulation of Radioactive Material (and particularly of fugitive dust) and
the documented off-site migration pose a serious and long-term threat to human health and to the
health and well-being of UMU Tribal Members and the local environment.
In 2010, the Tribe engaged in the DAQ modification of DUSA's air approval order by
submitting comments regarding fugitive dust management at the WMM. On February 24,2011, the
DAQ issued a Memorandum regarding Response to Comments dismissing the Tribe's comments
and claiming that DAQ lacked jurisdiction to regulate certain aspects of the radioactive materials.
See e.g., Exhibit N, 'oMemorandum in Response to Comments" (hereinafter "Response Memo") at
p. 5 (claiming that DAQ cannot require DUSA to conduct vegetation sampling and that DAQ
cannot require DUSA to modifu its surety estimate to include remediation for the off-site
contamination). The DAQ then issued DUSA an Air Approval Order ("AAO") that failed to
mandate any work practice standards for fugitive dust management at the WMM and that failed to
place any special conditions or restrictions that reflect an understanding that fugitive dust
management at the WMM should be designed to prevent migration of Radioactive Material. See
Exhibit O (AAO); Exhibit B. In short, the Final AAO appears to treat the WMM fugitive dust as if
it does not contain Radioactive Material. Exhibit A (containing the November 5,2011 Amanda
Smith Letter (stating that "From an Air Quality standpoint, Denison is regulated the same as other
aggregate production/processing facilities.")). In March of 2011, the Tribe filed a Request for
Agency Action challenging the DAQ's AAO.
The Tribe also notes that DUSA's current Stormwater Plan contains conflicting information
on stormwater movement that makes it difficult for the Tribe (and DRC) to assess how DUSA
monitors and manages the movement of Radioactive Material desposited via air pathways. The
Stormwater Plan indicates that Drainage Basin 82 drains into the area of concern identified by the
individual small watersheds in the USGS report figures via Diversion Ditch No. 3. Stormwater
Plan, Figure 2. However, the Spill Containment, Controls and Counterrneasures Plan ("SPCC
Plan"), included within the Stormwater Plan, states that "Diversion Ditch No. 3 ultimately drains
into Diversion Ditch No. 2. This basin is not affected by mill operations." SPCC Plan, Appendix 1,
p. 3. Figure 2 clearly shows that Diversion Ditch No. 3 flows southeast to a point, based on the
topographical background, that would continue in that direction along the edge of basin 83, while
Diversion Ditch No. 2 starts 1000 feet from Diversion Ditch No. 3 flowing in a northwesterly
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(opposite) direction then turning north. So, either Diversion Ditch No. 3 does not flow into
Diversion Ditch No. 2 as stated in the SPCC Plan, or if it does, it transports storm water with wind
deposited material containing ore-source uranium and vanadium, and thus it is affected by mill
operations. The Tribe asserts that DRC must re-evaluate DUSA's Stormwater Plan and require
DUSA to address the stormwater component of Radioactive Material deposited by stack emissions
and fugitive dust.
The Tribe was hopeful that, especially given DAQ's claim of limited jurisdiction, the DRC
would include a more comprehensive review and regulation of air quality, air
deposition/contamination issues, and stormwater deposition issues at the WMM in the RML
Renewal and the SER. The Tribe was troubled to find that neither the RML Renewal nor the SER
contains any discussion of airbome deposition of Radioactive Material or the evidence of off-site
migration of Radioactive Material that was presented to the DAQ in 2010 and201l. The SER does
briefly describe semi-annual effluent monitoring (which includes air monitoring), but does not
identify any air deposition contamination issues. From its review, the Tribe can only conclude that,
while DRC has assessed, identified, and attempted to resolve known groundwater contamination
issues at the WMM facility, the DRC is unaware that there are known environmental contamination
issues at and near the WMM facility caused by airborne deposition of Radioactive Material.
The DRC's apparent lack of knowledge of airborne vectors of contamination also leads the
Tribe to the conclusion that there is currently a regulatory gap in DEQ addressing air pollution at
the WMM facility. The Tribe is concerned that the DRC is relying on the DAQ to regulate and
monitor air pollution (including airborne deposition of Radioactive Material) at the facility, and at
the same time, DAQ is refusing to regulate and monitor Radioactive Material differently than it
regulates and monitors more benign fugitive dust. The Tribe is particularly concerned that DRC
does not understand the regulatory parameters (or lack thereof) that DAQ has placed upon DUSA in
the current AAO. For example, on page 9 of the SER, DRC staff notes that the Health Physics
Interrogatories on the alternative feed program included a line of inquiry regarding wind dispersal
of the alternative feed stacks on the ore storage pad. DRC appears to resolve this issue by noting
that DUSA's response was that wind dispersal was addressed in dust minimization and work
practice standards for fugitive dust. SER at p. 9. However, as the Tribe has noted in both the DAQ
public comment period and in its RAA regarding the new AAO, DAQ has not mandated the use of
any work practice standards for fugitive dust, and both the fugitive dust practices and fugitive dust
control equipment at the WMM are far below BACT or BAT for the facility. See RAA III(BX3).
This indicates to the Tribe that DRC has not reviewed the new AAO or discussed important fugitive
dust or air dispersal issues with DAQ to ensure that Radioactive Material is not allowed to migrate
off the WMM facility.
The Tribe now comments to DRC that DRC is ultimately responsible for regulating and
monitoring the off-site migration of Radioactive Material from the WMM facility. The Tribe also
comments that DRC must in the RML Renewal clarify jurisdiction and regulatory responsibility
over air pollution and airborne deposition of Radioactive Material.
b. List of Tribal Demands (Air Deposition/Surface Contamination)
* DRC must clearly identift in the RML Renewal that DRC is responsible for regulating and
monitoring Radioactive Material.
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DRC must impose sufficient terms and conditions in the RML Renewal to prevent
environmental contamination via airborne pathways. Central to this license revision will be
an acknowledgement by DRC that fugitive dust from the WMM facility contains
Radioactive Material and must be treated as such. This will likely include a provision
requiring adherence to a new AAO issued by DAQ and adherence to additional conditions
imposed by the DRC. See Exhibits A and B to the RAA (providing examples of more
stringent fugitive dust management practices).
The RML Renewal must allow DRC to open the AAO during future license renewals to
ensure that the AAO and the RML License conditions require that future license renewals
are not inimical to the health and safety of the public. In the altemative, DRC must be able
to supplement and override conditions of a non-renewed AAO with terms and conditions
placed in the RML Renewal.
DRC must review the current AAO with DAQ and assess and address the Tribe's concerns,
as put forth in the RAA, regarding the flexible provisions of the AAO, the chronic lack of
enforcement, and the lack of even basic work practice standards for the management of
fugitive dust.
DRC must impose additional conditions, such as work practice standards or BAT/BACT for
fugitive dust management, as a condition of the RML Renewal.
DRC must investigate the evidence presented by the Tribe in the USGS Report and address
the known off-site migration of Radioactive Material.
DRC must investigate the inconsistencies in the Stormwater Plan and investigate stormwater
pathways for the movement of deposited Radioactive Material.
DRC must require DUSA to amend its Stormwater Management Plan to correctly identify
and control pathways for the movement of air-deposited Radioactive Material.
DRC must engage DUSA to begin formulating a CAP to remediate the surface
contamination and to prevent future contamination.
DRC must amend the SER and the RML Renewal to reflect the surface contamination issue.
This includes amending the surety provision to require DUSA to adjust its surety amount to
include remediation of off-site migration of radioactive fugitive dust.
DRC must set hard deadlines for formulating the CAP and implementing the approved CAP
measures.
DRC must add a provision to the RML Renewal that allows DRC to revoke the RML
License if DUSA fails to meet its obligations under the CAP.
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The DRC Must Require DUSA to Identif.v and Promptly Minimize Airborne Contamination
Pathways to Tribal Resources
Issue Identification
Section III(AX3), supra, describes the new land use survey report requirement (License
Condition 12.3) and DRC's intent to require DUSA to identify contamination pathways used by the
public and by UMU Tribal Members. Section III(A)(3) also describes how the land use survey
requirement currently does not require DUSA to assess or correct potential routes of exposure
between WMM facilities and UMUT groundwater resources. The Tribe asserts here that the land
use survey and the RML Renewal are not currently sufficient to require DUSA to assess or correct
potential airborne contamination pathways between the WMM facility and UMU Tribal Members
and UMU Tribal lands.
As asserted above, the language of License Condition 12.3 only requires DUSA to conduct
an annual survey of off-site land use, and does not require DUSA to conduct an on-site survey of
contamination pathways. The land use survey condition does not currently require DUSA to assess
or minimize airborne contamination pathways between WMM facilities (including ore piles, stack
emissions, and alternative feed material piles) and UMU Tribal Members and Tribal lands.
The RML Renewal and the SER do contain provisions discussing the semi-annual effluent
monitoring program at the WMM facility. See, e.g., SER at p. 30-31 (describing the monitoring and
stating: "DRC staff concluded that the frequency and type of environmental monitoring for the
White Mesa facility is adequate."). However, the Tribe is concerned that neither DUSA nor DRC
have, through the approved semi-annual effluent monitoring program, detected the airborne
migration problem identified in the USGS Report. Accordingly, the Tribe now asserts that DUSA
and DRC must review the semi-annual effluent monitoring program to determine why the program
is failing to detect the off-site migration identified in the USGS Report. The Tribe also reiterates
that DRC must assess and address communication problems between DAQ and DRC so that when,
for example, the Tribe notifies DAQ of an off-site Radioactive Material migration problem, DRC is
able to timely address the problem.
b. List of Tribal Demands (Identification and Minimization of Airborne Pathways)
* The Tribe supports DRC's addition of the land use survey.
* DRC must amend License Condition 12.3 to require DUSA to identify, assess, and promptly
minimize potential airbone migration pathways of exposure on and between the WMM
facility and adjacent lands.
* DRC must review DUSA's semi-annual effluent monitoring program to determine why the
monitoring did not detect the airborne migration of Radioactive Material and then require
DUSA to modifu the program to correct any deficiencies. See Exhibit P (providing initial
technical comments on improvements to the semi-annual effluent monitoring program).
* DRC must review its communication policies with DAQ to determine why DAQ did not
notifu DRC of the pertinent data from the USGS Report delivered with AAO comments
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prior to the issuance of the RML Renewal and set forth new procedures to coordinate
communication between DRC and DAQ.
The RML Renewal Violates Applicable Federal Law By Allowing Simultaneous Operation
of Five Tailines Cells
Issue Identification
The WMM facility is subject to the National Emission Standards for Radon Emissions from
Operating Mill Tailings promulgated as a National Emission Standard forHazardous Air Pollutants
under the federal Clean Air Act and published in 40 C.F.R. Part 61, subpart W ("Subpart W
NESHAP"). The Subpart W NESHAP imposes not only aRadon-222 air emission standard on the
tailings impoundments at the WMM facility, but also imposes work practice standards for design,
construction and operation of tailings impoundments that limit a uranium mill to only two tailings
impoundments in operation at any one time.
The Tribe believes DUSA and the WMM facility are operating more tailings impoundments
than the two allowed by the Subpart W NESHAP, and are, therefore, not in compliance with the
Subpart W NESHAP. The RML Renewal fails to properly limit the number of impoundments in
operation at the WMM facility to no more than two, as required by the Subpart W NESHAP.
As set forth in 40 C.F.R. $ 61.252(b), the work practice standards applicable to the WMM
facility under Subpart W NESHAP apply to tailings impoundments built after December 15, 1989,
and provide:
(l) Phased disposal in lined tailings impoundments that are no more than 40 acres in area
and meet the requirements of 40 CFR 19232(a) as determined by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. The owner or operator shall have no more than two impoundments, including
existing impoundments, in operation at any one time." (emphasis supplied).
And, as set forth in 40 C.F.R.5 61.252(c) of the Subpart W NESHAP, all active mill owners
or operators are also required to o'comply with the provisions of 40 C.F.R.I92.32(a) in the
operation of tailings piles, the exemption for existing piles in 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a) notwithstanding."
The language of the Subpart W NESHAP explicitly limits an active uranium mill to only
two tailings impoundments in operation at any one time, regardless of when those tailings
impoundments were constructed. Moreover, the Subpart W NESHAP defines a tailings
impoundment to be "in operation" from "the day that tailings are first placed in the impoundment
until the doy thatfinal closure begins." (emphasis supplied.) 40 C.F.R. $ 61.251(e).
Both the RML Renewal and the Groundwater Discharge Permit for the WMM facility
authorize tailings disposal in all five cells. The Groundwater Discharge Permit UGW3700A, Part
L, Section 2, states "tailings disposal in existing Tailings Cells 1, 2, and 3 is authorized by this
Permit as defined in Table 3 and Part I.D.1, above." License Condition 9.1 of the RML Renewal
states "Mill process and wastewater storage and tailings disposal shall be limited to existing
engineering design, construction, and operation of Tailings Cells I , 2, 3 , 4A and 4B, as authorized
in Part I.D of the Ground Water Discharge Permit ...."
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Nothing in the RML Renewal limits the WMM to two operating impoundments as required
by the Subpart W NESHAP. Moreover, nothing in the RML Renewal confirms that final "closure,"
or reclamation, has actually begun with respect to any of the five approved tailings cells at the
WMM facility. Under the pertinent NRC regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 40, Appendix A
(incorporated by reference into the UDRC regulations at Utah Admin. Code R313-24-4), the term
"closure" is defined to mean: "the activities following operations to decontaminate and
decommission the buildings and site used to produce byproduct materials and reclaim the tailings
and/or waste disposal area." (emphasis supplied.)
In short, the WMM facility has more than two tailings impoundents in operation, and the
RML Renewal fails to restrict the number of operating tailings impoundments to no more than two
as required by the NESHAP.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the State of Utah (and the DRC, under the NRC's
delegation of primacy to the State) has the primary responsibility for enforcing the Subpart W
NESHAP at the WMM facility. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. $ 61.252(b) (requiring the WMM to "meet the
requirements of 40 C.F.R. 192.32(a) as determined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. . ..").
Thus, DRC stands in the shoes of the NRC in enforcing the work practice, as well as the air
emission standards of the Subpart W NESHAP.
b. List of Tribal Demands (Violation of Subpart W, NESHAP)
* DRC must evaluate DUSA's compliance with the Subpart W work practice standard
limitation to two cells.
* DRC must identifu in the RML Renewal which two cells are authorizedto be "in operation"
under Subpart W and condition the RML Renewal to ensure compliance with the work
practice standard limitation of the Subpart W NESHAP at all times.
C. SPECIAL CONTAMINATION ISSUES WITH ALTERNATIVE FEED MATERIAL
Pages 9-12 of the SER provide a brief discussion of two special contamination issues
associated with the alternative feed program at the WMM. The Tribe will identiff those two
contamination issues and will then present a third issue regarding federal limitations on the receipt
of alternative feed materials.
1.DRC Must Address the Increased Likelihood of Tailings Cell Liner Leakage Caused by
Incompatibility Between the Liners and Alternative Feed Materials
Issue Identification
Page I I of the SER identifies a second special contamination issue involving proper
disposal of alternative feed material. The SER indicates that a new License Condition 10.1 has
been added that prohibits the receipt of alternative feed material from new sites until DUSA has
demonstrated sufficient disposal capacity, adequate disposal cell operation, and compliance with
NRC alternative feed policy. SER at p. 11.
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The Tribe asserts that the prohibition on the receipt of alternative feed material from new
sites is insufficient to protect the public, UMU Tribal Members, and the local environment from
high risk of environmental contamination. As noted above, Section III(AXl), the Tribe is
concerned that the thin PVC liners in Tailings Cells 1, 2, and 3 are incompatible with an acidic
environment and that these cells are leaking and are causing (or will cause in the future)
contamination of groundwater resources. In addition, the Tribe is concerned that the alternative
feed material is incompatible with the PVC liners in Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3 and that such
incompatibility will exacerbate liner leakage in these cells. See RRD Letter $ 2.3 (explaining how
solvents in the altemative feed material exacerbate problems with PVC liner leakage); see also
Exhibit Q (noting DRC's concern with liner incompatibility with altemative feed materials).
Accordingly, the Tribe asserts that DRC should prohibit DUSA from receiving any new shipments
of alternative feed material (from any site) and that DRC should require DUSA to cease putting any
existing alternative feed material into Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3. Here, the Tribe reiterates that
DUSA should immediately be required to take the measures outlined in Section III(A), supra,to
minimize the risk of catastrophic groundwater contamination (including the release of alternative
feed material into the groundwater).
The Tribe also asserts that DRC should prohibit DUSA from placing alternative feed waste
in Tailings Cells 4,A. and 48 and require DUSA to design a new tailings cell or cell portion that is
designed to hold the wastes and solvents present in the alternative feed material. Here, the Tribe is
concerned that some of the solvents in the alternative feed could, in certain concentrations, damage
the liner systems in Cells 4,A. and 48, and it asserts that DRC should act now to ensure that those
liners are intact to receive by-product material from the WMM's normal mill processes.
List of Tribal Demands (Liner Incompatibility with Altemative Feed Materials)
The Tribe supports License Condition 10.1.
The Tribe supports the additional opportunity for public comment and license amendment
noted on Page 1l of the SER.
DRC should prohibit DUSA from receiving any new shipments of alternative feed material
(from any site) until DUSA can meet the requirements of License Condition 10.1.
DRC must keep the conditions of the License Condition 10.1 in place permanently to ensure
that failure to have sufficient disposal capacity or adequate disposal cell operation is always
a violation of the license.
Given the potential incompatibility with the PVC liners and the known issues with the liners
and LDS in Cells 1,2, and 3, DRC must amend the RML Renewal to contain a new License
condition prohibiting disposal or storage of alternative feed material in Cells 1,2, and3.
Given the potential incompatibility of solvents in the alternative feed material and the liners
in Cell 4A and 48, DRC must amend the RML Renewal to contain a new License condition
prohibiting disposal or storage of alternative feed material in Tailings Cells 4,{ and 48.
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* DRC must require DUSA to design and construct a new disposal cell or upgrade a portion of
an existing cell for alternative feed material designed to BAT/BACT in 2011 for materials
and solvents present in the alternative feed material.
DRC Must Prevent Wind Dispersal/Fueitive Dust from Alternative Feed Piles on the Ore
Storage Pad
Issue Identification
As noted above, page 9 of the SER identifies a concern regarding fugitive dust/wind
dispersal of alternative feed material stored on the Ore Storage Pad. The SER incorrectly asserts
that the AAO from the DAQ addresses wind dispersal of alternative feed materials with dust
minimization and fugitive dust work practice standards. The Tribe reiterates here that the current
AAO does not require DUSA to adhere to work practice standards, and the Tribe reiterates that the
current AAO does not require DUSA to install BAT/BACT fugitive dust management and
equipment. See generali/ RAA. The Tribe also notes that the current enforcement of the AAO has
been, and will likely continue to be, insufficient to prevent off-site migration of alternative feed
stored on the Ore Storage Pad.
The Tribe is concemed that DUSA is not currently capable of monitoring or minimizing air
dispersal of alternative feed or other Radioactive Material at the WMM facility. Here, the Tribe
believes that neither DRC nor DUSA maintains records of the chemical compounds and
radioisotope mixtures present in the different types of alternative feed material. The Tribe also
understands that DUSA's semi-annual effluent monitoring program is limited to measuring gross
gamma radiation, natural uranium (U-238) and its progeny Th-230 andRa-226, and Pb-210 and Rn-
222. See Exhibit R. $ l. This means that DUSA is not properly monitoring air dispersal of
components of the alternative feed material.
The Tribe's review of DUSA's MILDOS-AREA model for dose assessments to the public
and to UMU Tribal Members indicates that the model does not include alternative feed material
values for specific activity levels in the pCilg, bulk density estimates and the Derived Air
Concentration values. The Tribe asserts that the lack of knowledge about the composition of the
alternative feed material, the likelihood that alternative feed material is more susceptible to wind
dispersion3, and the absence of empirical information for altemative feed material in the MILDOS-
AREA model indicate that DUSA is not estimating the dose assessment of alternative feed material
to the public. This compounds the problem described in Section III(BX2), supra (that lack of
knowledge about dispersal through air pathways and stormwater pathways makes it difficult to
assess and control threats to the health of the public, UMU Tribal Members, and the local
environment).
b. List of Tribal Demands (Fugitive Dust from Alternative Feed Material)
, DRC must, as part of its investigation into air deposition and surface contamination, re-
evaluate its initial inquiry into wind dispersal of the alternative feed material.
3 See Exhibit R, $ 2.
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DRC must require DUSA to identifu and analyze the concentration of the chemical
compounds and radioisotope mixtures present in alternative feed material and disclose that
information to DRC and the public (and/or Tribe) for review.
DRC must require DUSA to modifr its semi-annual effluent monitoring to detect the
migration of the identified chemical compounds and radioisotope mixtures of alternative
feed and include these modifications to the MILDOS-AREA model for dose assessments to
the public and to UMU Tribal Members. See Exhibits P, R (offering specific technical
changes to the semi-annual effluent monitoring program).
DRC must require DUSA to modify its Stormwater Plan to contain the migration of any air-
deposited alternative feed material.
DRC must require DUSA to properly model the dose assessment of the alternative feed
material to the public and to UMU Tribal Members.
DRC Should Not Allow the Continued Transfer of Alternative Feed Material and Other
Material to the WMM Facility Unless and Until DUSA Properly Controls Groundwater.
Surface Water. and Soil Contamination under DRC-Approved Corrective Action Plans
Issue Identification
The Tribe is concerned that groundwater, surface water, and soil contamination and
uncontrolled continuing releases of such contamination at the WMM facility render the facility
ineligible or at least inappropriate for the receipt of alternative feed material or other waste
materials. At the WMM facility, there is documented evidence of: (1) alternative feed material
constituents in the groundwater, see Exhibit S; (2) otherhazardous substances indicating the
possibility of Radioactive Material and other chemicals in the groundwater, see Section III(A),
supra; and (3) air dispersal of Radioactive Material into surface water and soil, see Section III(B),
supra.
The WMM facility has already received significant quantities of altemative feed material,
and Section 10 of the RML Renewal (even with the addition of License Condition 10.1)
contemplates the future transfer of alternative feed material to the WMM facility. See SER at p. I 1.
The off-site transfer of any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant, from sites being
remediated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as
amended (CERCLA) is subject to the mandate in Section 121(dX3) of CERCLA and 40 C.F.R. $
300.440 of the National Contingency Plan (also known as the "Off-Site Rule") that such material
may only be transferred to a facility that is operating in compliance with applicable federal and state
law. The Off-Site Rule is designed to ensure that wastes from CERCLA response actions are only
disposed of in properly controlled and compliant off-site facilities and to avoid having such wastes
contribute to present or future environmental problems at those facilities. See, e.g., 58 FR 49200-01
("The purpose of this off-site regulation is to avoid having CERCLA wastes from CERCLA-
authorized or -funded response actions contribute to present or future environmental problems by
directing these wastes to management units determined to be environmentally sound. Congress and
EPA have always believed that a CERCLA cleanup should be more than a relocation of
environmental problems, and have attempted to ensure the proper treatment and disposal of
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CERCLA wastes removed from a CERCLA site."). The Off-Site Rule is the law and it is wise
policy for protecting the public and the environment from inappropriate disposal of waste materials.
DUSA has shown continued slow progress in formulating, much less actually implementing,
corrective action plans to address groundwater contamination at the WMM facility. DUSA has also
failed to take adequate actions to prevent air dispersal of Radioactive Material at the WMM facility.
DUSA has refused to remediate known groundwater and air dispersal contamination. The Tribe
believes these problems raise serious questions as to whether the WMM facility is or should be
qualified to receive CERCLA waste under the Offsite Rule.
The Tribe recognizes that the Off-Site Rule charges the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency with determining if there are releases of hazardous substances or violations at a facility that
would preclude the facility from receiving CERCLA waste and urges that agency to do so.
However, DRC is charged with regulating the WMM facility and enforcing applicable state and
delegated federal law governing the WMM facility. The Off-Site Rule relies on state regulatory
agencies like DRC to identify and disclose when a facility is out of compliance with applicable state
and delegated federal law. Here, the Tribe comments that it may be difficult for the Environmental
Protection Agency to determine compliance with the Off-Site Rule because of DRC's prolonged
processes for requiring corrective action plans for known contamination, see Section III(A), supra,
and because DRC often fails to document or clarifu when DUSA is in violation of applicable state
laws, see generally Section III, supra.
Finally, given the documented contamination issues at the WMM facility, the Tribe is
concerned that DRC is contemplating the transfer of Radioactive Material waste from other sites to
the WMM facility. See, e.9., UDRC's proposed Amendment 6 to License Number UT 0900480 for
the Uranium One America's Inc. Shootaring Canyon Uranium Mill Facility. The Tribe asserts that
DRC should not authorize the transfer of decommissioning waste from DRC-regulated facilities in
Utah to the WMM facility until DUSA has fully remediated known environmental contamination at
the facility.
b. List of Tribal Demands (Receipt of Alternative Feed and Other Waste Materials)
* DRC must consult with the United States Environmental Protection Agency to determine
whether DUSA can still legally receive the alternative feed material. During this
consultation, DRC must clarify to EPA where DUSA has violated applicable Utah laws.
* DRC must immediately ensure that DUSA is bound to adequate corrective action plans to
control known groundwater and airborne deposition releases of Radioactive Material and
alternative feed material.
.f. DRC should add cleanup of groundwater and airborne deposition contamination as a
condition of License Condition 10.1 outlined in the SER.
{. DRC should re-evaluate including the WMM facility as a facility to accept waste from
decommissioning plans for other DRC-regulated facilities so long as there are outstanding
environmental contamination issues at the WMM facility.
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TRIBAL CONCERNS REGARDING LONG.TERM ISSUES OF RECLAMATION
AND SURETY ESTIMATES
DUSA'S RECLAMATION PLAN DOES NOT PROTECT THE LONG TERM
HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC AND OF UTE MOUNTAIN UTE
TRIBAL MEMBERS.
DRC Should Not Approve Reclamation Plan 5.0 Provisions Regarding Tailines Cell I
Issue Identification
Pages 25-30 of the SER describe DRC work with DUSA to finalize the Reclamation Plan
(and in particular, to justify the tailing cover design and surety estimate for the facility). The SER
notes that DRC work on Reclamation Plan 5.0 is ongoing and that the Executive Secretary has
"unilaterally prohibited future construction of any new tailings cells (beyond Cell 4B)" until DUSA
secures final approval of the revised Reclamation Plan. See SER atp.29, RML Renewal License
Condition 9.1L The Tribe understands that the Executive Secretary has imposed this limitation to
require DUSA to promptly frnalize the Reclamation Plan and the surety estimate, but notes here that
this limitation will likely be insufficient to require DUSA to finalize these items during the life of
the RML Renewal.
The Tribe's first concern with Reclamation Plan 5.0 relates to provisions regarding the
closure of Tailings Cell 1. These provisions indicate that, when decommissioning commences,
DUSA anticipates de-watering Cell 1, moving the contents of Cell 1 into a the last "active" tailings
cell, and creating a new "cell" within the cell I footprint for the receipt of demolition materials and
contaminated soil. Reclamation Plan 5.0, Attachment A, I.3.c, p. A-4. The Tribe has several
concerns with the plan for Cell l. First, as noted above, the Tribe is concerned that the current, 30-
mil PVC liner on Cell 1 is leaking or in danger of having catastrophic liner leakage. See Sections
III(A), (C), supra. The Tribe reiterates here that, to protect the public health, UMU Tribal Member
health, and the environment, DRC must require DUSA to take action now closing Cell 1, either re-
lining the cell with liners meeting BAT/BACT in 2011 or disposing of liquid waste in another cell
with an adequate liner system.
Second, the Tribe is concerned that the new "area of contaminated materials disposal" in the
area currently occupied by Cell I will pose a signif,rcant threat of environmental contamination. As
explained by the Tribe's expert, the proposed 12-inch clay liner on this "area" is unreliable,
unsuitable for the disposal of uranium mill demolition debris, and not in compliance with regulatory
standards. RRD Letter $ L0; Exhibit T, "Reclamation Plan Deficiencies" $ l. The Tribe's expert
recommends that disposal cells for uranium mill demolition debris meet the standards set forth for
Cells 44. and 48 (at a minimum), but also recognizes that the second 60-mil liner may not be
necessary if the demolition cell does not contain liquids. RRD Letter $ 1.3; but see Exhibit To'Reclamation Plan Deficiencies" $ 1(b) (describing issues with storm water leakage from the
planned sediment retention basin).
Third, the Tribe is concerned that the new stormwater discharge design within the area
currently occupied by Cell 1 will pose a significant threat of environmental contamination.
Reclamation Plan 5.0 indicates that DUSA plans to discharge storm water from the Mill Yard into a
sediment retention basin (located in the area currently occupied by Cell I and just adjacent to the
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I "area of contaminated materials disposal") and out a discharge channel to the west. See! Reclamation Plan Deficiencies $ 2. The Tribe asserts that this plan violates DUSA's Stormwater
Plan, which currently shows no stormwater discharge to the west of Cell I and which shows-I stormwater entering Cell I from several directions. 1d. The Reclamation Plan 5.0 proposal tor discharge water west of Cell I may result in the movement of Radioactive Material and other
- chemicals from the Mill Yard into the washes and creeks west of Cell l. Id. The Tribe also asserts
I that placing the sediment retention basin just adjacent to the "area of contaminated materialsr disposal" could allow water to leak or seep into the "area," which could result in water, chemicals,
. and Radioactive Material leaking through the Area's l2-inch clay liner. Reclamation Plan
I Deficiencies $ l(b); RRD Letter $1.3 (addressing the necessity for a second, 60-mil liner).
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b. Tribal Demands
- * DRC must not approve Reclamation Plan 5.0 provisions regarding Tailings Cell 1. In
f particular, DRC must not approve the proposed "area of contaminated materials disposal" as
I designed (with a l2-inch clay liner), and DRC must not approve the adjacent stormwater
basin discharging material from the Mill Yard to the west of Cell I until mill
f decommissioning is complete and all contaminated soil that has the potential to transport
I radioactive or other hazardous material has been removed from all areas draining into the
current Cell I location and DRC has verified and approved the work.
t .|. DRC should require DUSA to close, de-water, re-design, and re-line Tailings Cell I to
BAT/BACT for 201 1. In the altemative, DRC could require DUSA to close, de-water, and
I remove the contents of Cell I and to re-direct storm water from the Mill Yard to a safe,
I contained location.
t * DRC should allow for public comment on any new altemative put forth by DUSA to address
I cleanup and closure of Cell 1.
I 2. DRC Should Require DUSA to Add Additional Items to the Final Cover DesignIa. Issue Identification
t Section 3 of Reclamation Plan 5.0, Attachment A, "Plans and Technical Specifications," and
Appendix D, "Updated Tailings Cover Design" (including figures titled "WHITE MESA MILL
I TAILINGS RECLAMATION") provide a new tailings cell cover design for the WMM tailingI impoundments. The Tribe recognizes that DUSA has made improvements to its tailing cell cover
design between Reclamation Plan 4.0 and Reclamation Plan 5.0. However, the Tribe's experts are
I still concerned that the planned cap at the WMM omits several important components, including aI biotic intrusion layer, a geotextile and capillary break, and an HDPE membrane (which are all
components of the capping system at the Monticello facility). See RRD Letter $ 3.1. Without such
I components, particularly given the evidence of existing groundwater contamination and theI likelihood that the liners in Tailings Cells I ,2, and 3 are inadequate, the Tribe asserts that the final
cover design is still deficient.
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b. Tribal Demands
* DRC must require DUSA to amend its final cover design to include a biotic intrusion layer,
a geotextile and capillary break, and an HDPE liner comparable to the cap in place in
Monticello.
3. Additional Deficiencies in Reclamation Plan 5.0
a. DRC Must Require DUSA to Comply with the Current AAO During Final Reclamation
Section 1.5 of Reclamation Plan 5.0, Attachment A, Technical Plans and Specifications,
states that reclamation will comply with State of Utah Air Quality Approval Order (DAQE-
AN1205005-06, issue date July 20,2006). DRC must require DUSA to amend the Reclamation
Plan to comply with the most current Air Approval Order for the facility and with RML Renewal
License Conditions regarding air quality and the airborne migration of Radioactive Material and
alternative feed material. See Sections III(A), (C), supra.
b. DRC Must Require DRC Approval of Any Design Modifications of the Reclamation Plan
Section l.8b of Reclamation Plan 5.0, Attachment A, Technical Plans and Specifications,
describes "Possible submittal to, and review by, DRC for approval" of design modifications. DRC
must review and approve all design modifications to the Reclamation Plan.
c. DRC Must Require DUSA To Amend the Reclamation Plan to Require Disposal of All
Contaminated Soil in the Last Operational Tailings Disposal Cell
The Reclamation Plan contains several conflicting references regarding the placement of
contaminated soil. Reclamation Plan Deficiencies $ 3. As explained in Section IV(AXI), supra,
DRC should not approve DUSA's "area of contaminated materials disposal." DRC should also
require DUSA to clarify that all contaminated soil from the WMM be disposed of in the last
operational tailings disposal cell. See Reclamation Plan Deficiencies $ 3.
d. DRC Must Require DUSA to Re-Design the Scoping Survey and Soil Sampling Methods
The scoping survey proposed in the Reclamation Plan is currently insufficient to protect the
public health, and thus the locations for soil sampling may not be representative of all contaminated
soils. Reclamation Plan Deficiencies $$ 3, 5. DRC must require DUSA to design a scoping survey
that measures more than ten percent of the facility.
B. THE RML RENEWAL FAILS TO REQUIRE DUSA TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE
SURETY FOR THE FACILITY
l. Issue Identification
Under the NRCfutah Primacy Agreement, the State of Utah must require DUSA to make
financial surety arangements sufficient to "ensure compliance with those standards established by
the Commission pertaining to bonds, sureties, and financial arrangements to ensure adequate
reclamation and long-term management of such byproduct material and its disposal site." Article
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IX(B). The DRC is responsible for ensuring that DUSA posts a surety sufficient to "carry out the
decontamination and decommissioning of the mill and site and for the reclamation of any tailings or
waste disposal areas." Utah Admin. Code R3l3-24-4 (adopting 10 C.F.R. Part 40, App. A,
Criterion 9); see alsoUtah Admin Code R313-22-35. Importantly, DRC is responsible for ensuring
that DUSA's surety estimate takes into account o'total costs that would be incurred if an independent
contractor were hired to perform the decommissioning and reclamation work." Utah Admin. Code
P.3l3-24-4 (adopting 10 C.F.R. Part 40, App. A, Criterion 9).
The SER indicates that DRC staff is now working with DUSA to increase the WMM surety
from its current amount of roughly $16 million. Pages 25-27 of the SER describe changes and new
requirements to the surety amount, including a new requirement to provide surety for groundwater
contamination and an amendment to include costs for new tailings cell cover designs. License
Condition 9.1 I currently requires DUSA to submit an Interim Surety Cost Estimate Report by
October 1,2071 that includes, among other things, that DUSA include a new cover design. That
condition states, "Under no circumstances shall the surety amount be less than that already
approved by the Executive Secretary on December 20,2010 ($18,777,388). Despite DRC's clear
statement on the surety minimum, on September 29,2011, DUSA submitted to DRC an Interim
Surety Cost Estimate that provided only $17.7 million. The SER states that DRC will "not accept
this Surety on good faith" and that the surety will be kept at a minimum of $18,777,388 until the
ICTM report and the Reclamation Plan are approved. See SER at p.26.
The Tribe asserts that the DRC's minimum surety estimate is grossly insufficient to ensure
adequate decontamination and decommissioning of the WMM facility. Here, the Tribe's expert
undertook both a benchmarking cost review and an evaluation of DUSA's builrup estimates, which
is provided to DRC now in Section 3.2 of the RRD Letter.
In the built-up cost estimate review, the Tribe's expert focused on evaluating whether
DUSA's surety estimate will ensure that sufficient funds exist to properly close and secure the site
in the event that DUSA or a future owner walks away. RRD Letter at $ 3.2.3. Here, the Tribe's
expert noted that DUSA's surety estimate does not currently anticipate a third-party or government
completing the reclamation work. RRD Letter at $ 3.2.3; see also Utah Admin. Code P.3l3-24-4
(adopting 10 C.F.R. Part 40, App. A, Criterion 9). The expert then adjusted labor rates, equipment
rates, fuel rates, quality control cell dewatering, and the indirect cleanup costs. Id. The adjusted
estimate, which excluded any groundwater and air deposition remediation and which excluded the
increased cost to an upgraded tailings cell cover design, was $36,466,431 (roughly $51 million in
2020 dollars). See RRD Letter Table 3.6. The built-up cost estimate demonstrates that both
DUSA's current proposal and DRC's current minimum are grossly insufficient to cover basic
remediation at the WMM facility.
In the benchmarking cost review, the Tribe's expert reviewed closure costs for more than
110 sites worldwide (with more than half being uranium mill tailings sites). Here, the Tribe's
expert found that the median and average per acre closure costs were $350,000 and $600,000
respectively, but that the current estimate of $ 17.7 million calculates only $78,000 per acre of
tailings. RRD Letter $ 3.2.2. The expert noted that the most directly relevant site closure is the
cleanup of the uranium mill facility in Monticello, Utah, which cost $520 million, or $1.4 million
per acre, in 2010 dollars. The expert also performed per-ton calculations for closure of the WMM
facility and found, using a Department of Energy measure, that closure costs per ton calculate to
roughly $470 million for the facility. RRD Letter $ 3.2.2.
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Leaving aside the $470 million DOE per-ton calculation, the expert calculated the
benchmarking estimate for the WMM facility to be $91,254,000 (which adjusts to $97,753,566
when escalated to 2012, and $ 128,722, 779 when escalated to 2020). See RRD Letter Table 3.7.
The benchmarking study demonstrates that the more probable cost of remediating the WMM
facility will be closer to the average cost of closure for United States uranium mill facilities, which
is $107 million. Indeed, the Tribe asserts that the cost of a government remediation of the WMM
facility may place the WMM facility above average, given the volume of tailings present at the
facility and given that significant groundwater and surface contamination have been identified
already at the WMM facility.
The Tribe is concerned that, unless and until DRC revises its minimum surety estimate to
reflect real closure costs for the WMM facility and DRC conditions the RML Renewal on DUSA
providing adequate surety by a firm deadline, DUSA will continue to provide unreasonable surety
estimates to the DRC. The Tribe is particularly concerned that DUSA will continue to dispute the
surety estimate amount with DRC over this license renewal period and future license renewal
periods so that DUSA can minimize its ultimate surety liability and simply leave the WMM facility
contamination to the State of Utah or the DOE as a legacy site. The Tribe is also concerned that the
operation of the WMM facility with the ultimate reclamation and surety plan to be a DOE legacy
site will allow DUSA to avoid liability for environmental contamination and will allow DUSA to
operate the WMM facility in a manner that poses an increased threat to both the short-term and the
long-term health and safety of UMU Tribal Members.
2. Tribal Demands
.1. DRC must require DUSA to increase the minimum interim surety amount to $51 million in
2020 dollars (to reflect an accurate built-up estimate). DRC must require DUSA to post the
minimum surety estimate within 30 days.
* The Tribe supports License Condition 9.11(E), which requires DUSA to add groundwater
contamination to that minimum amount. DRC must add a new License Condition to require
DUSA to add air-deposited surface contamination to that minimum amount.
* DRC should review the new surety amount using a benchmarking approach as outlined in
the RRD Letter.
* DRC must set a new date by which DUSA must respond to DRC with a new interim surety
estimate.
DRC must allow public review and comment of the final surety amount.
DRC must set a final date by which DUSA must have the new surety amount in place.
DRC must set forth license conditions that allow DRC to revoke the RML Renewal for
failure to meet deadlines or secure the surety amount and allow DRC to amend the RML
Renewal after public comment on the final surety amount.
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v.COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF TRIBAL DEMANDS
Section Subiect Demand
II.B Mandate Clean-up
Actions
The Tribe asserts that the DRC has a responsibility in the
RML Renewal process to mandate cleanup actions and
timelines to DUSA to avoid catastrophic water and
resource contamination resulting from known sources of
contamination.
II.B Account for Lack
of DRC Resources
The Tribe believes that the DRC could compensate for
the lack ofstaffresources by: (1) setting forth clear
license conditions requiring additional quality control
measures, standard operating procedures, and more
specific monitoring requirements; and (2) providing clear
instructions and hard deadlines for DUSA to accomplish
monitoring, licensing, and cleanup and remediation
work.
III.A.I.b Nitrate Clean-up
Deadlines;
Deadlines in RML
The Tribe supports deadlines put forth in the License and
in the SER to require DUSA to submit a corrective
action plan by November 30,2011 and to have the surety
estimate include groundwater remediation by March 4,
2012. Given the history of relaxed timelines for DUSA
to address this issue, DRC must put deadlines on DUSA
to complete the remediation work. Here, the Tribe
suggests that DRC either: (1) amend the RML Renewal
in December 2011 to place the deadlines in the renewal
document; or (2) amend the RML Renewal to place a
hard deadline for DUSA to implement the work outlined
in the CAP.
III.A.I.b Groundwater
Clean-up Deadline
Too Far in Future;
Uncertain
The Tribe does not support the deadline put forth in the
Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement requiring
completion of groundwater remediation at the time of
transfer to federal authority. See Exhibit J, "Amended
Stipulated Consent Agreement" atp.8, September 30,
2011. The Tribe does not support the amount of time
DRC has allowed DUSA between the identification of
groundwater pollution and the corrective action plan.
Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement at pp. l-4.
DRC must add a provision to the RML Renewal that
allows DRC to revoke the RML License if DUSA fails to
perform prompt remediation of the nitrate plume and
other oblisations under the CAP.
III.A.1.b MW-22
Contamination
The Tribe does not support DUSA's lack of attention to
the MW-22 contamination. DRC must revisit the status
of MW-20 and MW-22 and conduct a source
identification assessment of these wells, as described in
Permit UGW370004 Part IE.2. oase 5.
III.A.1.b MW-22 DRC must desisnate MW-20 and MW-22 as Point of
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Contamination Compliance Wells and immediately require DUSA to
implement the concurrent closure and other groundwater
protection measures necessary to protect human health
and the environment.
III.A.1.b Nitrate CAP
Comments
DRC must provide an additional opportunity to review
and comment on the nitrate plume corrective action plan
and to suggest and comment on any amendments to the
RML Renewal addressing the CAP. Here, the Tribe puts
forth its preliminary comments on the corrective action
plan.
III.A.I.b Nitrate CAP Require DUSA to immediately implement groundwater
pumping to prevent further contamination.
III.A.1.b N trate CAP Require DUSA to permanently close Tailines Cell2.
III.A.1.b Nitrate CAP Require DUSA to cease putting any additional
into Tailings Cell3 (including ISL Waste) and
permanently close Tailines Cell 3.
material
to
III.A.1.b Nitrate CAP Require that DUSA place adequate permanent cap
systems on Tailinss Cells 2 and 3.
III.A.I.b Nitrate CAP Require DUSA to cease putting any additional material
(liquid or otherwise) into Tailings Cell 1. Here, the
Tribe recommends that DRC require DUSA to re-line
Tailings Cell I with a liner that meets BAT/BACT for
2011 so that the WMM has a functional liquids disposal
cell for the life of the facility and to provide an adequate
stormwater catchment basin during reclamation of the
facility. In the alternative, DRC could require DUSA to
close and de-water Cell 1, place the remaining contents
of Cell 1 in a disposal cell, and re-route stormwater from
the Mill Yard.
III.A.2.b Leak Detection Closure of Tailings Cells 2 and 3 with adequate
permanent caps will reduce the likelihood of catastrophic
groundwater contamination caused by leaking liners and
a flawed LDS. The same is true of Cell l; however, if
DUSA re-lines Cell 1, DUSA must design a new LDS
that has a collection system that does not allow for
vertical migration of leaks.
III.A.3.b Land Use Survey DRC must amend License Condition 12.3 to require
DUSA to identiff, assess, and promptly minimize
potential routes of exposure on its facility to land uses on
adiacent lands.
III.A.3.b Well Pathways DRC must add the Deep Supply Well and other wells
under Cells 3 and 4 as potential routes for exposure of
contaminates and dose to the general public and to UMU
Tribal Members.
III.A.3.b Well Pathways DRC must put a firm and short deadline (no longer than
60 days from the January 2012 assessment deadline in
the GWDP) on DUSA to correct any deficiencies on the
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well casing for the Deep Supply Well.
III.B.I.b Air--DRC
Responsibility
DRC must clearly identiff in the RML Renewal that
DRC is responsible for regulating and monitoring
Radioactive Material.
III.B.I.b Impose Terms in
RML to Control
Radioactive Dust
Migration
DRC must impose sufficient terms and conditions in the
RML Renewal to prevent environmental contamination
via airbome pathways. Central to this license revision
will be an acknowledgement by DRC that fugitive dust
from the WMM facility contains Radioactive Material
and must be treated as such. This will likely include a
provision requiring adherence to a new AAO issued by
DAQ and adherence to additional conditions imposed by
the DRC. See Exhibits A and B to the RAA (providing
examples of more stringent fugitive dust management
oractices).
III.B.1.b Ability to Reopen
or Override AAO
The RML Renewal must allow DRC to open the AAO
during future license renewals to ensure that the AAO
and the RML License conditions require that future
license renewals are not inimical to the health and safety
of the public. In the alternative, DRC must be able to
supplement and override conditions of a non-renewed
AAO with terms and conditions placed in the RML
Renewal.
III.B.1.b Coordination with
DAQ and
Correction of
Deficiencies in
Regulation of
Radioactive Dust
DRC must review the current AAO with DAQ and
assess and address the Tribe's concerns, as put forth in
the RAA, regarding the flexible provisions of the AAO,
the chronic lack of enforcement, and the lack of even
basic work practice standards for the management of
fusitive dust.
III.B.1.b BAT/BACT for
Fugitive Dust
DRC must impose additional conditions, such as work
practice standards or BAT/BACT for fugitive dust
management, as a condition of the RML Renewal.
III.B.1.b Off-site Migration
of Radioactive
Material
DRC must investigate the evidence presented by the
Tribe in the USGS Report and address the known off-site
misration of Radioactive Material.
III.B.1.b Stormwater Plan
Inconsistent
DRC must investigate the inconsistencies in the
Stormwater Plan and investigate stormwater pathways
for the movement of deposited Radioactive Material.
III.B.I.b Stormwater Plan
Deficient
DRC must require DUSA to amend its Stormwater
Management Plan to correctly identify and control
pathways for the movement of air-deposited Radioactive
Material.
III.B.I.b Surface
Contamination
Corrective Action
DRC must engage DUSA to begin formulating a CAP to
remediate the surface contamination and to prevent
future contamination.
III.B.1.b Surface
Contamination in
DRC must amend the SER and the RML Renewal to
reflect the surface contamination issue. This includes
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SER/RML and
Surety
amending the surety provision to require DUSA to adjust
its surety amount to include remediation of off-site
migration of radioactive fueitive dust.
III.B.1.b Hard Deadlines in
Surface
Contamination
Corrective Action
DRC must set hard deadlines for formulating the CAP
and implementing the approved CAP measures.
III.B.1.b Ability to Revoke
RML
DRC must add a provision to the RML Renewal that
allows DRC to revoke the RML License if DUSA fails to
meet its oblieations under the CAP.
III.B.2.b Land Use Survey DRC must amend License Condition 12.3 to require
DUSA to identify, assess, and promptly minimize
potential airborne migration pathways of exposure on
and between the WMM facility and adiacent lands.
III.B.2.b Audit/ Review of
Air Monitoring
Program
DRC must review DUSA's semi-annual effluent
monitoring program to determine why the monitoring
did not detect the airborne migration of Radioactive
Material and then require DUSA to modiff the program
to correct any deficiencies. See Exhibit P (providing
initial technical comments on improvements to the semi-
annual effluent monitoring program
III.B.2.b Review Inter-
divisional
Communication
DRC must review its communication policies with DAQ
to determine why DAQ did not notify DRC of the
pertinent data from the USGS Report delivered with
AAO comments prior to the issuance of the RML
Renewal and set forth new procedures to coordinate
communication between DRC and DAQ.
III.B.3.b 40 C.F.R. Part 61
Subpart W Work
Practice Standards
DRC must evaluate DUSA's compliance with the
Subpart W work practice standard limitation to two cells.
III.B.3.b 40 C.F.R. Part 61
Subpart W Work
Practice Standards
DRC must identify in the RML Renewal which two cells
are authorizedto be o'in operation" under Subpart W and
condition the RML Renewal to ensure compliance with
the work practice standard limitation of the Subpart W
NESHAP at all times.
III.C.I,b Alternative Feed
Prohibition
DRC should prohibit DUSA from receiving any new
shipments of alternative feed material (from any site)
until DUSA can meet the requirements of License
Condition 10.1.
ilr.c.1.b Alternative Feed
Control
DRC must keep the conditions of the License Condition
l0.l in place permanently to ensure that failure to have
sufficient disposal capacity or adequate disposal cell
operation is always a violation of the license.
m.c.1.b Alternative Feed
Disposal, Cells 1,2,
and 3
Given the potential incompatibility with the PVC liners
and the known issues with the liners and LDS in Cell 3,
DRC must amend the RML Renewal to contain a new
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License condition prohibiting disposal or storage of
alternative feed material in Cells 1.2, and3.
III.C.1.b Alternative Feed
Disposal, Cells 4.A.
and 48
Given the potential incompatibility of solvents in the
alternative feed material and the liners in Cell 4,{ and
48, DRC must amend the RML Renewal to contain a
new License condition prohibiting disposal or storage of
alternative feed material in Tailinss Cells 4,A. and 48.
III.C.I.b Construct New
BAT/BACT Cell
for Altemative Feed
Tailings Disposal
DRC must require DUSA to design and construct a new
disposal cell or upgrade a portion of an existing cell for
alternative feed material designed to BAT/BACT in
2011 for materials and solvents present in the alternative
feed material.
III.C.2.b Alternative Feed
Dust
DRC must, as part of its investigation into air deposition
and surface contamination, re-evaluate its initial inquiry
into wind dispersal of the alternative feed material.
III.C.2.b Disclosure of all
Alternative Feed
Chemical
Compositions
DRC must require DUSA to identiff and analyze the
concentration of the chemical compounds and
radioisotope mixtures present in alternative feed material
and disclose that information to DRC and the public
(and/or Tribe) for review.
TII.C.2.b Alternative Feed
Monitoring
DRC must require DUSA to modiff its semi-annual
effluent monitoring to detect the migration of the
identified chemical compounds and radioisotope
mixtures of alternative feed and include these
modifications to the MILDOS-AREA model for dose
assessments to the public and to UMU Tribal Members.
See Exhibits P, R (offering specific technical changes to
the semi-annual effluent monitoring program).
III.C.2.b Modify Stormwater
Plan for Altemative
Feed Mieration
DRC must require DUSA to modify its Stormwater Plan
to contain the migration of any air-deposited alternative
feed material.
III.C.2.b Proper Dose
Modeling From
Alternative Feeds
DRC must require DUSA to properly model the dose
assessment of the alternative feed material to the public
and to UMU Tribal Members.
III.C.3.b Consult with U.S.
EPA about
CERCLA Off-site
Rule
DRC must consult with the United States Environmental
Protection Agency to determine whether DUSA can still
legally receive the alternative feed material. During this
consultation, DRC must clarify to EPA where DUSA has
violated applicable Utah laws.
III.C.3.b Corrective Action
to Control
Migration of
Alternative Feed
Materials
DRC must immediately ensure that DUSA is bound to
adequate corrective action plans to control known
groundwater and airborne deposition releases of
Radioactive Material and alternative feed material.
III.C.3.b Enhance RML
Condition 10.1
DRC should add cleanup of groundwater and airborne
deposition contamination as a condition of License
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Condition 10.1 outlined in the SER.
III.C.3.b Receipt of Waste
from Other DRC-
Regulated Facilities
DRC should re-evaluate including the WMM facility as a
facility to accept waste from decommissioning plans for
other DRC-regulated facilities so long as there are
outstanding environmental contamination issues at the
WMM facility.
IV.A.1.b Cell I Area
Reclamation Plan-
Disposal Cell and
Stormwater
DRC must not approve Reclamation Plan 5.0 provisions
regarding Tailings Cell l. In particular, DRC may not
approve the proposed"area of contaminated materials
disposal" as designed (with a l2-inch clay liner), and
DRC must not approve the adjacent stormwater basin
discharging material from the Mill Yard to the west of
Cell 1 until mill decommissioning is complete and all
contaminated soil that has the potential to transport
radioactive or other hazardous material has been
removed from all areas draining into the current Cell I
location and DRC has verified and approved the work.
IV.A.1.b Rebuild Cell DRC should require DUSA to close, de-water, re-design,
and re-line Tailings Cell 1 to BAT/BACT for 2011. In
the alternative, DRC could require DUSA to close, de-
water, and remove the contents of Cell I and to re-direct
storm water from the Mill Yard to a safe, contained
location.
IV.A.1.b Public Comment on
Cell I Rebuild
DRC should allow for public comment on any new
altemative put forth by DUSA to address cleanup and
closure of Cell 1.
IV.A.2.b Tailing Cell Cover
Design
DRC must require DUSA to amend its final cover design
to include a biotic intrusion layer, a geotextile and
capillary break, and an HDPE liner comparable to the
cap in place in Monticello.
IV.A.3.a Apply AAO to
Reclamation
DRC Must Require DUSA to Comply with the Current
AAO During Final Reclamation.
rv.A.3.b Modifications
Approval
DRC Must Require DRC Approval of Any Design
Modifications of the Reclamation Plan.
IV.A.3.c Contaminated Soil
Disposal
DRC Must Require DUSA To Amend the Reclamation
Plan to Require Disposal of All Contaminated Soil in the
Last Operational Tailinqs Disposal Cell.
IV.A.3.d Scoping Survey and
Soil Sampline
DRC Must Require DUSA to Re-Design the Scoping
Survey and Soil Sampling Methods.
IV.B.2 Surety Estimate
Insufficient
DRC must require DUSA to increase the minimum
interim surety amount to $51 million in2020 dollars (to
reflect an accurate built-up estimate). DRC must require
DUSA to post the minimum surety estimate within 30
days.
IV.B.2 Surety for
Groundwater
Contamination
The Tribe supports License Condition 9.11(E) to require
DUSA to add groundwater contamination to that
minimum amount. DRC must add a new License
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The Tribe appreciates your time and attention to these comments. If you have any questions, please
do not hesitate to contact Special Counsel H. Michael Keller at [phone], Associate General
Counsel Celene Hawkins at [phone], or Scott Clow, Environmental Programs Director, at
(970) s64-s432.
Sincerely
C,t.^-'lt E""
Celene Hawkins
Associate General Counsel
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
^..Gt'--ry - tlvi tif"*fud:i
H. Michael Keller
Special Counsel
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
Utah Bar # 1784
Liability Condition to require DUSA to add air-deposited surface
contamination to that minimum amount.
IV.B.2 Use Benchmarking
for Surety Estimate
DRC should review the new surety amount using a
benchmarkins approach as outlined in the RRD Letter.
IV.B.2 Set Firm Date for
Revised Surety
Estimate
DRC must set a new date by which DUSA must respond
to DRC with a new interim surety estimate.
IV.B.2 Public Review of
Suretv Prooosal
DRC must allow public review and comment of the final
surety amount.
IV.B.2 Final Date for Proof
of Suretv Amount
DRC must have a final date by which DUSA must have
the new suretv amount in place.
IV.B.2 RML Renewal
Failure and Final
Surety Estimate
DRC must set forth license conditions that allow DRC to
revoke the RML Renewal for failure to meet deadlines or
secure the surety amount and allow DRC to amend the
RML Renewal after public comment on the final surety
amount.
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T TABLE OF EXHIBITS
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Exhibit A: Government-to-Government Correspondence, UMUT/DEQ
Exhibit B: Request for Agency Action
I Exhibit C: Identification of Potential Tailings Cell Influence in Groundwater at White Mesa
I M,r
Exhibit D: February 11,1999 Letter to David C. Frydenlund
I Exhibit E: Chloride Citations
I Exhibit F: June27,2000 Memo to Dane Finerfrock
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Exhibit G: EPD Review of CAP
I Exhibit H: RRD Lener
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Exhibit I: DOE Letter Re: 2035 DOE Receipt (Closure)
Exhibit J: Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement, September 30, 2011
! Exhibit K: Description of the White Mesa Water System
I Exhibit L: USGS Reporr (on disc)
Exhibit M: Bioavailability, Bioaccumulation and Food Chain Transfer of Airborne
I Radionuclides
r Exhibit N: Response Memo (AAO)I
Exhibit O: Air Approval Oorder
I Exhibit P: Deficiencies in DUSA's Environmental Monitoring Program
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Exhibit Q: Brown Letter with Attachments
Exhibit R: Particular Concerns with Altemative Feed Material
t Exhibit S: Sampting Memo
I Exhibit T: Reclamation Plan Deficiencies
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E,XHIBIT A
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GARY R, HERSERT
Govemor
GREG BELL
Liculen/,,l4 Gaflrr'@lt
Department of
Environmentat Quality
, tunsndg Smith
Esacutave Olrec/,gr
Brad T Johnron
Dcptty Dbactor
April6,201l
Mr. Richard Jc4ks,Ir., Chairman
Ute Indian Tribe i' --^-E-E'ffiT90*' +'-:-=- -- r'-l - r? :\r-"i'=-,-,:- --.-:r'a--*+s-:. :; .r?---J-
Fort Duchesne, UT 84026-0190 :
Dear Mr. Jenks,
The Division also looked.closely qt the photos that.were'submitted with,the comrnents. The letter
stated that the Tribe was c6ncerned about fugitive dust and the possible.impacts of off-site
migration of dust from the mill opprations. "fh" letter also addressed a Soientific Investigations
Repo( conceming thc conditions around White Mesa, which would include information that may
be informative to the Division's dticision to issue the frnal Approyal Order and asked that a
decision be delayed until after Lnfary 31, 2011.
.??,*-rAll-of.the points in,the letter.were.bonsidered'at length'by Division,staf.L=The-Approval-Order--,---i
prohibits_opacities abovc 20o/o ftomany operation at the mill, which seles as a surogate for
Ifugitive dust. As long as the.fugitive dust opacity is below 20Yo,lhe source is in compliance with i
both the Approval Order and the state rule on fugitive dust.. The Approval Order alsorcquires the
White Mesa mill operators to dctivate a water-spray whcnever the situation exists ttiat the opacity
may exceed 207o. The meJhod of d,etbrmining this coinpliance'is containod iq the Aprproval Ordcr,, Division oomplianoe inspectors do, perform unannounced inspections of the mill and check on all
conditions of the Approval Order and peiform opacity. observations if there is activity to observe.r
However, the Division does not have the'authority to monitor or rnodi$ a source's daily
gp.prqtiA11pjbeygpi compliance with the terms of the Approval Order. I was also informed that the
p.-l:i$ql:s,inf[.!aq,not.gqen pr.recpived the report .discussed in the 'Tribeiq.leJter.;;r;:
r ';];,1;; l i iji .' )i..' '. .
, ii,,,r-',,ffi,lT,i.t_,3ifr,J.?#:illilii.liiiHi1?18:f,,till11ii,
vw.dcq.tdr.6ov
Plintcd otr 100!a rccyclGd prpcr
'--+rrt-",.
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The Division of Air Quality takes all comments received seriously and works diligently to put .
conditions in the Approval Orders for all sources that address ooncerns of all partics involved, but
the conditions must have a legal basis as. well.
Thank y6u ftii you iaterest in this matter.
*:q*9'
*ft,'U'L
Amanda Smith
Executive Director
cc: Gary Hayes, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
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uetfi2iltcAl,N ilCS TKIH€
P.O. Box 248
Tbwaoc, Colorado 81 894.0248
(s70).565.3751
October 6, 2011
Amanda Smith
Executive Director
State of Utah
Department of Environmental Quality
195 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:White Mesa Uranium Mill
Dear Ms. Smith:
I am writing to you today to continue the process of addressing specific issues of concern to the
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe ("Tribe") regarding the White Mesa Uranium Mill ("Mill") currently owned and
operated by Denison Mines (USA) Corp. ("Denison") in San Juan County, UT, Our Tribal Chairman Gary
Hayes recently attempted to discuss the following issues with you and Governor Herbert, but he was
informed that the envlronmental issues of importance to the Tribe had been addressed in a letter of
response to our appeal of an Air Approval Order, Unfortunately, that letter was addressed to the Ute
lndian Tribe, a different Tribe than the Ute Mountain Ute fribe that employs me as their Environmental
Programs Director. The following letter is meant to clarify serious issues of concern to our Tribe
regarding the Mill that were not addressed in your response letter regarding the Air Approval order.
The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe is a sovereign nation, a federally-recognized tribe, and a tribe that
has engaged your agency in government-to-Bovernment consultation for the purposes of regutatory
jurisdiction and cross-boundary issues with the State of Utah. I have attached to this letter a map that
should clarify any BeoBraphical and political misunderstanding or confusion regarding the Ute Mountaln
Ute Tribe and its lands and communities within and adjacent to the State of Utah, Ute Mountain Ute
Tribal Members have lived on and around White Mesa for centuries and intend to do so forever. Tribal
members continue traditional practices, which include hunting and gathering and using the land, plants,
wildlife and water in ways that are integral to their culture, lt is reasonable to expect that those
resources are not contaminated with hazardous materials that have blown on the wind or traveled
through the groundwater from facilities regulated by your agency.
The Tribe has serious concerns about the rnanner in which the Mill is currently operated and
regulated. The Tribe has, over the past few years, resorted to using public comment and administrative
litigation to raise its concerRs, piece by piece, with the relevant divisions of your departrnent, Because
the Tribe feels that government-to-Bovernment consultation on the Tribe's concerns with the facility is
A,
1.
B.
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the appropriate course of action between the Tribal government and the State of Utah, t now present to
you the Tribe's major known concerns about the operation and the regulation of the Mill.
AIR QUALITY CONCERNS
Mi8ration of Radioactive Fueitive Dust
The Tribe's first air quality concern is that there is documented evidence of the migration of
uranium and vanadium-laden dust from the Mill to adjacent lands. Dust suppression at the ore storage
area at the Mill is conducted by a water truck at ground level; however, the ore piles are approximately
20feettall. Thetruckthatwaterstheroadduringoredeliveryandthatwatersthebaseofthepiles
creates additional dust during the watering process. Ore delivery also causes significant dust as delivery
trucks drop their cargo. The percent opacity measurements and process for deterrnining the exact
aPpropriate time to initiate dust suppression are virtually unregulated. Windborne dust has blown from
the ore pad causing off-site migration of uranium. The Tribe is very concerned that, even when
presented with evidence of serious fugitive dust-related environmental contaminatlon, your agency is
unwilling to require Denison to perform industry-standard fugitive dust control at the Mill.
2. lnsufficient Recglation of Radon Emissions
The Tribe's second air quality concern is that the Staters regulation of radon emissions from the
tailings cells at the mill is insufficient. The Clean Air Act NESHAP Subpart w standards and procedures
for operating a "phased disposal" facility such as the White Mesa Mill clearly state that only two 4o-acre
cells can be in operation at one time. 40 C.F.R. S 61,252(b)(1). Without documentation of cell ,'closure,,
dates and regulations that clearly define "closure" and the minimum temporary cap for "closed" cells,
the State's interpretation and Denison's interpretation of the regulation is ambiguous at best. fhe State
cannot expect Denison to meet NESHAP standards without clear guidance on how to implement the
program. Failure to regulate radon emissions from the taiting cells in compliance with 40 CFR Part 61,
Subpart W poses unnecessary risks to mill workers, local residents, and wildlife.
GROUNOWATER AND OTHER FACILIry FAILURE CONCERNS
Tailines Cell f_?ltuj:es and lnadequate.Lgak Detection System
Ihe Tribe's first groundwater quality concern is that failure of tailing cell liners in cells 1, 2, and 3
may have caused, or rnay cause in the future, catastrophic contamination of groundwater resources.
The tailing cell llners originally installed for cells 1, 2, and 3 were not "state of the art" when they were
installed in the late 1970s, and the Tribe's experts now believe these liners are insufficient to contain the
contents of tailing cells 1, 2, and 3. Significant concern was raised by the Division of Radiation Control
("DRC") about the chemical compatlblllty of the liners and the.materials that were poised to be
delivered to the Miil for processing and disposal when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")
amended the radioactive materials license for the facility to accept alternative feed materials in the late
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1990s. The NRC approved the license amendment over the objection of DRC and the Tribe. As
predicted by DRC at that time, it now appears that the liners have been leaking and that the leak
detection system is inadequate to detect the leakage in a reasonable amount of time to mitigate
pollutant migration beyond the cells, The time that DRc has allowed Denison to deliberate over the
sources of nitrate and chloride contaminants in the shallow groundwater at the facility has exacerbated
the migration of contaminants while Denison proposes hypotheses that deflect blame from ltself and
does nothing to address the spreading contamination.
2. lnade.gu.ate Closure Plan
The closure and reclamation plan for the Mill is currently inadequate to ensure continued
protection of public health and enviionment once the Mill has ceased operation. The proposed final
capping of waste tailing cells that Denlson is negotiating with the DRC is far below standard industry
practice, For exarnple, just up the road in Monticello, the Department of Energy maintains the
Monticello mill through its Legacy prograrn. The cap deslgn for that facility is more robust than what is
being proposed (20 years [ater) by De nison, fhe Tribe insists that the State of Utah require Denison to
protect the long'term health of residents of Elanding and White Mesa by requiring a cap design that
meets lndustry sta ndard.
The current closure plan also does not address the environmental liabilities that Denison is
trying to resolve with DRC at this time (such as the chloroform groundwater contamination, the
tetrahydrofuran groundwater contamination, the nitrate groundwater contamination, and the chloride
groundwater contamination). The evidence of chlorides in the groundwater indicates liner leakage of
much nrore hazardous materials into the groundwater table, and the evidence of off-site migration of
radioactive fugitive dust indicates contamination of surface and land resources. The Tribe is concerned
that the State of Utah is not requiring Denison to address gl.oundwater and surface resource
contamination and that Denison may simply leave this contamlnation as legacy pollution for state and
federal agencies to address in the future,
lnadeouate Financial SureW
The Tribe asserts that the current level of financial surety for the clean-up, closure and
reclanration of the Mill is drastically inadequate to handle the expenses associated with the closure of
the Mill. The current surety amount of roughly Stt mitlion cannot cover the costs of rnill
decontmissionlng, contaminated soil remediation, groundwater remediation, tailing cell repair, or
replacement, closure and capping of the tailing cells and total remediation of cell 1, the liquid waste cell,
and the probable contamination below the "Roberts Pond" area of the Mill, The Trlbe is also concerned
that the current surety amount does not address the incompatibility of alternative feed materials with
the tailing cell liners. '[his incompatibility may cause the need to totally excavate the tailings f rom cells 2
and 3 and rebuild the cells wlth liners that are adequate to contain the mixture in perpetuity; the other
alternative would be long-term groundwater remediation around the cells beyond th€ projected
responsibilities of Denison. Based on the closure cost data complied through decades of these
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undertakings by the Department of Energy and the total volume of tailings projected at closure, the
Tribe's experts predict that the surety amount is deficient by at least one order of magnltude.
The Tribe insists that the DRC assess all of Denison's current liabilities and that the DRC require
Denison to provide a surety amountthat provides for real, total, and safe reclamation and closure of the
facility. Similar to the recent discussion at the September 2011 Radiation Control Board Meeting
regarding a radioactive waste disposal facility, the DRC must require Denison to provide adequate
financial suretv prior to epproval of another radioactive materlal license for this uranium mill.
The foregoing issues are of deep concern to the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and its Members.
Protection and preservation of the land and natural resources on and around White Mesa are critical to
our way of life. As a sovereign nation and federally-recognized tribe, we have sought to engage your
agency in government-to-governrnent consultation regarding regulation of the Mill and protection of
Tribal lands, resources and comrnunities on and around White Mesa. We expect the same in return,
We iook forward to working with you and your staff in this regard,
Sincerely,
Scott Clow
Environmental Programs Director
ute Mountain Ute Tribe
Cc: Gary Hayes, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
Peter Ortego, General Counsel, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
Celene Hawkins, Associate General Counsel, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
H. Michael Keller, Special Counsel, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
Rusty Lundberg, Director, UT Division of Radiation Control
Eryce Bird, Director, UT Oivision of Air Quality
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Depanment of
Environmental Quality
Amanda Smith
Execallvv Direclor
Brad T Johnson
Depw* Ditcctar
State of Utah
CARY R, HERBERT
Governor
GREG EELL
Licutetpna Govcrnot
November 5,201I
Scott Clow, Environmental Programs Director
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
P.O. Box 248
Towaoc, Colorado 81 334-0248
Dear Mr. Clow,
Thank you for your letter of October 6,2011 outlining additional concerns the Ute Mountain Ute
Tribe has with the White MeSa Mill, operated by the Denison Mines USA Corporation in San
Juan County. Please acccpt rny apoiogies for the fact that an earlier letter was sent to the Ute
indian Tribe and you and Chairman Gary Hayes from the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe were only
copied on that cotrespondence, It was a mistake on our part and we hope to move forward with
better communication.
The Department has taken the Tribe's comments to heart and has attempted to address them in the
same format as you presented. These responses have been coordinated between the Division of
Air Quality (DAQ) and the Division of Radiation Control (DRC), I apologize in advance that
these responses may sound bureaucratic, but it is important to articr.rlate the legal boundaries set
by starute and rule in which DEQ is able to regulate. That being said, we are committed to
working with the Tribe to better understand the environmental impacts and ensure the protection
of the resources and communities on and around White Mesa.
A. AIR QUALITY CONCERNS
l. Migration of Radioactiyq_Fugitive Dust
Your letter exptesses concern about contaminated fugitive dust. Air Quality rules address dust in
gencral. Migration of contaminated dust is a consideration in the Radioactive Material License.
The License mandates monitoring of the radionuclidc concentration in the air at five locations.
The results are reviewed by DRC on a semi-annualbasis. The environmental monitors operate
continuously and DRC inspects them annually. Placement of the rnonitors was strategic: two of
the five locations are based on prevailing wind directions; two locations on secondary prevailing
winds; and, one location was selected based on the Tribe's request. Since monitoring began,
concentrations have been well below the Effluent Concentration Limits for Natural Uranium,
195 Nonh 1950 Wcsr. Salr L..kc City, U]'M.ilint Addrcss: P,O, Bo,r l44El0 . Salr t,skc Ciry, UT Ml l4-;tEJ0
Tclcphonc [phone]'Far (801.536.006t . T.D.D. (80t) j36-441{
w.lcq.utoh.gov
hin.cd o t00% rccyclcd prpcr
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Thorium-230, Radium-226, and Lead-2l0. These are federally-established limits that have been
adopted by the DRC through guidance, nrle, or license conditions.
You referenced "documented evidence of the migration of uranium and vanadium-laden dust from
the Mill to adjacent lands." We would welcome a copy of that report, We did see an EPA
powerpoint presentation summarizing soil, plant, and water samples in the area, but it was
prelirninary. Please forward the information you have to Phil Goble in the DRC. He can be
contacted at 801-5364044 or at [e-mail]
From an air quality standpoint, Denison is regulated the same as other aggregate
productior/processing facilities. Its Air Quality Approval Order stipulates l5% opacity for the ore
loading area and 20% opacity for haul roads and unpaved areas. The approval order requires
Denison to activate a water-spray whencver opacity may exceed 20%, State Rule requires tmck
track-out to be prornptly cleaned from a paved road.
Due to public awareness and concern about this source, DAQ compliance inspectors conduct
unannounced surveillance inspections whenever they are in the area - at least 2x a quarter. One
challenge DAQ has in being able to take action on fugitive dust complaints is that the20o/o opacity
has to be verified by a certified visible emissions observer. If you are interested in leaming more
ahut opacity and what is needed to be make a certifred observation, Iay Morris of our Division of
DAQ would be happy to speak to you. He can be contacted at 801-536-4079 or
i nmorris (i).utah. sov.
2. .i.nsuflicient Rggulation of Radon Emissions
The second concern expressed was about rcgulating radon emissions in compliance with
NESHAP Subpart W, These requirements include an annual Radon-222 ernission test from
existing uranium mill tailings piles. They also require tailings impoundments to be lined, to be
less than 40 acres, and limit sources to two impoundments in operation at any one time. Since
these requirernents have been in place, Denison ha.s met thern.
White Mesa Mill test results are submitted to DAQ by March 3l of each year and reviewed by
slaff for compliance. These results have shown compliance with established Radon-222 emission
limits. You raised the issue of cell closrue in this context. Limits on the radon emitted from
closed cells are being met with the tEmporary cover. A permanent cell cover systBm will be
addressed in the reclamation plan which is a requirement of the draft license renewal currently in
public corffnent. No more ccll construotion can begin until the modeling and reclamation plan are
approved by the DRC Executive Secretary.
NESH.AP Subpart $/ is under review by EPA and new guidance is anticipated next Spring.
B. GROi.INDWATER AND OTHER FACILITY FAILURE CONCERNS
l. Tailings Cell Failures and Inadequatg Leak Detection Systefn
We understand your concems about adequate leak detection systems and the protection of
groundwater sources, As you are aware, the Leak Detection Systems for Tailing Cells l, 2, and 3
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were inadequate ztnd so the original groundwater permit, issued by the DRC on March 8, 2005,
required the installation of additional monitoring wells immediately adjacent to the cells.
The leak detection systems seem to be providing the additional waming and protection sought. In
June, 2010, an accumulation of fluid was discovered within the Tailings Cell I leak deteciion
system. An initial pH paper lest indicated a pH of 2.0 to 3.0 which told us that the fluid originated
from Cell I . To repaiq the liner, Denison lowered the fluid level to 56 I 3, I 0 feet amsl by pumping
the solution into another cell, Eliminating the flow of wastewater to the leak detection system
allowed Denison to identiff damage to the liner and to perform repairs. When the former liquid
Ievel was allowed to retum, the system remained dry for a time. However, fluid was again
registered on August 7,2010, indicating that repairs had not addressed all of the damage. A new
repair plan was negotiated and is curently being implemented. No wastewater has been observed
in the Cell I leak detection system since mid-August 2010.
Tailings Cells 4,{ and 48 liners were constructed using Best Available Technology, The first
opportunity to see if a leak has occuned within those cells would be by their respective leak
detection systems.
Your ietter specifically mentions chloroform and nitrate contamination. There are two
contamination plumes (one chlorofonn, one nitrate) identified at thc site. Based on monitoring
results, neither plume appears to have originated from the Tailings Cells.
Chloroform
There are currently 27 monitoring wells associated with the chloroform plume. Repeated
groundwater sampling by both Denison and DRC have confirmed concentrations in excess of the
State's Groundwater Quality Standards. The sampling appears to have defined the plume's
eastem and southern boundaries. Impacted wells are along the eastern margin of the site and are
upgradient or cross-gradient from the tailings cells.
Contamination appears to have been caused by laboratory wastewater disposal activities that pre-
dated mill operation. Denison's predecessor used chloroform in the laboratory and then dumped
the excess into the septic system. This practice no longer occurs. Laboratory water is now
discharged to Tailing Cell #1.
Wc acknowledge the length of time this has taken to address this issue. A Corrective Action Plan
(CAP) is near completion and should be ready for public comment this winter. In the interim,
Denison is currently using a hydraulic control system (pump and treat) to address the plume.
Nitrate
Based on nitrate contamination found in a number of onsite wells, DRC identified the plume while
preparing a permit modification in 2008. Denison agreed to conduct an investigation to determine
the source in a Stipulated Consent Agreement dated January 27,2009.
A final conclusion has not been reached, in spite of two-plus years of investigation. Site
conditions make it difficult to determine the total number, locations, magnitudc of contribution,
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and proportion of the various sources. As a result, it was agreed that resources would be better
spent in developing a Corrective Action Plan. A Stipulated Consent Agreement was signed by
both parties on September 30, 201 l. Denison is required to submit a CAP by November 30, 201 L
The CAP will be released for comrnent and a meeting will be held to give the public a chance to
comment on the proposed path forward.
Inadcouate Closure Plan
We, too, are concerned about the adequacy of the current closure plan and have taken steps to
address it in the Denison Mines License Renewalwhich is cunently our for public comment
ttuough December 14,2011. License Condition 9.1 I specifies that the Infiltration and
Contaminant Transport Modeling Report, and Reclamation Plan and a more final update of the
surety estimate must be approved by the Radiation Control Board Executive Secretary before any
nerv tailings cell construction will be considered.
Inadequate Financial Suretv
The current, approved sur€ty for the Denison Mines White Mesa Uranium Mill is $18,777,388. In
the License Renewal, Liccnse Condition 9.5 requires Denison Mines to submit a revised suety on
or before March 4,Z0lZ. The revised surety must include all costs nocessary to remediate any
groundwater contamination required by new License Condition 10.20. That condition states: '7s
of July l, 201l, groundwater contaminants that require remediation at or near the site include,
but are not limited to: chloroform, carbon letrachloride, dichloromelhane, chloromethane, and
nilrate- " Any remediation costs for groundwater contamination at the White Mesa Mill property
will be included with this suety submittal.
Upon Executive Secretary approval, Denison will be required to submit written evidence of the
final approved surety arnount within 60 calendar days.
I anticipate there may be more questions about Denison and invite you to contact me or my staff
as they arise. Working with DEQ staff does not constitute goverffnent to govemment
consultatlon with the Tribe. We will try to honor the Tribe's expectation by facilitating the
elevation of critical issues to a meeting with Tribal Leaders and senior staff from the Govemor's
Office.
Thank you for your letter and for your time reviewing this information.
ftb',t
/1,/,ltYw#cL/ Amanda Smith
Executive Director
Lieutenant Governor Greg Bell
Gary Hayes, Sr. Chairman Ute Mountain Utes
Cc:
E,XHIBIT B
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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In the Matter of: Approval Order-
Modification to Add a Baghouse, to Allow
Alterative Fuel Usage and to Incorporate
Work Practice Standards
Denison Mines (USA) Corporation
White Mesa Mill
Project Number: N01 1205
DAQE-ANOIr2050018-1 1
Request for Agency Action
March 31,2011
t REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION
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Pursuant to Utah Code {ili 63G-4-201(lXb), (3) and Utah Admin. Code R307-103, the
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe ("Tribe") hereby files its Request for Agency Aotion with Reginald D.
Olsen, Acting Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board ("Board"), The Tribe seeks
review of the March 2,2071 decision by the Utah Division of Air Quality and the Executive
Secretary (collectively "DAQ") to issue an Approval Order granting a Modification to Add a
Baghouse, to Allow Alternative Fuel Usage and to Incorporate Work Practice Standards ("March
Approval Order" or "Approval Order") to Denison Mines (USA) Corp. ("Denison") for the
operation of the White Mesa Uranium Mill near Blanding, Utah ("Mill"). As set forth in Section
IY , infra, and in accordance with Utah Admin. Code R307-103-6(3), the Tribe is a proper party
with standing to request commencement of and participation in the requested formal adjudicative
proceeding.
I. PERMIT NSMPPR AI.YP DATE OF MAILING
The Tribe contests the Approval Order signed on March 2,2011 by M. Cheryl Heying,
Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board, to authorize the r:equested Modification to
Add a Baghouse, to Allow Altemative FuelUsage and to Incorporate Work Practice Standards
(DAQE-ANOI12050018-11) (ProjectNumberNOt1205-0018). This Request for Agency Action
is tiruely submitted to DAQ on March 31, 2011. Utah Admin. Code R307-103-3(3).
II. STATEMENT OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AN.D.IUBISDICTION
The Tribe brings this Request for Agency Action pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R307-
103-3(1). Utah Code $$ 63G-4-201(1Xb), (3Xa) specifies the content of this Request for Agency
Action.
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Request lbr Agency Action
March 3L,20lL
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND REASONS
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
The White Mesa Uranium Mili is located in southeastern Utah, approximately six miles
south of Blanding and three miles north of the White Mesa community of the Ute Mountain Ute
Tribe. The Mill was constructed in 1979 to process ores and alternate feed materials into UtOs,
which is sold to power companies for further processing and, eventually, for use in power plants.
The Mill is now owned and operated by Denison Mines (USA) Corp.
One of Denison's important environmental compliance responsibilities at the Mill is to
ninimize fugitive dust, which travels from ore storage areas and stockpiles of ores and
alternative feed materials at the Mill and which can disperse radioactive and other hazardous air
pollutants. Fugitive dust at the Mill is regulated by the DAQ under the Mill's air approval order.
Tlre Tribe, through its Environmental Programs Department ("EPD"), has periodically observed
and reported fugitive dust events at the Mill. For example, in June of ?007, Tribal EPD staff
observed, photographed, and reported to DAQ a dust event on the ore storage areaat the Mill.
See ulso Septernber' 4,2007 letter to DAQ noting the Tribe's concern over the human health
threat of the fugitive dust event. The Tribe has also worked in cooperation with the United
States Environmental Protection Agency to assist the United States Geologic Survey with a
Scientific Investigations Report ("USGS Report") concerning environmental conditions around
White Mesa and the Mill. This USGS Report, which is currently in draft form, provides
scientilic data indicating that radioactive material has migrated off site from the fugitive dust
sources at the Mill.
The curent Mill air approval order modification process started on May 28, 2008 when
DAQ conducted an inspection at the Mill and issued a Compliance Advisory to Denison for two
violations of its air approval order: operation of an unapproved baghouse and not maintaining
the four percent moisture content required for front-end loading operations. See Denison's
Addendum to Notice of Intent to Amend Approval Order, "Background" (June 22,2070). On
November 3, 2008, Denison and DAQ entered into a settlement agreement, and on January 31,
2009, Denison submitted documents requesting to modify its Approval Order to include the
"bucking area" baghouse and implementing new Work Practice Standards for fugitive dust
control. Id. an April 7, 2010, Denison again requested a modification to its Approval Order by
submitting to DAQ a Notification of Soda Ash Baghouse Replacement-In-Kind requesting
pen:rission to replace an existing dry soda ash silo bin baghouse with an equivalent baghouse.
On May 10, 2010, the DAQ issued an approval order determining that the proposed replacement-
in-kind met the criteria found in R307-401-1 1. On lune 22,2010, Denison submitted an
addendurn to its Notice of Intent to Amend Approval Order requosting an upgrade to the existing
baghouse and again submitting new Work Practice Standards for fugitive dust control. On
September 23,2A10, DAQ issued a new Intent to Approve: Approval Order Modification to
Add a Baghouse, to Allow Altemative Fuel Usage, and to Incorporate Work Standards.
On October 29,2010 the Tribe submitted extensive comments regarding the DAQ's
September 23,20L0Intent to Approve. This first set of comments expressed the Tribe's
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Request lbr Agency Action 3
March 31, 201 I
concerns with th.e fugitive dust provisions of the Intent to Approve, contained photographic
evidence of fugitive dust events, and notified DAQ of the USGS Report. On November 11,
2010, the Tribe submitted a second set of supplemental data and comments to DAQ. This
second set of comments addressed the USGS Report draft findings regarding off-site migration
of radioactive materials, provided initial data frorn the USGS Report, and outlined five issues to
be addressed in the Approval Order.
On March 2,2011, M. Cheryl Heying, Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality
Board, signed Denison's Approval Order. No changes were made to the section of the Approval
Order addressing "Roads & Fugitive Dust," and the Approval Order contained no discussion or
incorporation of Denison's proposed Work Practice Standards. On March 7 ,2011, DAQ
emailed the Memorandum regarding Response to Comments (Dated February 24,2011)
("February 24 Memo") to the Tribe. The Memo contained two terse responses to the Tribe's
comments that only partially addressed the issues raised by the Tribe. ,See Comments and
Responses 9 and 10 in February 24 Memo.
B. STATEMENT OF REASONS
As set forth below, UDAQ's approval of the March Approval Order fails to comply with
the Clean Air Act, the Utah Air Conservation Act, and the Utah Administrative Code. The Tribe
lrereby incorporates and references the comments dated October 29,2010 and November 11,
2010. In addition to, and in clarification of those comments, the Tribe sets forth the reasons for
its Request for Agency Action below.
l. The March Approval Order Failed to Address One of the Three Requested
Approval Order Modifications (Work Practice Standards for Control of Fugitive
Dust).
In its.lanuary 31, 2009 submission and in its June 22,2010 Addendum to Notice of Intent
to Amend Approval Order, Denison submitted to DAQ draft Work Practice Standards for
Control of Fugitive Dust (applicable to the ore storage location). Both the September 23,2OlO
Intent to Approve and the March Approval Order are titled to include three modifications: (1) a
modification to add a baghouse1' (2) amodification to allow alternative fuel usage; and (3) a
modification to incorporate work practice standards. However, neither the September 23,2010
Lrrtenl to Approve nor the March Approval Order contains any analysis of, reference to, or
incorporation of the submitted Work Practice Standards. Similarly, the February 24 Memo did
not refer to the submitted Work Practice Standards or any analysis of the Approval Order's
fugitive dust provisions when responding to the Tribe's comments regarding concerns about
Denison's fugitive dust management and the USGS Report's evidence of off-site migration of
radioactive material.
The reoord created by the DAQ in support of the issuance of the Approval Order fails to
explain the basis of DAQ's decision not to modify the fugitive dust emissions provisions of the
Approval Order (and in particular, why DAQ did not incorporate the Work Practice Standards).
Tlre February 24Memo (which contains inaccurate and confusing statements as to the content of
the Approval Order's fugitive dust provisions and which fails to address evidence in the USGS
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Request fbr Agency Action 4
March 31, 201 1
Report of off-site migration of radioactive particles, see Sections 2-5, infra) suggests some
confusion on DAQ's part about the March Approval Order's fugitive dust control requirements.
Takeu together, the record created by DAQ in support of the Approval Order suggests that the
DAQ had insufficient data in front of it to make a reasonable and informed decision regarding
necessary and appropriate Approval Order provisions to address fugitive dust emissions. To be
complete, the Approval Order must address stockpile moisture content and work practice
standards for control of fugitive dust. Accordingly, the Board should rescind the Approval Order
or rentand it to DAQ for proper consideration and incorporation of work practice standards for
control of fugitive dust.
2. The March Approval Order's Fugitive I)ust Provisions Are Insufficient to Minimize
Fugitive Dust and Protect the Tribe, Tribal Resources, and Tribal Members from
Migrating, Radioactive Dust.
Section II.B.4 of the March Approval Order (Roads & Fugitive Dust) is insufficient to
nrinimize fugitive dust, as required by R307-205-5, R307-205-7(2), and R307-205-8(2). The 11
provisions set out in Section II.B.4 do set irnportant fugitive dust enrissions limits for the Mill's
roads, storage piles, front-end loading operations, and tailings retention ard mill areas, The
Approval Order contains a general requirement for Denison to comply with applicable
requirements of R307-205, but Section ILB.4 does not specify what the applicable requirements
are and contains no work practice standards, monitoring requirements, or other measures that
ensure complianoe with the applicable fugitive dust emissions limits. Instead, Section II.B.4
gives Denison significant discretion (and little direction) on how to comply with the Approval
Order's fugitive dust emissions limitations. See, e.9., Section II.B.4.b ("Visible emissions
determinations from traffic sources shall use procedures similar lo Method 9); Section II.B.4.o
("Treatment shall be af suflicientfrequency and quantity to maintain the surface material in a
damp/moist condition"); Section II.B.4.d ("Any section of paved road under the
owner/operator's jurisdiction shall be periodically swept or sprayed clean as dry conditions
worrant or as determined necessary by the Executive Secretary''); Sections II.B.4.f j, k (all
requiring spraying "as dry conditions wctrrant or as determined by the Executive Secretary")
(emphasis added). Section ILB.4leaves the rest of the fugitive dust regulation, management, and
monitoring to the discretion of the Executive Secretary. See provisions cited above (giving
Executive Secretary discretion to require spraying); see also ILB.4.h ("The moisture content
shall be tested if dtrected by the Executive Secretary using a test method approved by the
Executive Secretary.") (emphasis added).
The historical lack of on-site DAQ presence and the historical lack of fugitive dust
nror:itoring data make it difficult for an outside entity like the Tribe to determine how effective
Denison and DAQ have been at implementing the Approval Order's fugitive dust emissions
limits in tlre past. However, Denison's documented fugitive dust violation in May of 2008, the
other fugitive dust events described in the Tribe's comments, and the USGS Report data showing
off-site rnigration of radioactive dust demonstrate that the Approval Order's flexible
implementation and monitoring requirements are not sufficient to either: (a) meet the fugitive
dust emissions limits set forth in Section II.B.4; or (b) minimize migration of radioactive and
hazardous fugitive dust from the Mill. See also February 24 Memo, Response to Comment 10
(acknowledging that "particuiate in the air below 20Yo opacity may migrate," but failing to
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Request for Agency Action 5
Marclr 31,2011
address [row DAQ minimizes the migration of radioactive or other hazardous dust at the Mill).
Accordingly, the Board should rescind the March Approval Order or remand it to DAQ for
proper consideration and incorporation of work practice standards for minimization of fugitive
dust (as recluired by Ut,:rh Admin. Code R307-205).
3. The March 2 Approval Order Does Not Contain BACT for Fugitive Dust Control.
The March Approval Order does not contain BACT to conhol fugitive dust emissions
from the Mill. Utah Admin, Code R-307-401-8(1Xa) states that the Executive Secretary will
issue an approval order if, among other things, "the degree of pollution control for emissions, to
include fugitive dust emissions and fugitive dust, is at least best available control technology."
(emphasis added). The March Approval Order and the Agency record in support of it, including
the February 24 Memo, do not include a BACT analysis for fugitive dust emissions or otherwise
indicate whether or how DAQ determined that the provisions in the Approval Order met BACT
fbr fugitive dust emissions aud fugitive dust.r
As explained above, the Approval Order's flexible implementation and monitoring
requirements have not prevented uranium and vanadium-laden particles from migrating off-site.
Moreover, the current fugitive dust control provisions fall far below other BACT provisions and
industry standards for controlling dust at facilities handling the same or similar materials as those
heurdled at the White Mesa Mill. ,lee, e.9., Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan (March
2002), http://www.gjem.energy.gov/ moab/documents /moab_fugitive_dust.pdf (fugitive dust
plan for former uranium processing facility), attached as Exhibit 1; Crescent Junction Project
Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan (July 2006), http://www. gjem.energy.gov/moab/documents
/Crescent_.[unction/fugitive_dust.pdf (fugitive dust plan for Utah facility with mill tailings and
contaminated materialrepository), attached as Exhibit 2.' See a/so Denison's submitted Work
Practice Standards (requiring the initiation of dust control measures upon observation of opacity
in excess of ten percent and requiring daily opacity recordings, but stiil failing to require
installation of sprinkler systems, robust monitoring and reporting systems, and other dust control
methods present in the Crescent Junction and Moab plans), attached as Exhibit 3.3 Accordingly,
the Board should rescind the March Approval Order or remand it to DAQ for proper BACT
I The DAQ draft source plan review section "Review of Best Available Control Technology"
contaius BACT review of the baghouse control, but no BACT review for the incorporation of
Work Practice Standards.
2 Both the Moab nncl Crescent Junction plans are required under Utah Admin. Code R307-309.
Both plans divide the relevant facility into high potential, moderate potential, and low potential
source areas and apply specific and appropriate dust control measures to each tlpe of area. Dust
control measures include: water trucks, installed sprinkler systems, vegetative cover, soil
conditioners, surfactant, magnesium/calcium chloride, and gravel. ,See Table 1 in each Plan.
Each Plan also requires extensive environmental air monitoring, including meteorological
mouitoring systems that provide wind speed and wind direction data for triggering dust control
lu'reasures. See Section Crescent Junction Plan Section 1.6, Moab Plan Section 1.5.I Not" here that Denison's submitted two-page Work Practice Standards is rather limited. A
comprelrensive set of work practice standards for all fugitive dust management at the Mill would
likely require more robust analysis of the facility and dust control procedures.
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Request for Agency Action 6
March 3l, 201 1
analysis and inclusion of BACT in the Approval Order (as required by Utah Admin. Code R-
307 -4a1-8( t)(a).
4, The February 24 Memo Failed to Adequately Address the Tribe's Comments.
The February 24 Memo failed to adequately address the Tribe's comments regarding
fugitive dust monitoring and control at the Mill. Febmary 24 Memo at 3, Comment 9. The
DAQ response to Comment 9 only addressed the fixed schedule for monitoring, and simply
stated, "To require a fixed schedule without regard to weather or material conditions could have
detrimental effects (such as water being applied during freezing conditions)." /d The DAQ did
not address other Tribal comments such as that the Approval Order should require.Denison to
install a water spray or other watering system and that DAQ should collect and publish watering
records for the MiU,4
The DAQ's response to Comment I0 both failed to respond to Tribal concerns and
contained inaccurate and confusing statements. February 24 Memo at 5, Comment 10, The
Memo's response to Tribal concems about proper implementation of the four percent moisture
requirement was to (inconectly) state, "The 4o/o moisture content of the ore is no longer a
condition of this approval order." Id. The Febmary 24 Memo also stated that the method of
determining compliance with the 20 percent opacity requirement was in the March Approval
Order (which, as discussed above, is also incorrect, as the measurement methods in II.B.4
invariably teave compliance to the discretion of Denison or the Executive Secretarys). The rest
of the Response to Comment 10 pleaded lack of authority to regulate (see Section 5, infra) and
addressed the USGS Report data by stating, "particulate in the air below 20o/o opacity may
migrate." Accordingly, the Board should, at a minimum, remand the March Approval Order to
DAQ for proper analysis and response to the Tribe's comments and the evidence of off-site
migration of radioactive particles presented in the USGS Report.
5. The February 24 Memo Incorrectly Limited DAQ's Authority to Minimize Fugitive
Dust and to Require Proper Monitoring of Bugitive Dust.
In the February 24 Memo, DAQ incorrectly stated that it lacked jurisdiction or authority
to implement several measures to minimize or control fugitive dust at the Mjll. ,lee Response to
Comment 10 (DAQ has no jurisdiction to require water, soil, or vegetation sampling; DAQ has
no authority to allow for extemal review; and "DAQ does not have the authority to monitor or
nrodify a source's daily operations beyond compliance with the terms of the approval order.").
DAQ does have broad authority in R-307-205 to work with owners and operators to design
effective fugitive dust control measures. Moreover, DAQ has authority to require Denison to
perform continuous and systematic monitoring of fugitive dust, and in this particular case, can do
a The Tribe reiterates its comments here. The Tribe is particularly concerned that the Mill's
current watering system (a watering truck) cannot adequately apply water to all radioactive,
!'ugitive dust sources and tlrat the watering truck itself is a source of fugitive dust events.
' The Tribe reiterates its concern that neither entity is taking measures to ensure continuous
conrpliance with either the 20 percent opacity or the four percent moisture content requirements.
S.ee October 29,2010 Comments.
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I(equest for Agency Action 7
March 31, 201 1
so as a condition of the Approval Order and can even do so under the existing authority given to
the Executive Secretary in the Approval Order. ^lee Section 2, supra. Accordingly, if the Board
remands the March Approval Orcler to DAQ for proper oonsideration and incorporation of work
practice starrdards for minimization of fugitive dust (as required by Utah Adrnin. Code R307-
205), the Board should direct the DAQ to exercise its full authority over fugitive dust to
minirnize the off-site migration of radioactive and other hazardous pollutants,
6. The Tribe reserves the right to supplement its Reasons for Request and this Request
upon the receipt of new information.
rv. STATEMENT 9r PABTY p,TAIUS ANp SrAf{prNG
A. STATEMENT OF PARTY STATUS
The Tribe is a proper party to request commencement of and participation in the
requested fonnal adjurdicative proceeding. The Tribe meets all requirements for party status and
is entitled to: (1) the grant of party status; (2) commencement of a formal adjudicative
proceeding; and (3) participation as a fuil party in the requested formal adjudicative proceeding.
Utah Admin. Code R307-103-6(d).
B. STATEMENT OF STANDING
1.Introduction
Utah Adrnin. Code R307-103-3(2) requires the Tribe to "specify in writing sufficient
facts to allow the board to determine whether the person has standing under R307-103-6(3) to
bring the requested action." Under Utah Admin Code R307-103(6)(3), standing in front of the
DAQ board is to be evaluated using applicable Utah case law. Under applicable Utah case law,
there are two means by which a plaintiff may establish standing: the "traditional test" and the
"alternative test." Utah Chapter of the Sierya Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 967
(Utah 2006), The Tribe has standing under both the traditional and altemative tests.
2. Traditional Standing-Distinct and Palpable Injury
Under the "traditional" or "distinct and palpable injury" test, an entity bringing a request
for agency action must assert: (1) the entity has been or will be adversely affected by the
challenged actions; (2) there is a causal relationship between the injury and the relief requested;
and (3) the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury caused. See id. (citing
Jenkins v. Swcm,675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)). In this Request, the Tribe can meet all three
parts of the traditional standing test.
htiurv
Under the traditional standing test, a petitioning party must allege a "distinct and palpable
injury" that gives the party a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute, See City of
Gruntsville v. Reclev. Agency of Tooele City,223 P.3d 461,466 (Utah 2010) (citing Sierra Club,
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Request for Agency Action 8
March 3l , 20'l I
148 P.3d 960). Here, DAQ's issuance of the March Approval Order containing inadequate and
illegal fugitive dust managernent provisions threatens a distinct and palpable injury to Trjbal
lands, the Tribal government, and to Tribal members who dwell, work, hunt, and derive their
sustenance and livelihood from Tribal and public lands located adjacent to the White Mesa Mill.
The Tribal community of White Mesa is located within three miles of the Mill. The lands
cornprising the White Mesa community are held in trust for the Tribe and for other individual
Tribal member owners. The Tribe has jurisdiction (as a federally-recognized tribal govemment)
over: Tribally-owned lands, Tribal member-owned lands, and menrbers of the Ute Mountain Ute
Tribe who live in the Write Mesa community. Under the Tribe's Constitution, the Tribal
Council is responsible for, among other things, the management and protection of Tribal lands
and for the protection of public peace, safety, and welfare. The Tribe can adequately represent
both the distinct Tribal interests and the interests of Tribal members in the requested formal
adjudication.
The Tribe has long expressed its concern that the fugitive dust management practices of
Denison at the Mill (and in particular, management practices that have allowed the off-site
migration of radioactive dust) may impact the long-term health of its land, its natural and cultural
resources, and Tribal members. The Tribe submitted comments to DAQ on the Mill's approval
order on October 29,2A10 and November 1 1, 2010. DAQ's approval of the March Approval
Order without imposing meaningful regulation that would halt the known off-site migration of
hamrful, radioactive dust poses a serious and long-term threat of injury to the Tribe's landowner
and governmental interests and to the health of Tribal members, lands, and resources,
b. Redressibilitv and Causatigq
DAQ is charged with denying or approving the Approval Order and with ensuring that
Denison's management practices at the Mill do not violate applicable federal and state air quality
Iaws. The Tribe's injuries imminently result from the DAQ's failure to include proper
nrechaurisms to regulate radioactive fugitive dust emissions in the March Approval Order, and
thus, a causal connection exists between the DAQ's approval of the Approval Order and the
Tribe's injuries. The Tribe seeks a revocation of the March Approval Order and/or a remand to
the agency for further analysis. The requested relief will redress the Tribe's injuries.
3. Alternative Standing
Under the alternative standing test, an entity requesting agency action must establish: (1)
that it is the appropriate party to raise the issue in the dispute; and (2) that the issues the party
seeks to raise are of "sufficient public importance ." Sierra Club, 148 P.3d at 972-73. Here, the
Tr:ibe is the appropriate party to raise the issue in the dispute because it is responsible for
protecting Tribal and Tribal member-owned land resources and because it is responsible for the
healtlr and welfare of its members, In addition, the Tribe believes that it is the only party willing
arrd able to bring a Request for Agency Action on the issues raised in this Request, and the Tribe
has both tlie interest and the experfise necessary to investigate and review all legal and factual
questions relating to the fugitive dust provisions of the Approval Order. See id. at974,
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Request for Agency Action
March 3I,2011.
Tlte issues the Tribe t'aises in this Request are of great public inrportance. Inadequate
ftrgitive dust management practices and the off-site migration of radioactive dust pose a serious
public health threat to both Tribal members and to members of other local communities
surrounding the White Mesa Mill. The environmental legacy of the fugitive dust management
practices will also impact the land, natural resources, and economic development activities of
surrounding communities for generations. As such, the Tribe has proper alternative standing to
resolve this important matter in front of the Board.
v. R-EQUEST FOR R-ELTEF
Based on the above, the Tribe respectfully requests that the Board rescind the March
Approval Order andior remand the Approval Order to DAQ with instructions that the agency:
( 1) acknowledge jurisdiction and responsibility for regulating and monitoring ftigitive dust at the
Mill; (2) review the USGS Report and any other available data concerning off-site migration of
radioactive and hazardous air pollutants; (3) undertake a BACT analysis for fugitive dust control
and revise the Approval Order to require BACT; and (4) undertake or require the proper analysis
to revise the Approval Order fugitive dust provisions to require appropriate work practice
standards that provide continuous monitoring, management, and control of radioactive and other
hazardous dust at the Mill.
Dated: March 31, 201 1 -(trk
Scott Clow
Environmental Programs Director
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
P.O. Box
Towaoc, CO 81334
sc low@utemountain. org
970-s64-5432
Certificate of Service
The foregoing Requesr for Agency Action was hand delivered today to:
Reglnald D. Olsen
Acting Executive Secretary
Air Quality Board
Division of Air Quality
P.O. Box 144820
195 North 1950 West
Fourth Floor
Salt Lake Ciry, Utah 84116
Christian C. Stephens
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Division of Air Quality
195 North 1950 West
Fourtlr Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
Copies were mailed to:
Jo Ann Tischler
Denison Mines (USA) Corp,
IndependencePlaza
1050 lTth Street, Suite 950
Denver, CO 80265
Dated this 3l't day of March, 2011.
G'O-2002*301*T R
G'O-MOA 1.7*1
r$ .&ftrt6*..tv$Lpffir.? &,$-#fi#flq"
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Moab Proiect Site
Fugitive Dust Control Plan
March 2OOz
Prepared {or U.S. Department of Energy Crand Junetion Office
under DOE Contract Number DE-AC'l 3-96CJ87335.
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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GJO-2002-301-TAR
GJO-MOA 1.7-l
Moab Project
Moab Project Site
Fugitive Dust Control Plan
March 2002
Prepared for
U.S. Department of Energy
Idaho Operations Office
Grand Junction Office
Work Performed Under DOE Contract Number DE-AC13-96GJ87335
Task Order Number MAC02*16
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GJO-MOA 1.7-1
Contents
1.0 introduction............ ........................1
1. I Site Location............,... ..................... I
1.2 Site History .....................1
1 .3 Climatology ............... ........................21.4 Regulatory Requiremcrrts ............. ........................2
1.5 Environmental Monitoring ........... .......................7
2.0 Site Source Infiormation ..............9
2.1 Site Orvnership and Physical Location ................92.2 Source Information ........9
3.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Activities .......... t3
4.0 Dcscription of Fugitive Dust Emission Controls On-Sitc... ................ i 54.1 l{igh Potential Source Areas......... .....................15
4.2 Moderate Potential Source Areas .......................154.3 Low Potcrrtial Sourcc Areas ...........154.4 Standards, Action Levels, and Response Actions ................164.5 Bcst Managemcnt Practiccs ............17
5.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Controls Off-Sile..... ............21
6.0 Ret'erences............. ....................23
Figures
Figure l. Area Location Map for the Moab Site............ ........ 3
Figurc 2. Site Features Map for the Moab Site............ .....,..,. 5
Figurc 3. Location Map for the Moab Sitc Fugitive Dust Sourccs ......... I I
Figru'e 4. Air Particulate Monitoring Locatior"rs... .."............. 19
Tables
Table l. Sumnrary of Fugitivc Dust Controls for the Moab Site.........,..
Tablc 2. Fugitive Dust Standards, Action Levels, and Response Actions.
Appendix A Material Saf-ety f)ata Shects
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DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
March 2002I
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control PIan
Page iii
GJO-MOA 1.7-r
End of current text
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page iv
DOE/Grand Junction Office
March 2002
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GJO-MOA 1.7-l
1.0 Introduction
The State of Utah, Division of Air Quality rules for the control of fugitive dust and emissions
require that all sources whose activities or equipment have the potential to produce fugitive or
airborne dust, must prepare and implement a Fugitive Dust Control Plan. Accordingly, this
Fugitive Dust Control Plan (Plan) is prepared to address the control of fugitive and airborne dust
emissions from the Moab Project Site (Moab Site) located in Moab, Utah. Specifically, this Plan
complies with the State of Utah rules for controlling fugitive dust emissions as specified in the
Utah Administrative Code (U.A.C.) R307-205, Emission Standards; Fugitive Emissions and
Fugitive Dzrsl. This Plan has been prepared to address activities and operations conducted by the
U.S. Department of Energy's Grand Junction Office (DOE-GJO) at the Moab Site. The primary
objective of this plan is to formulate a strategy for controlling, to the greatest extent practicable,
fugitive or airborne dust emissions at the Moab Site. This will be accomplished by identifying
specific sources and activities which have the highest potential to produce or generate fugitive or
airborne dust emissions. This plan describes the engineering controls necessary to minimize and
control dust emissions from those sources and activities. This plan is prepared to address the
control of fugitive dust emissions at the Moab site which are a result of current DOE activities.
As necessary, the scope of this plan will be revised to reflect changes in DOE's dust control
strategy as site conditions or activities may change in the future.
1.1 Site Location
The Moab Site is a former uranium-ore-processing facility located approximately 3 miles
northwest of the city of Moab in Grand County, Utah (Figure 1). The Moab Site is irregularly
shaped; a uranium mill tailings pile occupies much of the western portion of the site. The Moab
Site is bordered on the north and southwest by steep sandstone cliffs. The Colorado River forms
the southeastern boundary of the site. U.S. Highway 191 parallels the northern site boundary, and
State Highway 279 crosses the western portion of the property. Arches National Park is located
adjacent to the northern site boundary, and Canyonlands National Park is located approximately
12 miles to the southwest. The Union Pacific Railroad traverses a small section of the site just
west of Highway 279, then enters a tunnel and emerges several miles to the southwest. Moab
Wash runs in a southeasterly direction through the center of the site and joins with the Colorado
River. The wash is an ephemeral stream that flows only after precipitation or during snowmelt.
The entire site covers approximately 400 acres of which 130 acres are covered by the tailings
pile. Figure 2 shows the major physiographic features of the Moab Site.
1.2 Site History
Originally, the property and facility were owned by the Uranium Reduction Company (URC)
and were regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission, predecessor agency to DOE. In 1956,
URC began operation of the Moab mill. In 1962,the Atlas Minerals Corporation acquired URC
and operated the mill until operations ceased in 1984. Between 1956 and 1984, uranium mill
tailings were disposed of on site in an unlined impoundment. Decommissioning of the mill began
in 1988; between 1989 and 1995, an interim cover was placed on the impoundment. In 1996,
Atlas proposed to reclaim the tailings pile for permanent disposal in its current location.
However, Atlas declared bankruptcy in 1998, and subsequently, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) appointed Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) as the trustee of the Moab Mill
Reclamation Trust and licensee for the site. Ownership and responsibility of the Moab Site was
effectively transferred from PwC to DOE by passage of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
March 2002
T
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
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GJO-MOA I.7_I
Authorization Act (H.R. 5408, 2001). This act further designates that the Moab Site undergo
remediation in accordance with Title I of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of
1978 (UMTRCA; 42 U.S.C. 7912) (as amended). The DOE-GJO took possession of the Moab
Site on October 24,2001.
1.3 Climatology
The climate of the Moab region is semiarid. Average annual temperature is approximately
l4 degrees Celsius CC) (57 degrees Fahrenheit ["F]). January is the coldest month, averaging -
1'C (30'F), and July is the warmest month, averaging 28"C (82"F). Extreme temperatures have
ranged from -28'C (-18"F) in January 1963 to 44'C (111oF), which has occurred more than once
(in July 1953 and on earlier occasions). Temperatures of 32oC (90'F) or higher occur about
100 days per year, with about 80 percent of those occurring during June, July, and August.
Temperatures below freezing 0'C (32'F) occur on the average of 123 days of the year with about
80 percent of those occurring during November through February. The effects of high
temperature on human comfort are moderated by the low relative humidity, which is often less
than 50 percent during the daytime hours.
Average annual precipitation at Moab is 20 centimeters (cm) (8 inches), distributed
approximately equally among the seasons with slight peaks during the spring and fall. Potential
evapotranspiration (about 127 cm [50 inches] per year) greatly exceeds annual precipitation.
Mean pan evaporation (about 140 cm [55 inches] per year) and lake evaporation (about 97 cm
[38 inches] per year) also greatly exceeds the total annual precipitation,
Low humidity in the region limits fog occurrences (visibility less than 0.5 kilometer [km]
[0.3 mi]) to fewer than l0 days per year. Thunderstorms occur about 40 days per year. Hail
occurs approximately 3 days per year.
Prevailing winds in the Moab region are southeasterly. Cold air drainage at the Moab Site can
occur from the northwest under very stable conditions. The probability of a tornado is very
small. One tornado with wind speeds of 160 km/hour (hr) (100 miles/hr) would be expected only
once in approximately 100,000 years (NRC 2001).
1.4 Regulatory Requirements
This Fugitive Dust Control Plan is prepared in response to State of Utah, Division of Air of
Quality regulations for the control of fugitive dust, as found in Section R307-205 (U,A.C.,
September 2001). Dust control plans are required to minimize fugitive dust on-site from various
types of pits, yards, and storage areas. The Fugitive Dust Rule (R307 - 309 U.A.C.) also
addresses storage and handling of aggregate materials, construction / demolition activities,
mining activities, and tailings piles and ponds. The portion of the Fugitive Dust Rule that
specifically applies to the Moab Site is found at R307-205-6(l-2), and requires that "... any
person owning or operating an existing tailings operation where fugitive dust results from
grading, excavating, depositing, or natural erosion or other causes in association with such
operation shall take steps to minimize fugitive dust from such activities." This site specific
Fugitive Dust Control Plan will be submitted to the Executive Secretary for the Utah Air Quality
Board in Salt Lake City, Utah, for approval, and will be updated and revised as necessary to
reflect dust controls which correspond to current and on-going site activities and operations.
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page2t
DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
March 2002
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Figure 1. Area Location Map for the Moab Site
GJO_MOA I.7_I
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,/ National/ Park qsP
GRAND JUNCTION OFFICE. COLORADO
Regional Location Map
DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
March 2002
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page 3
GJO-MOA 1.7-l
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March 2002
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page 5
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GJO-MOA 1.7-1
1.5 Environmental Monitoring
In addition to the implementation of physical dust controls, the DOE-GJO has developed and
implemented an environmental air monitoring program for the Moab Site. This environmental air
monitoring program consists of sampling airborne particulates, radon, and direct gamma
radiation at various locations along the site perimeter and at various off-site locations.
Background monitoring locations also have been established to provide ambient air quality data.
The background or ambient air quality data will be compared to air quality data collected from
the on-site monitoring locations, for the purposes of determining compliance with various DOE
Orders, and Federal and State air quality regulations.
As part of DOE's environmental air monitoring and fugitive dust control strategy, a
meteorological monitoring station has been established at the Moab Site. Wind speed and wind
direction data collected from this monitoring station will be used to determine when site-specific
action levels have been exceeded and specific dust controls (e.g., the application of dust
suppression techniques) must be initiated. ln addition, personnel certified in reading opacity
measurements in the State of Utah will also be used to determine when active dust control
measures should be initiated, and when specific dust generating activities (i.e., excavating,
hauling, grading, etc.) should be discontinued.
In addition to complying with the State of Utah Fugitive Dust Rule, this Fugitive Dust Plan is
consistent with the intent of complying with various DOE Orders. U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Prograrz, specifies that effluent
monitoring and environmental surveillance be conducted to determine the effect of DOE
activities upon "...on-site and offsite environmental and natual resources," and to "...verify
compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local effluent regulations and DOE Orders."
Similarly, DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environmenf, requires
that DOE control and monitor radiological exposures from its facilities and activities.
The physical form of the radioactive contaminants (i,e., uranium mill tailings) at the Moab Site is
primarily best described as a fine-grained, sand-like material, which is highly susceptible to wind
erosion. Consequently, one of DOE's major objectives at the Moab Site is to control and contain
the off-site transportation of radiological contaminants resulting from the erosive forces of wind
and storm water. This Fugitive Dust Control Plan outlines DOE's strategy for controlling
airborne dust emissions and minimizing/controlling the off-site transport of mill tailings resulting
from wind erosion.
DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
March 2002
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Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page 7
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GJO-MOA 1.7-r
2.0 Site Source Information
2.1 Site Ownership and Physical Location
As required by the Utah Division of Air Quality, the following site-specific source information is
provided:
1) Name of Operation-Moab Site Project, formerly known as the Atlas Mining
Corporation Uranium Mill.
2) Owner/Operator Information-U,S. Department of Energy, Grand Junction Office.
2597 B3l4 Road, Grand Junction, Colorado, 81503. DOE Contact: Joel Berwick (970)
248-6020. On-Site Contact: Irwin Stewart (435) 259- 5131.
3) Physical Address of Operations-l 871 N. Highway 191, Moab, Utah, 84532.
4) UTM Coordinates or Longitude/Latitude of Operations:
Latitude: 38 degrees, 36 minutes, 17.53329 seconds - North
Longitude: 109 degrees, 35 minutes, 23.47893 seconds - West
Elevation: 3977.624 US feet above MSL
2.2 Source Information
Type of Material Processed or Disturbed-The materials of concern with respect to fugitive
dust emissions at the Moab Site are residual uranium mill tailings and unstable native soils/sand.
Although the former Atlas mill is no longer active, a total of approximately 1 1.8 million tons of
uranium mill tailings and surface contaminated soils remain on site. The majority of the mill
tailings are contained within an on-site tailings pile, the footprint of which covers approximately
136 acres. An interim cover of the tailings pile was completed in 1995. Soils from on-site borrow
areas were used as the source of material for the temporary cover. Some of the soils used for the
cover are contaminated with low-level residual radioactive contamination resulting from
previous milling activities conducted at the site. A portion of the cover was seeded in 1999;
however, presently, there is no established vegetative growth on the cell.
The majority of materials on the surface of the tailings pile consist of poorly consolidated soils,
and therefore is considered to be a "high-potential" source of fugitive dust emissions at the Moab
Site. Similarly, the two on-site borrow areas (i.e., the north west and the north east borrow areas)
are essentially void of any plant or vegetation cover; the soils are poorly consolidated, and are
considered to be major sources for fugitive dust emissions at the Moab Site (Figure 3).
Combined, the tailings pile and the two borrow areas comprise approximately 40 percent of the
total land surface of the Moab Site. The remainder of site is not considered to be a significant
source of fugitive dust emissions due to: l) The low level of past disturbances in these areas; 2)
The low levels and quantity of contaminated soils identified within these areas; 3) The low
levels of anticipated activity occurring in these areas; and, 4) A greater percentage of vegetative
cover present within these areas.
DOE/Grand Junction Office
March 2002
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
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Source areas identified as a "moderate-potential" consist of areas that have been partially
disturbed in the past (approximately 20 percent of the total site area); however, soils and surface
sediments in these areas are typically better consolidated and are more stabile due to varying
degrees of vegetative cover. If these areas prove to be a source for fugitive dust emissions in the
future, appropriate control measures will be implemented.
Most of the "1ow-potential" areas are found along the site perimeter and consist of steep, rocky
terrain (i.e., sandstone slopes and cliffs) in the west, and wetland/river bottom areas along the
south and eastern margins of the site boundary. Typically, there is little to no activity occurring
or planned in these areas, nor have these areas been disturbed by past milling activities. The
"low-potential" areas comprise approximately 40 percent of the total site area. Consequently,
DOE does not anticipate that these areas will be a significant source of dust emissions from the
facility, and no controls are planned for these areas.
Length/Duration of Construction Project-The DOE is in the process of evaluating remedial
action alternatives for the mill tailings currently stockpiled at the Moab Site. Depending upon
which remedial action alternative is ultimately selected, DOE's responsibility for monitoring and
controlling fugitive dust emissions from this site will range in duration from approximately three
to eleven years.
Description of Processes/Site Activities-Currently, the activities occurring at the Moab Site
include: l) Site characteization (including radiological assessments, surveying, environmental
sampling and monitoring, biological surveys, etc.); 2) Site stabilization (securing unsafe
conditions/structures/utilities); 3) Implementing fugitive dust and storm water controls; 4) Waste
management activities (cleaning up oil spills, consolidating drums and petroleum products,
addressing excess chemical inventory, etc.); 5) Site security (fence installation/repair, postings,
barricades, etc.); and, 6) Installation of a Construction Office and an equipment staging area.
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
Page I 0
DOE/Grand Junction Office
March 2002
GJO-MOA I.7-I
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3.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Activities
A description of the on-site activities which may contribute to, or generate fugitive dust
emissions at the Moab Site are discussed below:
Site Characterization-DoE is currently in the process of performing various types of
environmental characterization activities at the Moab Site. These activities include: radiological
charucteization, surface and ground water monitoring, radon and direct gamma radiation
monitoring, environmental airlparticulate monitoring, meteorological monitoring, floodplain and
wetlands assessment and delineation, threatened and endangered species surveys and critical
habitat identification, and various engineering studies and surveys. Most of these types of
activities are non-intrusive and result in little to no fugitive dust emissions. Vehicles, used to
transport personnel and equipment from one location to another, may result in minimal
generation of fugitive dust.
Interim and Initial Remedial Actions-DOE will be engaged in various remedial efforts to
mitigate immediate threats to the environment (i.e., ground water). Specifically, an Initial
Remedial Action will be initiated during the summer months of 2002 while the Interim Action
may be initiated in 2003. Activities associated with these remedial actions will necessitate the
use of heavy equipment for clearing and grading purposes. These actions will have the potential
to generate moderate levels of fugitive dust emissions.
Site Stabilization Activities-DOE will be securing a former mill building and associated
structures (i.e., pump houses, electrical breaker panels, electrical transmission and distribution
systems, etc.) that were left behind by the Atlas Milling Corporation. Many of these structures
were left in an unsafe condition and need to be stabilized with the increased level of activity at
the site. Although the mill buildings will be eventually demolished, all structures and
appurtenances will simply be secured (i.e., buildings will be locked, live utilities will be de-
energized, etc.) for the present time. These activities may also include the installation or repair of
site fences, installing signs and postings, and setting up various site boundaries and barricades.
The stabilization activities planned for the near future will not result in significant fugitive dust
emissions.
Implementation of Fugitive Dust and Storm Water Runoff Controls-DOE recognizes that
mill tailings and residual contaminated soils are especially wlnerable to wind and storm runoff.
In an effort to contain these contaminants and prevent their migration off-site, establishing
fugitive dust and storm water runoff controls is a priority for DOE. Implementation of these
controls will necessitate the use of heavy equipment to construct or strengthen berms, construct
sediment retention basins, dig borrow ditches, install culverts, apply dust suppressant materials,
etc.; however, fugitive emissions expected as a result of these activities are expected to be
minimal.
Waste Management Activities-DOE will be performing various housekeeping activities at the
site, which will include the consolidation of various materials. These activities will consist of
consolidating miscellaneous fuels, drums of used oil and lubricants, and cleaning up
miscellaneous spills and leaks that have accumulated near the maintenance shop over the years.
For safe storage and to prevent the spread of contaminants into the environment, petroleum
contaminated soils will be excavated and placed into a Best Management Practice Area (BMPA)
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
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DOE/Grand Junction Offi ce
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along with other consolidated waste materials. Any on-site wastes requiring special handling or
management will be identified and addressed by DOE's waste management policy and
procedures developed specifically for the Moab Project Site.
The BMPA will be a bermed temporary storage area that will be constructed with a polyethylene
liner. Materials will be temporarily stored at this location until a permanent disposal option has
been defined. The construction of this area and the removal and excavation of various petroleum
contaminated soils will involve the use of heavy equipment, Moderate fugitive dust emissions
can be expected from these activities.
Establishing Construction Office and Equipment Staging Areas-DOE is in the process of
setting up construction office and support trailers, various storage facilities, a decontamination
pad, and an equipment staging area. To complete this task, mobile office buildings will be set-up
on-site, security fencing and gates will be installed, and utilities will be extended to the new
facilities. This effort will require the use of heavy equipment; however, the duration is relatively
short-term, and is not expected to result in significant fugitive dust emissions.
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
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DOE/Crand Junction Office
March 2002
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4.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Controls On-Site
The fugitive dust emission controls to be used at the Moab Site are discussed for each of the
potential source areas. All sources of fugitive dust emissions at the Moab Site are related to site
activities and site conditions. The routine operation of heavy equipment (until remediation
occurs) is not considered to be a significant source of emissions at this site.
4.1 High Potential Source Areas
Certain portions of the Moab Site are considered to be significant sources of fugitive dust
emissions, and require more active controls than other areas. These areas are charactenzedby:
loose, poorly consolidated sediments, poor vegetative cover, high levels of previous disturbance,
high levels of future/anticipated activity or disturbance, or areas with significant residual
radioactive contamination remaining. Because both the native soils and uranium mill tailings
possess a sand-like texture, these materials can easily become airborne given sufficient climatic
conditions (i.e., low soil moisture content, sufficient wind speeds, etc.). Consequently, DOE has
designated these areas as having the highest priority in their dust control strategy. Cumulatively,
these high-potential areas comprise approximately 40 percent of the total site surface area. The
specific "high-potential" source areas and the planned dust controls to be implemented for each
of these areas are summarized Table 1.
4.2 Moderate Potential Source Areas
Other portions of the Moab Site are considered to be moderate sources of fugitive dust emissions
and will require a less aggressive approach to dust control. These areas are characterized my
more stable soil conditions, a greater percentage of vegetative cover, lesser quantities of
radiologically contaminated materials, and moderate levels of activity. As shown in Figure 3,
these areas are found mostly in the north east and north central portions of the Moab Site.
Cumulatively, these moderate-potential areas comprise approximately 20 percent of the total site
surface area. A summary of the anticipated dust control measures to be used in these areas is
found in Table 1.
4.3 Low Potential Source Areas
Approximately 40 percent of the site is considered to be a low potential source for fugitive dust
emissions. These areas include the river bottom and wetland areas along the eastern and southern
site boundaries; the Moab Wash corridor; the sandstone cliffs and rocky slopes along the
southern and western site boundaries; and the Highway 191 and 279 coridors. These areas are
designated as having a low potential for fugitive dust emissions because there is very little
surface disturbances in these areas; some areas contain dense vegetative cover; these areas are
relatively uncontaminated; and/or there is little to no activity occurring in these areas. No dust
controls are planned for these areas, as shown in Table 1.
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
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Table 1. Summary of Fugitive Dust Controls for the Moab Site
4.4 Standards, Action Levels, and Response Actions
Table 2 outlines the applicable regulatory standards and action levels relative to controlling
fugitive dust emissions at the Moab Site, and the appropriate response actions to be implemented
once it is determined that standards or actions levels have been exceeded.
An air particulate monitoring network has been implemented at the Moab Site in accordance
with DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and Environment and DOE's
Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Efrluent Monitoring and Environmental
Surveillance (DOE 1991). As per the Moab Site Project Environmental Air Monitoring Sampling
and Analysrs Plan (DOE 2002), air quality monitoring data are routinely collected and reviewed
to ensure compliance with DOE Orders and applicable federal and state air quality regulations.
Air particulate sample locations are shown in Figure 4.
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Fugitive Dust Source
Dust Controls
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Tailings Pile
(Too)x x x x x x x
Tailings Pile
(Side Slopes)x x x
Northeast
Borrow Area x x x
Northwest
Borrow Area x x x
Site Roads x x x x
Moderate
Potential
Areas
North and east
portions of
Moab Site
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Potential
Areas
Moab Wash
Corridor x
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Table 2. Fugitive Dusf Sfandards, Action Levels, and Response Actions
Standard /
Site-Specific Action Level Method of Determination Response Action
Opacity cannot exceed 20 percent
at any on-site location or source
(R307-309 U.A.C.). DOE's ooal at
the site boundary is 0 percent
opacity.
Visual observation by a Certified
Opacity Reader
(EPAMethod9-Visual
Determination of Opacity
Emissions from Stationary
Sources)
lnitiate immediate dust control
measures as outlined in Table 1
Cease all dust generating
activities.
Sustained Wind Speeds Exceeding
20 mph (miles per hour).
(EPAMethod9-Visual
Determination of Opacity
Emissions from Stationary
Sources)
Real time meteorological
monitoring.
Monitor visible emissions; Cease
all dust generating activities if
necessary to maintain 20 percent
opacity or less. lf needed, initiate
immediate dust control measures
as outlined in Table 1.
Cannot exceed public exposure
standards (DOE Order 5400.5)
Analysis of filters collected by
continuous air samplers.
Reassess dust control plan and
controls.
4.5 Best Management Practices
The following Best Management Practices (BMPs) will also be followed to help minimize and
control dust emissions at the Moab Site to the greatest extent possible:
Roads-All onsite traffic will be restricted to specific designated roads. Off-road travel will only
be authorized on a case-by-case basis (e.g., access to a remote monitoring well, etc.). Traffic on
the tailings pile will be restricted to designated roads to minimize disturbance of previously
treated/stabilized areas. Traffic speed will also be restricted to an appropriate level on all
designated roads. All designated roads will be considered as high potential dust source areas, and
as such, will be a priority for dust controls utilizing magnesium/calcium chloride, watering, or
gravel.
Hours of Operation-This Plan will be in effect during all hours of operation at the Moab Site.
During non-business hours, there will be no activities generating dust; therefore, dust control
actions will restricted to hours of operation only, However, as a best management practice, if
high winds are evident at the close of a business day (or immediately prior to a weekend,
holiday, etc.), site personnel should evaluate vulnerable areas and implement controls as
appropriate to minimize off-hours emissions.
Use of Chemical Suppressants-Use of various chemical dust suppressants (e.g., surfactants,
salt-based soil conditioners, etc.) shall be done in accordance with the recommended end-uses
for those products. Site personnel shall not exceed the manufacturer recommended application
rates. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) for all dust suppressant materials used at the Moab
Site shall be reviewed and approved by the Environmental Services organization. Prior to
application, site personnel shall determine and evaluate if the use of the dust suppressant could
interfere with other site monitoring activities, or cause other harm to the environment (e.9.,
runoff into critical habitat for threatened or endangered fish). The MSDSs for dust suppressants
to be used at the Moab Site are included in Appendix A.
Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan
March2002
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Figure 4. Air Particulate Monitoring Locations
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5.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Controls Off-Site
To minimize the potential for off-site releases or emissions, the following controls will also be
implemented:
Decontamination and Tracking Pad-Prior to leaving designated contamination areas at the
Moab Site, all vehicles and equipment will be thoroughly washed and decontaminated at a
decontamination pad using a high pressure water wash. This practice should minimize the
potential for any off-site tracking of sediment or contaminants.
Covered Loads-Any trucks hauling materials off-site shall be tarped and covered to minimize
the loss of materials in-transit / off-site. All loads shall be inspected to ensure that they are
properly covered prior to departure.
Spill Response-In the event of a spill or release of contaminated materials off-site, the spilled
materials will be immediately contained and cleaned up. Emergency spill response actions are
outlined in Section 13.0 of the Moab Site Project Health and Safety Plan (DOE200l).
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I 6.0 References
I Grand Junction Office, Moab Site Project Environmental Air Monitoring Sampling and Analysis
Plan, February 2002, GJO-2001-274-TAPt, MAC-MOA 1.6-1, Grand Junction, Colorado
I
-,
2001, Moab Site project Health and Safety Plan, Decemb er 2007,GJO-2001-281-TAR,
MAC-MOA 1.3 (continuously updated), Grand Junction, Colorado
I U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program
I :',,,"::::,_,";""."..;"*]I:l;:,":.".;:Environmen,
I
-tEnvironmental
Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and
Environmental Surveillance, DOE/EH-0 17 3T, January I 99 1
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Environmental Impact Statement Related to! Reclamation of the Uranium Mill Tailings at the Atlas Site, Moab, Utah, NUREG-1531, Vol.1
I C.2, March 1999, Washington, DC
I Utah Administrative Code (U.A.C.), R307- 205-6:Emission Standards: Fugitive Emissions and
I
Fugitive Dust, September 2001, Salt Lake City, UT
, R3 l3-15-301 : Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Dose Limits for
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Individual members of the Public, September 2001, Salt Lake City, UT
GJO-MOA 1.7-1
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I Materiar Safety Data :il::t l#:,S,ypressants
used at the
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T MATEHIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
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PRODUCT NAME:
CAS NUMBEB: 10043-52-4
CALCIUM CHLOFIID E, LIQUID
HBCC NISDS NO. CCOoOOO
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HILL BROTHEBS CHEMICAL CO.
1675 No. Main Street
Orange, California 92667 Telephone No:
outslde calll:
CHEMTREC:
714-998-8800
800-821-7234
800-424-9300
Revision issued: B/1 2i93 S upercedes: 5127192 First issued:1U01185
TMPOBTANT! Bead this IJSDS belore use or disposal ol this product. Pass along lhe lnlorrnation to
ernployees and any other persons who could be exposed to lhe product to be sure lhat lhey aro aware ol lhe
inlormation belore use or other exposure. This l"tSDS has been prepared according lo the OSHA Hazaro
Communication Standard [29 CFH 1910.1200]. The ]'ISDS lnlormallon is based on sources belleved to be
reliable. However, since data. salety standards, and goYarnrnent regulations are sublect lo change and the
ccnditions ol handling and use, or misuse are beyond our conrrol, HILL BFOTHERS CHEMICAL COl,lPAllY
makes no y/arranfy, either expressed or implied, wilh respect lo the completoness or contlnuing accuracy
ol the intormalion contained herein and disclaims all llabillty lor reliance lhereon. Also, addltional
inlormation may be necossary or helplul lor specilic conditlons and circumstances of use. ll ls the user's
responsibil'fi to determlne the suitability ol this product and to evaluale rlsks prior to use, and then to
exercise aooroorlate autions lor orotection ol e s and others.
SYNONYMS / COMI/ON NAMES: CALGUM CHLORIDE, LlOUlo
cHEMICAL FAMILY I TYPE: INOFGAIIICSALT
DOT PBOPEB'SHIPPING NAl,lE: N/A
OOT HAZARO CLASS / l.O. NO.: N/A
BEPOBTABLE OUANTITY: N/A
HFPA RATING: HEALTH . 1; FIRE . O;FIEACTJVITY - O
0=lnsiqnincant 1=Slight 2=Moderate
Chemtcal Name
Exposuro Limlts (TWAs) ln Alr
ACGIH TLV OSHA PEL Other'
4=Exlrem
T
CAS
N u mber
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Physlcal State: LIOUID pH: 9-10 Meltlng Polnt/Rango:
Appearanco/Colo r/Odor: CLEAR UOUID, ODORLESS
Bolllng PolnUBange: N /A
Vapor Prossuro(mmHg); N /A
lilolecular \{olght: 110.99
% Volatlles: N /A
Solublllty ln Water:
N/A
1 00%
Specillc Gravlty(Water = 1): 1.347 6O-0 F
Denslty(Alr = 1): N/A
10043-52-4
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Flash Polnt: Not
Lower Explosive
llammable
Llmit: N /A
How to detect lhis compound: N/A
Autotgnltlon Temperature: Not llammable
Uppor Exploslve Llmlt: N /A
j::: . :i l+:'t:r-:': iia :il+:-'i'.-r
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ProducL/Trade N.:tme : CALCIUM CHLORIUE, LlOUlu
Unutual Flro and Erplorlon Hazardr: I.l/A
t 0,j
S ECTION IV FIBE AND EXPLOSlOII.CONTINUEO
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Extlnqulshlnq Medla: f'l /A Soecial Firell Procodures: tl / A
SECTION V . REACTIVITY
Slablllty: Srablo
Condltlons lo Avold: N /A
M aterlals to Avold: Metals will slowly corroda
are lncompatible.
Hazardous Decom ositlon Produqls: l'lcne
Boutos ol Exposuro: Calclum chlorlde can aHect the body ll lt ls lngesred or il ll comas ln contact with
lhe eyes or skin.
Summary ol Acute Health Hazards:
INGESTION: Causes lrrltatlon ol mouth and stomach.
I N H A LAT lO N : Causos lrrltatlon ol nose and throat.
S K lN: Causes mild irritailon.
EYES: Causes irritatlon and possible transient corneal injury.
Carcinogeniclty Lisls: NO NTP: NO IAHC f,lonograph; NO OSHA Hegulated: t'D
Summary ol Chronlc Healih l-lazards: N/A
Ellecis ol Ovorexposuro: Posslble supedlcial burns and lransient corneal injury.
Emergency and Flrst Ald Procedures:
INGESTION: ll swallowed will cause nausea and vomitjng ll vhtim is consclous, have viclim drink waler
or milk. ll victim is unconscious or ha'ring convulsions, do nothlng excEpt keep victim warm -- call for
meCical help.
INHALATION: Mo'/e to fresh air; il discomlort persisrs, get medlcal altention.
SKIN: ll necessary, remove coniaminaled clothing and shoes, Flush atlected areas with plenry ol water.
EYES: Prompuy llocd with water and continue washlng tor at least 15 minutes. Consult an
oph thalmologist.
Medical Conditlons Generally Aggravated by Exposure: N/A
Hazardous Polymerlzallon: V/lll nol occur
ln aqueous solulions. Borlc acid and calclum oxide
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SECTION VII . PRECAUTIONS FOB SAFE HANOLING AND USE
Stepr To Bo Taken ln Care Material ls Boleared Or Spilled: Dlka the spilled liquid, and either
pump back into original containar or cov€r with clay.fype substanca,or absorpt,on.
Handllng and Storlng Precautlons: Slore at ambient lemperature. Pre,/ent possible eye and skin
contact by wearing protective clolhlng and equlpment.
lYaste Dlsposal Mothods: Add to large volume ol waler. Stlr in llght excess scda ash. (Md slaked
lime in presence ol lluoride.) Decant acd neutrallzs ln second container with 6M-HCL Fouie to se,,{aceplanL Use as landlill sludge. Noli,y local sey/age plant and solkJ waste authorify.Other Precautlons: I'l/A
SECTION VIII CONTROL MEASUBES
Bosplratory Protoclion: N/A Vontllatlon: tl/A
Prolectlvo Clothlng; Employees should be provided with and use imperrlous clothing, rubber gloves,
and rubber bools.
Eye Prolecllon: Employees should be provlded with and required to use splash-prool salety goggles
where lhere is any posslbillty ol calclum chtorlde contacling the eyes.
Oih:r Prolacllve Clothlng c'Equlpmont: N/A
Work/Hyglenlc Practlcos: A'.'oid contact with the eyes, skln, and mucbus membranes.
N/A - Not Applicabli
:jJ,iih ii:,:i)ji .:,;l,r; ' ..:ii ,. ,Jl.-.r.tj:r,1,..1:i1::i ;j,-r,5i-ii(,i:'';:i.1, i,',..- . .,:i '!{ij:::, ;r..!
Page 2 ol 2
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ra)sr $ \f . J J, Irrp.]/ w ta w.cMluu9.tuilt, msos.ntnl
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Ilnvirotiro II is at lvork in
Alghanistan aiding
Opcration Enduring
Frcctlorrr
Stabi l rz-i n g Ilunrvays,
l.anding Pads & More!
(Download/Print a MSDS copy from the References
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Envirotac ll@
Enrcrgency Phone #: (909) 980-t.122
l'roduct 'I'rrdc Nrrnc ti,nvirot;rc ll'
SECTION 02 HAZARDOUS INGREDIENTS
[ lazlrdous Componcnts: 1''his product is non-h;rzlrdous undcr OS I [r\ I lluirrd Conrrntrnicrtion StrnLlrrd 29 C FIt l9 I 0. I 200
Chcrnical Fanrily: Vinyl acrylic copolynrcr
Prodtrcl Solids: 39.43'li' (rctivc soliG)
SECTION O3 PFIYSICAL/CI-IEMICALCHARACTERISTICS
St:rtc: Liquirl
Appcarance antl Cr>lor: lvlilky lVhitc
SECTION
lvlanu fucturer:
Address:
D;rte Prepared:
pl !'Boiling Point:
lYlclting Point:
Vapor Prcrsurc:
Vapor Derrsity:
Solubility in Watr'r
Spccilic Cravity:
Evaporation Rrte:
SECTION
Unusual Hazards
Er.tin gu ishin g tvtc.di a
Surbility:
tlazardous Polymerization:
lvlaterials to Avoid:
O1 lDENTIFICATION
Envirormental Products and Applicatir:ns, lnc
10722 Arrorv Route, Suitc I l6
Ruruho Cucamonga, Cr\ 9 1730
07.30-87
5.0 t() 9.J
2l2Fl100C Watcr
32Fl0C Watcr
(nrnr llg)ITnrg llg@20Cl68F Watcr( I Water
Dilatablc
(rPO=l) 1.0 to t.2
(llutyl Acetate=l) < I Water
04 FIRE AND E)cLoSIoN HAZARD DATA
Nlaterirl can splaBer above 2 I 2F. Dried product can burn
Usc errlinguished media appropriate for surrounrJing fire
Unusual Fire & Esplosion llazards None Knorvn
Spccific Fire Fighting Pror'edures: Wear self.contained breathing apparatus and full prote.tirc gear
SECTION 05 REACTIVITY DATA
Stable (r\void tempertrtures above 350F and open flrnres)
Will not occur
None Knorm
F[azardous Decoorposition Products: Theimal der'onrposition mry yield acryliL'mononres or vinyl acetate monomer
SECTION 06 HEALTH HAzARD DATA
ROUTES OF L\POSURE:
Inhalation: lnhaling vapor or mist can cause headaches, nausel and irritation ofthe nose. rhroat and lungs.hrgestion: Yes
Eye Conlact: Slightly irritating to eyes
Skin Contact: Irritating to skin upon repeated or prolonged contact.
T:I\IERGENCY & FIRST AID PROCEDURES:
I ol2
1., ,,,',,,,,
2/8i02 l:31 Pltl
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rr JUU ruurrr4er \!)-st\\)g:.,/J)/nEp:.//tw!a!.enurotac.comrmsds.htm
lnhalalion: lvlove subject lo fresh air
I Ey. md Skin contact: Flush cya with a large amount of water flor ot ledn fiflcen minutes. See a physician if irritation persisls.
I Ingestion: lf swallowed, dilute by giving 2 ghsses olwater to drinli. Comulr o physician. Nevcr givc anything by
I ACUTF/C[IRONIC (or carclnogcnlc): None eslabllshed
SECTION 07 PRECAUTIoNS FoR SAFE HANDLING AND USE
I Steps to be taken in case material is released ofspilled: Dike and contain spill rvith ine( material (i,e.. sald, earth). Covr }lfli3jxi:1llifJi;"n*o,,"r"l,"fl,l"litvthestepwise addili:[Tf,Ts,;:!,:i:,"fl1Ti,*11"ff:[i:.:T;*Tiil*:
t SECTION 0B coNrRoL MEASURESI [:0"i1'ffi,1:*"t'.' l]:::i:lti:'"'.iliil1?.""conditionsofuse'
lvtechanical (Genera[): N/A
t Protective Gloves: Use gloves impervious to water and soap
I Hi"l'ill[.1i. ","*,.r, $;e
chemicar sprash goggres
Work/HygienicPractices: N/At [*r*ifili']',fr:l;:ld';[i:s,?:1r:iil{i.}i***rsu['.T#:f;H::#
Lab laboratories Laboratory land Land Landtrll Landflrlls landing Landing landings lands Lane Lane La
I penzoil Penzsuppress PenzsuppressD Performed Pertbrming Pertbrms Permazyme Petro Petrobond P
I Soapstock Soapstock Sod Soded Soding Soil Soiloc SOTLOC-MQ Soils Soilsement Soil-sement sokle
r Scnd mai[ to rnfS@enVl1ot,rl.calq with questions about Envirotac II or comments abotrt this wcb site,
I ilI';'iJ}:.1:rt;rt';r Procructs 'lt Appricatio.s' r'lre'
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Rece ived Jan-zg-oz OAiZ6pnJBU:zg:ZrlqBl 3:dlPt'l f rom 5702497682 - IvIACTEC_ERS page gI{FCTEC-EPS N(), gi,5 p. g /8,,/g1
.SSPeo
^
r.!-Fr r.l-.^ I td lrrll||.ai rF.'- O. u.
SOIL STABILIZATIQN FRODUGTS COMPANY, INC.
P.Q. Box 2770, Muced, CA gXU
Phone: [phone] or [phone]
Fax: (?00) 383.7849 E-mail: [e-mail]
W ob p a g e : http //www. sspco. corn
Pric.e..Per Gallon
s11.00
$r 0.70
s i 0,40
FACTORY
QUOIE
$olL SEAL@
CONCET{TRATE
PRICE LIIST
Effective Date: January 1, 2001
Number of Drums Nu;gbgr gf Gallons,
l-9 55-495
t0 - 49 550 .2,695
50. lgg 2,750 - 10,945
200 and up I 1,000 and up
Prices quoted above are F.o.B. our Pico Rivera warehouse and are subject ro change wlrhour norice.
SOIL SEAL is a registcrad radcrnark, of lhc Soil Seal Corporation
Ref: January 1,2001
TOTfl- P,Oi
6063,SS
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[]ni:,l.l.l(. i i ,^. I i
Stote-oi-the Arl ENyIPONMENTAL PRODUCIS for ihe Protection
of 5O/1, WATER ond A,P AUALIW
A poienfed hign gi'ode copolymei'formulotion for soit
Suricce stobilizo'iion, Thls product seis the stondord for
durcS'lily, env'ronrnenfol occeplobilirT ond eose of
opplisqiien,
Dust Control
Blow Sond Conirol
Revegetoiion
Erosion Control
Hydroseeding
Woler Conservotion
5()lL
SEAL*
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Joil rtdbilizotion Produstr;: ,,-.
Cqllfall Free qt I (80O SZ3-9992p,o 8ox 2779, M€rced, cA90344 (209) 3s3_3295 Fox(209) 383-7849
Rece i ved Jan-29-OZ 04 : 26pm
JAr{,,ZrlEe lrom 9i02437r,Sr.:l i,IACTEC-ERS page 3
cheaper pctyrners rnoy brlally hola ogqlnsi wlnd qnd woier, but ihe lun (force nurnbcr throa)
PqtreiiinclJucgemenl'. lvherltccmerloonenvltonrnentollyoccepioUssosemotorl€tthot
h cll'cctlve for 3.3i1 5vrl6n9 stobltl:ottcn, o perg ocrytlc capolymgr lt lnjurpossed in lls terliioncoto b[Eokdow..l und3r Liliicvrolai eroai!/a SOlL SEALT rr formulalod wi?h a pure ocrytlo bot6,oilowhrg for morimum cil\rfion, morlrr,vrn p€netfoflon ond durobillfy. !i/e iqve sinole lr6ot.martl still prov;Cing dut: ccnfrd c 1d e/clion conirol over four yeots qttef oaplicoiicn,
SOIL SEALS PROMOTES VEGSANON!
ll ycu wanf Io k9ep qn creo oi bcrd ecrrh 'ln contrcl' qr.ld frte af vcAetcticn, flrsi oppty onooefepricta prB.. omarganl h6..,cro€, Ofhcn{lti, nc:urqlly clspersad seed wlll bc glvoh omci'cr bco:i h effecriv:ne5! o! i-r€ sott srdaca il haio in ptocp by tna sotL sEALr lrebtmsnt.provlchg o :robie germrnofron -rec SOIL SEALT Is fcrn.rlqted tc rDinforoe fl^l€ colllt, of fno sollsudsce Io slleo theei wclet flo,,v. 'r'ar stllt f,rg pqrrnsgale to thc grodl:ol tr,o(rfuto lntiltroilonneed3c to r,!poori vs5alcilcn.
EQr o more cCfrv€ QoPfQo.h io ter,€gef oiion, solL sEAr.t i! $ofe . cl . t69 . qd cJ o lackifier forl.35,r,ulcnc'1csoil. SOILSEAL'i',otbgsnsiie.cllveinprcrnohnOveqg|?flgncnngqtv€rticel,
cru'nblino 5r3pe3 t.Jrnln! the. gioon wrth gtowino 6ro$s covet, \^jh€n succets al oreve(f,aiOrrcr, prJcrom il ctll,eqi, SOIL SEAlr i! yout bcsl insuronCA,
OUSI CONTROL AND V/ATER CONSERVAIION
F;ca.rl Plv'l r i?:Errrctic,.ri q.,!, lo,:c' ccuniy cnd city re€ulciicns for tne cont:ol ol fugiflvs ds3ic'e pLiing pr(itJrri cn cr).on,i .vrln e lcl ol dillurbeJ G/cund fo hold ln ptocg. Agoncles.
In'3,.13'1 . Ca',':rocefs cnl- coni'c,:ror5 con cqil on sol! SEAlt to Frovldg o dollor sovlng3i:3tn.f,live lo lle4ecrivg gpra!'liaJlrngni's ono to prcviSe o woier. c!nsenvrng olrgfnoilvalo Coii'; curl COntrol wCf Sr:in6.
vvi-lo ls uslng SOIL SEALe?
Hignwoy & Public Work: Depodm6nls
FeOercl & Stote Lond Mcnogemen:
Agencies
tvlilllcry Focllities & lvliliicry Contrccior:
Felrcieum & Peirochemiccl lndr.is:rles
DevEiopers & conlrcciort
Nrinst, Mllls & 6uorries
Fubllc Ulilliies & Power Flonts
Lcirdfllls & V/oste Conlainrnenl Closuf ei
Roilroods & Porl Focilil;es
Environmentol Cleqn-up Controc lo's
Aifporis & Igsl Rong€s
Hydroseedi;rg & Hydromuf chlng
Contrcctqrs
Pcrks & Conseruollon Dgpodmenis
ot qvgt l'rpnry yaots,lhlr unlque copoly.mgt formulatlon hor bcan r.titng thgstondord /or sotl Eurfoce ltoblllzeilon,
SolL sEALr ho! bocn lpocltled tof the
o06nclas such Ar lho
mo$ cnvlronmgnfolly sensi?ive ritor bV,nclas such Ar thg Nst{onol Pqtk Scrvlco,thc Faroct ServlcB ond lh€ Eovkonmsntot Pro-
tocilon Agsncy, lVhcn EPA rcrnodiot octioncl6on-up! 6r fup.fun6 sites nEed retisble
dust control, efoslon conlrol or ptotpoflon olhydrotrc,:hg ond nyCromulchlng cpprlco.
iloru, SOll S!AL. fitr lhe bill,
Whllo rh6 enYlronrreirql occaptabiilry cf SOtLSEAI! i! on ournondlng cttdbLto lor prolecrswher. rnvkanm€ntot clsanlhess ls corefuilyrevlewed,lhe duobillA ond cotl - rlfrctivi.n.rrof lho h6oltoonl Ir squolly lrDped€nt, For€genciei or lndustries wiin o fequirCmenr toconkol lorge cxpcn{es ot bore soit, pcfiiollyvs€etoled rond, mlne ond rnill toiiings, qr
ncwly plqntod s6cd on orotlvg lclls or ileep
Jlop6r, corl - .ll.cliv.nefi murl be o pilotily
concem,
Why ls SOIL SEAL! Untque
ln Ellacliveness orrd Unique
ln Dwobllily?
l-,1o19 sie ihreg pdrnory noiurql srrOsive force!ol work w,th vilich o soil !u,.ioca stabilitsr
musi conle.d. whd, wof ot cl.rd Sin. Yihei,rErtne gool ls to control dust or fo stop wind ond
woter ercrlon, on cff*ctive traotmenl musi
be wglllntggroted wlth lhs 3oil io t^ctd ogo,nrt
hlgh winds, roin lmpoct OnC n6o\ry 6noel -
tlowof wcigf. Ih€, lto,ttm€nfotsa negds tc b9
r89l$qnr Io the eroJlve force af t1e iunl ultro.ylol6: degrsdotian. Ihc pOladtcd nien OrnC6
ccpotymar lormulqilon of the SOiL SEAIt prcd.
uct n6qlt tho lhrce fcrcer of nofure hc6d .
o^ with three Uniqr.Ja copcDilitias. Uio o, tho
hlch grode copalym€rbqso cllawr SOIL3!ALt
to be highly Jllut3d with wciar lor p6nel/oilon
d'.rrhg opcilcollon, yei stllt oble lo pelymrrlrg
oro fo(m o coho:lve mqttlx wlttih fho tail
once tha wql6/ €vopofotet Spacio{ 6ddi.
tJver rudh8r imp/ove the obitity ct the solt
SEAL' solrrlion lo flf'l ponolroio ihe ioltrncfo.
rlck cnd then to horden fof moxtrnum hold-
ing powor, PE^JFTPALON ond HOI.DING
F)WEP. hyo ol lho lhr6c vnlqu. focloft,
SOIL SEAL0 Eosy to Apply, Environmentolly Acceptoble, Tenoeious ln Hotdlng soll ln ptoce,
sotl sEAL' ls o reglrtorod rrodrT* "r!,x"T",t s.ot corporqflon
WHEN YOU NEED TO HOLD SOIL WHERE IT BELONGS
When you need to stop dusling, erosion and siffolion,
ti:'.r;a t.t:,'-:a' a:;i!;-' .:--::rrr ;! l!i, .:!' ,r.;.
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i .. " JAI'I , i9 , :Eoe -r: cl,lFt't f,1Ar:TErl-EF,i page 4l{,i f i: s ,1 ,.)
SQII. STABILIZATION PRODUCTS COMPANY, INC.
Ph..", ?i?i iSIf.iiLTi?iXt)?if 333i
Fax: [phone] E-malh [e-mail]
Erwironmantally Apptoprlate Product Technologles
for Pavemenfs, Dust Control, Erosion Control& SorT Stabilization
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
SOIL SEALO CONCENTRATE
MSDS # 7701
Rovlewed;01,04/Eg
SECTION 0l r IDENTIFICATiON
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INFORMATION FURNISI-,IED BYI
ADDRESS;
DATE PREPARED:
EMERGENCY FHONE #:
PRODUCT OR TMDE NAMEI
ComponantS
ACRYLIC POLYIITER +
WATER
AMMONIA
Soil Stabilization Products Company, Inc.
P,O, Box 2770, Merced, CA 95344
01/04/99
(800) 523.9Q92 or [phone]
SOIL SEAL'!' Concenhate
SEC?ICiN O^. H^'^RTTOUEJNGFFDIFNTS .
% by Wt CAS#
46-48% Non Haz5{520/o Non Haz
.2o/o Max 7664,41-l
crsHA PFJ
NE
NE
NE
ACtrIH TLV
NE
NE
25 ppm
s E cTl O N 0 3 :-ltt\1SlCAUC H F M I c A t C HARA CT E R I STI CS
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EOILING POINT
MELTING POINT
VA,POR PRESSURE (mrn Hg)
VAPOR DENSITY (Air = 1)
SOLUBILITY IN WATER
APPEARANCE & COLOR
SPECIFIC GMVITY (H.O: 1
EVAPORATION RATE (Butyl Acetate = 1)
SECTION 04: FIRE AND EXPLOSION I-IAZARD DATA
> 212'. F
N/A
Same as watar
<1
Dilutable
Greenlsh Llquid wlth sllght ammoniacal odor
1.06
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F[-ASH POINT (Method Used)
FTAMMABLE LtMTTS
EXTINGUISHING MEOIA
SPFC|AL FrRE FtGHTTNG PROCEPUtsES
UNUSUAL FIRE FIGHTINF FFOCFDPRFS
NonE (Tcc)
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Not Applicable
Prgduct will not burn hut may splattor if temperature
exleeds boiling point. Polympr films ar6 cepable of giving
off oxldes of c€rbon/nltrogen.
SolL SEAL is a registercd trademarlt of Soil Seal Corporation
Paga 1 ol 2
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Rece ived Jan-29-02 94:Z6pn f rom g7}Z4gl68? , Iv|ACTEC_ERS- .J.rrt, 3 -i. eerti 3: .:,JFm tlHr:TEc_EF:rj
EECTION 05: REACTMW DATA
STAEILITY
HATSRDOUS POLYM ERIZATIO N
CONDITIONS AND MATERIALS TO AVOID:
HMAROOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS:
SECTION 06r HEALTII HATARD DATL
lnhalatlon
Eye and Skin Contaot
ln0€stlon
RESPIMTORY PROTECTION
LOCAL EXHAUST
MECHANICAL (General)
PROTECTIVE GLOVES
EYE PROTECTION
OTHER PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
WOR'/(HYGIENIC PMCTICES
page
F,) lj
Stable under Normal Cortditlons
Will Not Occur
N/A
lf lnvolved ln a fire, dried film capable of burnlng giving off
oxldes of carbon/nltrogen.
None should be required, Usa OSHA/NIOSH-approved rospirator
in poorly venillated Ereas.
lf needed to control mist cr vapor.
ls expectcd to bo satlsfactory.
Usg gloves lmpervlous to water and soap,
Safety Glasacc snd availebla eye bath,
N/A
N/A
ROUTES OF EXPOSLJRE:
lnhalation
Absorption
lngostion
Eya Contact
Skin Contact
Vapor or mist can cause headacho, nausea, and irritailon ol the nose, throat and
lurrgs,
Contact-yes; Absorption.un likely.
Yes
SlighUy lrrltatlng to eyes,
lrritating to skin upon ropeated or prolonged contast.
EMEBGFNCY & FIRST AID PROCFNIIRES;
Move subject to fresh air.
Flush eyes wlth a large amount of watar for at leaEt 15 minutes, See aphysiclan lf lrritation persists. Wash affccted skin areas wlth soap and
water.
lf swallowad, dilute by giving 2 glasses of water to drink. See a physlclan.
Navcr glvc anflhlng by mouth to an unconscloue person,
SFcrlQH.OT: PRFcaU?loNS FoR SAEE#aNDLINO ANn USr .. _STFPS ro FF TAKFN lN CASE MATFR|A|JI-EiEI FASFD OR sFtll Fn: Keep spectators away. Floor may boslippery. Use caro to svoid falllng. Dlke and contaln 6ptll with inert materlal (e.g., sand, ear4h). fransfer liquid to
containers for_tecovery or dlsposal and solid dikirrg materlal to separate coniainars for disposal, Keep spllis andcleaning runoffs out of municipal sawers and open bodieg of wat8r.
@:CoagulatetheemulsionbythastoPwiseaddltlonoflerrlochlorldeandthenllmc.Remove thc clear supematant liquid and flush to a chamlcil Gew6r, lnclnarato the solids and contaminatod diking
material at a permltted facility ln accordance wlth local, stato and fedenal rcgulations.
FRECAUTIONS_TO FE TAKFN lN HANDLII'\IG & STOSIAGE: Properventilatton and keep from freezing,
sEcflnNryq..JoNTROrJHE^SURF.s. _ ._
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SOIL SEAL ls a reglstered trademark ol Soil Scal Gorporationpage2 of2 Ref:5/21l€9
R e c e'' l-ryffi# kqf#H{E#ffiffi;lIXfiSH[I ry:
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WHAT IS SOIL SE.AL?
solL SEAL ls e soil stabilizer $ill-g.-".r"nts crosion.by cr-aating E larga.masr of rtabilized soit noE eariiydislurbed !v win a and.lv€tan' S0lL SEAL penecrgtes rhi soll surfiee and forms an excellenc cohesive bondbeoveen the soil penticles, tu can be used as a sote tr€Etrnent in ;omuering ousringinl soit epoFlon, oric can be ulad as a reckifier in hydroseeding end.hydro-;richirg applicarions. solL SEAL is a non-taxic,noncoffosive, non-flammabte auxiliory roil ihemicir tormularcI il pnovida safe and sconomical surfacesoil st8bilization, The solL SEAL soluriin may bu "pptiia'"*itllouon or seeded areus wirhout harmfulcffecE.
APPLI CATION PROCEtrUFI ES
solL.sEAL con bc applicd by nea.nly.all rypes of equ.ipmenr designed to apply liquids, ranging in size fromemallgandenspn8yErs uP ro linge hydrorJeding tru'cti and wereriruckE. ln altceses, rhe cquipmentshouldbe capable of disuribuung uhe macaiiel in a uniForm pun".n, oppllng ilre solurjon in iirgJaroplers insteadof fine misrc.
oncetheapplication rate of the concanrrs@ in gollons pcracrur has been es:eblished, the dilurion of theconcemmEo vrich werar.can be_gin. .The *andaFa aituribn racio is bo gallons of water'per gellon of sotlSEAL Thcnormelturbulenceor.a{dinglvof€lEgt!mixingtankwilt;ff;;;;;qi,",iiliriigofrhesoturion.
Fu.therogitation is notrequincd, Pouirhe sotLsEAi;;;;;;;;i;;;;"-;i-.i;li."ii,l,riii., no more rhan
!_ojz1or.ch1 wEEen required {oler proper mi:ruru atruady in ttre ran[, e;i t],,rffi1ytri,ino'*"ur sftar chaconcenBraEE hEs bBEn:!d-?9.,Fon,lgadjnp q9c.eri.al, vou can use onE of several rnethods: 6 gallon bucketgelavating the drum up ro che haighr of tlie fill hole b't/ u;;Gironieno loedan on fork lifi, on se66g up asurnP.pump or trssh pump thot can mov6 a fairly $ick liquid, Alwols hose down ony =lillogu thEu occurswhile loading the concEnrnate inso rhe rruok.
Suggesuad clmhing t":,|]:i:f-y is dispasable uni,turms or old clothes end old shoes, tf any of rie creyrlvEar lye glassses, safery-gogglas cal be u.sed to pmtect ii;;;= from o'ra*l.iv.- mir is particularlyimporttntonwindydeys. For"itEan<pofclorhinganieqrp-".nt,roo6wa:erlvashrocleanupihisw€rer-
bsse prcdus!,
Hll:ln:=l1d,,q F schedulE applicotion of thc producc whrn wind condition6 Era bclow s mph. ThesotL SEAL P[ducy is oppliad ln, muttiple spray pusles t.o minlmlze runotf sf tho solurion and to maximizepenelracior], Tha tull :Io!l! of sglrSon ptannia for applicariJn ro a specino eres ehould be appiila i" "conrinuous saries of spreyPssses (ic is not'posslute to eip-rype.i ori-n. pioduc,u on a.econa a.vro a parciallytmaLcd Eftr€ Es the existing producc. would elreacv u"'J"[J ""a *oul,i i"i',i'"ii pen#;ti;;;?;; il"o]lirpplicationJ' curing rime oiri range fnom a ferv hours ln hoc summEr wearhen ri pa houcs on mora duningperiods of high humldiry or eold ileather. Allow a aa ro so ho;r. u"v,"g p";"J f";r#mear€d ar€a rodevelop maximum crrsr strength, rvv 'sr L' 'q
CA!J!oN: Crrs nn'r* bc alrrnclsed !o prcvenB dam€oc *rat crn rrsulr hom lmprnpcr rppllcrrlon of solL SEAL Erch slte shouldbE ewlusted pnior tr appliqarion lonfriors such ,= i,ina sJeeo'iM;i;&;;.'Ec,iililiffit:r.i, Eu-iiil.,-ilind odrrn lumr on.sica which requirr protacdon frsrn ovensFruy should be rnsvcd or p..p-.di*-r.]i_d prior ta t}rc SOIL SEIL applierdon.
TheproperapplicadonofsolLSEALisessgnu'cl toit.perforrnrnce. Ttre o.rmerandconsulr.inglnglnaenshouldlnsurathatdreappli$tion cnerrt is thornuohlyfamilirn witlr alt tachnicalli;'JrJii]Ltliii,iii'#*n;on, ror trc"soit senr- producc The se,er,rhc soil stabiliradon Products companv, is noc rcsponsiui ii.i-lrui,r$idil;.;;i-dti#i;Goii sear- rpplicocion.
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DOE-EM/G|1235-2006
Office of Environmental Monagement - Grond lunction
UMTRA Project
Crescent lunction Project Site
Fugitive Dust Control Plan
luly 2006
U.S. Department
of Energy
ffitueafl @
Work Peiormed Under DOE Contract No. DE-4C01-02GJ79491
for the U.S. Dapadment of Energy Office of Environmental Management.
Approved for public raleaso; distibution is unlimited.
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DOE-EM/Glt235-2006
Moab UMTRA Project
Crescent Junction Site
Fugitive Dust Control Plan
July 2006
Work Performed by S.M. Stoller Corporation under DOE Contract No. DE-AC0I-02GJ79491
for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management, Grand Junction,
Colorado
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Contents
Page
1 .0 Introcluction ...... 1* l
1.1 Sit. f-u.rti,rn..,,.............. ...... ^..............1-l1.2 Site Ilistory ................1*4
I .3 Purposc and Need ...... i*4
L4 Climatology.. .... ... ...................1-5
I .5 llcgr-rlatory Reqr.rirements ............... ................. l-5
L6 Environmcntal Monitoring ........... ....................1-5
2.0 Site Source lnlormation ......2-l
2.1 Site Ownership and Physical Location ............2-1
2.2 Sourcc Infbrmatior1................. ......2-l
3.0 Description of'FLrgitive Dust Iimission Activitics............... .........3-l
4.0 f)cscription of FLrgitivc Dust Enrission Controls On-Sitc ............4-l,4.1 Higli-Potcntial SoLrrcc Arcas ........4*1
4.2 Moclerate-Polential Source Areas .. .................4--1
4.3 Low-Potential Source Areas .........4*l
4.4 Standards, Action Lcvcls, and Rcspottsc Actiotts ..............4*2
4.5 Bcst Managonlent Practiccs ..........4-3
-5.0 Off-Sitc Fugitive Dust Emission C-'ontrols................ ...................5-l
6.0 Rci'crcnccs ........6-l
Figures
Figrrre l*1.l.ocation ol'Crescenl Junclion Disposal Site............ .........1*2
F-igulc 1-2. Site Map........... ......... l*3
Figrrrc 1*3. Monitoring Locations at and Adjaccnt to Crcscent Junction, Utah.........................1-7
Figurc 3-1. Disposal Clell Secluencc Pr:ofilc ...3*2
Tables
Tablc 4-1. Sunrrnary of Fugitive Dust Controls for the Crcsccnt Junction Site............ ........,....4-.2
Table 4-2. Fugitivc l)ust Standards, Action Lcvels, and Rcsponsc Actions. ..........4-3
Appendix
Appcndix A Matcrial Salbty Data Shccts tbr Dust Supprcssanls Used at thc Crcscent
.|unction Sitc
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1.0 Introduction
The State of Utah Division of Air Quality rules for the control of fugitive dust and emissions
require that all sources whose activities or equipment have the potential to produce fugitive or
airborne dust must prepare and implement a Fugitive Dust Control Plan. Accordingly, this
Fugitive Dust Control Plan (Plan) addresses the control of fugitive and airborne dust emissions
from the Crescent Junction Site of the Moab, Utah, Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action
(UMTRA) Project, located approximately 1.5 miles northeast of Crescent Junction, Utah.
Specifically, this Plan complies with the State of Utah rules for controlling fugitive dust
emissions as specified inthe Utah Administrative Code (U.A.C.) R307-309, "Fugitive Emission
and Fugitive Dust Rule."
This Plan has been prepared to address activities and operations conducted by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) to construct a disposal cell and emplace uranium mill tailings at
the Crescent Junction Site. The primary objective of this plan is to formulate a strategy for
controlling, to the greatest extent practicable, fugitive or airborne dust emissions at the Crescent
Junction Site. This will be accomplished by identiSring specific sources and activities that have
the highest potential to produce or generate fugitive or airborne dust emissions. This plan
presents the engineering controls necessary to minimize and control dust emissions from those
sources and activities. As necessary, the scope of this plan will be revised to reflect changes in
DOE's dust control strategy as site conditions or activities change.
1.1 Site Location
The Crescent Junction Disposal Site is located approximately 1.5 miles east of the intersection of
U.S. Highway l9l (US-191) and Interstate 70 (I-70) and north of the Union Pacific Railroad. It
is about 30 miles north of Moab,20 miles east of Green River, and approximately 6 miles west
of Thompson Springs (see Figure 1*1).
The disposal site is located within portions of Sections 26 and 27 ,T27S, Rl9E, Salt Lake
Principal Meridian (SLPM) (see Figur:c l-2). The majority of the area that will be used for the
repository and site activities is in the NE1/4 of Section 27 and NW1/4 of Section 26; a portion of
the cell will extend into Sections22 and23.
DOE withdrew land from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for a mill tailings and
contaminated material repository and ancillary facilities (e.g., construction management trailers,
parking, vehicle wash, construction water pond). An estimated 400 acres will be impacted by
disposal activities. Once the disposal cell is completed, DOE will retain permanent ownership of
the repository, a buffer area, and access to the repository; the remaining acreage will be returned
to the BLM. The area that will be permanently withdrawn from other uses is approximately
200 acres.
The Crescent Junction Disposal Site is surrounded on three sides by land administered by BLM.
The talus slopes of the Book Cliffs delineate the northern boundary. To the east and west, the
surrounding areas are basically flat, and drainage is generally to the south and west toward the
Green River. To the south, the Union Pacific Railroad bounds the property. Farther south is
County Road 175 (CR-175) and I-70, There are no active commercial establishments present in
the immedi ate area. The former Crescent Junction gas station and restaurant, now vacated, are
located approximately I .5 miles southwest of the site at the interchange of I-70 and US- 191 .
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Figure 1-1 . Location of Crescent Junction Dlsposa/ Sife
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I One residence is located approxim ately 0.25mile south of I-70. Thompson Springs,
approximately 6 miles to the east, has fewer than 5O-full time residents. No rivers or major
I drainages are present on the withdrawn disposal site property.I 1.2 Site History
I The Crescent Junction Disposal Site area was historically public land administered by the BLM.
It contains a cattle grazing allotment that is currently used and oil and gas leases that are
I undeveloped. BLM has designated the area as access limited to existing roads. The general area
I is used by wildlife for forage, nesting, and hunting by various raptors and as a wildlife migratory
corridor. Prairie dogs, raptors, bighorn sheep, antelope, chukars, and a variety of small mammals
I and birds (e.g., antelope squirrel, horned lark) remain in the area part of the year or migrate
I through the area.
I The Crescent Junction location was identified as a disposal site during the Environmental Impact
I Statement and Record of Decision process in 2005, Ownership and responsibility of the mill
tailings at the Moab Site were transferred to DOE by passage of the Floyd D. Spence National
I Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398). This act further
I designates that the Moab Site undergo remediation in accordance with Title I of the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA; 42 U.S.C. 7912, as amended).
I 1.3 Purpose and Need
r Contaminated materials associated with the former Atlas Minerals Mill at the Moab UMTRA
I Site will be transported to the Crescent Junction Disposal Site and placed in a repository that will
be secure from human intrusion. This action will result in the removal of tailings materials at the
I existing tailings pile, all surface contamination, and contamination from vicinity properties,
I totaling approximately 12 million cubic yards (16 million tons) of contaminated materials.
I The majority of contaminated materials will be transported from the Moab UMTRA Project Site
t in containers by rail over the existing Cane Creek Branch of the Union Pacific Railroad. The
containers will be offloaded adjacent to the southern border of the Crescent Junction Disposal
. Site, at which point they will be conveyed by truck to the disposal cell. Material that is too large
I for transport by container on rail cars will be transported to the disposal site by covered truck onI us-rgl.
I The disposal cell footprint will be excavated to a depth of approximately 20 feet.The final'-footprint configuration has not yet been determined. Contaminated materials will be placed and
compacted in layers. Dust will be controlled through use of construction water. After all
I materials are transported, the pile will be covered with rock/soil materials. Surrounding areasr will be reclaimed with native seed mixes approved by BLM, and all areas not necessary for
future access or study will be released back to the BLM.
I Typical site activities will include a controlled access area with active tailings deposition, vehicle
washing and decontamination stations, a pond for construction water, temporary field offices,
I vehicle maintenance and storage areas, a iadiological control area to checl worker radiation! levels, worker parking, and soil stockpile areas.
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1.4 Climatology
The climate (based on Moab) of the Crescent Junction region is semiarid. Average annual
temperature is approximately 57 oF. January is the coldest month, averaging 30 oF, and July is
the warmest month, averaging 82 'F. Extreme temperatures have ranged from -18 oF in
January 1963 to I I I oF, which has occurred more than once (in July 1953 and on earlier
occasions). Temperatures of 90 oF or higher occur about 100 days per year, with about
80 percent of those occurring during June, July, and August. Temperatures below freezing
(32 "F) occur on the average of 123 days of the year with about 80 percent of those occurring
during November through February. The effects of high temperature on human comfort are
moderated by the low relative humidity, which is often less than 50 percent during the dalime
hours.
Average annual precipitation at Moab is 8 inches, distributed approximately equally among the
seasons with slight peaks during the spring and fall. Potential evapotranspiration of 50 inches per
year greatly exceeds annual precipitation, Mean pan evaporation (about 55 inches per year) and
lake evaporation (about 38 inches per year) also greatly exceed the total annual precipitation.
Thunderstorns occur about 40 days per year. Hail occurs approximately 3 days per year.
Prevailing winds in the region are southeasterly. Cold air drainage at the site can occur from the
northwest under stable conditions. The probability of a tornado is minimal. One tornado with
wind speeds of 100 miles per hour would be expected only once in approximately 100,000 years
(NRC leee).
1.5 Regulatory Requirements
This Plan is prepared in response to State of Utah Division of Air Quality regulations for the
control of fugitive dust, as found in Section R307-205 (U.A.C., September 2001). Dust control
plans are required to minimize on-site fugitive dust from storage and handling of aggregate
materials, construction/demolition activities, mining activities, and tailings piles and ponds. The
portion of the regulations that specifically applies to the Crescent Junction Site (R307-205),
requires that ". . . any person owning or operating an existing tailings operation where fugitive
dust results from grading, excavating, depositing, or natural erosion or other causes in
association with such operation shall take steps to minimize fugitive dust from such activities."
This site-specific Plan will be submitted to the Executive Secretary for the Utah Division of Air
Quality in Salt Lake City, Utah, for approval and will be updated and revised as necessary to
reflect dust controls that correspond to current and on-going site activities and operations.
1.6 Environmental Monitoring
In addition to the implementation of physical dust controls, DOE has developed and
implemented an environmental air-monitoring program for the Crescent Junction Site. This
environmental air monitoring program consists of sampling airborne particulates, radon, and
direct gamma radiation at various locations along the site perimeter and at various off-site
locations. Background monitoring locations have been established to provide ambient air quality
data. The background or ambient air quality data will be compared to air quality data collected
from the on-site monitoring locations for the purposes of determining compliance with various
DOE orders and federal and state air quality regulations.
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As part of DOE's environmental air monitoring and fugitive dust control strategy, a
meteorological monitoring station has been established at the Crescent Junction Site. Wind speed
and wind direction data collected from this monitoring station will be used to determine when
site-specific action levels have been exceeded and specific dust controls (e.g., the application of
dust suppression techniques) must be initiated. ln addition, personnel certified in reading opacity
measurements in the State of Utah will determine when active dust control measures should be
initiated and when specific dust generating activities (i.e., excavating, hauling, grading, etc.)
should be discontinued.
In addition to complying with the State of Utah Fugitive Dust Rule, this Plan is consistent with
the intent of complying with various DOE orders. DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental
Protection Program, specifies that effluent monitoring and environmental surveillance be
conducted to determine the effect of DOE activities upon "...on-site and offsite environmental
and natural resources," and to "...verify compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local
effluent regulations and DOE Orders." Similarly, DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the
Public and the Environmerl, requires that DOE control and monitor radiological exposures from
its facilities and activities.
The physical form of the radioactive contaminants (i.e., uranium mill tailings) to be transferred
from the Moab Site is primarily best described as a fine-grained, sand-like material that is
susceptible to wind erosion. Consequently, one of DOE's major objectives at the Crescent
Junction Site is to control and contain the off-site transport of radiological contaminants resulting
from the erosive forces of wind and storm water. This Plan outlines DOE's strategy for
controlling airborne dust emissions and minimizing/controlling the off-site transport of mill
tailings resulting from wind erosion.
A summary of air monitoring program at Crescent Junction consists of
. Five air monitoring stations to measure radon and gamma.
o One residential monitoring location approximately 1.5 miles south of the disposal cell for
radon, direct gamma, and radioparticulates (thorium-230, polonium-210, radium-226, and
total uranium in microcuries per milliliter).
Off-site air monitoring stations for radon, direct gamma, and radioparticulates consists of
o A meteorological monitoring station near Crescent Junction.
. Residential and exterior air monitoring stations for radon, gamma, radioparticulates, and
indoor direct gamma monitoring at one location in Thompson Springs.
Data collection instruments that will be used for the air-monitoring program are
r Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) badges
. Radon TrackEtch cups
o Particulate sampler
Figurc l-3 presents the locations of air monitoring instruments.
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2.0 Site Source Information
2.1 Site Ownership and Physical Location
As required by the Utah Division of Air Quality, the following site-specific source information is
provided:
Name of Operation- Crescent Junction Site of Moab UMTRA Project
Owner/Operator Information-U.S. Department of Energy Grand Junction office.
2597 B3l4 Road, Grand Junction, Colorado 81503. DOE Contact: Donald R. Metzler,
Federal Project Director [phone].Plan Contact: Ed Baker [phone].
3) Physical Address of Operations-1.5 miles northeast, Crescent Junction, Utah.
4) UTM Coordinates or Longitude/Latitude of Operations:
Latitude: 38 degrees, 57 minutes, 79 seconds - North
Longitude: 109 degrees, 48 minutes, 0.1 seconds - West
Elevation: 5,130 U.S. feet above MSL
2.2 Source Information
Type of Material Processed or Disturbed-The materials of concern with respect to fugitive
dust emissions at the Crescent Junction Site will be residual uranium mill tailings and
contaminated native soils/sand. Approximately 16 million tons of uranium mill tailings and
contaminated soils will be removed from the Moab site and transported to the Crescent Junction
repository site. The majority of materials will be poorly consolidated soils that are considered to
be a "high-potential" source of fugitive dust emissions.
The points of potential emissions are the transfer point for transported material to site haul
trucks, the dumping of material into the disposal cell, and the active disposal material surface in
the cell. Another major point of potential emissions is the stockpiled soil removed from the
disposal cell. Combined, the disposal cell and stockpiled native material will constitute
approximately 80 percent of the total land surface of the Crescent Junction Disposal Site. The
remainder of the site is not considered to be a significant source of fugitive dust emissions
because of (1) The low level of past disturbances in these areas, (2) the low level of anticipated
activity occurring in these areas, and (3) The percentage of vegetative cover present within these
areas.
Source areas identified as a "moderate-potential" consist of areas that will be moderately
disturbed and temporarily stabilized, such as the office trailer staging area, access road, rail spur,
and construction water pond areas (approximately 10 percent of the total site area). Soils and
graveled surface in these areas are typically better consolidated and more stable because of
varying degrees of vegetation or rock cover. If these areas prove to be a source for fugitive dust
emissions in the future, appropriate control measures will be implemented.
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Most of the "low-potential" areas are located along the site perimeter and consist of vegetated
rangeland on the margins of the site boundary. Typically, little to no activity is occurring or is
planned in these areas. The "low-potential" areas constitute approximately 10 percent of the total
site area. Consequently, DOE does not anticipate that these areas will be a significant source of
dust emissions from the facility, and no controls are planned for these areas.
Length/Duration of Construction Project-DOE is in the process of evaluating disposal action
alternatives. Depending upon which disposal alternative is ultimately selected, DOE's
responsibility for monitoring and controlling fugitive dust emissions from this site will range in
duration from approximately 10 to 20 years.
Description of Planned Activities-Contaminated materials associated with the former Atlas
Minerals Mill at the Moab UMTRA Project Site will be transported to the Crescent Junction
Disposal Site and placed in a repository of approximately 420 acres, which will be secure from
human intrusion. The repository consists of the disposal cell(approximately 200 acres), soil
stockpile areas, and support facilities for offices, rail road spur, roads, and construction water
pond.
The planned action will result in the removal of tailings materials from the Moab tailings pile,
associated surface contamination, and contaminated material from vicinity properties, for a total
volume of approximately 12 million cubic yards of contaminated materials.
The majority of contaminated materials will be transported from the Moab UMTRA Project Site
in sealed containers by rail over the existing Cane Creek Branch of the Union Pacific Railroad.
They will be offloaded adjacent to the southern border of the Crescent Junction Disposal Site, at
which point they will be conveyed in sealed containers by truck to the disposal cell. Material that
is too large for transport by container on rail cars will be transported to the disposal site by
covered truck along US- 191 .
The disposal cell footprint will be excavated to a depth of approximately 18 to 25 feet. The final
footprint configuration has not been determined. Contaminated materials will be placed and
compacted in layers. Dust will be controlled through use of construction water and/or dust
palliatives. After all materials are transported, the pile will be covered with rock materials.
Surrounding areas will be reclaimed with native seed mixes approved by BLM, and all areas not
necessary for future access or study will be released back to BLM.
Responsible Individuals
Donald R. Metzler, DOE Federal Project Director [phone]
I Ken Karp, Contractor Project Manager (g7O) 248-6464I Jim Erickson, Contractor Site Manager [phone]
Ed Baker, Environmental Compliance Lead [phone]
I If a subcontractor is selected and assumes dust control responsibilities, the State of Utah will be
notified.
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I 3.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Activities
I Descriptions of the on-site activities that may contribute to or generate fugitive dust emissions atI the Crescent Junction Site are presented in the following text.
Types of Activity-DOE is currently in the process of performing various types of
environmental characterization activities at the Crescent Junction Site. These activities which
will provide a baseline of conditions prior to construction, include surface and ground water
monitoring, radon and direct gamma radiation monitoring, environmental airlparticulate
monitoring, meteorological monitoring, and various engineering studies and surveys. Most of
these activities are non-intrusive and result in little-to-no fugitive dust emissions. Vehicles, used
to transport personnel and equipment from one location to another, may result in minimal
generation of fugitive dust.
Implementation of Fugitive Dust and Storm Water Runoff Controls During
Construction-DOE recognizes that disturbed soils, mill tailings, and residual contaminated
soils are especially vulnerable to wind and storm runoff. In an effort to contain these
contaminants and prevent their migration off the site, establishment of fugitive dust and storm
water runoff controls is a priority for DOE. Implementation of these controls will necessitate the
use of heavy equipment to construct support facilities, construct the disposal cell, construct
sediment retention basins, excavate borrow ditches, install culverts, apply dust suppressant
materials, etc. However, fugitive emissions anticipated as a result of these activities are expected
to be minimal in conjunction with extensive dust suppression activities. Whenever possible,
construction will be phased, and each phase will include reclamation and/or permanent
stabilization. Soils will be excavated and stockpiled.
Establishing Support Offices, Access Road, and Railroad Staging Areas-DOE plans to
construct a potable water line, construction office and support trailers, and an access road in
2006. In the next 2years power and construction water utilities will also be installed, and a
railroad staging area will be constructed. To complete these tasks, mobile office buildings will be
set up on the site, security fencing and gates will be installed, and utilities will be extended to the
new facilities. This effort will require the use of heavy equipment for a relatively short-term
duration and is not expected to result in significant fugitive dust emissions.
Preliminary Plans for Construction of Disposal Cell-The disposal cell fooprint will be less
than 150 acres in size. Approximately 12 inches of topsoil-like material will be stripped and
stockpiled from the cell and support facilities. The cell will be excavated to a depth of 18 to
25 feet, and excavated material will be placed around the perimeter to construct the buttress area.
Excavation and deposition of tailings material will proceed sequentially to minimize the size of
the working arcathat will be exposed to wind and water erosion.
Disposal Cell Activities- Cell construction will be phased in subsections to minimize disturbed
areas and the size of soil stockpiles at any given time. Figure 3-1 presents the disposal cell
sequence profile. The cell cover will be an engineered mixture of various materials. Although
more detailed information is available in the Final Environmental Impact Statement, and
specifics may change as the design progresses, the following information is a general description
of the planned cover structure. After the tailings are placed, a compacted heavy clay borrow
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layer (1.5 feet thick) will be placed over the tailings as a radon barrier. A capillary break,
consisting of sand and gravel (0.5 feet thick) will be placed over the radon barrier. This would be
topped with a soil water storage layer (3 feet thick on the sides; 3.5 feet thick on the top), then a
vegetated layer. The vegetated layer on the top of the cell would be seeded in a 0.5-foot-thick
soil/rock admixture; on the side slopes, it would consist of a 1-foot-thick rock layer with soil fill.
Support structures, trailer staging areas, loadout areas, and most of the access roads will be
removed and reclaimed following installation of the final section of the cover,.
Waste Management Activities-For safe storage and to prevent the spread of contaminants into
the environment, petroleum-contaminated soils will be excavated and placed into a Best
Management Practice Area (BMPA) along with other consolidated waste materials. Any on-site
wastes requiring special handling or management will be identified and addressed by DOE's
waste management policy and procedures. The BMPA will be a bermed temporary storage area
that will be constructed with a polyethylene liner. Materials will be temporarily stored at this
location until a permanent disposal option is defined. The construction of this area and the
removal and excavation of various petroleum-contaminated soils will involve the use of heavy
equipment. Moderate fugitive dust emissions can be expected from these activities.
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4.0 Description of Fugitive Dust Emission Controls On-Site
Fugitive dust emission controls to be used at the Crescent Junction Site are presented for each of
the potential source areas, All sources of fugitive dust emissions at the Crescent Junction Site are
related to site activities and site conditions. The routine operation of heavy equipment is not
considered to be a significant source of emissions at this site because of planned mitigation
measures.
4.1 High-Potential Source Areas
Certain portions of the Crescent Junction Site are considered to be potentially significant sources
of fugitive dust emissions and will require more active controls than other areas. These areas are
characterized by loose, poorly consolidated sediments; poor vegetative cover, and high levels of
future/anticipated activity or disturbance. Because both the native soils and uranium mill tailings
possess a silt/sand-like texture, these materials can easily become airborne given sufficient
climatic conditions (i.e., low soil moisture content, sufficient wind speeds). Consequently, DOE
has designated these areas as the highest priority in its dust control strategy. Cumulatively, these
high-potential areas consist of approximately 40 percent of the total site surface area. Table 4-l
presents the specific high-potential source areas, generally associated with the disposal cell,
rail/truck transfer station, and site work roads, and the planned dust controls to be implemented
for each ofthese areas.
4.2 Moderate-Potential Source Areas
Other portions of the Crescent Junction Site are considered to be moderate sources of fugitive
dust emissions and will require a less aggressive approach to dust control. These areas are
characterized by more stable soil conditions, a greater percentage of vegetative cover, lesser
quantities of radiologically contaminated materials, and moderate levels of activity. These areas
are located mostly around the disposal cell in areas used for short-term stockpiling of excavated
native material. Cumulatively, these moderate-potential areas constitute approximately
20 percent of the total site surface area. Table 4-l presents a summary of the anticipated dust
control measures to be used in these areas.
4.3 Low-Potential Source Areas
Approximately 40 percent of the site is considered to be a low-potential source for fugitive dust
emissions. These areas include the trailer support area, railroad support area, main access road,
construction water pond, and relatively undisturbed areas. These areas are designated as having a
low potential for fugitive dust emissions because there is little continuing surface disturbances in
these areas and some areas contain vegetative cover. After the initial construction and
stabilization with dust palliative, gravel, or vegetation, the potential for fugitive dust is low.
Minimal or no dust controls are planned for these areas (see Table 4-1).
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July 2006
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Table 4-1. Summary of Fugitive Dust Controls for the Crescent Junction Site
4.4 Standards, Action Levels, and Response Actions
Table 4-2 presents the applicable regulatory standards and action levels relative to controlling
fugitive dust emissions at the Crescent Junction Site, and the appropriate response actions to be
implemented once it is determined that standards or actions levels have been exceeded.
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Page 4-2
U.S. Department of Energy
July 2006
Fugitive Dust Source
Dust Gontrols
xo)
o
(l,
=
-e6.l'Ec(u'E O)o.'tr6=
(,
E9oo
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LCqr=-)^=tro* 5.9r6ap -=E +do -g!
c(E
(,(!E
Jo
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-toot
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(l,
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bc.clo
s[IoE;oqlLE
.9,o
oooz
High
Potential
Areas
Active
Disoosal Cell x x x x
Rail/Truck
Transfer Area x x x x
Tailings Pile
(lnactive sites)x x x x
Buttress
Material Area x x x x x
Capped/Final
Surface Area x x x x x x
Site Work
Roads x x x
Moderate
Potential
Areas
Excavated
Material
Stockpile
Areas
x x x x
Utility
Corridors x x x x
Low
Potential
Areas
Trailer Support
Area x
Railroad
Support Area x
Main Access
Road x x
Construction
Water Pond
and Vegetated
Areas
x
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An air particulate monitoring network has been implemented at the Crescent Junction Site in
accordance with DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment
and DOE's Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and
Environmental Surveillance (DOE 1991). Air-quality monitoring data are routinely collected and
reviewed to ensure compliance with DOE orders and applicable federal and state air quality
regulations. Air particulate sample locations are shown in Figure 1-3.
Table 4-2. Fugitive Dust Standards, Action Levels, and Response Actions
4.5 Best Management Practices
The following best management practices will also be followed to help minimize and control
dust emissions at the Crescent Junction Site to the greatest extent possible:
Roads-All on-site traffic will be restricted to specific-designated roads. Off-road travel will
only be authorized on a case-by-case basis (e.g., access to a remote monitoring well). The main
access road will be gravel, treated with dust palliative or paved. Traffic on the active tailings pile
will be restricted to designated roads to minimize disturbance of previously treated/stabilized
areas. Traffic speed will also be restricted to an appropriate level on all designated roads, All
designated roads will be considered as high potential dust source areas and, as such, will be a
priority for dust controls using magnesium/calcium chloride, watering, or gtavel.
Hours of Operation-This Plan will be in effect during all hours of operation at the Crescent
Junction Site. During non-business hours, there will be no activities generating dust; therefore,
dust control actions will be restricted to hours of operation only, However, as a best management
practice, if high winds are evident at the close of a business day (or immediately prior to a
weekend, holiday, etc.), site personnel should evaluate wlnerable areas and implement controls
as appropriate to minimize off-hours emissions.
Use of Dust Palliatives or Chemical Suppressants-Various chemical dust suppressants
(e.g., surfactants, salt-based soil conditioners, polymers) shall be used in accordance with the
recommended end uses for those products. For temporary dust control, a polymer may be used
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July 2006
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Standard/
Site-Specific Action Level Method of Determination Response Action
Opacity cannot exceed 20 percent
at any on-site location or source
(U.A.C. R307-309). DOE's qoal at
the site boundary is 0-percent
opacity.
Visual observation by a Certified
Opacity Reader
(EPA Method 9, "Visual
Determination of Opacity
Emissions from Stationary
Sources")
lnitiate immediate dust control
measures as outlined in Table 4-1 .
Cease all dust-generating activities.
Sustained wind speeds exceeding
20 miles per hour.
(EPA Method 9, "Visual
Determination of Opacity
Emissions from Stationary
Sources")
Real time meteorological
monitoring.
Monitor visible emissions; cease all
dust-generating activities if necessary to
maintain 2O-percent opacity or less. lf
needed, initiate immediate dust control
measures as outlined in Table 4-1 .
Cannot exceed public exposure
standards (DOE Order 5400.5)
Analysis of filters collected by
continuous air samplers.
Reassess Fugitive Dust Control Plan
and controls.
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for stabilization prior to revegetation. Site personnel shall not exceed the manufacturer
recommended application rates. Material safety data sheets (MSDSs) for all dust suppressant
materials used at the Crescent Junction Site shall be reviewed and approved by the Compliance
and Health and Safety organizations. Prior to application, site personnel shall determine and
evaluate if the use of the dust suppressant could interfere with other site monitoring activities.
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5.0 Off-Site Fugitive Dust Emission Controls
To minimize the potential for off-site releases or emissions, the following controls will also be
implemented:
Decontamination and Tracking Pad*Prior to leaving designated contamination areas at the
Crescent Junction Site, all vehicles and equipment will be thoroughly washed and
decontaminated at a decontamination pad using a high-pressure water wash. This practice should
minimize the potential for any tracking of sediment or contaminants off the site.
Covered Loads-Tailings material will be transported primarily to the disposal site in sealed
containers on flatbed rail cars. At the rail staging area, the containers will be transferred to haul
trucks for final transport to the disposal cell. A minor portion of oversized contaminated material
will be transported entirely by truck. All trucks hauling materials shall be covered with tarps to
minimize the loss of materials in transit and on the site. All loads shall be inspected to ensure
that they are properly covered prior to departure from both the Moab project Site and the rail
staging area.
Spill Response-In the event of a spill or release of contaminated materials off site, the spilled
materials will be immediately contained and cleaned up. Emergency spill response actions are
outlined in Section 6.0 of the Moab UMTRA Project Health and Safety Plan (DO82006).
U.S. Department of Energy
July 2006
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6.0 References
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1991 . Environmental Regulatory Guidefor Radiological
Efrluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, DOE/EH-0 1 73 T, January.
------, 2006 (continuously updated), Moab UMTM Project Health and Safety Plan,DOE-
EM/GJ 1 085 -2006, Grand Junction, Colorado.
-t
DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program.
-,
DOE Order 231.I, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting.
-;
DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1999. Final Environmental Impact Statement
Related to Reclamation of the Uranium Mill Tailings at the Atlas Site, Moab, Utah,
NUREG-1531, Vol. 1, Washington, DC
Public Law 106-398, 2001. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001.
U.A.C. (Utah Administrative Code),2001. R307-205,: Emission Standards: Fugitive Emissions
and Fugitive Dust, September, Salt Lake City, Utah.
R313-15-301, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, Dose Limits for Individual
members of the Public, September 2001, Salt Lake City, Utah.
UMTRCA 42 United States Code 7912.
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July 2006
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Appendix A
Material Safety Data Sheets for
Dust Suppressants Used at the Crescent Junction Site
1. Calcium Chloride
2. Dust Bond
3. Envirotac II
4. Magnesium Chloride
5. Soil Seal
6. SoilTac
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Material Safety Data Sheet
Revision Issued: 8/1912003 Supercedes: 812512000 First Issued: l2lol/85
S-ectign I ; Clgyucat Prydqgt.And Company Identification
Product Name: Calcium
10043-52-4
Chloride, Liquid
HBCC MSDS No. CC06000
HILt EilBTHER,Y:,&_*#fr
1E?5 NoRTHMANSTREEI r 0RAl.lGE. CAL|FoBNtAS2€6?.3zl0S
C14)gg8.88m r FAX:(/l{00e63i0
ttF:/,hiltbshersrcm
1675 No. Main Street, Orange, California 92867
Telephone No: 714-998-8800 I Chemtrec: 800-424-9300
Section II - Composition/Information On Ingredients
Exposure Limits (TWAs) in Air
AEGIH TLV IOSHA PEL
lN/A lN/A
CAS Number:
;"s#:
%",ilf."u
r::w;--t-
W40
lChemical Name ICAS Number.-,-
-
lCalcium Chloride 110043-52-4
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n-.:i Section III - Hazard Identification
Routes of Exposure: Calcium chloride can affect the body if it is ingested oi if iiiomes
in contact with the eyes or skin.
Summary of Acute Health Hazards
Ingestion: Causes irritation of mouth and stomach,
Inhalation: Causes irritation of nose and throat. Additional effects may include shortness
of breath.
Skin: Causes mild irritation, Additional effects may include blisters or sores, , '
Eyes: Causes irritation and possible transient corneal injury. Tearing may occur. n
Summary of Chronic Health Hazards: May cause perforation of the nasal septum and
nosebleeds. Contact with heated product can cause thermal burns with resultant corneal
injury.
Effects of Overexposure: Possible superficial burns and transient corneal injury.
Med i cal C on d i ti ons $g.,per{ly a HHI SI3J:.{ _bJ, FTp gir 1,,9, Nre
Ingestion: If swallowed will cause nausea and vomiting. If victim ii cons"ious, hav"victim drink water or milk. If victim is unconscious or having convulsions, do nothing
except keep victim warm GET MEDICAL ATIENTION.
Inhalation: Move to fresh air; if discomfort persists, GET MEDICAL ATTENTI9N.
Skin: ff necessary, remove contaminated clothing and shoes. Flush affected areas withplenty of water for at least 15 minutes.
Calcium Chloride, Liquid
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Eyes: Promptly flood with water and continue washing for at least l5 minutes. Consult
an ophtla.lmologist.
I-- S."f,"" V - Fi.. Ftghtt"g-M#r.* -_---*=
Flash Point: Not flammable Autoignition Temperature: Not fl ammable
Lower Explosive Limit: N/A Upper Explosive Limit: N/A
Unusual Fire and Explosion llazards: N/A
Extinguishing Media: This product is non-flammable.
Special Firefighting Procedures: Avoid breathing corrosive vapors; keep upwind, Dike
area to prevent runoff and contamination of water sources.
Section VI - Accidental Release Measures
Dike the spilled liquid, and either pump back into original container or cover with Ciiy-
store at ambient temperature. Prevent possible eye and skin contact by wearing
!ggliy*?,9lgll3,g,1i4 :t*pPgll:,,,,.,, : j,,:,.,,"iir
Respiratory Protection : N/A
Ventilation: Use local exhaust in enclosed areas. Natural ventilation for outdoor a.reas.
Protective Clothing: Employees should be provided with and use impervious clothing,
rubber gloves, and rubber boots.
Eye Protection: Employees should be provided with and required to use splash-proof
safety goggles where there is any possibility of calcium chloride contacting the eyes.
Other Protective Clothing or Equipment: N/A
Worlc/Hygienic Practices; Avoid contact with the eyes, skin, and mucous membranes.
Wash hands thoroughly with soap and water before eating, drinking, smoking or using
toilet facilities. Do NOT place food, coffee or other drinks in the area where dusting or
Se--ction IX - P-hysical and Chemical hoperties
Physical State: Liquid
Melting Point/Range: N/A
pH:5-9
Boiling Point/Range: 113'C for 3OVo
Solution; 115"C for 34.7Vo Solution;
Molecular Weight: 1 10.99
7o Volatiles: 70Vo for 33 Be: 65.3%o for
118oC for 37.5Vo Solution
Appearance/Color/Odor: Clear to straw colored liquid, odorless
Solubility in Water: 1007o Vapor pressure(mmHg): N/A
Specific Gravity(Water=1): 1.3 @ 60"F (for
307o Solution); 1,35 @ 60'F (for34.7Vo
Solution); 1.39 @ 60'F (for 37.5Vo Solution)
Vapor Density(Air=1): N/A
Section VItr - Exposure ControlslPersonal Protection
'jr.'.iil.,ll11:..;
'
Calcium Chloride, Liquid
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37 .4 Be: 62.5Vo for 40 Be
How to detect this compound : N/A
Section X - Stability and Reactivity
Stability: Stable Hazardous Polymerization: Wiil not occur
Conditions to Avoid: N/A
Materials to Avoid: Metals will slowly corrode in aqueous solutions. Keep away from
galvanized iron, aluminum, and tin. Boric acid and calcium oxide are incompatible.
Hazardous Decomposition Products: ff liquid completely dries from fire, thermal
decomposition products may include toxic and corrosive fumes of chlorine and hydrogen
chloride. Product may react with some metals (aluminum, zinc, tin, etc.) to releaseoir.Tflt" nr9::r:18u1.,." : ;r
T Section XI - Toxicological Information
N/A
T Section XII - Ecological Information
N/A
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Section XIII - Disposal Considerations
Add to large volume of water. Dispose of in accordance will local, state and federal
Sectigl XIV - Transport Information
DOT Proper Shipping Name: N/A
DOT Hazard Class/ I.D. No.: N/A
NFPA Rating: Health - 1;Fire - 0; Reactivity - 0
0=Insi gnific ant 1 =S light 2=Moderate 3 =Hi gh 4=Extreme
Synonyms/Common Names : Calcium Chloride-Liquid
Chemical Family/Type: Inorganic Salt
Sections changed since last revision: V, Vm,
RTANT!of
information to employees 4nd any other persons who could be exposed to the produilto
be sure that they are aware of the information before use or other exposure. f'tris MSpS
has been prepared according to the OSHA HazardCommunication Standard t29 CFR
1910.12001. The MSDS information is based on sources believed to be reliable.
However, since data, safety standards, and government regulations are subject to change
and the conditions of handling and use, or misuse are beyond our conftol, HiII BrothersChemical Comoanv makes no warrantv. either exoressed or imolied. with resoect to the
Calcium Chloride, Liquid
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Reportable Quantity: N/A
:1.i ::tr .,..1: r'
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completeness or continuing accuracy of the information contained herein and disclaims
all liability for reliance thereon. Also, additional information may be necessary or helpful
for specific conditions and circumstances of use. It is the user's responsibility to
determine the suitability of this product and to evaluate risks prior to use, and then to
exercise appropriate precautions for protection of employees and others.
Calcium Chloride, Liquid
!,,., ,', ',. n,, ;:,:r::: ..1:..::r'.:ri!i:',..n.i ;1 -.ij :r.: .,:i ' j ' .1
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MATERIAL SAFETY D TA SHEETPmoucrilAte
DUsT BoND"
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tsEIloN x. rR$tsFoFTATtO[ DATA
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Products &
PO Box 786. Gilbert. RZ 859990786
Fhone: (480) 6594747 Fox: [phone]
€moll: lnfo@€nvirotoc. com lUobslto: uruul.envirotoc.com
Our €nvironment fron tho Grouncl Up"
Envirotac ll@
Motoriol SoFety Doto Sheet (pog@ 114)
Vlnyl Flcetoto / flcrrTllc Copolymer
Envirotac II@ Soil Stabilizer / Dust Palliative
MSDS Date: 3/22100
COMPANY IDENDIFICATION Vermillion's Environmental Products & Applications, Inc. @P&A, Inc.)
PO Box 786, Gilbert, Arizona 85299-0786
Envirotaco is a registered trademark of Vermillion's Environmental Products and Applications, Inc.
EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS I{EAITHEMERGENCY....."...[phone]
SPILL EMERGENCY 774-8375
2-.....--. - ._____.-.--Individual residual monomers-__--_-_--------Not Required .-.-"..--_<0.1
Inhalation Inhalation of vapor or mist can cause the following: -headache -nausea -irritation of nose, throat,
and lungs
-___-..Direct contact with material can cause the following: -slight irritation
Skin skin contact can cause the following: -slieht skin iritation
Move subject to fresh air.
--_..Flush eyes with water. Consult a physician if initation persists.
tact------- Wash affected skin area thoroughly with soap and water. Consult a physician if irritation persists.
-------"---.If swallowed, give 2 glasses of water to drink. Consult a physician. Never give anything Ly
Eye Contact
3. HAZARDS TDENTIF'ICATION
Primary Routes of Exposure-_---__--.Inhalation, Eye Contact and Skin Contact
4. FIRST AID MEASURES
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mOuth to an unconscious Derson.
Flash Point__-. -____-___.NoncombustibleAuto-ignition Temperature - _ _ _- _ _-. - _ -Not Applicable
Lower Explosive Limit... -- _ _ _---... _ -.Not Applicable
Upper Explosive Limit---..__--_..._---_Not Applicable
Unusual Hazards----,----.----.---------.-Material can splatter above 100C/212F. Dried product can burn.Extinguishing Agents.----____--__..---_-Use extinguishing media appropriate for surrounding fire.
Personal Protective Equiprnent-.-----Wear self-contained berating apparatus (pressure-demand NIOSH approved or
Personal Protection, _ -- _ -Appropriate pro
SECTION 8, Exposure Controls/Personal Protection, for recommendations. If exposed to
material during clean-up operations, see SECTION 4, First Aid Measures, for actions tofollow.
€nvlrotac lP
Procedures.-.-.--.--.-------Keep spectators away. Floor may be slippery; use care to avoid falling. Contain spillsimmediately with inert materials (e.q, sand, earth). Transfer liquids and solid diking materialto separate suitable containers for recovery or disposal.
CAUTION: Keep spills and cleaning runoffour of municipal r.*.r, und open bodies of water.
6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES
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(Dust & (toslon Control)
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PO Bor 786, Gilbert, RZ 85299-0786
Phone: [phone] For: [phone]
€moll: lnfo@€nvirotoc. (orn lUebslta: uluu,.onvirotoc.com
"Protacting Our €nvironment From tho Grouncl Up"
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MoEeriol SoFetg DoEo Sheet (po g@, 214)
Storage Conditions-----.-..--Keep from freezing; material may coagulate. ftie rninin trm recon n enae .rye
I [ili:::lil: fi:lil: ilffi:i:i liiil]ii;J'e maximum recommended storase
I Handling Procedures.-----.--Monomer vapors can be evolved when material is heated during processing operations.
See SECTION 8, Exposure Controls/Personal Protection, for types of ventilation
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required.
I 8. EXPOSURECONTROLS/PERSONAI,PROTECTION I
Exposure Limit InformationNo. CAS REG NO WEIGHT (%)
I 1.._.__"--Acrylic copolymer-. Not Hazardous.__----39-43
I 2-._______Individual residual monomers.------Not Required.-..--.._.<0.13 --_Aqua ammonia-_-_-_- .1336-21-6--_-__.._-.--.<l .0
4--- -._ .Water. 7732-18-5 57-61
Comp. EP&A.I+o. - O*SHA ACGIHNo. Units TWA STEL, TWA STEL TWA STEL
1___-__--_---.__-.-._.---_-^.None...-.-__-..-.None__--_-.--None_--_-.-.--.--..None.-.____.____-_.None.--.--.-.-----.None
2 _--"--.---_-____--_____--._.a.-.-.---.-_--_--_-_ a--..-_."_-_..--,a....------._-.__.._..a_-.-.--.......__-_ _-_a.._. -_-_. -- --...--"-. a
3- ------_-_ppm_ .._- .--..25 b----.- -_._-.-35 b.__-.....-.None 35 b 25 b 35 b
a----Not Requiredb As Ammonia
Respiratory Protection-..-.---.------..---A respiratory protection program meeting OSHA 1910.134 and ANSI Zgg,2
requirements or equivalent must be followed whenevor workplace conditions
warrant a respirator's use. None required ifairborne concentrations are
maintained below the exposure limit listed in 'Exposure Limit Information,.
For airborne concentrations up to I0 times the exposure limit, wear a properly
fitted MOSH approved (or equivalent) half-mask, air-purif,ing respiratoi, Airpurifuing respiralors should be equipped with NIosH approved (oiequivalent)
ammonia/methylamine cartridges and N95 filters. If oil mist is pre*sent, useR95 orP95 filters.EyeProtection --.-..-----Usesafetyglasseswithsideshields(ANSI ZST.lorapprovedeqilivalent). Eyeprotection wom must be compatible with respiratory protection system
employed.
Hand Protection-"--.------......-..--..---.-The glove(s) listed below may provide protection against permeation. Gloves
of other chemically resistant materials may not provide adequate protection: -
Neoprene
Engineering Controls (Ventilation)--.Use Local exhaust ventilation with a minimum capture velocity of 100 fl/min.' (0.5 m/sec.) at the point of vapor evolution. Refei to the current edition of
Industrial ventilation: A Manual of Recommended practice published by the
American Conference of Governmental Indushial Hygienists for Information
on the desiga, installation, use, and maintenance of exhaust systems.Other Protective Equipment:-..----.---.Facilities storing or utilizing this material should be equippej with an eyewashfacility.
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PO Bor 786, Gilberr. RZ 85299-0786
Phone: [phone] For: (480) 8q2-7755
€moll: lnio@€nvlroloc. (om tlJobslte: uJu,ru.snvirotoc.(om
Our €nvlronment From the Grouncl Up"
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Moteriol SofeEg DoEo Sheet (pog@ 314)
9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
Appearance-__ ---__"Milky
Color WhiteState..._-_.--.--_ -.___.Liquid
Odor Characteristi c.. -- ---... --.- _ _ _ _Ammonia odorPH__-.._-_--_.... ._"...5.0 to 9.5Visoosity..____- __....1500 CpS Maximum
Specific Gravity (Water: l)_____,1.0 to 1.2
Vapor Density (Air: l).-.._.-----.<l Water
Vapor Pressure._-__-_._-_.--- .- -___-.17 mm Hg@20.C/68"F Water
Melting Point _--_-_._---_---...______-.0"C/32.F Water
Boiling Point_-_-_----_.----,_.-_-..-- 100oC/272oF Water
Solub ility in Water-- -..- _ -_ _ -_ _- - __ - Dilatable
Percent Vo lati lity _ - _ - _ _ _ -., _ - _. _ - - - _ _.5 7to 6 lo/o W ater
Evaporation Rate (Bac: l).---_._.<1 Water
The physical and chemical data given in Section 9 are typical values for this product and are not intended to be
product specifications.
See Section 5, Fire Measures
This material is considered stable. However, avoid temperitures above
Hazardous Decomposition Products..-_ -
Hazardo us Po lymerization. _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - -
177C1350F, the onset of polymer decomposition. Thermal decomposition is
dependent on time and temperature.
Thermal decomposition may yield acrylic monomers.
Product will not undergo polymerization.
There are no known materials which are i
10. STABTLITY AND REACTIVITY
1 T. TOXICOLOGICAL INF'ORMATIONT
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Incompatibili ble with this
Acute Data No Toxicity data are available for this material
The information shown in SECTION 3, Hazards Identification, is based on the toxicity profiles for
a number of acrylic emulsions that are compositionally similar to this product. Typical data are:Oral LD50. -_-_._.-" rat_.-.--.._)5000 mg/kg
Dermal LD-_---_ __rabbit-_--->5000 mg/kg rSkin irritation-----rabbit..--practically non-inupting ,:
tial irrational
Procedure Coagulatetheemulsionbythestepwiseadditionoffenicffi
Landfill or incinerate remainins solids in accordance with local state and federal
12. ECOLOGICAL INF'ORMATION
13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS
supernatant and flush to a chemical sewer.
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Products &
PO Box 766, Gilbert, RZ 85e99-0766
Phone: [phone] For: (480) AqZ-7755(moll: lnfo@€nvlroLoc.com tljobslte: urul.u.onviroto(.com"ftota(ting Our €nvlronment from tha Ground Up"
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Moteriol 5of eLr; Doto Shoet (po ga, 414)
Workplace Classification..-This product is considered non-hazardous under the OSHA Hazard Commuric?tion
Standard (29CFR I 910. 1200).
This product is not a 'contiolled product' under the Canadian Workplace Hazardous Materials Inforrnation System(wHMrs).
SARA TITLE 3: Section 311/312 Categorizations (40CFR 370)--. .--___This product is not a hazardous chemical
under 29CFR 1910.1200, and therefore is not covered by Title III ofSARA
SARA TITLE 3: Section 313 Information (40CRF 372).---------.This product does not contain a chemical which is
listed in Section 3 l3 at or above de minimis concentrations.
CERCLA Information (40CFR 302.4).-----..-X.eleases of this material to air, land, or water are not reportable to the
National Response Center under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,Liability Act (CERCLA) or to state and local emergency planning committees under the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) Title III Section 304.
Waste Classification---------When a decision is made to discard this material as supplied, it does not meet RCRA's
characteristic definition of ignitability, coffosively, or reactivity, and is not listed in 40 CFR
261 .33. The toxicity characteristic (TC), however, has not been evaluated by the Toxicity
Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP).
United States------All components of this product are in compliance with the inventory listing tequirements of theU.S. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Chemical Substance Inventory.
Pennsylvania-.-.-.Any material listed as "Not Hazardous" in the CAS REG NO. column otSfCnON Z,
PERSONAL PRoTECTIoN:,.see section 8, Exposure controlslpersonal protection for
recommended handling of material as supplied; check with supervisor for your actual usecondition.
Scale: 0 : Minimal, I = Slight, 2 =Moderate, 3 : Serious, 4 = Severe* : Chronic Effects (See Section 3, Hazards ldentification)
. HMIS is a registered trademark otthe National paint and Coatings Association.
Theinfomationcontainedhereinrelatesonlytothespecificmaterialidentified.v"."itt
believes that such information is accurate and reliable as ofthe date ofthis material safety data sheet, but no representution, gilrante" o,warranty;.expressed or implied is made as to the accuracy, reliability, orcompleteness oithe information. Vermillion's Environmental products
and Applications, Inc. urges persons receiving this information to make their own determination as to the information's suitability andfor their
€nvirotoc lF
16. OTHER INFORMATION
ABBREVIATIONS ACGIH...--.-.---..-American conference of Governmental Industrial HygienistsOSHA__---.-....----_OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration,
TI,v.-----_--.__---..._Threshold Limit Value j
PEL- - _-_ -- ---- _. -_ _ --'-Permissible Exposure Limit
TWA _..__.___-._-_--.Time Weighted Average
STEL. _. ---- - - - - _. - -_.Short-Term Exposure Limit
BAc__-_..__-_-__-___.-Butyl acetate
MSDS in this area
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Stobillzation & €toslon Control)
MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE Page 1 of7
MSDS Number: M0156 * * * t * Effective Date: 11/04/04 * * + * * Supercedes: 03/28/02
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MAGI{ESIUM CHLORIDE
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L. Product Identification
Synonyms: Magnesium chloride, hexahydrate; Magnesium chloride, 6-hydrate, crystal
CAS No.: 7786-30-3 (Anhydrous); 7791-18-6 (Hexahydrate)
Molecular Weight: 203.30
Chemical Formula: MgClZ 6H2O
Product Codes:
J.T. Baker: 2444, 2448, 2449, 2450,4003, 5 1 83
Mallinckrodt: 12131, 5910, 5933, 5954,5956, 5958, 5960, 7 55A, 77gl
2. Composition/Information on Ingredients
Ingredient gAS No percent Hazardous
Magnesium Chloride 7785-30-3 98 - l_00*Yes
3. Hazards Identification
Emergency Overview
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MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE
CAUTION! MAY BE HARMFUL IF SWALLOWED.
SAF-T-DA14(Im) Ratings (Provided here for your convenience)
Page 2 of 7
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Health Rating: 1 - Slight
Flammability Rating: 0 - None
Reactivity Rating: 1 - Slight
Contact Rating: I - Slight
Lab Protective Equip: GOGGLES; LAB COAT; PROPER GLOVES
Storage Color Code: Green (General Storage)I
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Potential Health Effects
Inhalation:
Inhalation of dust may cause mild irritation to the mucous membranes.
Ingestion:
Since magnesium salts are slowly absorbed, abdominal pain, vomiting and dia:rhea may be
the only symptoms. However, if elimination is blocked by bowel blockage or other reasons,
CNS depression, lack of reflexes, hypocalcemia (deficiency of calcium in the blood) may
occur.
Skin Contact:
No adverse effects expected but may cause minor skin irritation.
Eye Contact:
No adverse effects expected but dust may cause mechanical irritation.
Chronic Exposure:
No information found.
Aggravation of Pre-existing Conditions:
No information found.
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4. First Aid Measures ,.
Inhalation:
Remove to fresh air. Get medical attention for any breathing difficurty.
Ingestion:
Give several glasses of water to drink to dilute. If large amounts were swallowed, get
medical advice.
Skin Contact:
Remove any contaminated clothing. Wash skin with soap and water for at least 15 minutes.
Get medical attention if irritation develops or persists.
Eye Contact:
Wash thoroughly with running water. Get medical advice if irritation develops.
Note to Physician:
IV administration of calcium gluconate will partially reverse the effects of acute magnesiumtoxicity. Ventricular support with calcium chloride infusion and mannitol forced diuresis
has also been successful.
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I MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE Page 3 of7
5. Fire Fighting Measures
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Fire:
Not considered to be a fire hazard.
Explosion:
Not considered to be an explosion hazard. At room temperature the addition of magnesium
chloride to fiuan-2-peroxycarboxylic acid, wiil cause the acid to explode.
Fire Extinguishin g Media:
Use any means suitable for extinguishing surrounding fire.
Special Information:
In the event of a fire, wear full protective clothing and NlOSH-approved self-contained
breathing apparatus with full facepiece operated in the pressure demand or other positive
pressure mode.
6. Accidental Release Measures
Ventilate area of leak or spill. Wear appropriate personal protective equipment as specifiedin Section 8. Spills: Sweep up and containerize for reclamation or disposal. Vacuuming orwet sweeping may be used to avoid dust dispersal.
7. Handting and Storage
Keep in a tightly closed container, stored in a cool, dry, ventilated area. Protect againstphysical damage. Isolate from incompatible substances. Containers of this materi-al may behazardous when empty since they retain product residues (dust, solids); observe allwarnings and precautions listed for the product. ,,
8. Exposure Controls/Personal Protection
Airborne Exposure Limits :
None established.
Ventilation System:
A system of local and"/or general exhaust is recommended to keep employee exposures asIow as possible. Local exhaust ventilation is generally preferred b""um" it .* control theemissions of the contaminant at its source, preventing dispersion of it into the general workarea. Please refer to the ACGIH document,,In dustriaT Veitilation, A Manual ofRecommended Practices, most recent edition, for details.
Personal Respirators (NIOSH Approved) :
For conditions of use yhgre exposure to dust or mist is apparent and engineering controlsare not feasible, a particulate respirator (NIOSH type N95-or better filteis) may be wom. If
http ://www jtbaker. com/msds/englishhtmlA{0 1 5 6.htrn 7/20t2006
MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE Page 4 of7
oil particles (e.g. lubricants, cutting fluids, glycerine, etc.) are present, use a NIOSH type R
or P filter. For emergencies or instances where the exposure levels are not known, use a
fuIl-face positive-pressure, air-supplied respirator. WARMNG: Air-purifying respirators do
not protect workers in oxygen-deficient atmospheres.
Skin Protection:
Wear protective gloves and clean body-covering clothing.
Eye Protection:
Use chemical safety goggles. Maintain eye wash fountain and quick-drench facilities in
work area.
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9. Physical and Chemical Properties
Appearance:
Colorless flakes or crystals.
Odor:
Odorless.
Solubility:
167g/l}}ml water @ 20C (68F)
Density:
|.57
pH:
5Yo rn water is neuhal to litrnus.
7o Volatiles by volume @ZlC (70F):
0
Boiling Point:
Not applicable.
Melting Point:
1 18C (244F)
Vapor Density (Air:l):
No information found.
Vapor Pressure (mm Hg):
No information found.
Evaporation Rate @uAc=l) :
No information found.
10. Stability and Reactivity
Stability:
Stable under ordinary conditions of use and storage. By strong ignition is converted intooxychloride.
Hazardous Decomposition Products:
When heated to decomposition it emits corrosivo hydrochloric acid vapor. When heated totemperatures above 300c (572F) it emits toxic fumes of chlorine gas.
Hazardous Polymerization:
Will not occur.
Incompatibilities:
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;i:,r:li,t:il.i.ir:1jl ':) ra...,.;:{..:... j_ ,i. .t.. /:.:;:.::..:i::.;'.r'11,.-,:::ri:j . ,. .: i . ' .- ,.,.rr .?:
7/20/2006
MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE
Furan-2-peroxycarboxylic acid. Strong oxidizing agents will release chlorine.
Conditions to Avoid:
Heat, moisture, incompatibles.
Page 5 of7
I 1. Toxicological Information
Oral rat LD50:
- - -\Cancer
Ingredient
8100mglkg. lnvestigated as a mutagen.
t ists\
---NTP Carcinogen---
Known anticipated IARC CaEegory
Magnesium Chl-oride (7T86-30-3)
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12. Ecological Information
Environmental Fate:
No information found.
Environmental Toxicity:
No information found.
13. Disposal Considerations
Whatever cannot be saved for recovery or recycling should be managed in an appropriate
and approved waste disposal facility. Processing, use or contamination of this priduct may
change the waste management options. State and local disposal regulations may difier fromfederal disposal regulations, Dispose of container and unused contents in accordanie with
federal, state and local requirements.
14. Transport Information
Not regulated.
15. Regulatory
Ingredient
Information
Inventory Status Part 1-\
TSCA EC rTapan Australia
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T MAGNESILA4 CHLoRIDE Page 6 of7
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Magnesium Chloride (77A6-30-3)Yes Yes Yes Yes
---\Chemical Inventory Status - part 2\--- - --__;;;;;r_:
fngredient Korea DSL NDSI, Phil.
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Magnesium Chloride (7786-30-3)Yes Yes No YeB
---\Federa1, SEaEe & International Regulations - part 1\---
-SARA 302- -SARA 3l_3______rngredient Re Tpe List Chemical CaLg.
Magnesium Chloride (7786-30-3) No No No No
---\Federa1, State & International Regulat,ions - part 2\---
I rngredient -RCRA- -TSCA-CERCLA 261_ .33 8 (d)
I
esium Chloride 07a6-30-3) No No No
ChemicaL Weapons Convention: No TSCA 12 (b) : No CDTA: No
I ;:::.iillii';" Acute' "ir,,.. /"3:iil;' * Fire: No pressure: No
I Australian Hazchem Code: None allocated._ Poison Schedule: None allocated.I WHMIS:t This MSDS has been prepared according to the hazardcriteria of the Controlled products
Regulations (CPR) and the MSDS contains all of the information required by the CpR.I
16. Other Information
r NFPA Ratings: Health: l Flammability: 0 Reactivity: 0 ,., '
I Label Hazard Warning:I CAUTION! MAY BE HARMFUL IF SWALLOWED.
Label Precautions:
I Keep container closed.! Wash thoroughly after handling.
Label First Aid:
I If swallowed, give large amounts of water to drink. Never give anything by mouth to anI unconscious person. Get medical attention.
Product Use:
I Laboratory Reagent.
I Revision Information:
MSDS Section(s) changed since last revision of document include: 3.
I Disclaimer:
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I
Mallinckrodt Baker,Inc. provides the information contained herein in good faith but
I ,,:I11T:I*llll-.Ylensrlshhtmvr\401s6:htrn : 7/20/2006
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MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE PageT of7
makes no representation as to its comprehensiveness or accuracy. This document is
intended only as a guide to the appropriate precautionary handling of the material by
a properly trained person using this product. Individuals receiving the information
must exercise their independent judgment in determining its appropriateness for aparticular purpose. MALLINCKRODT BAKER, INC. MAKES NO
REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION AI\IY WARRANTIES oFMERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE WITH
RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION SET FORTH HEREIN OR THE PRODUCT
TO WHICH THE INFORMATION REFERS. ACCORDINGLY, MALLINCKRODTBAKER,INC. WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES RESULTING
FROM USE OF OR RELIANCE UPON THIS INFORMATION.*+ *rF* * *:t rkX<*{. * **r(*rf {. t:f **** * {<rf ** {< rc {. rF* *:t * ***:{. *** **********f ,FiF:t *{< {< * *X{<* rl.rl.rt*rl.{€*d<*rk **
Prepared by: Environmental Health & Safety
Phone Number: (314) 654-t600 (u.S.A.)
7120t2006
NE
NE
NE
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"rFffr"FE*ffiSSPCo
,\ qr,,,tlorffN Trdsr.4a r,*,ilStdrliJltiln FEddd C.. rE
SOIL STABILIZATION PHODUCTS COMPANY, IN
P,O. Box 277S, Merced, GA gS:
..*'(Hffi ;113.%i3'-8ff :',:'"1'"81ff .,;i'
E nvi ro n me nta I ly,A,p p rop ri ate p rod uct fe c h n ot o g ifor Pavements, Dust control, Erosion control & soilstabiliziti,
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
SOIL SEALO coNcENTRATE
I. PBODUCT IDENTIFICATIONP--
INFORMATION FURNTSHED By: Soil Stabilization products Comparry, lnc.ADDRESS: p,O. Box 277g, MerceO, Cn gsiqa''DATE PIIEI5AHED: January g, ZOO'OEMEHGENTIy pHoNE #; (B0o) 523-99'9-2 0r (aOg) 38s_3296
P1*:{get Famity Acrytic potymer product in waterDoT $hipplng Name eoryric norimer fiioouct in waterDOT Status ruot'regutafea '
!l,t1Sl-.lA BEGU LATE D INGHEDI E NTSlnqre.dienls Qfft ,l,,6$L6---
ACRYLIC POLYMEFT Non HazWATEH Non HazAMMONTA 7664-41-7
NOTE: See Eection XIt for other regutatory tnformafion
NE
NE
25 ppm
46'48u/o
54-52V"
0.2ol., Ivlax
I II I. PRECAUTIONAHY INFOHMATION
' Product is not considered hazardous under normalconditions.I . Direct contact of product witn eybs can cause irritation,' PrDlonged or repeared contact i,vrtn srin may cars* irritation.t
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Iv. EMERGENaT a nd FiHsflii, FnoffiunEs
Eye Contact
Skin Contact
lnhalatlon
lngestion
Fire
Spill
Flush eyes tmmodiatBly with water for alpersists,
wash affected skin areas wilh soap and water. wash contiiminated clothing before reuse.
Move subject to lresh air.
I swallowed, dilute by giving 2 glasses ol water to drlnli- see a phy$ician. Never give anythirby mouth to an unconsciggs person,
Product is non-flammable in the liquid state. Use waler spra),, foarn, dry chernicarl of carbcdloxide on driod product.
collect and remove using inert absorbent. Gontain spill entering s6wers, Notify approprialagencies
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least 'irS rrrinutos. Consutt a physician if irrilatj(:
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Soil Seal is a registered fiad€mark ol Soil Seal CorporatiortPage 1 of 3 Hef: 1/09/06
I v. PHYST.AT- cHAPAcrERrs.c$
PnysicalState Miilry liqutd
I eoitirrs roint >2ooo Fr ljjffi,:ffi :,:T',J'"',
t vr.PER$oNAfffi
! Eyes Wear chemical safety goggles to reduce lhe potenlial for eye contarct. Eye rnraslr fountain should brr availabl
I $kin y..,:l|tJ[:able chemlcalgloves and wear appropriate protective c:othing. Launder contaminated ctothir
Flesoiratorv Respiratory protection is not norrnally required, Use NIOSH/MSHA ap,proved respirator if conditions warrarr- Ventilation Standard industrial ventilation Is recommended.
r Flash Point Non-flammable
I
Extinguishing media, Non-flamrnable iil Liquid state. Use water spray, foarm, rJry chemical or carbon dioxir
on dried produot.
I Unusual Fire and Explosion Hazard Personnel exposed to product ol combustion should wear self.contained brearhir
I apparalug and lull protective equipment. Containersr expoSed in a tire should be coolewith water to prevent Vapor prc$sure buitdup leading to a rupture.
I ilil;
ttrvrrYrNFo**ot'o],uo,eurrdernormarcord*ions
I lrrcompatibility Not Established
Hazardous Decornposition Combustion of the dried product can give off oxides ol,carbon ancJ nitrogen.
I trr*Yrrrmerization Wiil nor occur,
IX. EFFECT OF OVEREXPOSURE
I , Eyes Eye contact with liquid may cause irritarion. t
$kin Repoatod or prolonged skin contact with liquid may cause irritation.
I lnhatatiorr No expected etfecrs.
I
Chronic
}aor.?$'r"xl1t:d
effecls. rhis product does not contained regulrrtorJ revers ()f NTP, |ARC or OSHA tisre
Existing Health Conditions Affectgd by Exposure - No know effects on olher illrrersses,
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I Soil Seal is a regislered tradpmark of Soil Seal Corlucratiorr
Pase 2 of 3
l , ',, j,:.;ii,.iJ:ilr;ii .',,:.,J:r.r)..:r:.,i.:,.:. ,, '',l.,,:,',;r-.,',-r::t".i-...:ir::ri;:,i1,,i
Ref: '1109/06
I x. SFILL arrd DISFoSAL INFoHMATION
I $mall Spilts $hoLrld be contained using absorbent rnatoriat, such as clay, soil or ilny commercially available absorllent
t Large Spilhi Should be diked to prevent lurther movement and reclaim into recovery of salvage drums for disposal.
- Disposal This product does not meet the definition of hazardous wa$te under the U, $. EPA Hazardous Waste
I [:',|,',J?,x:i:ffl,:::fr:';r3,;:*''t vour state or rocar euthoritie$ ror proper disposar in the ovent more
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Xl. STORAGE Protect from freezing - product stability may be affected.
XII. REGULATOHY INFOBMATION
I TOSCA This product mosts the compositional requirements of the,Toxic Sttbstances ControlAct and contarni
only chemical ingredients that are listed on the TOSCA inver/tory.
I PA*A rnb ,,r' sec' 31' Jt":xJl'ffi [r#l"J,:i[1]Txi::iBTl?fi'].i ffi[i31i']i,#f,.;x]ffifxH:15fl:1{l;
and Heauthorization Act of 19E6(SARA) and 40 CFR part 372.
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Soil Seal is a rHgistered trademark of Soil SealCrorporation
Page 3 ol
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5051,ss Rel 1/0906
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I SOTLTUORXS, LLc
661 N. Monterey St., fl01
Gilbert, Arlzona 85233
Phon6: [phone] Far: [phone]
wwJv.Soiltac.com [e-mail]
SOILTAE@
Soil Stabilizer &Dust Gontrol Agent
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SOIL
MANUFACTURER
TELEPHONE NUMBER
ONLINE INFORMATION
EMERGENCY TELEPHONE NUMBERS
REVISION DATE
'SOILTAC is a registered tradema* of Soilworks, LLC.
Soilworks, LLC.
681 North Monterey Stre€t, Sulte 't01
Gilbert, Arizona 85233-8318 USA
www.soilworks.com
800-545-5420
www.Soiltac,com
800-545-5420 (National & lnternational)
March 2006
EMERGENCY OVERVIEW
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PHYSICAL FORM
COLOR
ODOR
HAZARDS
EXTINGUISHING MEDIA
C.A.S. CHEMICAL NAME
SYNONYMS
CHEMICAL FAMILY
EMPIRICAL FORMULA
INTENDEO USE
REVISION NOTES
Mobile liquid
White (transparent once cured)
Mird
There are no known health hazards.
The product will only burn after the water it contains is driven off.
Mixture
Soil stabilizer, soil stabilization agent, soil solidifler, soil amendment, soil additive, soil crusting agent,
dust control agent, dust inhibitor, dust palliative, dust suppressant, dust retardant
Vinyl Acetate Copolymer Emulsion
Mixture
Soil stabilization, soil solidification, fugitive dusl control, dust suppression, dust abatement, tackifier,
dust abatement, PMro and PM2.5 air quality control and erosion control
NoneToltoumber and Chem
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1.
2.
3.
The
Vinyl Acetate Copolymer
7732-18-5 Water
108-05-04 Vinyl Acetate Monomer
is a trade secret. Contains no other which will influence the classlflcation of the
Eye Contact rSkin Contactlngestion t
lnhalation
EXPOSURE STANDARDS
Seo Section 2 for exposure standards on ingrodients. Maintain air contaminant concentrations in the workplace at the lowest
feasible levels. Minor components will migrate into the container headspace. Levels in excess of the TLV's or pEL's can accumulatein non'vented container headspaces. Open drums in a well ventilated space. The principal volatile component is water. Minor
volatilo components are identified in Section 2',lngredients,,.HEALTH HAZARDS
There are no known health hazards.
TARGET ORGANS
None known
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF EXPOSURE (Acute effects)
There are no known signs or symptoms of exposure.
SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF EXPOSURE (Possibte Longer Term Effects)
No known effects
MEDICAL CONDITIONS GENERALLY AGGRAVATED BY EXPOSURE
None known
50-65
50-35
< 0.5
,.rr!,:a,:.:,:;ii .1:,:-.',tt',
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SOILIUORKS. LLc
681 N. Monterey SL, *101
Gilbert, Arlzona 85233
Phon.: [phone] F6x (48o) 545-5456M.Soiltac.com lnfoaSoiltec.com
Rinse immediately with plenty of water.
SKIN CONTACT
Remove contaminated clothing and shoes. Wash affected area with soap and water.
INHALATION
Move patient to fresh air. lf breathing has stopped or is labored give assisted respiration (e.g. mouh-to-mouth). Supplemental
oxygen may be indicated. Seek medical advice. Prevent aspiration of vomit. Turn victim's head to the side.INGESTION
lf swallowed, call a physlcian immediately Remove stomach contents by gastric suction or induce vomiting only as directed by
SOILTAE@
Soil stabilizor EDust Contrirl Agent
medical personn6l. Never mouth to an unconscious
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FLASH POINT (closed cup)
UPPER EXPLOSION LIMITUPPER EXPLOSTON LtMtT (UEL)
LOWER EXPLOSTON LtMtT (LEL)
AUTOIGN ITION TEM PERATURE
F|RE HMARD CLASSIFIGATION (OSHA/NFpA)
EXTINGUISHING MEDIA
No Data
No Data
No Data
No Data
Non-Combustible
The product will only burn after the water it contains is driven off. For dry polymer use water or carbon dioxide. product does not
burn. Aqueous solution is not flammable.
SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES
No special procedures required. The product, as distributed, is noncombustible.UNUSUAL FIRE AND EXPLOS]ON HAZARDS
When dried carbon dioxide and smoke are
CONT sources,ng etc)
Stop the leak, if possible. Ventilate the space involved.
CLEAN.UP PROCEDURES
Wear suitable protectiVe equipment. lf recovery is not feasible, admix with dry soil, sand or non-reactive absorbent and place in anappropriate chemical waste container. Transfer to containers by suction, preparatory for later disposal. place in metal containers forrecovery or disposal' Flush area with water spray. Wash contaminated property (e.g., automobiles) quickly before the material dries.For large spills, recover spilled material with a vacuum truck,
OTHER EMERGENCY ADVICE
Spilled polymer emulsion is very slippery. Use care to avoid falls. A film will form on drying. Removo saturated clothing and washcontacted skin area with soap and water. Product imparts a milky white color to contaminated waters. Foaming may result. Sewage
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treatment plants may not be able to remove the white color imparted to the water
STORAGE
Keep away from: oxidizers. Avoid freezing temperatures during storage.
Minimizs contact with atmospheric air to prevent inoculation with microorganisms.HANDLING
use only in well-ventilated areas. Avoid contactwith eyes. Avoid breathing vapors.
eat, drlnk or smoke.
OTHER PRECAUTIONS
No soeci
HAND PROTECTION
Rubber Gloves. The breakthrough time of the selected glove(s) must be greater than the intended use period.RESPIRATORY PROTECTION
Not required under normal use.
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
No specific recommendation.
ENG!NEERING CONTROLS
Maintain air concentratlons in work spaces in accord with standards oufllned in Seclions 2 and 3.
,.
Avoid contact with skin. When using, do not
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Chemical safety glasses.
PROTECTION
./i,j,.r,: l ::, i'!f: .:i:;'.., .:..:- l;.;:*!. ....-.,.,,j..,:.
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GOLOR
ODOR
pH
VAPOR PRESSURE
VAPOR DENSITY (Air = 1)
BOILING POINT
SOLUBILITY IN WATER
SPECIFIC GRAVITY (Water = 1)
MOLECULAR WEIGHT
Mobile liquid
White (transparent once cured)
Mitd
4.0-6.0
18.65 (mm Hg at 21'C (70"F))
Of water vapor
>100.00'c (>212.00'F)
Completely ('1007o) (until cured)
1 .04-1 .1 0
Mixture
sotLTAc@
Soil Stabilizbr EDust Gontrol Agcnt
Concentration
Undiluted
Undiluted
Undiluted
SOILIUORKS. LLo
681 N. Monter6y SL, f101
Gilbert, Arizona 85233
Phon6: [phone] Far (/180) 545-5456
www,Soiltao.oom [e-mail]
WORK AND HYGIENIC PRACTICES
Minorcompon€ntswill migrateintothecontainerheadspace. Levelsinexcessoftheexposurelimitscanaccumulateinnon-vented
container headspaces. Under normal conditions of use in a well-ventilatBd space, the concentration of minor components in the
air will not exceed the e
CHEMICAL STABILITY
Stable at ambient temperatures. Coagulation may occur following freezing, thawing or boiling.
CONDITIONS TO AVOID (if unstable)
Not applicable
INCOMPATIBILITY (Materials to Avoid)
Mineral acids (i.e. sulfuric, phosphoric, etc.). Alkalis (i.e. Sodium or Potassium Hydroxide etc.).
HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS (from burning, heating, or reaction with
other materials).
Depending upon formulation conditions (such as pH>7), the level of acetaldehyde may increase as a result of hydrolysis of residual
vinyl acetate monomer. Carbon Monoxide in a fire. Carbon Dioxide in a fire. Aldehydes. Acetic Acid.
HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION
Will not occur
CONDITIONS TO AVOID (if polymerization may occur)
No Data
ACUTE DERMAL TOXICITY
No Data
ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY
No Data
Components: Vinyl Acetate Monomer LC50 (1 h): 5,656 ppm Species: Rat
OTHER ACUTE EFFECTS
No Data
CHRONIC/SUBCHRONIC DATA .,'This product contains small amounts of vinyl acetate monomer. ACGIH evaluated vlnyl acetate (1993) as an A3 Animal
Carcinogen: Available evidence suggests that the agent is not likely to cause cancsr in humans except under uncommon or unlikely
routesofexposure. Thelnternational AgencyforResearchonCancer(IARC) publishedamonographonvinyl acetate(1995). ln
this monograph IARC indicates "there is inadequate evidence in humans for carcinogenicity of vinyl acetate. There is limited
evidence in oxperimental animals for carcinogenicity of vinyl acetate." Normally, this lack of conclusive evidence would place a
substance in the IARC Category 3 classification (Not classified as a human carcinogen), However, because vinyl acetate is
metabolized to acetald€hyde, which has an IARC 2 B (Possibly carcinogenic to humans) classiflcatlon, it also has been listed under
Common Name
Green Algae
Fathead Minnow
Rainbow Trout
ENVIRONMENTAL FATE
No Data
ADDITIONAL IN FORMATION
No Data
Specles
Raphidocelus Subcapitata
Pimephales Promelas
Oncorhynchus Mykiss
Test
96-hr chronic LCS0
96-hr acute LC50
96-hr acute LC50
Result
>1,000
>1,208
>1,000
#ffid ffi soi'|ta
1:f;. ':r{'; n! ;i'
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t SOILIUORKS, LLc
681 N, MontG.ey St,, *10'1
Gilbert, Arlzona 85233
Phon6: (800) 54tt-5420 Far: (4E0) 545-6456www.Soiltao,oom lnfo(@Soiltao,oom
sotLTACo
Soil Stabalizor &Oust Gontrol Agent
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DISPOSAL
Comply with all Federal, State and Local Regulations. For small quantitios (less than 100 gallons): Disposal to municipal or industrial
wastewater treatment plants is normally acceptable. Obtain approval Irom these authorities before disposal. The product does
impart a white, milky color to wat6r, which may not be removed or sufiiciently diluted by the treatment facility. The product may also
cause foaming when agitated. The product can be chemically or biologically degraded. For large quantities: Disposal through
licensed waste disposal facilitles is suggested. The product can be incinerated, though chemical or biological treatment is sufficient.
Chemical precipitation/coagulation can be used to facilitate removal of solids (consult manufacturerfor detailed procedure). NOTE:
As suppliod or diluted, product material (foam included), when splashed on automobiles or other porsonal property, is difficult tot
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remove if allowed to
SHIPPING
DOT BULK SHIPPING NAME
IMO SHIPPING DATA
ICAO/IATA SHIPPING DATA
CFR
IMDG
cTc
Refer to Bill of Lading - Not Dor Regulated // Keep From Freezing // Not dangerous goods
Refer to Bill of Lading.
Refer to Bitl of Lading.
Refer to Bill of Lading - Not IATA Regulated i/ Keep From Freezing // Not dangerous goods
Not Regulated // Keep From Freezing // Not dangerous goods
Not Regulated // Keep From Freezing // Nol dangerous goods
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// Keep From Freezino // Not
SUBSTAN (TSCA)-
All components are included in the EPA Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Chemical Substance lnventory.TOX]C SUBSTANCE CONTROL ACT (TSCA) 12(b) COMPONENT(S)
None
osHA Hazard communication standard (29cFRl 91 0. 1 2oo) hazard ctass(es)
None
EPA SARA Title lll Section 312 (40CFR370) hazard class
None
EPA SARA Title lll Section 313 (40CFR372) toxic chemicals above "de minimis" level are
Vinyl Acetate Monomer
US. california safe Drlnking water & Toxic Enforcement Act (proposition 65)
!-{B_Nll.lG] This product contains a chemical known in the State of California to cause cancer. AcetaldehydeWHMIS HAZARD CLASSIFICAT]ON
None
WHMIS INGREDIENT DISCLOSURE LIST
None
WHMIS SYMBOLS
None
ETNECS / ELTNCS MASTER INVENTORY (EU)
lncluded on EINECS inv€ntory or polymer substance, monomers included on EINECS inventory or no longer polymerDSL (Canada)
lncluded on inventory
AICS (Australia)
lncluded on inventory
ENCS (Japan)
lncluded on inventory
ECL (South Korea)
Included on inventory
SEPA (China)
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lncluded on
HMIS ng
Health
Flammability
Physical Hazard
:1
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Exhibit C
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UTE MOUNTAIN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit C to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML Renewal
Re: Identification of Potential Tailings Cell Influence in Groundwater at White Mesa
Miil
Assessment of groundwater data from two monitoring wells at Denison Mine's (USA)
Corp. (DUSA) White Mesa Uranium Mill ("the Mill", or "Mill") has been completed by the Ute
Mountain Ute Tribe Environmental Programs Department (UMU-EPD). UMU-EPD staff
presents results of this assessment below, which indicate that contamination originating from the
tailings cells is present in the groundwater at the southern boundary of the Mill's monitoring
network.
Monitoring wells MW-20 andMW-22 were installed by (the Mill or DUSA) in 1994.
They are located downgradient of the tailings impoundments and are the closest monitoring
wells to the Ute Mountain Ute Tribal community of White Mesa (see Map I below).
MAP I
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I Although the wells were installed in 1994, the Utah Division of Radiation
f Control (DRC) did not require DUSA to provide any monitoring data from these
wells until 2010 (after adding a requirement at Part LE.2 of the Groundwater
I Discharge Permit (Permit UGW370004) during the March 17,2008 Permit
I Modification). This requirement mandated DUSA to begin quarterly monitoring for
eight consecutive quarters in wells MW-20 and MW-22 and to submit a report
I to determine background water quality and calculations of groundwater velocities within
I the vicinities of these wells.
I On June 1, 2010 DUSA submitted the "Background Groundwater Quality Report for
t Wells MW-20 and MW-22 for Denison Mines (USA) Corp.'s White Mesa Mill Site, San
Juan County Utah." The results included in the report for well MW-22 are disturbing and
I indicate that the groundwater aquifer is dangerously contaminated by the tailings
I impoundments. The presence of tailings leachate in the groundwater atMW-22 (located
approximately one mile south of tailings cell44. and approximately 1.3 miles north of the
I Tribes' border, see Map I above) is alarming due to the serious risk of pollutant-migration to
I springs around the mesa as well as to the deeper Navajo aquifer, which supplies drinking water
to the community of White Mesa (and to Bluff).
I DUSA has resolutely stated that chloride, followed by fluoride, is the best indicator ofr tailings cell leakage ("Revised Background Groundwater Quality Report: Existing Wells For
r Denison Mines (USA) Corp.'s White Mesa Mill Site, San Juan County, Utah, October 2007,"
f "Background Report"). Chloride has chemical properties that facilitate transport by water and it
- is often chosen as a tracer of groundwater flow. Chloride is present at elevated concentrations in
MW-20 and MW-22 and the results exhibit a rising trend:rr
r o=ou.[#h=,u*I&8
ra
?l??r08 drflS gJlSAg lzrl8fig 348[0 ?&€9 10rl4lt9 lEiylo A?Jlo
S{Tae &t"
Background Report, 2007
MT ,:rI $-
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Fluoride is cited by DUSA as the second-best indicator of tailings impact to groundwater
I at White Mesa, "Other than chloride, the constituent with most promise for indicating potential
I impacts from tailings solutions is fluoride," Background Report page 9-3. Fluoride is also
present at elevated levels on a rising trend in MW-20 and MW-22:
I ..0..[IffiT.oo*
2.4
2.r'ZA1iAE 6l1tlg &tl,* !?l&09 3r28,Ee 7.EOg l$l{Je? tE3'10 5An0
Sarple &!e
Background Report, 2007
I Additional chemical indicators of tailings impacts are also evident in the southern-most
I monitoring wells, where li4'W-22 displays a pH trending downwards with a sample result as low
as 5.5 s.u. Furtherrnore, cadmium, cobalt, molybdenum, nickel and zinc are all present in the
I tailings solutions at extremely high concentrations (Annual Tailings Wastewater Monitoring
I Report Groundwater Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004 White Mesa Uranium Mill,
November 19,2010), and analytical results included in the Background Report state that these
I trace metals exist at elevated concentrations in MW-22 and are exhibiting rising trends
I (Background Report, 2007).
I *aungu#i"f,T,'i:"11il![1".Jffi,T.;LT::f#'ffliji,tY;3i,i;dru:H;:Tilffil';l'
concentrations in }l4W-22 have been recorded as high as 31,800 ug/L (Background Report,
f 2007), which is a level that cannot represent natural groundwater conditions. Analysis of over
I 5,000 manganese results from the U.S. Geological Survey National Water-Quality Assessment
Program, which collected trace element concentrations in groundwater from 5,183 monitoring
I wells between 1992 and 2003 from aquifers in arid and humid regions across the United States
I (Trace Elements and Radon in Groundwater Across the United States: U.S. Geological Survey
Scientific Investigations Report 201 l -5059), did not find a single manganese result at such a
hish level.IIr There is also isotopic evidence suggesting tailings cell influence at MW-22. The report,
r "Summary of work completed, data results, interpretations and recommendations for the July
t 2007 samplings event at the Denison Mines, USA, White Mesa Uranium Mill near Blanding,r Utah, University of Utah May 2008" (University of Utah Report), provides evidence that modem
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(less than 50 year old) surface water is recharging the shallow aquifer at the Mill site and is
present in the groundwater atMW-22.
Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. Because groundwater tritium
concentrations reflect atmospheric tritium levels when the water was last in contact with the
atmosphere, tritium can be used to date groundwater recharge. Tritium found in MW-22
indicates that recent recharge from a surface water source is occurring and influencing the well
(page 27 ,33). The evidence of recent surface water recharge in the aquifer, along with the
presence of chemical tailings signature parameters, directly contradicts the WMM's claim and
DRC's acceptance of calculated groundwater velocities and traveltimes in the shallow aquifer
("Calculated average linear groundwater velocities for MW-20 andMW-22 are 0.33 feet per year
(ft/y| and 0.43 ftlyr, respectively" Ground Water Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004
Statement of Basis February, 2011),
Sulfur isotopes were also sampled inMW-22, "Analytical results for sulfur-34 and
oxygen-18 isotopes of sulfate, and deuterium and oxygen-18 isotopes of water were conducted to
provide a possible fingerprint of water originating from the Mill tailings cells. Down-gradient
waters with a similar isotopic fingerprint as the tailings cells, in addition to a significantly
different isotopic fingerprint up-gradient of the tailings cells, may imply the tailings cells as
contamination point-sources," (University of Utah Report page 4). }l4W-22 exhibited sulfur
isotopes with ratios similar to surface water sites in tandem with oxygen-sulfur isotopes that
were distinct from the surface water sites. These results, "may be explained by a recharge of
surface water that isn't evaporated" pniversity of Utah Report page 48). Tailings leachate
originating from the bottom of the tailings cells is un-exposed to the atmosphere and is thus a
probable source for this signature given the distressing presence of leakage parameters of MW-
22.
DRC has failed to adequately analyze multiple lines of evidence that indicate
contamination originating from the tailings cells. Contaminants characteristic of the mill's
tailings cells present in the groundwater aquifer a generous distance from the source constitutes a
serious threat to public and environmental health. DRC has dismissed evidence from well MW-
22 by stating that, "Monitoring wells MW-20 and MW-22 are far downgradient from the nearest
tailings impoundment. MW-20 is about three quarters of a mile away and MW-22 is about a mile
away and cross gradient from the downgradient edge of Cell 44. making it unlikely that
groundwater quality in samples from these wells today has been influenced by potential tailings
cell" (Ground Water Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004 Statement of Basis February,
201l).
The Tribe demands that DRC designate MW-20 and MW-22 as Point of Compliance
Wells and immediately require DUSA to implement the concurrent closure and other
groundwater protection measures the Tribe has specified in, "Comments Regarding Denison
Mines (USA) Corp. Radioactive Materials License Renewal DRC-045" along with any other
groundwater remediation measures that are necessary to protect human health and the
environment.
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References
I Ayotte, J.D. Gronberg, J.M., and Apodac a,L,E.,2Oll, Trace Elements and Radon in
Groundvvater Across the United States: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report
r 2011-5059, l15 p.I
Solomon, D.Kip., Hurst, T.Grant., May 2008. Summary of work completed, data results,
I interpretations and recommendations For the July 2007 Sampling Event At the Denison Mines,
I USA, White Mesa Uranium Mill Near Blanding Utah.
I Interra, Inc. Prepared for Denison Mines. June 2010. Background Groundwater Quality Report
I for Wells MW-20 and MW-22 for Denison Mines (USA) Corp.'s White Mesa Mill Site,
Sqn Juan County, Utah.
I Denison Mines (USA) Corp. Annual Tailings Wastewater Monitoring Report Groundwater
Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004 White Mesa Uranium Mill. November 19,2010.
I Utah Division of Radiation Control. Ground Water Quality Discharge Permit UGW370004
Statement of Basis February, 2011.
I Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, December 201 l, Comments Regarding Denison Mines (USA) Corp.
Radioactive Materials License Renewal DRC-045. Gary Hayes, Chairman, Ute Mountain Ute
I
Tribe to Rusty Lundberg, Director, Utah Division of Radiation Control.
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EXHIBIT I)
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!rlrclr:cl 0 LcavittCo.mq
Di:nnr fi. Nrclson. Ph.D.fi.rutr. Drds
\\'ill ranr J, SinclairOr<to
Fcbruary I I
DEPARTMENT OF ENViRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OT RADIATION CONTROL
168 Nonh 1950 Wcst
P.O. Box 144850
Satr Lakc City. UtaI 84 I l4-4850
[phone] voicc
(801) 533-40f7 Fat
(80r) 536-4114 T.D.D.
I 999
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David C. Frydenlund
Vice President and General Counsel
international Uranium (LISA) Corporation
independence Plaza, Suite 950
l 050 Seventeenlh Street
I)enver, CO 80265
SUBJTCT: February 4, 1999 Letter to Mr. Don Ostler
Director - Division of Watcr Quality
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
Dear Mr. Frydenlund:
The Urah Dcparrrnent of Environmental Qualiry, Division of Radiation Control @RC) has
re ceived the subject lener via facsimile on February 4,1999. As u'e indicated in our meeting
rvith i,ou on December i l, 1998, rhe DRC has maxy conccms related tCI groundwater protection
lrom porential seepage from the tailings impoundmenls at lhe White Mesa Mill. These concerns
rr*rc funher clarified in subsequent leners lo International Uranium Corporation (lUC) on
J.ir:irai1'8. l999andJanuary2l,l999, Asrequestedbyyouinthesubjeciletter,theDRC's
corlcsrns are stated again belorv.
1-r ilings Impoundment Liner Systems
]'he DRC is not convinced lhat the bottom liner systems for tailings impoundment cells 1,2, and
I ar \Vhire Mesa are adequate for rninimizing discharge of tailings leachate to groundwatcr.
DRC sraff reviews of the November 23, I998 and December 31, 1998 Knight Piisold modeling
reporrs indicated that a number of assumptions were made in the modeling effbrt without
appropriate supporting documentation. As stated in the January 2l, 1999 lette r to IUC, these
assumptions have critical implications associated with the analytical model inputs and
conesponding output lincr leakagepredictions. Without the supporling documentation, these
assumptions and the coresponding modelpredictions cannot be confirmed. As we indicated in
rl're January 21,1999letter, thc DRC cannot verifu the predictions re ndered by the modeiing
e florr without the requested infsrmation. In addition, the DRC does not believc that a best-casc
sccnario for liner leakage is valid as assumed in the lfuight Pidsold modeling effort. A more
rcalisric approach should be employed whieh considers sensitivity analyses of key modcl input
pararneters to provide a range of possible predictions instead of a single best*case scenario.
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David C. Frydenlund
February 11,1999
Page ?
Lc:rk De tcction Systems
Sinrilarly, the DRC does not have confidence in the efficiency of the leak detection systems for
r;iilings impoundment celts 1,2, and 3 at the Wi:ite Mesa Mill. The lealt detection systems have
a high potential lbr undetected teakage for two primary reasons. First of all, an efficient lcalc
derecrion systern must have a secondary low-permeability barrier belor.v the prirnary low-
permeability tiner to accumulate and divert leakage to the lealc collection pipe. However, the
icak detection systems for these cells consists of a primary 30-mil PVC geomembrane on top of a
6-inch thick layer of reworked sandstone bedrock which is supposed to function as a secondary
lo*'-permeabiliry barrier. In the Decembcr 31, 1998 Knight Pidsold modeling repon, the
re rlorkecl sandstone bedrock matcrial is assigned a saturated hydraulic conductivity of lxl0{
ccnrimeters pe r second. Because thc reworked bedrock layer beneath the PVC geomembrane is
rhe eontrolling soil layer, there nceds to be some quantitative justification for using this value.
Se condly, should a leak occur that is large enough to pool and accumulate on top of the
rcrvorked sandstone bedrock material, it would have to travel over a long horizontal distance to
rrech rhe cotlection pipe and be detected at the downslope end of the cell. During this horizontal
rrave I path across the irnpoundment, vefiical seepagc losscs through the rervorked sandstonc
nrnle rial will further reduce ttre effectivencss of the detection system to repon small lealis.
Ccnsequenriy, only the largest catastrophic leaks will be detected by the current leal< detection
sr siems lor rhese cells, Non-catastrophic seepage from these disposal cells rvill travel vertically
rlrror:gh rhe vadose zone rvith the potential for reaching the water table aquifer. Once reaching
tirc rvarer rable, leachate contamination will not be detected until reaching the groundrvater
nronitoring rvells rvhich could take many years to occur.
Fractu re Florv Potcntial
Accelerated kavel tirrres of tailings fluid leakagc via secondary permeability fiom joints and
lrnclures was not addressed in e ither the Novemb er 21,1998 or the December 3 l, 1998 K.night
Piesold reports. As repofled in tlre February l99l UMETCO Croundrvater Study of &e White
h4esa Faciliry (Peel Environmental Services, t993) lluid travel times to the perched aquifer frorn
pond liner lealcage were estimatcd based on site-specific boring and well test data. These data
indicare that it is likely that seepage under positive pressure could be in direct contact with
verricaljoints at the base of the ponds. In this case, seepage would occur as localized saturated
florv through joints within the Dakota Sandstone into the Burro Canyon perched aquifer.
Consequently, travel times for tailings pond leakage to the pcrchcd aquifcr could be as short as a
lerv rveeks thnough joints directly in contact with tailings solutions to approximately 60 years for
parrially saturated flow conditions (Peel Environmental Services, 1993)* This is in sharp contrast
ro rhe 1,300 year travel time estimated in the November 23,1998 Knight Piesold report.
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Dar !d C. Frydenlund
Fcbruary I l, 1999
I)r,rp 1
tlcl'icicnt Groundrvater Moniloring Program
An6rher concern rhe DRC has is the ground*'ater monitoring program rvhich we find to be
ir.ra4equate. Presently, lhe groundwaier detecrion monitoring program enrployed at the rnill
,nl!1,z.es only for the'inorginic constitue nts of chloride, potassium, nickel, and uranium" Based
on r5e consrituents rhar ari typically present in I le.(2) byproduct material lrom acid leach
processing olnatural uranium ores, olher consen'alive more mobile "smoking gun" leakage
ptrtnleters such as arnrnonia, nitrate, nitritc, molybdenum and sulfate should be included. In
l1ilirion to inorganics xsociated with acid leach processing of natural uranium ores,lUC has
inrroduced a number of addirional organic consriruents from alternote leed materials such as the
Ashland 2 FUSRAP material wtrich are not common conslituenls of lle.(2) byproduct material
lrom natural ores. J'he current groundwater detection monitoring program al the mill does not
include any organic compounds and is therefore inadequate for detecting releases of these
.or1pounds ro ih* perched aquifer. As indicated by analytical resulr of soil samples in the
Remedial Investigation Report, pre-excavation sampling aclivities, and receipt sampling
acri'iries ar rhe mill, thcre are a wide range of volatile and senri-volatile arganic compounds
nrixed rvirh the Ashland 2 mareriat including chlorinated solvents. Chlorinated solvents have
nrue h cJifferent chemical characteristics than petroleum hydrocarbons rvhich make thcm a serious
r5rear to groundrvarer sysrems. In parricular, the high dcnsity and lorv viscosity of chlorinated
sol\.ents enables them to migrate dorvnrvard tfuough verlical fractures in bedrock sys{cms such as
the one beneath the While Mesa tailings impoundment.
I hupe rhjs lener has clarified our concerns to IUC regarding Utah DEQ's requesl for a groundwater
,lirrharge pe rmit. The State will notify you prior to taking any lormal enlorcement action against
lUC. If ,vou luve any questions about this lener, please call me or Rob Herberr at (801) 5364250.
Sincerely,@w\\'illiam J. Sinclalr, Eirector
I-livision of Radiahdn Conrol
Fred Nelson, Utah Attorney Cenerals Office
Don 0stler, P.E., Director,'DEQ'DWQ
Diannc Niclson, Ph.D., Executivc Director, UDEQ
,:.a}rata€rr1*f\wtd'ft Mts,r\rtYo€liLuxD,trr
E,XHIBIT E
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REPORTS CITING CHLORIDE AS AN INDICATOR OF TAILINGS CELL LEAKAGE
WHITE MESA URANIUM MILL. SAN JUAN COUNTY UTAH
TEPORT DATE iEPORT TITLE AUTHOR CITATIO N/QUOTE/RELEVANC E )AGE NIJMBER
1981 Letter Report: Assessment of Groundwater
Quality, White Mesa Prcject D'Appolonia
MW-3 showed elevated concentrations of chloride
after rising water levels were detected in the leak
detection system from Cell 2
Electronic or Hardcopy of Report
not cunently available
July, 1 994 Hydrogeologic Evaluation of White Mesa
Uranium Mill TITAN, INC
"Because chlorides are a conseruative species and
are concentrated in tailings solutions, this or other
similar mobile constituents may be selecled as an
initial method of detecting impacts to ground wate/'
33
October.'1994 Points of Compliance White Mesa Uranium Mill Tilan Environmental
Corporation
The most depondable indicators of water quality and
potential cell failure are considered to be chloride
nickel potassium and natural uranium 6,7
October, 2007
Revised Background Groundwater Quality
INTERA
'is inconceivable to have an increasing trend in any
)ther parameter caused by seepage from the Mill
:ailings without corespondinq increase in chloride"7-Jan
:hloride meets at least two specifications of an ideal
ndicator of potential tailings solution impact to
Jroundwater. the average chloride concentration in
ailings impoundment solutions of 4,600 mg/L is
iufficient to guarantee that any seepage from
ailings impoundments would be
neasurable in groundwater before any substantial
,olume had entered the system. Thus,
rhloride is a primary indicator of potential tailings
mpact.
Kepon Exsung vvens ror uenrson Mrnes u5A
Corp White Mesa Mill Site San Juan County Utaf Other useful chemical indicator species listed in
Table 15 include ammonia, nitrate, fluoride, sulfate,
and TDS.
None of these parameters provides the utility of
chloride as a tracer in groundwater at
the Mill site,"
9-4
Any poteniial seepage from tailings impoundments
vould be expected to
)xhibil rising concenlrations of chloride"9-7
lecause of its well documented fate and transport
:haracteristics and presence
rt high concentrations in the tailings impoundments,
nonitoring of chloride
)oncentrations in groundwater provides the highest
)otential for early delection
t2-7
November,2007
Revised Addendum - Evaluation ofAvailable
Preoperational and Regional Background Oata
Background Groundwater Quality ReporlExisting
Wells For Denison Mines USA Corp White Mesa
INTERA
'chloride which is very mobile and good indicator of
cotential tailings cell leakage at the site"
'?
April,2008
Revised Addendum - Background Groundwater
Quality Reporl New Wells For Denison Mines
JSA Corp White Mesa Mill Site San Juan Coun\
utah
INTERA
"chloride which is very mobile and good indicator of
potential tailings cell leakage at the site"
Page iii
September,2009
WHITE MESA URANIUM MILL Renewal
Application State of Utah Ground Water
Discharge Permit No UGW370004
Denison Mines
"chloride which is very mobile and Oood indicator ol
potential tailings cell leakage at the site"
Page 4
September,2010
WHITE MESA URANIUM MILL Renewal
Application State of Utah Ground Water
Discharge Pemit No UGW370005
Denison Mines
"Chloride is unquestionably the best indicator
parameter and there are no significanl lrends in
chloride in any of the wells"Page 45
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NTPARTME]!{T OT ENVIRO}{MENTAI QUALI
NIVISION d}F ITAOIATION T.Oh}TROL
fiJieh*l (]. l.*auilrL;nffiB
D;anr.c R hiiclran Ph.t)Lrm:rr llirt"ts
Willia{r: }, She l&irlfurctr{
Mri-n{o&An{*ltt{
TO:
FROIr{:
DA"I'H:June 27. 2()00
I SlilSJIiC'I: Itrtrernatianal t"lnmium Corporatir:n S&ite )vlesa Uranium l*rilings lacility:I Engineering tr)esign snd As-Built Reperrts; Stflff Finding*, Con*I$sirnr, and
Xe*ommentls{ious.
Ereplxive gpmmary
Review of *ngincering design plans, xpueilicatiuns and sx-huilt rellort$ provided by IIJC have lead
DRC staff tu *:onelude that:
t.It is unlikcly ttrrat any lrak deteclion system exists under lUe wastervater elisposal Cell 1.
'l"h*lefr:re, paiul r:f conrptriance groundwater rn*nil*ring wetls rvill he required araurrd Celj
I in the Prrmit.
Leak detection system; ftiund under lLiC Cells 2 and 3 are grossiy in*rlrquate. B*sed os
nvailatrlc syslem design. ge$mstr.v, erxl u*lerlying belrurk pnneahi Iity. IIRCI staffestirnate
thar llexibie memhrano liner (FML) leak*ge w*ulcl ren':ain undetected by rhe Gurrent systcrn
tmtil lcakage {lorvs rea{:Ilff rate ol bctwcen 2,500 an*l 840,CI00 gaUacr*1day, rvith an averege
of ab*ut ?S0,00CI gallaere/day. '[]ris kck af leak dctectiCIn sensitivity {ai}s to me*t Utah
Ilirision $f Watcr Qrrnlity {I}Wq1 gxrfiormance standsrds for exisine la*ititics (200
gal,acr*idny-)" As a resull, tlre exisling design fails ta c*mply with the DWQ Diseharge
htinimizatirn Technr:l*g)"{nMI) requircnrents firund in ths GWQP Rule.s.
Multiple lines of eviderrcs als$ suggrst thatthe 30-mil FVC membranc used a"s FMI- in Cells
1.3, and 3 is prone to cxcr$s lcak*ge due to a nun:her of factors, inclutiing: l) suspect
prepa.relion of FML b*dding and protective hlankst layer*, 2) lower PVC prulcture slrenglh.
3) high*r l)VCl v,'atsr vs,for kensmissicn,4) long-tenn elegradation cf PVC nrenrhranes due
tc lc*ching of plasticizer compounds ar:d crrganle c,hsrnical afia*k, and 5) $rmpecl FVC searn
preparatrion and eons{ructisn mr:thads.
As a resr"llt of le&k d$teLlion $ysiem design shrirtcomings and suspect physieal c*ndition and
integriry' ol'the fVC fiML in Cclls I " ? and 3, a denronstr*tion of adequate ilMT rvill largely
l?lcus *n pcrfcrnnance CIf the final cover system, antl tc * lesssr degrm on opcratiLlral
irnprovcments. Operational improvcments, include, but are not limited to: i) additional
Statepf {Jtah t
TY
Dane Finer t:rrrk 4f . , L
t-orr"n ltorton ,L*- b tl"'kt:-
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6.
7.
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Mernorandum
June 27, XffiO
Puge 2
5,
gruundwater charae terization and installation of new monitoring wells lbr each individual
disposal c*ll, 2) additional water quality mnnitoring peremeters, 3) accelerated cl{}sure {br
Cell 2. and 4) head minimization sfforts fr:rr Cells ? and 3. Impruvernents to the finsl cover
include: dccreased radon trarrier pe nneability, a*'ldition ol'ahigh pemrcability filt*r ar:ne anil
a lh'lllclay conrposite layer in tlre covcr.dcsign, and shnficr drainage palh l*ngtl"rs.
Althcugh tlre lealt dclection syslen:r design urder Cell ,*A reprs$ents a:r improvemen{ ovsr
previous disposal cells at thu facility, its leak detcction shorlcornings, and cunent stsre of
ncgkct *r:d disrepair nrandate tlrat this eell be r*trofit tr, meet current Best Avaikble
Tech.nolergy tBA R slandards befcire an)' use for tailings or w&stew&ter dispr:rsal activities.
Lack of separate and independent canstru*tion supervision anel construction qualily
controllquality assuranrc (CQA/QC) may have contributed to an increrrsed r{lte CIf
csnstrucilon dc{L",cts in IUel Tailirrgs Cells l, 2, 3. and 4, Revisions need to be made to any
fulurc IUC CQAIQC effons and plans tcl ensure n:odem construction techniquesandpreivide
ccnfirlence in the engineering cn*lainntert of new rvastervater and taitings disiosal cell
canstn:ction.
An engineering strvcy crror r:l'approximalely 900 ftct has hccn discovered at tai)ings Cell
2, whish rnu$t be rcsslved. Resr:lutinn of this eryor can be c.Omhined r,vith surv€ys needed
to corrscr othsr errors for the groundwater compiiance m*nitoring wells.
An unlined sedirnentatriou pernd ,fbnnerly draine{i the IUC mill site ancl ore storage pad area
and has been usrd for on-site disposal of fly-ash. 'I'his Fly-Ash Pond is a potential source
of gr*unrlw;rter pollulion that r:eeds ter lre investigated. Historical and ongaing cperation of
this Fly-Ash l,ond eonstitutos s 1xtential groundraater contarniniitiCIn $ource at the IUC
facility. Appropriare mearures to controi groundwater pallution at this facility" ine lude, hut
are not limited tcr: l) installation of an engineered cover sl,stcm followed hy pint-of-
compli*nce nronitoring u'ells. or 2i n:moval of the l1y-ash nmteri*l and other contaminants
and approprialcd disposal &t anolher apprnved and engineered fuciliry.
Cornpliance r',,ith the GWQP Rules f,or issuance of a P*rmit to an l; xisting fi*ilily at IUC car
bc aehieved as described above. I'Iolvever, if groundwatcr contarnination is discovered ncar
Cells 1" ?, or 3 during additional sitc characteri:xtion or installati*n of ttew grcundwater
nronitoring wells, the Executive Secretnry will not bc ahle to affirm the lacli of impairment
erf present and benefieial use without additional grr:undwater renrediation mrasurcs.
Inlrrqiuction
The purpose of this nremorandum is to sumnrarize DRC stallreview and lindings rcgurding fivc (5)
repnns pravided by the Iuemational Uranirlm.Corporation (ltlc) regarding engineering design and
ccnsrruc{ion of wasts$ateranrltailingsdisposal cellsatthe White MesafacilitynearB}anding, L}tah.
The llve engineering rcports revierved by DRC suffare summarized in Table 1, helow:
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Memorandum
Junc 27,2000
Page 3
Tahle I " Sumnran, of IUC fi.ngine*ring l}:sign and Ax-$it Reports
Review of these rnaterials $h*rvs that cngineering plans and en*slructi*r "as'built" report$ wcrt
pr*virled b1'lUC for i.ailings eslls 1. J, and 3" Unfortunately. rn (on:itrusli$n "a$*built" rupCIrt !rixi
prr:videei lbr cuns{ructioa *{' C*l I 4.
Ali*r revieu' ol tlre av*ilahle irngineering design plans" specilicntirrns, antl ccnsfi'ue(ifln "as-built
r*ports, DRC staffhave made ths lbllu*'ing {inclings fur sach of the tUC tailings cells:
Senercl-fmdinsb
I . I.ack of qo[stru$tiw llocutlr*n!fl1iqn; CeU I - detail$d rcvicw s[.:ows liule infeintation is
av*ilahle for the constmction o{ trilinSs wastcwxter Clcll I . I'he February, L82 nCfi Report
$lates that [.[rN performed ecnsrucdo* on both Cells I aud ?, rvirile DCI provirl*d
crnstruclinn su,pervi*i*n sen,ices lbr anly Cell 2 (ibid., p. 3- l )" Iurther the r*:p:rt So{es or
t& strate rhat the Ce 1l I eunstftiction intormati*n provid*d in the repo( was fumishrd b1, liFhl
and ncrl independrntll'eoll*rted b3, DCH, {ibid.).
I",lnlbnunately. Cell 1 construction irrf'ormation pmvided in the Iebruary, ! 9&2 DCf r*port
is Iirnited tu: final IiFN Ct:ll I exc*vation elevation c$$t$ur$ {Figure l2}, PVC liner tcrt
restrlts (Appentlix Di. and ? eenterlinc pnrfile er$ss*ser;tion*i (br the Cell I south and essl
dikes {}:igure 2j. Na infurmatir}n is provided rcgarding several important csnstructi*n
elements su*h as: lopsoil rcmaval" snil and rock excav*tion meth*ds, prepar*tir:$ of flcxitlle
membrane liner ITML) bedding materials, installation of leek eletcctinn or under drain
$ysiem$, instnlls;tion of th* fML, or inslallatiun slf a Ir&{1". ccvcr trr protectivr blan}iet layer.
UI
Rcp*rt Referune*eerrertl O*scription
Jtmc, I979 *'Appolonia Cunsulting
i-.nginecrs {DCf)
ilells 1 and 2 ils Phrs*) engineering design repofi
May- I98l DCE Cell 3 (2*'Ph**e) engineering design reporl
l:ebruary, 198? DCI Cclls I and ? (l" llhasc) construclion "a-s-huilt" reporl
Maruh, I983 Energy Fuels l.iuclear
Ine" {EFN}
Cell 3 (?"d Fhase) constructipn "as-built" report
Aprii 10, l9S9lJmetco Mincrals
ilorp*ration (UmeteoJ
Cells 4A and 48 rnginwring d*sign report. anrended.
Includes: l) responses trl NRe questions dated March
i 5" 1989, and 3) origi*al Augr"lst, i99* Un"ret*$ rep$rt
August, I 98S lJrrtctcr:Original lJmetso CeUs 4A and 48 rnginceri*g clesign
repofi
;Qeplenrher, I 996 Titan
Iinvirnnmental
Tailings cover elcsign, (lells I thru 4A
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Mermorandum
Jr"rnr 27.l*0{)
Ilage 4
Based $n the infornaticn tvnilnhle regarding er:rnstruction *f tailings wa$tswa{er Cell l.
DRC staffconclude thal:
lf Cell I wa"s construcled *.* per its design, it appears the cell is underlain hy a ringle
r MI,,
S'ithout additi*nal inf*rrnation regariling Celtr I desigr: and e*xstruetitln,Il&C sraff
ceinclude that:
I ) No leak detssxiCIn systenr {I.DS) exisrs brncsth Cell l, and?) .liuundation materials lbund below the FML are likely to be of high
p*rxr*uhilily, either in the furm of mechsnlcally clisrurbecl sandstone or
cruslred s$ndstonr ruhble.
7. iltXis$iIe CEII 4 .*s:I}*ilt K J!{}fi - no enginecring "a"x-builr" relxrt rvas providcd ,br the
r:dln$lru(tisn r:f Cell 4. As a result. DXe suff nre rurrently unahle to c*nfirm if actr:al
c*t,strueti*nean etrrnedtotlre April I0, I989Umctcodesign" However,thisisnotanurg*nt
r:$ncem! in tl:at ILIC hns agrr:ed lo rr::ltnin llom using this dispcsal wl} until it is retr*tit to
nl€et State requiremerits. H$wrver, in order to revi*w the adequacy of uny firture IUC
retrofit I'nr Cell 4, it will he essenlial to iravc a rhor$u&h de*criplion of th$ exisling
eoustruction Jbr this cell.
3. l-ggk ql lpil*pcadqrt C.al1$trileJipnQuality &,q;pr,{nq*J*i&!ity Cnnrr{}l - af ltJC Cells 1,2,
,{n{, 3. *nly Ccll 2 had eonstructian quality assur*neclqualin'control (CQA/Q{:i perfbrmed
by an independent party, enrJ then o*ly fi:r erthwrlrk *orl$truction (21S2 DEC Repon. p.3- l).
Ir*r Cclls I and 3, IUC {HfN} prrsannei perfurmed both r:arthrvork constxu{tirn and
earth*'$rk CQAiQC (Cell I : ihid.: Cell 3: 3i83 fir'N Rcport, p. 3-i ). In a sinrilar mnnner'
FML installation and fMI", CQAIQC function,i were also performed try the *une parly, i.e..
tlr* FML manulacturer ltrr eclls I and 2 (218? D(lE Report" p. 3-5, and Cell 3 (3183 fIrN
Repr:rt" p. 3-2).
This laek *f i*deperdent ovrrsight tbr ea*hwork eonslruction and l'ML installation
inere*ses the pr:tential lcr canstruetion {larvs or shortc$mings to have be*n ol'erlffiked sr
Einne uncorreeted. As a r**ult. defects in the FMI- nt fiells I , ?, and 3 may exirt whi*h eould
€{iuse o release of po}h^rtants 1o lhe underlying groundwater and nearby environment.
fiWcrql" lksie4 I'jndinss: Disn$xal Cells
l, Mqsl$qiqill Disturtlance snd Incrqased Foundation ler&eabilitv - the berlrock lormation
fotutd inrmediately lrelow the tailings cells is t"he Dakuts Sandstone" tUC field
m*a$urernents indicale thal the pern:rability of this bcdrock formatian ranses henvren ?,.8
and S4,* ft/yz {2"715-S to 9.12[,-4 cmlsec], pith an av{rage 237 fi/yr t2,29T,^4 cnrlsec). see
Attachn'lent 1" beluw [DI{e sprtatlshceti:lydC*ncl"Xl-$, tabsheetalldata, geo}ngi* tbn*aticn
Ktts].
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Memorandum
June 17. ?000
Iage 5
'1
I{*lv*ver. lirundation }xsp$fftiion iechniques uscd ta prepsre thr llnal cell fl*or grad* ftrr
Cells ?, and 3 inclrdsd e*mm*n soil exciavati*rr terh"niques, f*tlo*,rel hy mr*hanical ripping
cf the Dak*ta Sandstone b*drcek fr:r Ccll 2 (?ff.}IlCf R*poa F. 3-t), and CetI 3 tr31S3 EI"N
llejr*rt p. 3-31). It is alsr: presunred that sinrilar means lvsre used ro excavate ttre ecll f]*or
li;r {ailings $'fistrtr&l*r C$ll l. }n sCIme eases hlastirlg \\.a:i a}so used lo renlsvs excc$s
heilrock materials. r:.9. ecltr 3, see March, 1983 IFN ftep*rt" page 3-3" In both cases. such
rlisturbance will insrefise the pr:nnerbility ofrhc bedrock loundarion located below rhe f ML.
As a result, the Dakeitu fi*ndstrne pcnneabilities quoted by I{JC must be considercd
ruinimum values for the prlrlosc of estimating l*al detection elliciency r:r leachale
inliltration"
lqq$qqu31e!.$ah t),rts!'tipq $*T{eJr.;CdJsJ-?.. and 3 - revie,*'*f the ItJf engineeri*gdesign
arld as-buiit repcfis rcfurcnccd ah*vc h*s lead DIdC sta{T tr: ths e*ncluds &al fluid undcr
drain systenl$ flre inadequat* r* Ieak deleeiion $,vstem$ fl-nli) at Cells l, ?, and 3. 'fhis
cei:rclusi*n is be$ed iin the fnllnr*ing lacts and *bs*rv*rion*:
l,a{k ol Eouinqerin8 Desig,n or Docu{tp.gn"taXjgLjil ee}l l - none of the engineering
design anel as-built report"$ pr*vit3ed by ILiL: docunrents any typr ofpenneable IIuid
colleetion layer lne ated beneatlr the IrML in tailings Cell 1 (5179 DCE Report, Shests
I tlru lS. and ?18? DCIi Report, figures l, ?, and ll). Clt":nrequenlly, DRC staff
har,e ecnclud* that no I.DS exists at Cell l"
i'*$r CrI[ ? ap$l. ].L8$ Qqrjsn:-Siqqlq-O{ai*fi$$ - R{} p*r$reeble fluid under drain
la1,er is <iceumented in the Cell 2 cnginecring d*sign rcpon t5/79 UCn Rrpurl,
Slreets I thru 16), Hcrlrver, hriel'description is pmvided in rh( toxl ofthe $*bruary,
l9S2 ,)CA As-Built l{epcrt afan ounderdraiR" sys{erR sc$$tructed acrrl$s the interiar
slnpe af the Cell ? south dike (?/82 DCA Rtpart, pp. 3-3 antt 4). The mcst conrpletc
engineering desigr dctails fi:r the "undrr drain" $ystf;m are found in the Cell 3 rJr*ign
rcport, which ststcs that this "under drain" $ystem is sinrilar to that dcsignrd by IUC
fhr Ccll ? and upproveil by I{RC (5/Xl DCt }lcport, p.3-6). As a result, DI{C stitf{'
cunelud* that an "undsr drain" systcrll likcly cxists under the FIr{L ai both Cells ?
and 3"
Engireering deta'ils f*r this "under *r*in" systsm shnw it is limited tn a narrorv Iayer
*f gravell.l' sand installed nn the inside slcp* *f the snuthem dike (5181 ncn Reptrt,
Sh*ets 3 &nd 4). $aid ssnd "under drain" layer is l-fcxrt thick anri was qcrstructsd
*'irh a pr:rloratcd l-inch dianletcr, perfuraled, PVC pip*. at lhe inside toe of lltc south
dike; hcreatrlcr, rcf{rre.d to as tlrr "t{rc" dmirt (ibid.). 'l"his 3-ineh "toe" clroin
apparendy gr*vity drains tc a central callecri*n gx'rint rvherc it is coun*cted to a I foot
diameter IIVC riser pipr tlrat extends up the interir:r rlo;x under tle FML. 'lJris ris*r
pipr,: access cnables water to he removed ftom the "l$s" rJrain and sand "under drain'
layer by Brcslls of a pump.
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It is e lear f:om tlre engineering clcsign drawings thar the "un{ts, drai$" sysrem is
canfined tr: onlyth* inside slope of the suutl: dike, and does not extsnd underany
pnrlion of thc floeir ol'either Cell ? or 3. I;rrthunr-rore, use of a single druin pipc in
the LDS limirs ltre dctecti<tn of leaks to only those thal may, : t) occur inrnr*dixely
Q\,tr the "t08" drrlin pip,u, or 3) flow at a leAkag$ rAt$ grcat enouglr t* traV*l a
signilicar"rt ?r*rir-nntaldistance to the "tt:e" drain. $uch a design contributes t* poor
Isak detceti&n r*p*iling t'ime and efilriency, $ce riiseussions below.
C. l,aqk pf",llentea!,ility "f,pntrast Belgw*"!:Ml, ro Cr:llei:t and-$iys{l-"t]uidr Iior
kqlecti$n: (qllse - no perrneabiliry infbnnation has lrcrn pr*vided by IUC fb'r
soil ntsterials consil'ueled trelow the FML in Cells 2 ar 3. Howcver, avnilable IUC
soil grndatinr dnta *lleiwcd DRC staffto estimatc rhe h1'draulie cr:ueluetivity of lllese
materials. see Tahk 2. helow. 'l"he ar,crage Dakota Sanclsrone bedrock p*nrrcabiliry
is *ls* provieled bqlo*' lor compari$on purpfiscs. Revierl, of this inf$rmari$n shows
th*t the "urldcr c,trrain" sand layer cnnstnreted along the insirie slopc of the s<ruthern
dikes ha-s a l$r1rr prnncability than tlre FIvIL hedding layer. Cons*qucntly. it is
unlikelS, that FJVI t- le*k*ge wili he enc*uragrd tc {l;r,v into this layer unless high head
conditions ftirce it hnriznnrallv in lha{ direetirn.
'X'ablc 3. fstirrratrd I-{ydrar"l}ic Ccnductivily of lr{alerials !{elow FML; tUC Cells ? and 3
Footnole:
l. Penneubilig- detcrmined liom IUC soll gradatio* datf, os Jirllowri:
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8.
Flrtl. Ikdding Layer - frorn IUC grcin sirc nnnlyri* chan in Xlff? Df,e As-Built Repc& Figure
til as drurmin*d fionr a Ll.S. Departnrent of, Transportaricn filter nr*isid prrmeability
rr*mr,rpaph lMouhaa, p.Sl). For d*t*ilx, ced Atradhr$eflt 3, betorx.
Dakora $e*dsto*t " aserage pcrnrcabiliry* (itnr IUC tesr dam.. sre Anxhrnent 1. belor* IDRC
spreadshea l"lydConr!"Xl$, rahshe*r alldslc, gcologic lbrarafinn Kdr), r'here 33? {ltyr = 0.65
flrday, 'llis vaipc is cnnridered minimum permcability c,fthe Dakota Sandsrqne bedrock drrc to
mechanicaj fiacturing and dislcitsnce, se l.)&(,1 discugsion above-
tlndcr itrain Blaltter - from IUC design spccilications prtrvided in the 6/?9 DClj tlesign Repon.
Appendix B, p. a-2. No s$-built soil gradatiern dnls we re providcd in ; as ilcturntined liom s Li.S.
Oeparirnint olTra*sportatii:n liiter $rsleri$l ponreability nomogra$r (Mtulton, p.5t). Ior
dcrails. $er ,\ttachnrcnt l, below.
[,q*x Repqrtinp -]:inr$ Lg!i$a*.$; Crlls ? qlrd 3 - it is irnportant to consider LDS
geonretry in the stril layers imrnediatcly below thc FMI-, ir: onier ta cvalualt: leak
clerecrian rcpofling rimc" At IUC Cell 3. fML ieakage rvili {irst prrn]erte the FML
Bedcling Laycr" llrrd if suflluirnl flow and ht:ari arv available" may accumulate on the
urrderlying beelrcrck. At lhis poinl, the time it rakes a leak lo report lo the "loe " drain
L,*-v*r
Ilermeability rrl
Layer
Pcrme"tbiliru ('l
l1/dev cmlsee filda;"cn#ssc
Cell l;lp*r {leff lnsi$t Sitbilope {S*uth.fiike}
F\{1," llrelding .{0 t.4tE-?"tI nder clruir:" I3 lankst 2CI 7"06r-3
Dakata Ssndstorrc > 0,65 > 2.291i-4
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{br detection is a function of: l) the pen'neability of these tx'o mfflerials, 2) fML
le.a.liaEe llorv rate and head. xrd 3) lrng& and slope of the lravel path the leak may
tirliE ncross thc swface tr{'the underlying bedrock materi$l.
"['o de tEr:rrine ka]i palh length rsviqw cf muxt be given to bedrock elrvations and
slopr benr*th the Fh{L and "loc" tlrnin location. Unfortunalely, IUC has failed to
d*cunrent the tolal length ar horizrirrtal extent erf the "toe" drain at Cell 3 (sre 5lSl
DEC Ilesign Report. Sheets ? anet 3). I{crvever, three IUC e*nslruction photographs
suggcsts that thc "toe" dr&in nray e xtend aqross tlrc entire kngth af the Ce ll 3 ssluth
dikr (see 3i83 EI;N As-lSuilt lleporl. Appendix E, 2 phot*graphs entitleel "Cell 3
undcr druin installation", and one cntitled "Cell 3 under drain installati*n and hnttonr
preparation"). I'his loeatinn is les.r rhan ideal, in that Flr,ll" leakage will have tcl uavel
ftcr{:rss a lrrng exper}se of hedrock hefore reaching *le "toen' clrain. As explainccl
bclrrv, s€epage iosses acrnss this lang {.ravel path w'ill result ir rurdetcctcd leakagc
frorn the facility.
Shape ancl grade of the unclerlying trrdnrck formation under Cell 3 sr.rggest thal
l*akage frq:m the easteffi porlion of Cell 3 will taks * long rre$tenr path Ibllowed by
a sl:orter southem path to the "trJri" drain; Ibr a total distance *f aberul l,?fl0leet frorn
the no:lheast corn*r of &e {rell lloor (see 5/81 DCE Design Rep<lrt. Shest 2). A leak
hom the northw,est cell il*or cr:rnr:r would trav*l a path with nearly equal eastem and
.routhern Ie gs lbr a total elisuurce nl'*bout I ,100 lbel to reaeh the "toe" clrain {ibid.}.
(ine sinrpk nlcthCId of estinrating leak cletection repr:rling tinlr rveruld he to nssume:
1) rhnr d:e FML Beclding l"ayer is saturated, 2) thet fluids in this layer travel al the
same rate as the layer's permeabilit,*-, c,slimated at 40 fVdry, 3) ignore driving head
and gradirnt lbr the lcak, and 4) ignore ssepage lossss tn {he undurlying hedrock
layer as a result of horiznntal travel to the "t$e" drai$. Using these vcry sinrple
assutnpriolls, lcak*ge would lnke about4l and 28 days to rcpi)fi from the eastem and
$,cstern leak paths nrentioned above. respectively.
Unlbrlunately. these can only be cr:nsidercd rough minimurn estinrale s, in that fur the
FMl". Ilcdding L,ayer to becoms and be nrainlained ssturated. a large and conliruous
rare of leakage llorv rvr:uld bc required thnr the FML. Actusl or ffiort: realistic
estimetes of leak rcporting tinre may be crders crf magnitud& greater than 43 days"
In any case! cven the smallest sirnple assumption of 28 days iri well beyond rhe EPA
RCRA leak dstection r*pcrrling time perforaratrce standard of 1 day (TFA, p. 8).
Poor tr*g&L f)ctection Xiffir;iency - in arder for ieakage to find its uay to thc "tot"
tlrain under Cell 3, *:e leakagr ll*'w'rates tlrru tlre FML have to b* greater thtull the
scepage losses intr: the und*rlying tredrock. Oniy thcn can horizor:tal flr:w in the
liMI- Bt:"d di n g I ;lyer be achieved. f ML l ealiage ratcs hel ou' th is vnlue wi l l nol reporl
to the "toe" drain" nnd utll hence go und{.:lected"
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The l*u'cst I;ML leakage rate ne*tled fur dstectiun can be estimated fronr rhe
penncability ttf thc underlying Dak*ta $andsranc bedrock {brmarion. tUC
fi}ea$urements ol llakrrta Sandsl$ne permenbilit,v *re listed in Attachment l, *nd
surnmarized in Table 3. belorry;
Tsbl* 3. $unrrnar,v af II-]C Dakota $andst{rne Pern:eahility
ln-situ
lSoraholr: Tests
Bedroek Pcmr*ability
ft/Y1{r}gal/ae re/dny
It!aximum:94,1 84?.: 73
hlini:"nurn:2.8 2.4q8
Aver*ge:237 ? I I,4.{3
trjqglsglg;
l) from lll{f rpreatls}:gtt H1,d{iond.X1,S, tahthccr alldata t$ee Anachrnenr t, belorv).
ln tjris essc it i$ $*Rsr,r',"ative to eonsider ayeragc pcrmeabiiity valucs in that IUC
mechanically disturbe<l lhe Daknta Sandstnne hedrock by ripping and trla;ting thc
fuundati*ns of eells 2 and 3 {sce discussion abovei. Baced on the averege bedrock
pern'reahility, it appe ars that the FML lcakage rnte w*uld n$ed to reaeh ahout 200,000
gal,rarreiday before lluids x.ould eppe&r irl the "toe" elrain for detectian. &r*n under
the lowesl llakota San<lslone penneability, the FMl, Ie*kage ratf w$uld nesd to be
grealcr than ?,4911 gal/ncrelday in order lbr the "lse" drain t* detect leakage" B*th
scenarios are clranrntically greater tiran lhs IPA l{Cfi"t perf$rmancr $t nderd for leak
deteetiorr e{Xcie*cy {or xnsitivity} of I gallaerc/dny (EPA, p. 8).
Ir eonelusior?! no as-built doeunrentalion fur the Cell t LDS has beex made available,
con$equcntly, ilRC :,t&ffcafi only c*nclude thal no LDS exists a{ Ccl} 1 Fo,r Ce}ls ? efid 3,
the [.DS sl'stcm$ *rc inad*qnale, bccause : 1) use of a single LDS pip* ]imits the atrility ol'
$ystem tc) dstsct l**ks unless they nccur imrnediarely nvcr the pipe, or at high cnuugh
leakage rate to tr*vel horirontally to the pipe, ?) diversion of lcakage in a horizotrtal elirccti*n
tc*ards the "toe" drain is unlikely due to a lack of penneability contrast belorv the l'ML
Eedding l.ayer. 3) Iong travcl paths under the FMI- to the l,DIi drainage pipe grcall"v i*crcast;
thr time needed to detect r leak, on rhe ordcr of at ieast 28 days cr more. and 4) based on
thesE cr:nsiderati*ns, ieakage thru the FMI. uauld likcly be detecred under Cells ? *r 3, only
illthr FMI- leakagc rate exe.eeded about 20$,00S gallacre/da3'.
Inadeqpete [-eak D*Kstioq Sy$tp,]r Pl"sigtnl Cdl {A - sorno imprevenrenl was nmdc in the
design of the Cell,{A LD$. irr lhal a net\a'ork of pipe.r r*";as deviscd under a larger;:*rli*n;rf
lile iilell's flnr:r" This pipkg system was designed to gravity drain ta the Sauthwe$l corner
ofC*ll 4,{, rvherc u 12 inch &uces$ pipe woul<I aliow a punlp to r*move any collected leakagc
lluid (8188 Umetco Rcport, tiheet C4-4). H$wevcr, elelailsd review also shorvs the (lcll4A
l,t)S is also inatiequats fur the frrllowing reas$rlsr
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Lirek of PErmqrlbilitv *)Jrtra;l1? piyert.[,eacltatE ltl Col]ection Pipes - similar ta
Ceils l" ?. ancl 3, there is a lack *f pem:eability conlrast to clirect or divert FMI-
leakage t$ the LI)S collection pipe nenvr.rrk, based on:
l) !,ligM Bsddins, t,qyer - the Fh{L htdding lay*r uas
designetl tu havr a gradalion of 70% sand and gravel and 30% Iincs prxsing
rhe No. 300 sieve (8188 Umerco Report, Atrachnrent l. p, 7'i. IUC claimetl
this bedding layer rva$ "clayc1"', suggesling a lower permeahilit3' rnaterjal
that couid possible lbrce [rML leakage h*riz".onmlly torvards the LD$
cnllecti*n pipe network (nt the top of the FMI- hedding l*1'er)" i"lowever,
based *n *7Aa/* sancland gravel coRtent, it is likely that this material has a
high pernreabilir"r-" l:urthernrore, cl<ts* review of thc Au6usl, 1988 Linrctco
construction specificatiuns shoq's that no pei:nrability testing rvas required
1o document this n:atrrial's hydraulis {rqnductivit"v (ibid"- Atlac}rnre nt tr). }lor
rvss there any,ma.xin:um pcrn,rability specificalion defined f*r this material.
Consequcnll;-. DRC smlfconclurls that the perme abilil'ttfti:is I'"ML bedding
malerial is likel3' high.
2) High"Pem:reability lleclrock - the Augusl 1988 Llrneico Report outljnr$ that
eertain bedroek arras found to be soft will br; ov$r-dx{.ravatsd and r*placed
lvith ML or Cl-t1'pe soils (ibid., p. 8). Hotv&ver, this "spr:t" replacenrent
d*cs nol provide a uni&rrrn layer of cla-v nralerial across rl:e finai surfbce of
the Cell 4A floor excavation" Funher, the August, 1988 Limelco design
rep*rt also fbilrd to stipulate pennr:abilily testing ofthe foun<iation rnateriats
to confirm hydraulic conductivity be{bre placenrent of thc l;ML brdding
1a,v*r. lt is also clea,r that IUC's practice was to ::rechzurically rip and blast
Lri-xir*ck ir1 order tu achieve l'lnal grade {8188 unreteo Repofi, At[aclrnrent I,
p. 3).
Brsed rn these considerations, it appears that n:ush, ifnot ali, of the bedrock
surlhce untler Ccll.{A wari comp$s*d ufprrmeable materials. Consrquentl}',
DRC stall alx* concluded that il is unlikely that a lorv pernreability harrier
sxisls nt thc base of tht: FML bedding layer to c*llcct leakage and cnnvcy it
rownrd$ tlrc l.DS pipe nctwork,
Isnlation of [ [)S Piltes hv Sesg.ndan' FML - the I.DS design outlined in rhe Auguf,.
1988 tlnretcu Rep*n calls lbr the LD$ pipes to be in*talled in a FML lincd trench,
thc base olrvhieh \Aus ts bc loeatcd irnmediately oyer tht; bcdrock fbunqlaliun {ibid".
Sheet C4-3). This secr:udary FML rvould extcnd away fiom the LDS trenr:h a shon
dislancc, about 1 Jbnt to either sirle. Also, the LDS coilection pipe was to be
installed c,ver a thin granular bedding md under a subsequent traekfill of granular
nraterial in the tren*h.
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F*gc l0
As a resultof rhisgesmelry.erly l*'gun*frorn the uppermost or prirlaly l"[dL at n
dis:ant Iateral location. th*t became perehed on the iredroek material. u'ould lrate 1o
pass thru the second;rr1, ilit{l- in eirder tn be call*cred anrl removed via lhe LD$ pipe
ne{rvork. Co:rsequently, UIIC stal}co:rcludetl that ths abilit,v rrf the LD$ dcsign was
Iimitcd tei de tectiein of leaks in t1:e primary FMl" at locnlions thal immecliertely erv*rlie
the I-DS culJectiou pip and secur:dary. FML.
Ilqar Leak Dctrstipq [rJi(icncy - bas{rd on the abrve argilments, DRC statT
cunclud*ri rlrar tlre abilit"v ol'the Cell 4A LDS to detect leaks is linrited to the area
imn:cdiatul,v above the colleclion pipes and sccondariv FML, i"e", LDS area of
inlJuence" 'I'aking this as a guide. an estimate nf the I-DS area of inlluence was
c;rlculaled and cunrpal$d with the total Cell 44 floor area. see Atttchrnent 5. hclo\l,.
Bascd on lhcsie eslimfit*s, ilRC slaffc*ncluded thal the Cell 4A LDS design rv*uld
r:nly allorv detection of leaks across atmut 1.696 r:f the totai fleisr arca.
I..apk rrf COA/OC lqsti!:q Jbr Scrondflr!' Fl{L - the August, 1988 l-lmetco Design
Ideport outlin*s ilre use of r.acuum box re*ing of FMI- searns far the prinrary lincr
in Cell4A (ibid., Atti:cirment II, Procedme QC- 19-C4Sry\'{,p.2). Unl'ortunalely, this
sam* spccification excludes any such testing for the :ccondary' F'ML in thc LDS
coll*ction trenches (ibid.). As a result, less testing rvas perlirrrned on the secondary
FML" Consequenlly" higher potential exists frrr flaws or defrets to have gnne
undetected in the secondary FML, anrl rnore leakage tr: be released undetscted {iom
the Cell 4A Ln$. "l'hcrelirre, rhe leak dctcction efficiency of the Cell 4A LDS,
sstirnnted 4bgr'*:. is fi.rrther reduced.
ln eonr:lusion, llRC staflhave also drtermined that the Cell4A LIIS is inadequote ha.sed on
lack rrf penneability contrast to lbrqc lcakagc to the detection pipeagr network, isolation of
the I"DS piyres by the limited secondsry f ML gconre try, cnd pcor d*ection ell-iriency eaused
b3, Iinrited c$\,erq;e and lesser scrutiny rf seeondary fh{L con$tructiCIn" IJased $n these
findings, it app*ars that across alli:ut 98Yo of the Cell 4A footprint, thc sensitility of thc t-I)$
is as equall). p$er as Cells 2 and 3l ranging from about 2,500 to 840,000 gallacre/day.
Prirrran_-llurnose ojj'J]nder tlrain" Layer: Dikc Stabilitv - it is clear fiom the above
discussion that the elTectiveness of dre Cell ? and 3 leak detectinn systems is p*or.
Cansequently, it is apparent tha{ thrse design dr}:nents had a different engineering function.
Revierv of the May, l98l DCE Rep*n suggests that the primary purpose o1'thcss d*sign
elernents rvql ts minimir"c and eontral soil pr:re pre$$ures in thc sr:uth dike of eaeh t*ilings
cell in ordcr lo ma:tinrize dike stabilitl' (ibid., p. 4-2).
,gpropriate P"rliuts:ol.Cpr,lplisnce: Cells 1..3, 3. anll4 - hasetl on the abovc findings and
evaluatinns, nRC smffconclude that: 1) nei LDS exists under Cell 1 , and ?J lhe existing "toe"
clrain and "ufider drain" $y$tsm$ al Cslls ? and 3 are gg1 adequafe for purposes o1" lcak
detecrion ntr:nitcring. Since thesc threc elisposal cells have been in service lbr an extended
perieid r:flime, antJ are llll ar *t Rear full capacity oftailings anci/or w&srewotsr; liule cau be
rluns tc r$trrc,iit the existing fqcilitics, Consequenily. the firoundwater f)ischarge Penrnil
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(Pernrit) must require lLlC tr: install aclditional groundrvalermonitoring u.'e!ls rc, messurs
l*cal groundw&lerquality. ln clrderto provide earll,r.vaming, minimize both rhe tirne needed
to tistrlr:l gr*undwater peillution and clean it up* ttJC *rust design iu:r3 instatl a ncw
ground\ ,at*r monitoring rvell nelg'ork that includes monilorirrg weils arounrJ eaclr anrl every
t*ilings disposal cllll currently h sen'ice: i.e., Cells l, 2, ard 3. In order ro cleternrinr: k:cal
grounelwater l'Jox clireclions. sueh u,ells nrusl be instelled both up and d*u,ngradient of each
of these thrce tailings e{:lls in quextinn.
Previously, ILIC sta{Ih&ve expressed concems regardirrg possible difficulty to instsll new
ground*'aterrnoniLoring raells on ihe dikes between Cells I and 2. and 2 and 3" I-lowever,
revierv o{'t}re IUC *ngiricering ricsign shuu's each of thcsc dikes has a 20-lbol (rrs1 r'l{dth
{61?9 DCH Report. p" a-l 5). l"his is easily errough space f*r a truck-mounted drilling rig lo
rjrill and install the rcquired monitoring u'slls. Tn av*id furure rr*ffic concetrns: the new
u'e lls can be corripleted with a fluslr proteclive *$ver lhet rvili *llorv vel'ricular traflic to pasg
eiver the u'cllheads. Additional evidence that mcrnitnring rvells can be instatled au the dikes
belween the cells is the fact that fiva (5) IUC monit*ring rvells have alread.v been constn*cted
on rlikss at thc iacility', including; I\4W-5, MW-l 1, anr{ MW-l I (Ci:ll 3 South dike, 3/83 f;FN
fteport. }]igure 1), and MVi"-14 and h{W-15 {eell4 South dike- ?194 "I'itan linvir*nnrental
R.eperrt, Figure ?.1),
6. UnsatirllcLt:ry f lugsiri&iurd Abqnd.qnryqnlpf $even Weils.lnqiqiq. CEIJJ Fopl[]rint - thc May,
I9$ I IlCf Dcsign R*port fxplains lrorv six (6) dry wells installed inside the fortprint cf CelI
3 rvill *eerl to he plugged anr{ aba;rdr:ned belbre disposal cell conslruction; well pairs fi-1,
6-2,7-1"7-2,8-l,andli*?(ibitl.,p.5-?,*nd$igure2). 'tlisrcp$rtnlsocallsfrrre*chrvell
to br pluggeel hy pumping grout into the well with use ofa tremie pipe tei ensure an adequrte
scal and a lack of air voids in the grout (itlid").
In cunirasl, the Crll 3 As-Buiit Report citss ssven (?) we tls that rvere alrandoned, including
tlre xix {6) ntentioned atrcve, and a stockr,r'ater supply well {3/83 }iIrN Report, p" 3-.1).
I jrr{hrrunate ly. this as-hr:ilt report also cliseloses that no tremie pipe was used to plug these
sever: {7} wells. Instead lhe repr;rt explains horv euncrete was si:nply poured down ea*h
borehole and vibraled {ibid.). Such plugging and abandonrnent eppears to be a violatian r:f
the tJtah $tate F"ngineers Arirninistralive Rules fbr Water Wsll Drilleff, rvhich rcquir*s initial
placcment of ceinent gtrouts at (he bottom of the well rvith progressive upward placcnrent,
i.e., thru a trumie pipe flltah Adrninistrative Code {tiAci R655-4-] 2}. As a result, it appears
tlrst there wclls lteve the potenrial trl fi:nn vertical c*nduits fiir grou*dlyeter pollutian f'reim
Ccll3.
Although it is toc lete to r66tibr this mistalce, it is all the more re.ason for individual
ground*'aler qunlity nrunitnring to be d$ne around each disposal rcll, inuluding Clcll 3.
7. llailure tr:r Follou' $nr:cilie{ljpCI-tirr l}er:tal qr oundatinn Crire"ke - the
May. 1981 $CE Cell 3 Design Repnrt called for "dentid" Srouting CIf cracks in tlre berlrock
lhat qere greater than 0"5 irrch witJe aftsr cell excavation (ibid., App*ndix B, p. 2-3).
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htr*rnorenduffi
June 27, 2000
Page 1?
H**'evsr. rlr* l\'f*-rch, 1983 rrs-huilt rap*n fiates thfi ro "dental" gr*uting rr,&s und*t-&tken.
hr,rt inslead rh,at fractures in the he,dr*ek *'erc fiIled rvith r.rnsh*d sa*d {3183 ff:N Rep*x, p,
3-5i. This lailurc 1r: Jbll*u, tke prr-tcriheel engineering spcil-rcati*n reinforces DRe smff
interpret*tion. abttvr, of high bedrack permenbilit.l' for the Dak*$ $andsr*lre.
the h{arrh, 1?8: HfN As-}}uilt l{eport f'ar Ce}l 3 doeuments the ir:stallation *f a moniloring
rve ll MW- l 3. located finutb af Cell 3 (ibid., Figure I unrl Appendix D). Comparis*n rlith
nther IL)C drawitrgs $ugge$t$ this well was located in tr$ !u"e& that latcr trecarne tlre soulhru,esl
corner of tailings Cell 4.4 (8/8$ Ltmrtca Repeir{, Figuro:.?-l}. ln l*er, the July, l}94 lir.rn
finl'ironrnenral Rcp*r:l drrns conlirm that h{W-l3 was dcstroycd during c*nstruction of Cell
4A (itlid,.'l'abk: ?.3).
Ahhr:ugh the Incation of lvlW-13 is providtd in the Augu$t, 19SS Unretcr: Rcpan (Flgure
2.1-1), ntl discu*si*n is;:r*vided in th* rrpcfi if or how this wcll r*ill be pluggei and
abandoned. lt* such mention is mailc in cither the le xl r:f the Cell 4 Delign Report or in the
construction sp,cilic*lions regarding this nutlsr {see 8188 Umetco Report tcxt erld
Attaehmerrt 1 [Plans anrl Specilieations]].
fonsequently, it is not kncwn if r-rr how 0ris well wae phlggcil and abandored prior to
cr:nstruclion oleell 4,4" As a result. the potcntial cxlsts that well MW-13 eould form a
vertical conduit lbr grorrndwater pollutian. l'o r*sclve this potential problem, DRC xttif
rccomnrrnd th* fr:rrnit bu r:onditinned to rrquire subrnittaleif a plugging and abar:donment
report {br &{W-13 Ibr D}tCl approval. If thi* rspert is found uruleeeptabl&" then the Pcnnit
should rcquire cilrreotive ai:tions tbr excavation rlf the fi*nner rve Il site anrl renewcel cflbrts
tu adcquatel3' plug alld sbandon this *ell"
llrrfir in ling-inccrirl|, $ufv{:y C.$pr{linates: Nqerr-lbr lyr}ry $urvey - a discrepann' in l*r,:al
engineering surv*y *or:rdinates has heen discovered hy DRC stal? aller revi$e, *:rl'the
available cngineering plans and as-built rcports. Revirw of the Jurre, l9?9 DC[, Report
shrws that tire we$tem margin of Cell 2 is located near an Hasting grid coordinate tf E
?,576"(100 feet (ibid.. Sheet 4). In contrast, the August, lS88 Urnctco Report shorvs this
same edge of Cell ? ha:i dillbrent easting coordinate of atreut E 2,5?6,880 feetl an eror of
ab,out 88CI feet (ibid", $hest C4-] ). It appears this discrepancy ean be explained *nly by an
crror in design or ic e*nstruetiqrn.
Conreqilently, IIJC sl"muld he required to rssslve this error by irnplementa:ion of a Permit
cclnditioo. tlxt u,ould require suhmittal arid appraval of a ncrv reliable elev*tion sun'cy nf
rhe faeili6' to ceinfirnr end dilcument l$oation and elsvatiun oln all major ftsnres af the
f-acility. inrluding, but not linriwd to: etikes, pond spilhv*y$. nreiniloring wclls, borings,
pipelines, sedimentxtjon p-rnels, nmrby drainages, fire storsBe pads, milling llcilily, soil
stockpiles, etc. 'l}is in errder to corrrplJ'with the requirernerts of the Utah Water Qualit3,
l.Jesign Requiremerlt$ fbr Wastervater Collection, Trralment, anc,l Disposai Sysrerns ilJAC
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Memorandum
June 27. 2000
Page 13
R317-3-l .?(AXt )1, this suney must be canrpleted and sealed by a State lieenscd mgineer
,:r lanrl $un'ryor.
h'ljsrinB r:r lllegilrle tr]ssi$rr ps'sr$crIs - review of the Mareh, 1983 EI.N Ceil 3 As-Built
I(ep*r1 fbund ser,*ral nraps and {igures rtirsing or illegible. lUC ;hnuld he required to
pr*vidc legible eopies nf thc nrissing or illegible figilres, as follows: l) illcgible Figures !
(floor final excavaticn cnntour map) ar:d ,{ (slirnes drain pipeage system ia.vout), and ?)
missing Figure -5 (screen analy'sis of tailings us$d as protr:ctive blanli{rl and slimes dr*in
media),
Fh{L Bqjjdi.ng and Pfqlr:gtiy!: Blanket Llnn{rrnrs / Isqqgs - IUC tailings Cclls t, ?. nnd J were
lined rvith a FVC membrane" Revirrv nf available tenhnical literarure suggesls tlr*t l*akage
marv br exp{rcled Irnm rhc PVC materials in LJufsdon, due tc several fartt}r;s, as follows:
I "a.qk of Gradal!_rrn Specififfitions for IML Bqd{inE Mnleriqls: Fill Sqils - rsview of
trvo DCE engineering dcsign rsporls shorq,s that in areas wircn: soil fill materials
were lo be added to achieve iinal graile, thal no specilieati*ns lr'are provided for the
n:aximum bedding particle siz,e for the subgr-adc belerw the FML for either Cells I and
2 (()/79 DCE Rr:port, Appendix B, pp. ?-9 and ?-5) ar Cell 3 (5/81 DCA Repon,
Appendix B, pp. 2-B and 3-5). As a result, over-siue particles have thc patcnlialto
cause point slresses that can Iead r* nML fuilure aller k:ading; particularly il'bedding
material pefiicles nre angular in shape.
&rsular :larliqler,in FML Bcddins Marerials: Sub&rade Jbl.Exgilvnled Areas -
r:onxtructiur specificatierns {i:r Celts l, 2, and 3 call {trr the Dakata Sandstone
beiirr:ck in cenain area-s to he excavated in order to achieve final design grade. In
preparation *f these &tre&s, f)C[ t:*nstruction spccil'ications call for the lhllowing
aetiviti*s before FML installatior (Cells I and ?; 6179 DCE Report. AppendiN B, pp.
2-5 and 2-10; Cell 3: 5181 DCf; &.eport, Appendix B, pp.2-5, ?-6, and 2-9):
Mechaniealdisturbance of Dnkota Sandstone bedrrck. irrclurling ripping and
hlasring.
Crushing of suhgrade materials rvith multiple panses of the reads of a
crarvler-type tractor for subgrade nraterials {where 2{}% of thc particles
*xcced 5 inches in diameter).
$pccifications lbr subgracie prcparatior to ensurc:a) a final surface frec erf ar;y particls or r*ck over 6 inehes in diameter.h,) "smooth" final slope ,"1'ith nt: piece"s or fragments protruding mors
&an 4 inches lrcrn the pla*e of excavation.
Thesc vrry liberal IUC specifications allorv a subgrade surfbee with multiple areaq
of large angular rock fiagmenls that could have easily punctured the PVC liner.
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h4emorandum
June 27,2000
Pag* l4
Iltrwever. as-built rccords srggs$t fiat Lrdding rnaterial paxicle size may have rrot
been as large as once planned, in that une gradation test of the trcdding nraterial
hr:neath Cell 2 indicates that the maximum particla sizc rvas lsss than t.5 incl"les
(?18? DtlE Report, Figure l.:, nr00 - 1.5 inch, Dea - 0.75 inch. etc.). Unlbrtunately,
no erlh*r gradalion test result heve been preivided try ltJC for tlre hedding rnateri*t
undcr any of tire a{her tailings disposal cel}s al tlre White Mesa {aeilitv.
It is in:portant to note trsl pad research conducted $t axother LJtah wasre disposal
landlill facility has shornn thal angular rocks eif a size range of t).25 ro l.$ inch in
tllame{rr, placeil on su}rgraries in intinrats contaet r*ith FMLs, have cnused
pcrlirrali*ns in llre *verlying mcmbrane iiners under loarls of 4,500 to 4"80Ct lhlfrl
{"persenal Etinlnrunicatiorr, Blake Rolrertsr:n, t-ltah Division r:f Xiolid and l-lazardclus
Waste). DRC have estimated static Inads on the FMI- at ltlC Cetls ?. thru 4, ancl
&;und lhey apprar to be less tharr 4,500 lb/{t?, see Atraehment ?, below. }{orvever,
lLrC has prnvideri little information regarding sp*cilic types of equipment used ro
construcl the tailings eells. As a result, it is possible that dynmdc loads during
constn:ction of tlre IllC tailings cells could have been eqirivalcnt lo the iest pad
research in questinn. and therehy generated equivalent Fl\41- damage"
C. Particle"$irqy'n{rulanly" iuxl Plac,enrrntMethod$ !}}rOyqrl:*ins Fr{ltectivg"Blerr-kE$.
- review of thc l{JC cCInstruction specificaiions shows lhat al]er installation of the
FMI.. that a pruteetive s*il hlanket was installed in Cells 2 and 3 (Ccll ?: Si79 DCfl
Report, Appendix Il, p. 3-? nnd 218? DCI Report, pp. 3-5 and 3-6; Cell 3: 3iS3 lIIrN
Report, p. 3-? anrt 3-8)" Ior Cell 2, engineering specificelions fior this material ealled
fnr use ol'soils excavated frcrm the cell. rvith a maximum diamet*r ol'3 inches {ibid.).
Iior Cell 3. specihcations called for use of coense sand tailings (5/81 DCE Repofi,
App*ndix B, pp. 3-7). llorveverlhc as-br"rilt rsport dncumcnts otherwise and r:xplains
thrll sxcavatecl soils were *lsn used for seil protective hlanket over 70?d of the Cell
3 liner (IlE3 EfN Report. p"3-? and 3-8).
l;or br:th cells. tl:e snil proteetive hlankers were insttlled over the FML xfler
ccnslrucdon of a temporary acc€ss ramp? with &e use of trucks. {iont-end loader:"
and srtall d*zers (ibid.). Ilorvever, no inlormalion rvas providsd in any of tlir
engineering design sr lhe as-built rrpons to document the rveight of the equipment
ussrd tr-r plaue anel spread thc ssil protective blal*et. Nor werc any calculations n'ladc
ta e stimarc any dynamit stress appliecl tt the FML by this equipmenf . Consequently,
thc p{'}lc$tial dan:agc cauld lrave oecurted tn the Cell 2 [:lvfl- during placement erf
ihese rnaterials u,ith*ut detection hy IUC or ils crrmtruction contractors
Iihtll- Punctplj:*llfl:r,enlicm and Perl't$nlgngg - currcntly standardizr:d lcsts exist to mcosure
the puncture p:rlbnnalc* of FMI-,ntllcrials in respnnseto a load applied cverpointed object
*r prob*, e.g. ASIM Method 4833. I'he purpose of such a test is to deterrnine the maximurn
load fhat a Fi\{I- may be subjectcd to without puncture, and thereby desigr and contrnl
constru*tiiln c*nditions and sratic and dynarflic loads to prevent FL,IL damage.
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l\,lenroruntlum
June ?7" 1000
Pagr 15
ltevierv of the IUC engineering design reports shan's that ro FML puncture tests wsrc
e*nducled on any of the fVC ff\rl- n:aterials installed in either Cells I and 3 (5i79 DCE
Design Rcport, Appendix B, p. 3-3; and ll8? DCE As-Built Report" Appendix D; or Ccll 3
{5/81 DCE Report, Appendix B, p. 3-3; ar:d 5183 H}'N As-Built Report, Appendix B).
Ne ithcr was &n)'such testing planned fi:r Ccllrt (8i8tt lJmetcn f)esign Repon. Anachment
11, Pruc*dure QC-l !-C4WM). As a result. it appears that little effnrt was emplol,ed by IUC
to prevent perfiorations of the FML by stalic or ril'neunic loacls during tailings cell
cnnstruction" Consequenlly. it is rea;onable to espect that puncturo darnnge did occur durillg
conshlction: resulting in a numher al'inrperfectiorrs ar:d/or perforatir:ns in tlre PVC liner
under all four (4) IUC tailings cells.
It is also inrpnrlanl l{} nole thnt in general, PVC membranes exhibit lorve; punclur(1 stft:ngth
(1.? lblnril) than I'ligh Densit;- Polyethl,lrne (III)PE) liners {2.8 lb/mil. scc H,PA. p. 3 }, Tnble
3-?). Consequently, all othcr lartors bcing equal, a greatsr dcgree of irML puncture damage
is exp*ctcd under IUC tailings Ce lls 1, 2, and 3, in that thesr lacililies l*'ere construcred wiih
a *10-mil IVC lin*r {Cr;lls 1 & ?: 2/8: DCI! Report, p.3-5 and Appendix D: Cell 3: 5/83 Ei}I
trtcpc;rt, pp. i-6 and 7). ln eontrast. Cetrl 4 \ifas ilpparsntly cr:nrpleted w'ith a il0-nril HDPg
liner and ma;- have experierrceel lesse rpuncture darnagu during its cur:struction (8/88 tlmelco
$csign Rep*n, Attachrnent I, p. 13).
PVC l-iRelMatffid Desisn Conqerys I lqsuqs - at least three soRcern$ &re apperent at ths
selection of PVLI nra{erial as the IML of choice al the IUC tailings facility, as follo*'s:
Flieh Waler Vapor Penr:esbility au{ Unm.sasured,[)jstha&e te Hp].jreruqenl -
leclu:ical literature indicates that a 30-n:il PV{l membrane withnrrt defrcts will
discharge waler al a rate of L93 gallacre/dey due to water vapor transmissian alone
{.Koemer. p. 369, Table 5.2)" Unf*nunately, this le*age rate is greater than thr: EfA
RCRA dc-n:inimus leakage ratt {1.0 gallacrelday, see [PA, p.30). It is also
interesling 1o nclr that the PVC nremhrafle u"ater vapor permcability is 2-ordem of
:nagnitude higher than an equivalent thickness af HDPII }incr {Koerner, p. 3&9,"1 able
5.3)" In fact. PVC nenrbranes have the highest water vapor pern:rcahiliry'of the five
(5) difTerent FMI- rnedia cited (ibld.)" Conscqucntly, evcrt under the best of
circumstances,-use cf PVC liner ttrchnology at the IUC fucility is not equivalcrrt to
EpA RCITA minimum tcchnrrlogy guidance; nor does it constitute a de-minimus type
discharge under s*id rcgulations.
l.erpg- l srrn Intsgf ly ef PV*C Linsrs - thr lang-lena pcrllrnnance nr physianl integrity
of FVC lirers t* c*ntain tailings contaminanls oyer l*ng periods erf time is a concern,
basctl on at least two (2) conc*m$ Iistr:<J below:
1) - plasticizer cornpourlds arJded by the
mxlufacture to IIYC mcmbrancs leach fronr the Fh{L over time (Koerner, p"
510). Such leaching leads to prCIgressive brittleness and cracking of PVC
membranes iibid., p. 393). C*nsequently, the long-termperfurmance ofPVC
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Memnrandum
June ??, 2000
Ilage 16
memhranes nla3' d*teriorate with tinre; leading to increassd rales *f liner
failw* and leakage rs the Environnlenl. Oth*r ryn*etic nnembrancs {rpp**r
to hav* lnngu l*nger.ig. rJrari "PVC nrarqjrials (ibid.. p. i lCI).
l) ll-$Llr Rs)-i;lirnqe to Chenriqa!-j\fiask_bEJ:ku*ni{ ('*rirpounds - elne tscirnical
ref,arenpe citrs PVC membrsnes hns having gcncrally percr chcnrical
resistarrce in dre pr*sence oI: aliphatic and &rofiratic lrydmearbons.
ehls)rinated solvents, arrd crudc petroleum solyenls {Koerner, p. jBg}. lLlC
usr:s large &mouRts olkerosene fucl in i1s ur*nirrm solv*nt extraction proces$,
sb*ut 1,680 lblclay (5/?8199lUC Croundrvater lnfbrmarinn Reporr, p. A-*)"
Linliirtuntrttly, krrosene contains hnth *liphatic and erorratic hydroearbons.
"t"',vo anrnratie hydrr:earlrons {t*luenc ard *aphftalene}, and Ernr chlorinated
snl,i'ent {.chl*rolirrmi have also been rJrtected in t{.le tailings $:*.$ts1rlllf,r
srunples {?/94 'litan finvirc]nrncntal ltcporq Appendix B, Table l, slinre*
drain). As a result. deteri*r"ticrr shouid be exp*elcd in the PYC rnembranEs
belaw IIJC tailings Cells 1,2, and 3 as a res$lt erf interaeii*n rvith th*sr
chcrnicalx, Saicl ttetcrioration coulil eneourage {hrmation eif memhrane
de&cts and r*sulting rlischarge to lh* *nvironrnent.
UVC Seary Cqnrtrustjur:fqngg{$/lsxues - although the f ML liners were installed by lhe
m&nurheturer or their reprrsrnt{rtivss, n$ derailed descriptions are provided by theee parties
in uny ofthr: IUL- as-built rsporn (Cells I &2: ?/82 IlCf. Repurt, p. 3-5; Cell 3: 51fi3 li$?'l
Rtport. p. 3-5). Neither flrl; any detailcd dcsrriptiorx provided f*r Pl'C liner scar$
constructiiln in Cetls I, ?, *r I i;r the IUC rnginecringdrsign repo*s{Celtrs I & 3: 6/79 De I
Kep*rt. pp" 4- I I and I Q. eir Ana*hr:r*nt B spccific*tinns $n p. 3-5; Cell 3: 5/8 I DCe l{ep*n.
pp. 3-4 and 5" or Aflaehnrenl B specificari*n* on p. 3-1). As a result, little is kn*nx ab*ut
several rritieal lhcl*ru relareil to integrity ofrhe PVe liner $)'steffi. Also, other issues trre sf
con{ern reganling liner seam drsign and canstruction, aq fnllows:
A, PVC Scam p:ggisn and Sprgl"ficatitfls; Zones pf lphelqnl .Wqukness - it is comrnon
fur FML scum$ tn bi: wr:akor then thc g*umcmbrzure itselt, largely becausc ficld
construetion tectrniques eannot malch controllsd lhetory conrlitions used by thc iin$r
n:anu{hcturer {K*cnrer, p" 374). At IUC Cells I " 2, and 3, lleld s€am strenglh was
aiso frund to be lnwer than the virgin PVC matcrial: whcre engineering drsign ard
s?rcifie ations thal reqr,rired only an S*% rear strcngth criteria for field r**nufacured
seams relai;r'c tc the virgin PYC parel mrdsrial {Crlls I & 2: 6/79 DCE Rcpari-
.4ppcudix B, p. 3-?; a*d Ll*li 3: 5l8l DC* Rcpa:l, Appcndix B, p. 3-2), IUC
ennstruc?ir*n tefl dsts eern{irms {his in that the ssarfls eeim;lructed wsre rveahsr than
the virgin PV{l material, se* Table 4, hel*w.
Contrary'tc the discussion above, factory manufactur*d seanrs in IUC Cells l, 7" and
3 farcrl evcn wor$s than their {ield manu"faclured countr:rparts. Unfbrtun*tely, no
e xplar:ation w*s pravided in *ny oflhe IUC corrstructir;n ax-built reports" DRC staff
c*n *rly speeulate that either differcnt tests llere used, therctry rendering rhe results
B.
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h{ernorardum
.luns ]7, ?000
Pagc I 7
uncomparable; or tlrat tl:e lactory rnade seams lvrre actually of paor qualit_v, In any
case, btrth types *f iiner seams in Cells l,2. and 3 constitnte apparent zones of
*'erknc$s in thc l'MI- sy$terr thsl rir*ukl have heen acc*unled frrr in design nf the
FMI- s.vslern to rvithsland sratic and dynamic loads. Apparent failure eln tlte part of
ItlC tcr design f*r and prevenl adverse eftbcts ilf statie or dynamie l*ading suggest$
that signifie*n( defefis cnuld exist in thc PVC liners; thereby all*rving ur&sl.ew&ter
to be released to the environn:ent.
'tr"ahic 4. Snmn:ary nf Il-lC PVC l.iner Seanr Test l)ata
'tailings (icll Nn. r['fests Average Tear Slrength tr)Rsference (2)
l; i e I d lSa nu{a ct u r t d Secrrs
Cell I I lt)92.8V1 A
Cell ?165 8'1.3Va R
CeU 3 28 93.3%C
f u c I o ry ?u! u t n$u e t u t' e d Ss * rtts
Cell 1 ?E 81.5%ll'
Cell 2 gfi 82.4%B
Cell 3 r3 8*.5%C
Foolnotcs;L Averags $rnnt tei$ $trenglh ,*f *ii"r to tr* ,t.*nglh of thc virgin PVC panel nnaterial"
2. Sourees of IUC PVC linr sram te$ dafs are ns {bllows:A. ?A? DCE As-Built liepnn, Appxndix D. BF Cno<irie h Cornpany laborslory Report$ $f
Irebnrary 4, iqSl (fae tory s*ams) *nd Septernber 17, 198 I ifield reams).B" 2/82|ftE As"Buill R,rport, Appcndix C, BI Goodrieh Conrprny lahoratorl- repon* cf
Ichruarl' ll, April 3fi, and May 3S, 1980 {f*ctory seams}, and lrlay lt, Jurc 4, *ntl
Junr 16, 1i80 (field sears),
e. 3i83 EfN As-Built Report, Appendix B" $eptember?t), l9$3 W*texaler C,lornpary ln*
Repon qfield srams), and Septernber 3, 19fi? D1'anmit Nohel-l'larte laboratrry rcults
(factoqy seam*).
C}lg$ical ldgsiltur:Eqf A{thesive - ther above citcd design reports cite the use fif en
adhesive to join the FV( lin*r pancls in Cells l,2, and 3. As such, this adhesive
lixns a nt:w conrylonenl in the liner system. I-info*unately, n$ information was
provided in a*y cf ths Il-lC design or as-built repofls ab$ut the Xong-term resistanec
of the PVC adhcsive uscd to c$nxain contaminants {r,und in the lUCl tailings psnds.
e"g., acidic solutions, tliesel luel, chlorinated solvsnt$, e1c. If the adhesive w*rc tc
be morc prCIne tu chemical flttflck, lhe scaRrs r,vould become nrajr:r paints of wealinsss
in thc FML system; therehy resulting ir:r a discharge cf wastewater t$ the subgradr
environment.
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N{emorandurn
.lune 27,2000
Page 18
C.Seqq,l Clgarilts-Meth$d Inrq]jcatiorys - the abrive referenced design rcpans simply
-\tflle th$l the "... ficld seams shall [:e made only on lining surfaces that rre cleaned
af din, dust. moisture! rlr other fnreign rnatlsr." l-lowfvr:r, no e.uplanation rvas
prcrvidcd on how thi"s cleaning *nukl be uccr:rnrplished. lf simplr nrechanical meens
rverc uted 1o Lrrush the dirt from the fMI-" dust and dirr c*uld have casity
cerntaminrlcd the se&m atc&s, easily- re.sulting in weakenect PVC seams. Iletter silonls
eeruld have heen ecnstrucred if solvents rvsre used to elean the seam areas before
application of the adhesive. Holever, p$CIr or imcgr"rlar *pplication r:f cleaning
sslvents cnuld also render seam weakr:cs$es. {1s6, spillage of thc cieaning solvent
clsewhere on the IIVC panels could also f*rnr olher points ol'rveakness in the lrlv{L
s)':itcm. Static or dynamic loading could la{er open these u'eak area-s into IML
perlbrati*ns during the consruction procrss.
llti,f l, )Vfinkiep:tld Sqnrn lpleg.fitll- nilne olthe abave referenced design or as-br.ritt
repofis irrcluded meilsures used to tlimin*te u.rinkles in tlrc PVC panels before the
$eams were c$nslrucled. l f l iner r.rri nkles lver* tn hec orne i neorpnrated insidc a ssam
arta. bypass conduits u'ould be formed thru tl:e $eams thot would atlow r.vfl$tewater
to hr tlischnrged liom the tailings cells. If no mea:iurss r\orc prcrvided in the
cngirrecring design, specificatiorl$, or as-built repo(s to prev*nt rvrir:rlilcs llorn
fcrrming in or near sean'rs, it is reasonatrle to expect that sor:re PV C liner lcakage may
exist as a resuh of this oversight.
Disresair rrfCcil"4Al Need f$r R*lrofit Constrqclion - during an inspection r:1'M*y, 1999,
DI{C staff discovered tlut the F1vlL" liner in IUC Tailings Cell 4A was in grr;ss disrepair.
During this inrpectinfi it ws-.i eibsen'ed lhal a1 least a portion ofcrnc FMI. pnnel had separated
lronr the lirr* and treen bleiwn out of the cell h_v the prevailing windsl thereby l*aving the
underlying bedding layer expossd to the elernents fuersonal e*mmwrieation, Rob He&ff1,
D&C). At the same time it rvas observed that *thsr seam arrlas of lh$ FML in Cell 4A had
bccn nailed donrr with steel nails and 2-by-4 insh bouck to Frevent t}ern &eim also blo*tng
ax,ay (ibid.). Durirrg this ir:spection a grccn Xiquid rvas also obsrn'ed to hc contained in the
botton: ofCell4A (ihrd.). Dr:ring other inspeetiorrs.lUC staff have explained rhat this liquid
is a vanadiun: rafinate stored in Cell .*A.
As a result af these observations, DRC sr.affhave concluded that the Cell 4A liner system has
heen grossly neglected fi.nd damaged, and must be repaired before placing the eell in to
sen'ice. Based on this negleel and the LDS design shortcomings mentioned above, DRC
staf,{'rccommend thirt the cxisting Fh,{L in Cell 4A bc rcmoved and the tailings cell re-design
and rc*cr:nsuusted to prnvidr: adequat* I"DS perfrlrrnancc. Becausc IUC staffhave indicarsd
thal vanadiurn ramnate hns been slored on the Cell4A liner, rJecontan:ination efthe existing
Irlvll- bedding lry-er ancl foundation may also be in order during cell retrofit cr-rnstructian, As
a rrsult of rhese eonsidsrations, DRC sl.all recs$urend that Cell 4,4 not be auth$riz.ed or
included in any Permit; but inslead that IUC trc required to submit and eomplete a relrcrfit
c:onstructicn plarr for this cell befiore its re-usc for tailings rn w&stewater disposal at the
facility.
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h4cmorandum
Junc 27, ?000
Page 19
k erd f'atrili
l. Millacdi!_Ar9a, , the Junr,
l$79 DCE design relxnrl shu*'s thal a sedirncntnlion Jr*nd rvas c*nstrueted adjaeent to the
snutiteastr {crner of Cell I to rcceir,e st$rmu,al.rr drain*gr from the n':ill site area and the ore
5ttlragr: pilcs (ibid., liheet .l nnd p. 6-3). This sedinrent*tir:n pond was designed *tth an I I
aere-foot slorage eapncity, and without an outlet or overflr:w spilhvay. Mr:re irnporlxntly,
the pnnd rvas de"signed withont any Iiner. Consequently, rv*ti:r rnay only exit tlrs p*ncl thnr
either evapcratrian nr seepegc.
Ur:furtunalely. no ''a$-built" infurmation has becn provided by lLlC regarding the Mil.l
Facility Sediniertatir:n (MI;S) Ponrl. Consequently, I)Rfi xtaffassunretl t"hat its r:*nsrnrc{ioa
r*rlbrmed tu thc design protided in the June, 1979 DCE Report"
During a site visit r:rl Muy q, ?0CI0. DRC sraff inspccted rhc MFS Pond sire and found nei
npen surfaee in:pounelmenl a{ this }trcation. Aficr inqr"tir.v, lt"lC saff exp}ained that: l) thr
h{FS Pnnd had been fil3ed rvith {i1,-ash w&cta in aboui I990, ?) the company ili}i.v rclbrred
tr: this pund as thi* F'ly-Ash PonrJ. nlld 3) soon aftsr filling the p*nel with fly-ash the nrea ns*r
tlre Fly-r\sh Porrd hiul heen re-graded to elirect $lormwater runoff fr*m the mill site to
l"ailings Cell2. During rh* M*y I sire visit it was appffcnt that a soil cover had been placed
over the fly-ash (5/l li0CI DRC memorundum, pp. 5 alrrcl 6).
llascd an thc avoilable inl?rnnation, it appears that both cfintsc.t s,n*J non-nonlact slonuwater
runaff fr*nr thc nritl faciliry \\'as 6t ane tirne colleetcd in th$ ]\{F$ Pand and ultimately
discharged to groundwarer. As a result, mill :itc er*a spills erf reagents. chemicals, cr
rvrrsxer"vaterc could have bssn rctajned by this sedjnrrntettion pond a:rd also dis*}:arged lo
local gruundrvatcr" fironr an-site inspectir:n and disclosure by ItiC staffit is also epp]&rcr{
that &e hII$ Psnd tr*s alst heen use*l b-v the eompany fior thc clisptsnl t:f fly-ash.
As a resutrl, the M['S Fnnd shauld be cunsidsred *s a potential source eif graundrvater
contarninatinn at the foeility" Source lerm investigations shnuld be used to conlirnr pr
ascertain the presence of eontsminantu in this pond, *nd ;hould bc included in the ongcing
grounelwater contarninant irrvestigation reporl. If contaminatinn is confinned,IUC shauld
be required tc :xalie ccrtsin impreiv*nrents in engineering design to mitigate or prevent any
c*ntinui*g groundwaterpotrlutinn fiom this potentialpollution snurce. Apprapriate messure$
wnuld inclurle. hut are not limitrd lo: I) installation af an enginecred clr\,er s}'$t{:rn t*
n:inirnize iniiltratiun and pr:int-of-c*rrplianre monit*ring wclls tr detennine any advcrse
in:lpact tei groundrvater qunliq'. or 3) r*mr:val eif thc lly-ash material and otlrr cnnlaminants,
l"till*rved by apprr:pri*ted disprsal at en$thsr rppruvcd and engineered facility.
o@
l.Vater Balaneq Mfnrtc,iling - lhe Junc, 1979 nCH Report lists an aggressive prugram for
rvnler halance rnCInitnring al thr trhite lr.lesa {acility, ine luding: a local prceipikrion gaugt,
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h{emsrandum
June ??, l0S0
Page ?CI
*'aprrra{icn pan" sraff g!&ugss! irnd Jlcrv metsr: (ibid., p. 4-5). Inspeetions should be dunc
to confirm these devices lt{:re installed, thal histari$ mea$urcrnsnts \&ers m$dc, nncl reeords
krpt. If such H'ater balancc nTanitoring data nre avrilnble, revirw and evaluatinn ot'the
historic dcta should bc done 1$ determine if it s*n be an effective torl t$ measure
perfurmance q:rf the di*charge nrininrizsti*n technalogy apptoved under $e Permit.
:.AM.thcJrrrre.t979DCERcprrrrtcitestheo\,L'rageprecipitation
*s I I.8 incl:cs/1'ear, l}is valils is lnrv. Morc rceenl infinnrration ficxr the W**tern Regir:nal
Cli*rat* C*:nter indicates everage annual precipitarion is 13.38 inches {see Atmehnlent 4!
bclorl').
l i sqht rgc*M in r r& i rat iq n Teslnc.L*gy" (DMT) Consi d rrali$n$
i"]::iseA.&r Ol$TlDetsrrrrineti$n; ro ftJy Pntgetion Rulqs - in ordrr lbr the
flrecutive Seeretary tr: issuc a I'r:rnril for an existing {heilitv, one that prr-datcd the CWQP
Rult*, thc fcllorn"ing der*nninnliein rnust be madc first (uAC R-31?-6-6.4.C.1 tliru 4):
" t. {ke aplilicanr dcmorxtrates that the applicable clcss 7"DS linits, ground wfftel
qtlolity,.rt*wlar*ls and proteiliun tevels will be m*;
2. the nwnitoring plan, sumpling and reporling reqairentents cre adetlu*te to
dew rmine *smpl ian* u,i t h uppl ie*bl* rtq uire rxtnt"r ;J. the applic*nt utili;*e lreclment und disth*trgc *tinimizcuian l*rhnn{*gt
t:tjrrtrw&sar6t{*r w,itk p{unt prete,r.r design capability and sixrilur *r equiv*lent t* *zat
utilized by fueilities th*t pratlurc similur prudaets *r .rervices with simil*r
pr*$uttiox $rocess teehnoIrlgv, and
1. thvt is r'ru eurr*tt{ ur arztit:ipati:d impairnttnt *fprrsent andf*ture bent$eietl us*s
*l'the yr*unel x'fltsr"
f aelors tei be cansidereel in urriving al the ab{}ve lised deteffninations rrquircd of the
Exr*utive Secretary are lisled in the discussion hclorv,
IIM I Pe rfunrmnce $lruldfin{Jbr hxi-ting Fegillli*.$ - direussi*ns wilh Utah Divisi*n of Wcter
Q*ality (DWql stafl'hove sonlirmed thel the maximurn s€epage disehirgc allot'ed ilorn
IJWQ perrnitted existing laeilities is 2CI0 gallacre/day. As a rssult of this prrced*nce, this
?0$ gnllacrr/da1' seepage discharge rate should b* uscd as a Disheargc futininrizatioa:
Technology (DM'f) p:rf*rmnnce standard fs,r other existing fecilitie* (personal
cummu,nj*ati*n, Larry Mirr, DWQ). Under this pcrfunnance criteria, undeteeted FML
lr:akagc fium an exi*ting disp**rl ibcilitl' shoukl he no greater than 200 gallacre/day. "l"his
criteria is *mply reasonahle. in th*t currently available FMt technology allows le*.k
tictectio:r s),slem sensitivity as low as 1 gal/aer*/day $JS llnvironmental Protccli*n Agency
{fiPAl, pp. I and 3$)" 1}is t}WQ undetccled dischargc erite ria is slso applicable to b*th the
*peratianal pha$s and r":loseql-cell conditior olthe facility' (persanal cnmmunicati*n, Dcnuis
llred*rick, DWQ).
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Memorandrun
Jutte ?7,2000
Page 2l
--1. tinnqecptnble ll]f I.[]r ncsign and Cqjrstruqtion - lrased an availatrle LDS dcsign and
constructicn infirnnatinn. uncletectcd lerkage frorn IUC Cclls ?, 3, and 44 could range from
about ?,500 to 840,000 gal/acreJday, with *n average r:f300.000 galiacrcldal'(see discussion
nbove). This possible undetecled seepage discharge rate is much grellter than the ?00
gal/acrelday DS/Q miteria cited above.
Acln"rittcdll', this estirnotc r:f [.DS scnsifivit-y is bascd on the pcrmeahility of thc underlying
b*drock and the s)'slem's resulting failure tr: forre FML leakage hr:rizcntally to the leak
detection pipeage. Actual seeperge discharge thru the IIML ma1'be lorver, depending on
nra-ny contribtrring lactors such as: thickn{rss and perxrralrility ol thc tailings, total c{'l"cclivc
lread un the lrkfl, nuntbcr and size o{'elefects in ihe [:Ml-. r:tc.
Ho$'ever, it is clear thtt the existing iLlC leak detection systf:ns in question are ineffective
at nreasuring leakage in light crf the DWQ perfbrmance crileria for existing lbcililies (200
gallacrelday). Furthemr$re, the apparent lack of eny LDS under Cell I is also unaeeeplable .
rts a resuh, DRC staffconclude that neine r:f th$ cxisting disposal c*lls at thc IUC lucility ha*
:ur adequiirtq I-DS. N*r uan any af the cxisting I"DS be used a safisfact*ry point clf
*omplia:rce for purposcs of'a Pennil
I"agk gf Abilit-v-tq"Shiestir:ely Model II,!C Csll Seepag{ - the above DRC lea}i detec.lion
serrsitivity sespage rate estimates arc w"or$s-c&se figures. -Prcdictirxl af nclual or m$rs
realistie seepage discharge Iionr the existing IUC tailings ccll rvould require infiltralion
n:roelcling studies. One ccmmon modcl uscd for such infiltration predictions is the EPA
I13drokrgic Evah:ation of Landfill Per{i:rmance (HIlI.Pi rnodel.
I*ecnuse each cell has a separate dilTerent design or is in a dil'fcr*nt stage of its lilb cyctre,
sqpar&te model simulatiuns wauld hc needed for eaeh disposal ce il. lior example, Cell I is
rur*ntl.r' ussd lhr \\irste\vater storage and has little sedinrert disposed thtre. Cell ? is near
th* encl *f its eipcrationsl life and is being drained and prepared for final cover. Cell 3 is still
onl1, panialll, filleri; while Cell 4 au'aits rerofit and repair work brlbre it can be usetl lbr
ilispei*al.
Any infiltration merdel used w'ill require determination ola nurnber of ergineering d*sign,
soil hydraulic prr:perties, and qeather variatrles. Wrils nrany of the$c ars known ur can tre
deduced !'ronr avrilabje inlbrmation, some inpuls would be difficult to asccrtain, and
therrfure. would possibly rcnder the moclel results subjective and open to inrerpretation.'l'wo (2) imperrtant, yct suhrjective input varial:les needed in the HELP model are: li the
nultrht;r r:f field dcfects peracre in the FML, including those created rturing FML installation
{se an:r defects, puncluresr etc.), ardevel<ip thereafterin response to L:ading $uess orchen:ical
interaetions, iurd 3) t;,pe of FML placernent quality or degre.t o{'intinrate contact betrveen the
i:|vfl- and the over and untlcrlying seiil materials.
Becausc thc ILIC disE:sal cells rlere cnnstrucied nver 20 yeers ago. flw pe*ple are availabl*
tt'r provictre input on llre number of FMI" field defects tl:at might have occurrcd during
r)
2)
3)
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Memorandun'l
June ?7, 2000
I).rrp 11
inslallatiern. Fr.mhennure, fex, r:r uo rccr:rcls are *vaiJable to confirn: such, or prCIvide
inftrnnatinr on the degree of FMI- placemerrt quality. In *ddition, little can be quanlified
regarding cunent pliysical integrity $f the Fh,lL, particularly with regards tn chernical
resistanre rrf cither tltr PVC mernbrane panels $r the glues used to sea$1 them. As a result,
any ,rssunlpticns made by IUC cr IIRC staff regarding these I'IELI) modei inpu(s r.vould be
subjcctive and opcrr lo dispute nnd *rgument. Ccrtainly. bnsed on thc conrp*r:y's pasl
resistence to State regulation" ore san expect that any infiltration nradeling used to funher
quantify actual or probable $eepage diseharge *om the ItjC dispos*rl cells rvill be lorg"
argrmreulati vc, ardrmus, and delinitely subj ectivc"
5. l")RC.Staff Receinrmenclalit$s - as a result of the above c*nsicferatir:ns and findings, DRC
s{aff recomnrend that the flgency ftrrgo infiltration nrodeling as a me.ans tet detennine
compliance rvith th* DWQ 200 gal/acre/da1' seepage disclrarge critrria lbr th* eiperational
phasc af thc trUC lacility. Instrad. DRC stalI r*commm:d that the lirllorving artions be
con:pleted:
A, Neqetsarl Opgrqli0lql Xh$s Imprnvernentg - riistinct improvements should he msde
tn grnundwrrtrr nlonitfiring durir:g thr fneility's operatinnal lifc. including, hut not
limited to:
AddilionalMrrnitr;rinp Wells - tr: allow each tlisposal cell to be individually
monilored u,ith s series of n'clls located i:nnrediately up nnd downgradient.
'l"lrese u.clls would he inslalled on the internal dikes located brtrc'een each
cell,
Additio$al ILeael Mu$Uorjr}g and Reporlins - including liequent measuremenl
ol shallar.v aqr:ifer water lel'ets in all rnonitorilg wells a.t the facilily, carefill
clraracteriaatir:n ancl rnoriitoring of the apparent ground,*'a1er mnund al the
tbciliry', and preparation of water tsble nnntour map$.
Additiq$gl Qrqund$:ater L{oniloriqg Ppra$sl*ts - including the addition of
new groundw.ater monitoring analytcs 1o bettrer detcct and quanti$ any
s€sp&Se diseharge that may havr bren n:leased liom the ILJC facitity.
Actelerated Closurc and e*mnlioneq$ebedulq-fqr CeU 2 - IUC is currently
in rhe process o, stabilizing and advancing lsnrpors.ry soil cover *ver Cell 2.
Consequenlly" DRC staffrecomR:end a compliance xhedule be ineludcd irt
the Permit titat accelerates and makes enlbrceable closure,rfthis tailings ceii
in a timely manner"
Retrufit Constnrqtinn-Qjf Cell 4A, - hecause Cell 4A has not,vel been used Jbr
railing disposal. and is in a state of disrcpair, il i$ leasiblc ta re-design and re'
cconstruct this c*ll to nleet current Best Available Tschnology rcquir*ments
undsr the GWQP Rules. f,ansequently, DRC slaff recommend rhrt the
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c)
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r)
B.
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l\'lernorandunr
.lune 27,2000
})age 33
?enxit require Cell ,{A t* be upgradcd ro rnect currcnt BAT clesign and
technolngy standards befc're b*ing placed into senice"
Possible Operaliqna!- I,mproyenents - several imprgvements could bc ilrade to
disposal tell eiprrations to minimize ssrpilge discharges from the IUC farility,
including:
l) Disqosal Clqll llgid Minirnianrion - in rl:e event rhar rhe IllC disposal cells
rvcre lo |ls opcrated on a continuing basis, and for an rxtended period of time,
ccfiain improvcmenls to head rninimiartion could yield signilioenl decrease
in serpage flux li'orn thc {hcility. "fhis seepagc driving head could be
nTinimized at TUC hv:
Iru;tallation ofa clay intemcl liner slurried overthe top of the *xistiug
tailirgs surface; thereby reducing vertical seepage to the r:nderlying
FMI-, and
Jnstallaticn an<i full-tinre operarion <if pumps lo remove fluids frclm
lhe existing leachatc collecl.ion (slimes drainage) sl.stern constructed
in:rnrediatsty above the FML. Ihis rnay require installaiian of
automation and backup equipment to e$sure full+imc operation.
Careful measures to rrinimiz.e the depth of ffuids on top of tire
tailings, or on top of the FML in waste\ ,ater Cell I. Timely ef?iorts
to pump and rern<]l,e these lluids and re-circulute them back to the
mill will alsu help minirnizc driving hcad conditir:ns in the cells"
I-lou,ever, ilthe I{.lC tacilit.v were to be cl$secl *oern after issuancs ol
the Fenait, these head nrinirnization efforus q,suld elo littlt'to reverse
any seepage effects caused hy 20 years ofhistoric operation.
F-MI" l,ining"fc'r lrrlill site $tq.rm},'ater I $edinrsntatirln Ua$d - an FML liner
and leak dctcclior: system could be installsd fbrthe sedin:entatiun pond lbunrl
last of Cell I that is used for disposal cf stonnwater runo{f lrom the miil site
and contacl stormwatr:r runafffrnm the ore sterrage pile.
Conlamigated .G:aundlyater Reeovsr.v,.ffystem - in the event ftal
conlaminated groundwater is li:und at the kcility,IUC should install a series
ol'pumping rvells tc rr:covor and centain said watE:r.
(llosed-Cell Design Improi'gments - revierv of the proposed It/C tailing.s cells cover
design in the Seplembu, 1996 Titan fnvironmental Rcporl. shows that it includes
lour (4) layers abave the w'aste fsrrn, 8s sunrnrariircd in Tabk 5, below (in
elescending order):
e.
3)
4)
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h{emorandurn
.iune ?7, ?000
llage 24
l-ablc 5. S ufSe ber. 1996 IUC 'Iaili;1UtC ). )Umrnar , I vyb I uu I arllfigs L:ov8r s}'stem
Sideslope Areas Topslope Areas
Description Thickness (inch)Description Thickne.ss (inch)
Riprap 3.0 Riprap 12.a
Kandom Fill 24.{t Ranrlonr Fill ?4.0
Raiion Bnrrier 12.0 Radon Barrier l?.0
Rondon, Fill 3S.0'Randcnr Fill 36.0'
* 'l"hicknels varias in order to makc linal gradr for csver,
Sevcral inrprovcments coulcl bc made to th* currcnt cover systvrn tlesign tu rninimize
discharge *f tlte lacility Io groundrvatcr, including. hut not Iimitetl to:
I I Inclusi{ril qf ir-liJLcr Drainaqe l,r#er,4ho-u.q Radon Brurier - the sovcr clesign
propx.rsed elocs rot include a i.iltcr drainage laycr above the radon b*rricr.
Rath*r, it c,alls fbr a ?-foot thick "upper randum fill" layer, which is
reporledly made of a clay-like rnaterial (9/96'l"itan R*port, p.5 and Appendix
D. l{:Lp model outpul file "efn-fin2.ouf", Layer l, penneabiliry * g.8n-,
cmlsee). If all or pan of ilris layer were designed rnd cnnstrucled u.irh a
higherpern"reabilirv, infiltration that may accumulate ern top of the clay radon
barrier could be diverted out of the cover systerx and prevcnteel from entering
the waste in th* disposal cells.
7) Keductip-n g[RadSgFanier llgIr:eability - the current cover design simu]ated
by I1IC rvith the IIPA i{fl.p mndel assun:ed a radon barrier pcmrcability of
3.7Il-8 en/sec {9196 Titan Repart. Appendix D, IIELP moqlel output lile
"elh-fin2.ou1", Layer ?). This permrability c*ultl feasiblely tre reduced to
I.OE-B cm/sec.
Additiqn of fMLlCL{ry Campositc t.ay-er - the radon banier could be
converted to a FML / clay composite by addirion of a IIvIL imnrediately
atrove the clay radon trarrier. This design change would dramatically reduce
the xepage rate thru the tailings waste.
Ilodtle Shorter Drainaee Pa1,lr L,cngths - in the current IUC cover system
desigr:, the "clay-like" random fill layer cxlcnds uniformly froryr the Ncrth
side of Cell I tn the South side of Csll 4l\. a dis&mce of over 3,300 f*et (9196
"liitan Repnrt, I?igure t, Iiast side ol'Cclls 2, 3, and 4A). This provides for a
very long path iength for seepage to travel horizantally in the riprap layer
before it can exit the systcm. A* a reu'ult, se,;flage los.ses are maxir:rized
rluring the course ol'this ravel path; thereby maxin,izing infiirration t}ru the
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lilem*randum
June 27,2000
Page 25
t*ilings waste. Redesign of the cover system could allolv for shorter
horizontal drainage pa*s; thereby all*wing the seepage ta exit t}:e system
s$oner; minimizing ssrpags thru &s undtrlying wasle.
Comslian*e rvith Rcquircd Dctem:rinalions - detcnrinations rcquired [:y the fiWQP Itrrtles
re garrling cxisting facilities (L)Afl R31 7-6-6.4.C) can be accr:ntplished as fcllows:
Q"{*undly4tgle&$s"Li&ig-r{tandafdn;rnd Protc:crion Lirnits - alle r eornple ti*n of site
characluriiatian and res*lution of the DILC Febm&r.l, 7, ?00O request for additionsl
ht,drogcol*gical infr:rrnatieino rl:e Exscutil/e Secrctary should be able t<l ecrn{imt
groundwalcr elass cf the sh*llorv aquifbr. A{ier inrtallation of the adclitisnal
grcu:rdwaler monitoring rvells needed at the fucility, the Executive Secrelcry should
alro hr atrle tn determine if IUC currently meet$ State Cround Water Quality
Standards and Protrction Levels in the shallow aquikr ar$und eaeh di*prosal ccll.
Munitoring Plan, $an'rnlrn& and Re,$orling - irnprovemenls will be made to
groundrvaler monitoring at tlre facility to better characterize local conditions antl
bretter deterl tailings contaminants in thc shallou'aquiler (sec discussion above)"
Inrprovemcnts e an alxn h*: incnrpnrated for hetter qualitl assur&nce I quality cnntrul
arrd reportring for future eottstruclion projects al rhe {bcility. Thus, these
rcquirements in the CWQP Rules should also be met.
Oisqllgret Minimiuetion Tecjmolg&X - it is olear lhat ths currenr engineering
cr:rkinment at IUC is nol equivalent to what sinrilar urarrium mill operv-tor$ use
tnday. This discrcpancy is largcly because &e White Mes* faeility was consfiucled
20 yearu ago. Since that timr:, great intprnv*menb have heen made in FML
materials, design. and corrsiluction techniques, that makelhe IUC lae ilitl'nolv appe&r
ou{dated and ohsnlcte. One exaruple of this riisparity is the Plalcau Resources
uraniunl mill tailings facility ne.ifi Ticabou, Lltah. 'ltrr:re, *.louble FMI- liners, full
c$vcrage leachale removal systerni ovtr the ltpper FML, and fr:ll coverage Ll)S
br:Irvcen rhe FMLs were elesignsd with rnultiple observation sumps to minirnize
driving head, provide rapid reporting, and effcci high FMI- lealiage recovary.
tr-l*wever. certain impr*v*nrents can be mada at l\&ite Mesa inctruding: I ) pninr of
cr:rmpliance rnorritoring welk far each individual cell, 2) head minirnization
equi;:ment and uperation lbr Cells I and 3, 3) aucelerated closure $f Cell ?,4) rer
design and ffIrCIfil conslructicln for Cell 4 belbre rslurn to scR,ice, and 5) inrprovod
eov*r s!'$tcm design ftir all 4 Cells at the fueility.
Ahsense {}f eunerlt or-A}rtisipa{ed Impairment of BensJlqial usE - this rrquiremenl
can be considered satisfiecl st IUC if: 1) groundwalcr is adequately *urd carefirlly
rnonitrorcd at thc Ibcility, nnd 2) the current IIJC clesign and construstion hr]s not
caused any advcrse inrpacl on lncal groundwater quality, Addilional site
D.
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Memr:rnntlurn
June 27,30{}{}
Page 26
cimracteriz"*tion atrd imprnvements in the exi$tifig groundwater mr:nit*ring netrvork
ean establish if con"lpli*nce has been n:r:t in thcsc: Hrea$.
I"Iowever, in the cvcnl {hut gruundu'atrcr pollution is discovered and cr"lnfirmr:d at {"he
fat:ili11u" the fxcr:ulivc liecretary n'ould he hard-prcssed tr: make this last a{Irmation
ri:quired by the {iWQp Rules. ln that evsnt, bcncficial use oi }acal groun*lwater
could slill be prolerlted thru other n"lsans, such *s implrmenlation of a gr*undwater
rceoyery 0r remedlati*n systern to proteet dswnstrr:am grcrmdwcler users. For this
re&son" it will be r,rilical t$ euqrdinate the llennitting eff*rt-s for this {bcility with
ongoing c*ntiminant investigation studi*c at lhe ItlC facility {ner 8CI3/9} DRC
NOV and Crnu*chvatcr Cnrrectivc Actinn fin{er)"
llredictinns *f future degradation of groundwater quxlity al the {bcility wauld be
ditTicult to proridu, base<i or a lack of supporting infarn:*tion" and rvnuld be ldghly
"suh.iective, as discussed above.
epnclqsions
Atler revie*'of the enginecring dcsign, spccilications, anil as-huilt reports prr:vieled by IUe, DRC
st*ff iruve l:erneluded that:
It is unlikelyrh*t ary teak detection r;ystcm exists under IUC rmrstcrvatcrdisp*sal Cell l.
Thcrcfore,;roint nf conrpliance g5rerunduater morril*ring rvelis will be requircd around Cell
I ir thc Permit.
l.c*k detectiein systems f*und ufidsr trUC Cclls 2 and 3 are gr*ssly inarlcquate. ISased on
availatllr system design. Seonretry, tn* undertrying bedrock penneability, DKC stall estiffiate
that ['ML l*akage w*ulcl rernain undctected hy thc $urrenl sy$tem until leakage flows reach
s riile of hetween 2,5fif) and 84t).000 gal/ar:re/day, wilh an everage of about ?UCI,000
gal,/*urelday- This taEk of lei*{ detcsiion sensitivity fuils tei meet DWQ pcrfunnance
st*nelalds for existiag facilitics (200 galiacre/day). As a result, tk exisli*g desigrr fails to
conrpll with rl*e nWQ Dischirrge h,tinimization Technologi (0MT) req*ircnrcnts fr.rund in
&e fiWQP Rules.
h{ultipl* lines erf evidcnce alsn sugge"*t that the 30-mil fVC mcmbrane used as }'ML in C*lls
I, 2. and 3 is prunc to exr:esr leakage due to a nurnbsr uf factors, ineluding: l) suspct
pr*paraliern nf FML beckling and protectivc blanket laycrs, ?i lower PVC puncfure strength,
3) higher PVC waterv&ptlr transmissir:n, 4) long-term d*gradation of PVC membranes due
t* l*rching ofplasticixrcon:pou*dsand organie ehenrica.l attsck, and 5) susp$ct PVC seafir
preplrrxtion and construction meth0ds.
As a rcsull of leak dsmclion $),st$m design shortcomings and suspec{ physical uonditi*n and
inrr:griry ofthe PVC FML in Cclls I " I an,J 3, * demon*tr*tion <lfaclequate DM'I *ill larg*ly
I**us ort perforn:ance af th* l-tnal cover svstsm. and ts a lesser ciegree urr nperati*nal
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Memorandum
Juns 27. 2S0t)
Page ?7
improyeffeilts. Operati*nal im5rrovem*ntx, include, but are not limited to: l) addilianal
groundrvater charaeteri?"atior1 and instaliatii:rn of new monitoring wclls {br eaci"l individual
dispr:sal c,ell, 2) additioncl waler qu6lity mr"rnitoring parametr:rs, 3) accelerated clasure fnr
Cell 2, -tnd 4) head rninimiralion eff irns lbr Cells 2 and 3. Improvcnrfits ter the tlnal cover
includc: decrease d radon trnrrier pcrnrcabitity, addition of a higlr pmmeability filter zone and
a l;11,11.i*lay co:nposite layer in the cover design. and sh*rter drainage pa& Iengths"
Altlrcrugh tl're leak detecti*n system d*sign under Ccll 4A fiipre$cntii an ir:nprovcmcnt $yqr
pr*viaus disp*sal celis at the Iaciiity-, its lcak detriclion shtrrtcttntings, and currertt state of
nrglect ancl disrcpair rnardate that this qEll be retrofit to meet currrrnt Best Available
1'eclrnalogy (lJAT) st*ndards bclirre &rly u$e far tnilings or $'asteu,&ter dispusal aclil,itisc,
[".ack af sepilrnte and independent construetifin supen,ision and cunstruction quality
controilquality assur:urce (CQA/QC) may have contributcel to an increased rate of
r:onstruction de{bcts in II.IC: 'failings Cells I n 2, 3, and .1. Revisions neetl to be nrade to any
Iulurt: IUC L'QAIQC rlforts and plans tn eRsur* modern conslruction techniques and provide
confidence in tire engineering contaiffnent of new rva$tervater and tailings disposal cell
construction.
An cngineering survey error ol'uppnrximalely ?00 fset has hsen di*cov*red at tailings Cell
2, wl:iclr musl bc resalvcrJ. Resolution of,this eror cafi be combined with sun'trys needed
to c*rrect *ther crrr:rc for the graundwater conrplia"nce monitoring wells.
An unlinsd sedin,entation pond lormerly drained the IUC mill site and rrre storfigr pad area
antJ has bccn used feir on-sit* disp;sa! of fly-ash. 'I"his Fly-Ash lland is a potential sr:urce
of greirmetu'ater polluti$n that rrccds to be invr:stigated, Historical and ongoing r:peratinn of
this l?'ly-Ash Pond constitutes a potential groundx.ater cont&nlinaticn sourcc et the ruC
facility. rtppropriate m{ir.sures to control gr*undwaur pollution at this facility include, but
are nol limited to: i) insrullation ol'an engineered ccver s3'stem fullowod by point-of-
compliance n:onitoring wclls, $r 2) removal of thE fl1,-ash msterial and other contaminants
and apprcprimlcd disposal at another appruvcd and engineercd facility.
Compliarrce ra,itl: the GWQI} Rules for issuance of a Pennit to an sxisting facility al luC can
he ar:hieved as described abovs. However, if groundu,ater cantanrinati$n is discnl.ered ncar
Cells l,2,or 3 during additinnal site chnructcriration or installation of new ground\i!'ater
n:oniloring '.vells, the Executive Sccrclarr,- rvill no1 be able to affirm the l*ck of inrpairnrcnt
iif present and beneficial usr without additional groundrvater remediatioR measurf,"s.
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h'lemorandum
June 2?, 2000
Page 28
BEfrrEnces
D'Appononia Cnnsulting lh:gintr;rs, Int.. June, I979, "Engine*rs Report Tailings &{anagemrnt
System", rmpublished consultants r.rpart, approximately 50 pp., 2 figurcs, 2 appenrlices.
D'Appolonia Ccnsulting lingineers, lnc., N{ny. tgSl, "Engineer's Reporl Second Phcse Design -(..ell 3 Tailings Mxnagrrncn{ S3*slem", unpuhlished consultalts reporr. approxin:ate}y 30Fp.,I figure, 3 app*rrdices.
I D'Appolonia C*nsulting Xlngineers, Inc., F*Lrruary, 1982, "Con$truction Report Initial Ph:r-se -
I 'l"ailings h{anagemenl S,vslent", unpuhlishecl consultafits r{:port, *pproxirnately ? pp., 6
tablcs, i3 figures" 4 appendices.
Iine rgy l"'uels Nue icar,lnc., March, 19S3. "Ccnstruction Repnn $ecr:nd Phase Tailings h,Ia*agernent
Systcm". unpublished eornpaly report, lB pp., 3 tables,4 llgures, 5 appendices.
Inlern&tinn&] I-xraniurn Corporatir:r1 Ma1', 1999. "CraunrJwater lnfbnrratinn Repofl White Mesa
l.lr*nittm llill Blanding, Lltah", unpublished c$mlany repod, approxin:ately llg pp., I?
tat:kx, 15 figures, and I attachments.
Int*rnational l-jranium Corporation. January- 28.2000, "Transmittal of Program far llelirrearion of
Etrevated Chlor*form in Perched Clroundr,r'alrlrat MW-4, for Chloroforrn lnvestigation Phase
4 " Ut:tir DIIQ Notice ofVialnrion and Grourrdr*'aler Corrective Aclion Order, UDEQ Docket
l{o. UGQ {sic)-20-0l,lssued on August 23,l99g",unpuhlished conlpa$y translnittal telter
{ionl l)avid C. Fryrlenlund to Don A. Ostler, P"E.; includes a January 28. 2000 tcchnical
rrp$I'{ by $tew*:t Smitlt, Ruman Z. P1'rih, and Roman S. Popieta}i, "Progranl forDelineation
oflllevcted Chl<lroftrrm in I'erched Cround*'ateratMW-4". unpublished cfinsultaxt$rsport,
17 pp", ? frgures, I table, 1 appandix.
Koernrr, R.M. 1990, DesiFnin,i wiih 6qos),nlhetiqs, 2od Ed., Prentice l{all, Engleu'ocd CIifk, New
Jersey, 65? pp.
Moultan" L.K., August, I $80. "Highway Subdrairr*ge Design", U.S. Department ofTransportaiion,
l'eclcral llighrvay Adminisrratior: Publicatinn No. fllWA-TS-S0-224, (reprinted July, 1990),
l6? pp.
f ilan Envirnnmenul Corporatian, July, 1994. "H,vdrogeok:gic Evaluation of 1[r} ire Mcsa lJraniurn
Mill", unpublished consultants report, approximately 5l pp..5 tables. 19 figures,7
appendices.
I rirrrn bnvirei;urrcnrinx,:;::lTlrH:irff:jKill,i';1,fls:;il,m'::,.T*::"r*' rv{,r"'
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Li.S. [nvironnr*nlal Prcrlection Agency, August, 1989, "Requiremenls far I'laimrclous Wi*te Landfil]
I i:.iliil |;ililr,,"n, and Closure". r*chnrllogy Transfer Seminar Putrlic*ri*n ,EI'N62si4-
I Urletco Minertls Corpr:ration" April 10, lg$g, "Cell 4l)esign". unpublished conrpany repofi,r includes: l ) Aprii I 0, 1 989 letter {?om Curtis 0. ffea}y to [drvnnl F. i lawkins, I pp., u.ith 60I xuiffHi*;:liffix::Il?.H"'#ffi:;;1-:ffi;i#r:r}';:T:ffiffi11
and 2 appendice*.
t Llrah Divisfffi:,T*:i:;:;',:sil,*:i[.;J,;.,,,ff;;ffiny,iT*?trry,],1;l',.,1ffi$
I ,,-,,,:::;:;,-X- --;' Ilo-*o ?, z0rr0. "h{sy, reee IUC croundwarsrrnrorrnation
I fi[]';]Hffi;:J;#1:X*J;f#ation*er"'ed
to site llvdr*geo]os;v"' agencv
r Lltah Divi$inlr ol'Radietion Conu cl, M;ry i l. ?000, "fnkrnali*r':cl l.]raniurn Corporation \Vhite l\desa
I Mill; DRC Siite Visir of May 9, ?0f)0: Staff Ccmclusions and Recommentlafir:ns",
unpuhlished agenc)'memoranduru. 9 pp., 20 photagraphs.
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- attachrnents (5)I cc: Lar'ry Mize, DWQ
I i;l;,;ffi'*i:::ffierPern:i,P,b
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ATTACI{MENT T
l-ltah Division of Radiation Conrml
$rrmmary of
Availahle Fernreability Infu nn*tion
for thq
I!;C 1v'1ri1* Mesa Uraniurn Mill Tailings Facility
DRC $preadshet HydCond.XLS
Tabshest alldata
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ATTACHMENT 7
Utah Division of &"adiation Control
Summary of
[stimated Static Loads
on Flexible Men:brane Liners
aIIUC White Mesa Uranium Mill
Tailings Ceils Nas. I thru 4
DRC Spreadshest Cell Eng.Xl-S
Tabsheet Staticl"ocd
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dry d*nsity {rsrn *&2 Oi4ppofonia &as6rn Ropof f0elis ? & 2), p. ??
1 nla nla
2 5,614 5,583
3 5,6c$ 5,5734 5,SS3 5.556
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dry riensif frarn $fr'l O:Appatania 6hgrn*e*ng Oesrgn Repod (Cstl 3), p, 1-2
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$e Tailingx Callsl $t*tie Lsad an FUL
des6rn dEls fr*rn 2fi2 O'Appolonk 8a{16
Tailinge Elsvations
Utalr fJivision of Radirtion Contml
PIot of lUC Tailings Cells 2 and 3
Under drain Filter Gradation
and Camparjson wift IUC Reparred
FML Bedding Layer 0radation
Modi$ed from
218? I)' Appol onia eonsul ting Engineers Repor{
f igure 13.
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ER ANALYSIS1 i
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BEOOIN6 I{ATERIAL
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ATTACHMENT 4
Climate Summary Dats for
Blanding Utah
frorn the
Slestern Regional Clim*te Ceater
lntemet Webpage Addresr:
lr{p:/1r*rvq.rvrcc.dri.edrlcgi-tri.n/*liRfi ftM.pl futbl*q
t5/*r+rl'.r*rcc.dri.edd{&i-bi#cliRSelM. nltulUff
tsLANnING, UTAI-{ (420738)
Period of Reccrd Mont}ly Climat* Samnrary
Prriotl nf Rmord : 12l*11904 to 1?/3U1999
Jan S*b, Mar Apr May Jun
Average M*,*" is.? 44.7 s2.s 6r.g 7r.9 83,0Temp*aturc (S)
A'erage Min'*. t6.6 z?,.a z?.s 34.0 4r.T 5s.4Teraperatrue ff)
Av*rage Tot"l. r,I? l.r8 r.CIt 0.sB 0.?i 0.4?Precipitation (in,)
4verage.Total r I.? ' .7.s 4.3 ?.0 a.z, 0.0$nowFall (in.)
4rer$&3s-norv 4 3 o s o sDepth (in.)
Percent of passible *bservations tbr period of ree*rd.
Max. T.ernp.:96ols Min. Temp.:96.5a/o Prenipitation; 96.Ssrt $norvfall: 91.7% Snow Depth: S9"5%
Check ftarior M$la$ata. or Ir{etadata Eraphics fur more detail about data eornpletsness.
Nov Dq* Amual
51.3 41.0 63.6
76"4 I S.9 36"4
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3.4 10.3 39.3
01r
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ATTACHh{ENT 5
Utah Divi*ion of Radiation Control
Errim*te nf IUC Cell4A
Lcak f}etection System Efficiency
DRC Spreadsheet CEIIS*g.XL$
Tabsheet Cell4aLDS
t1AI c D E flG H I
1 Sall4A Lesk D*l*ttlon Sytterl eovoragc
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2 Leak natection $vstern
4 Bqls!
Siam. CI{
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rte c6ll4AEAnyax
Lenglh
Area ol iloorArw
I LDS
fri6-J - orain nrm
lnftuence \Ind$t
(ft)
Ar*a
a {ft'2}I 1 iwest Outsr
_
2,West Middle
3 \l{est lnner
905, 3,S; 3,187.6fzo -- {E z,szo.offi: *---3.5
1,575.0
1 2$0]_--1AW 1.?$0,000
6
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6 ffi;i["inne/-
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.1 ..- -.....-*-*-)
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i Totat: 20,230.0
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tcveraqe to lsor Area 0.016
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CellE n0.xls - Catl4aLD$4128/2000
Cslll C6
Comrnen* Approxirnate Drain Arrn Lengtlr: kom 8188 Urnetco Report, Western Engineers CIesign Srawing $heat
C4.{"
Cell: t)6
Commen* Ce{|.{A Leak &eteclion $ystem pipcags Oiameter of lnlluence: cross-seclisn plana provided by IUC
show that each L0$ plpewas to bo installaiJ insid* an 18 inch wid* trench, tined witlt afl FML i40 mil
HSPE or 30 mil PVC). Enginaadng ptan shows FML to exta,ld a dislance af 1 fgqt No either side of he
pip*'s tranch. Consequently, total width across which l*aks could be dlrected to the LDS collection
pip* * 3"$ f6et.
Paga ?
E,XHIBIT G
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UTE MOLINTATN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit G to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML Renewal
Re: Ute Mountain Ute Tribe Environmental Programs Department Review of "Nitrate
Corrective Action Plan for the White Mesa Mill Site- Docket No. UGW09-03-A and
Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement Executed September 30,2011"
The report,"Nitrate Corrective Action Plan for the White Mesa Mill Site- Docket No.
UGW09-03-A and Amended Stipulated Consent Agreement Executed September 30, 201l"
(CAP) was submitted by Denison Mines (USA) Corp. (DUSA) on November 29,2011 to the
Utah Division of Radiation Control (DRC) as required under the Amended Stipulated Consent
Agreement Executed September 30,2071 between DUSA and DRC to address nitrate + nitrite
(hereinafter referred to as "nitrate") contamination in the groundwater beneath the White Mesa
Uranium Mill (the o'site" or the "mill"), located near the Ute Mountain Ute Community of White
Mesa, San Juan County Utah. The CAP was prepared for DUSA by its private contractor Hydro
Geo Chem, Inc (HGM) based out of Tucson, Arizona.
Nitrate contamination at the site was first detected in 1999 in wells that were installed to
address a different contaminant plume on the site, chloroform. Pumping of chloroform
contaminated water began in 2003 and continues to the present day under White Mesa Uranium
Mill: Notice of Violation and Groundwater Corrective Action Order, Docket No. UGW20-01.
In a letter dated December I ,2009, DRC Co-Executive Secretary of the Utah Water
Quality Board (the "Executive Secretary") recommended that DUSA also address and explain
elevated chloride concentrations contaminating the groundwater at the site along with the nitrate
pollution. DUSA's CAP is required to meet Utah State requirements specified in the Utah
Administrative Code Rule, R317- 6-6.15.D.
This review has found the CAP to be deficient under the requirements of R-317-6-
6.15.D-E.,See R-317-6-6.15.8 2.a, requiring the CAP "To be protective of the public health and
the environment;" R-317-6-6.l5.E.4a, "Action shall Produce a Permanent Effect;" and R-3 l7-6-
6.15.E.4b, "any cap or other method of source control shall be designed so that the discharge
from the source following corrective action achieves groundwater quality standards or, if
approved by the Board, alternate corrective action concentration limits (ACACLs)."
Specific deficiencies in the CAP under Utah Administrative Code (UAC) are detailed
below following a brief description of the CAP.
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The CAP describes three phases of action. Phase one (source control) and Phase two
(remediation) are addressed in the CAP. Phase three (a long term solution) is defined but is not
covered in detail. DUSA proposes a separate CAP for phase three if DRC deems it necessary.
l. DUSA Proposed Corrective Actions
Phase One: DUSA proposes to delineate the physical extent of soil contamination around
the ammonium sulfate chemicaltanks and estimate the volume of contaminated soil, cover the
area with concrete, and move this volume of contaminated soil to the tailings impoundments at
closure of the facility. DUSA proposes to update the surety estimate to cover this activity.
Phase Two: DUSA proposes pumping from four wells in an attempt to hydraulically
control the nitrate plume to actively remove pollutant mass (or cycle it) and passively count on
"natural attenuation.," This is essentially waiting and hoping that environmental cycles diminish
the pollution over time.
Phase Three: DUSA describes possibilities of continuing phase one and/or phase two
activities with additionalmonitoring, evaluation and the possibility of additional remediation "as
necessary." DUSA also raises the possibility of petitioning DRC to allow alternate corrective
action concentration limits, which would raise the legal criteria for nitrate and chloride
concentrations levels in groundwater.
2. CAP Deficiencies
This CAP negligently considers ammonium sulfate tanks as the sole source of potential
nitrate contamination and does not identify any additional source for the chloride pollution.
DUSA's failure to seriously assess the tailings cells as a potential source for the nitrate and
chloride contamination is scientifically unsupportable, as is DRC's lack of resolve to require this
analysis. The failure to address this issue puts the health and safety of the public, UMU Tribal
members, and the environment at risk of substantial long term risks and fails to protect both in
violation of R317-6-6.1582. If the tailings cells are the source of the contamination, the nitrate
and chloride currently in the groundwater are the leading indicators of a pollutant plume that
may contain radionuclides, heavy metals and volatile organic chemicals that will persist in the
environment for many generations, constituting an incalculable risk.
DUSA dismisses the most likely source of groundwater pollution on-site, the tailings
cells. DUSA states that the hydrologic travel times through the shallow aquifer would not have
allowed leakage from the tailings to travel far enough from the source to cause the current extent
of pollution and that the amount of leakage necessary to result in the current contamination
would generate a groundwater mound that would be approximately five feet high under the
tailings.
First, travel times for groundwater through the shallow aquifer are uncertain regarding
vertical and horizontal groundwater travel times and hydrologic conductivity in the shallow
aquifer. DUSA has calculated travel times ranging from 0.22 ftlyr to 123 ftlyr (TABLE 3
Estimated Hydraulic Conductivities and Perched Zone Pore Velocities, Nitrate Investigation
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Report, December 30, 2009). This same report states that DUSA believes it is possible that
contamination may have moved 2,100 feet in 26 years, an average of 88 feet per year. However,
in the'Nitrate lnvestigation Report, December 2009, DUSA stated that leakage from the tailings
could not have migrated 1,000 feet.
DUSA states in the CAP that the ammonium sulfate tanks are the one remaining potential
source of the nitrate pollution in the groundwater (page l, CAP). Why would pollution sourced
from soils beneath the ammonium sulfate tanks be able to travel through the shallow aquifer to a
great spatial extent while this would be impossible for pollution from the tailings? With
measurable chloride and nitrate groundwater pollution in tandem, and both chloride and nitrate
solutions in the tailings, it is unacceptable to assume the source potential of these contaminants
in the CAP be from the ammonium sulfate tanks, which does not include a source potential for
chloride contamination.
DUSA also states that the amount of leakage from the tailings necessary to cause the
nitrate pollution would generate a groundwater mound five feet high. There is no evidence of
this. Of course, it is impossible to know if a mound this size exists because the current
groundwater monitoring network is not sophisticated enough to detect groundwater mounding of
this magnitude. Mounding around the wildlife ponds is detected at a resolution of ten feet.
The University of Utah's isotopic report (Utah Division of Radiation Control Summary
of work completed, data results, interpretations and recommendations For the July 2007
Sampling Event At the Denison Mines, USA, White Mesa Uranium MillNear Blanding, Utah
Prepared by T. Grant Hurst and D. Kip Solomon Department of Geology and Geophysics
University of Utah Submitted May 2008) is inappropriately used to dismiss the tailings as a
potential source of the nitrate and groundwater contamination. However, the report concluded
that groundwater flow in the shallow aquifer is active and only sampled two wells that are at the
far southern boundary of the nitrate contamination (MW-30 and MW-31). Why didn't DUSA
offer to repeat the isotopic sampling methods used in the University of Utah study with samples
from wells at the epicenters of the contamination such asTW4-24 or TWN-2?
Additionally, phase two of the CAP proposes pumping contaminated water into the
tailings cells. As outlined above, it is the Tribe's opinion that the tailings have not been
seriously assessed as the source of the pollution, and placing contaminated materialthere may
well result in further contamination of the aquifer and greater endangerment to public and
environmental health. The Tribe has detailed specific and substantial concerns regarding the
status of the liners and the inadequate leak detection systems (LDS) for the tailings cells. See
Comment Letter Section III(A).
The proposed pumping and resulting hydrologic changes to the shallow aquifer may
mask leakage from unaddressed actual sources of contamination, such as the tailings cells. lf the
pumping network hydraulically captures and alters contaminant plumes originating from the
tailings cells this could result in false negative results in the point of compliance well network.
Consequently leakage could remain undetected into the future leaving a contamination problem
will be impossible or at the least very expensive and complicated to clean up; this is a serious
potential situation that puts public and environmental health at risk.
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It also appears that neither of the proposed phases in the CAP will produce a permanent
effect (R3 l7-6-6.1 5.8.4a.) since DUSA has not been required to adequately identify or address
the tailings as a logical source of the nitrate contamination and has not identified a source of the
chloride pollution at all. In fact, page 23 of the CAP states, o'actual sources have not been
identifi ed and quantifi ed."
Also, the CAP is not designed so that the discharge from the source following corrective
action achieves groundwater quality standards (R317-6-6.15.E.4.b.) in any reasonable amount of
time. The corrective action concentration limit for nitrate is l0 mg/L, and relying on natural
attenuation for remediation of an unidentified source without control will not achieve compliance
with groundwater quality standards.
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EXHIBIT H
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RRD INTERNATIONAL CORP
Geotechnical & Environmental Consalting for Mining & Mineral Processing
I December 2011
Ms. Celene Hawkins
Associate General Counsel
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe
P.O. Box 128
Towaoc, CO 81334
Re: Review of Containment and Closure Issues
Denison USA / White Mesa Uranium Mill
Relicensing Application, Revision 5.0, Sept 2011
Dear Ms. Hawkins,
This letter presents the findings of a focused review of the
recommendations. This letter is divided into three parts:
l. Liner for the new cell for demolition debris
2. Liner systems, Cells 1, 2 and 3
3. Closure and financial surety
above referenced documents and resulting
Each section is designed to "stand alone" but there are common themes. The reference citations are
provided at the end ofeach section.
1.0 Liner for new cell for demolition debris
A thin (12" thick) compacted clay liner does not appear to be either best practice or a reasonable level
of containment for several reasons. Thin clay liners are (1) unreliable in general, (2) unsuitable for
disposal of any wastes other than clean construction & demolition debris, and (3) not in compliance
with industry or regulatory standards.
1.1. Thin clay liners are unreliable
The most authoritive study on the actual performance of compacted clay liners evaluated 85 full-scale
installations, comparing actual field hydraulic conductivity ("permeability" or "k" herein) to predicted
performance from laboratory permeability test results. A key result of this study was that poor
correlation exists between laboratory and field permeability and that this lack of correlation increases
dramatically for liners thinner than 24 inches (Benson, 1999). Another important research paper
(Koerner, 2006) cites the inability to maintain moisture in the compacted clay in the long-term as a key
factor in degradation of performance. This is pronounced in arid and semi-arid sites (such as Southern
Utah) where the underlying natural soils and overlying waste will be substantially drier than the clay.
This moisture gradient causes water to migrate out of the clay, causing shrinkage and related cracking,
Many studies, including Benson (1999), Albright (2006) and Maine DEP (2005), show that drying
dramatically increases permeability - by up to 4 orders of magnitude - and this effect is worse for thin
liners.
The most recent comprehensive study on clay field performance focused on caps, which are affected by
drying as well as other environmental factors. This study (Benson, 2007) found that the in-service
performance will generally be two to three orders of magnitude worse (i.e., higher permeability) than
short-term testing predicts, as illustrated in Figure l.l. This follows on earlier research on compacted
clay liners, which had similar results, as shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 (Benson, 1999).
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10'6
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Figure 1.3: Field permeability vs. compacted clay liner thickness (Benson, 1999)
1.2. Unsuitable for uranium mill demolition debris
Given that the debris will include random pieces of plastic liner from Cell 1, pieces of concrete and
reinforcing steel of various sizes from dust to intact structures, and soil related with and contaminated
by these components, it will be effectively impossible to fully clean the debris. Any expectation that
this will be accomplished is not based on industry experience or any collaborating evidence. Any
attempt to fully decontaminate the debris would produce a vast quantity of liquid and semi-solid wastes
not currently provided for in the closure plan. Such an approach would require a decontamination
facility, evaporation ponds for the wash water, and a sludge disposal cell (double lined, similar to the
tailings cells) for disposal ofthe cleaning residues.
1.3. Regulatory and industry standards
Industry standard practice is to dispose of the plant demolition materials in the tailings facility (Energy
Information Admin, 1995; USDOE Fact Sheet, Monticello, 1995). Based on the latest DRC-approved
tailings cells (4a and 4b) at White Mesa, the accepted standard for tailings in Utah is a double liner
consisting of a 60-mil thick high density polyethylene (HDPE) liner over a synthetic drainage layer
over another 60-mil HDPE liner over a geosynthetic clay liner. Given the lack of water in the
demolition debris, the top liner and drain layer could be omitted for the demolition disposal cell
(assuming it cannot be used for any liquids).
Non-radioactive wastes are regulated by the USEPA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, either
Subtitle C (hazardous wastes) or D (municipal solid wastes, MSW). The least of these prescriptive
standards requires at least a 60-mil HDPE over 24" of clay (k<1x10-7 crn/s); under no conditions is a
single 12-inch compacted clay liner acceptable. Any potentially radioactive waste, even of the lowest
levels, should be considered as higher-risk than MSW and thus require a higher level of containment.
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1.4 References
Albright, W. H., Benson, C. H. Gee, G. W., Abichou, T., Tyler, S. W. and Rock, S. A.,
"Field performance of a compacted clay landfill final cover at a humid site," ASCE Jr. Geotech.
Geoenv. Eng., Nov. (2006)
Benson, C. H., Daniel, D. E. and Boutwell, G. P., "Field performance of compacted clay liners," ASCE
Jr. Geotech. Geoenviron. Eng. (1999)
Benson, C. H., Sawangsuriya, A., Trzebiatowski, B., and Albright, W. H., "Post-construction changed
in the hydraulic properties of water balance cover soils," DRI Alternative Cover Assessment Program
(2007)
Energy Information Administration, "Decommissioning of U.S. uranium production facilities," office
of Coal, Nuclear, Electrical and Alternative Fuels, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Washington, D.C, Feb. (1995)
Fact Sheet, "Monticello remedial action project vicinity property cleanup process," US Dept. of Energy,
Nov. (1995)
Koerner, R. M., "The uselessness of compacted clay liners in the closure (i.e., capping) of landfills,"
GRI White Paper #10, Geosynthetic Institute and Drexel University, Jan. (2006)
Maine DEP, "lmplementation of a sealed double ring infiltrometer to evaluate the long-term hydraulic
performance of the barrier soil layer component of a composite landfill cover system in Norridgewock,
Maine," Bureau of Reclamation and Waste Management, Solid Waste Engineering Unit, Dept. of
Environmental Protection, May (2005)
2.0 Liner svstem. Cells l. 2 and 3
The existing liner system in the original three cells is a 30-mil thick polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
geomembrane over a drainage layer. This liner system is inadequate for uranium mill tailings
containment for a variety of reasons, as summarized below.
2.1. The system did not meet industry standards at the time of installation
Weak cyanide mill tailings from gold and silver operations would generally be considered as a lower-
level waste than uranium mill tailings. By the early 1980s, a number of these tailings impoundments in
the USA were using containment systems equal to or more advanced than that used in cells l-3.
Examples include: Paradise Peak, Nevada; Jamestown, Califomia; and Ridgeway, North Carolina.
There seems to be no other examples of contemporaneous tailings facilities using 30 mil PVC. The
incompatibility of PVC resins and plasticizers with organic solvents, as discussed in a following
subsection, was also well known by 1979.
Further and more importantly, modem containment engineering was born in the mid 1980s. Before
then, there was very little engineering involved and essentially no inspection or quality control during
construction. A number of practitioners made a business in the late 1980s of replacing containment
systems installed in the early 1980s. A surprising percentage of those systems failed completely or
simply performed very badly due to combinations of poor quality materials, poor installation practices,
and lack of engineering inspection during installation. As an example, the Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station (Arizona), built in the mid 1980s, finished relining all of its containment facilities in
2010. Many of the mines in Nevada (where most geomembrane liners were used circa 1980) either
abandoned those early facilities or completely reconstructed them. This also happened in South Dakota
at three of the gold mines built circa 1985, including the Golden Reward and Annie Creek mines.
2.2. PVC is not compatible with acidic wastes
PVC geomembranes have limited tolerance of acidic (low pH) wastes and are generally not
recommended for such containments, and PVC is only rarely used in such applications (Smith, 2004).
PVC geomembranes are more flexible than PVC pipe to a great extent because of plasticizers added to
the base resins. Acids, solvents and other chemicals extract these plasticizers, causing the
geomembrane to become brittle, losing critical flexibility and therefore tolerance for settlement,
movement of the wastes, planar and normal shear forces, and so forth (see Photo 2. 1). As the Table 2. 1
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and Photo 2.1 show, PVC can have a strong negative reaction to acidic wastes, losing94Yo of the seam
strength andT5Yo of flexibility (i.e., elongation at break) in as little as 2 months. Importantly, there is
no collaborating data to support a thin PVC liner in an acidic environment for over 30 years (Thiel,
2003). This data gap should be filled before any such installation is allowed to continue in service.
Table 2.1: PVC Agine Test Results (7o change from original) (Smith, 2004)
Immersion Time Tensile Strength Elongation at(Days) @ Break Break Puncture Seam Shear
Elongation
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60
120
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Photo 2.1: 30 mil PVC seam, before acid exposure (left) & after 60 days (right) (Smith,2004)
2.3. PVC is not compatible with the alternative feed wastes
The alternative feed wastes, and therefore the tailings solutions, contain these organic solvents:
benzene, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, methylene chloride and naphthalene. All of these are
aggressive to PVC resin and generally more aggressive to the plasticizers commonly used to make PVC
geomembranes flexible. Three industry sources were considered for the compatibility of PVC resin
with these chemicals and those are summarized in Table 2.2. Plasticizers and the other additives are
also (and often more) susceptible to attack and leaching by solvents, but each plasticizer is unique and
thus it is impossible to know how that component of the geomembranes used at White Mesa will react
with specific compatibility testing. However, broad conclusions can be drawn about the base PVC
resin, and the performance of the geomembrane will likely be worse than predicted from the resin
alone.
Dissolution of the base resin will mobilize PVC into the groundwater; monitoring results show elevated
(above background) levels of vinyl chlorides. This supports the conclusions that (i) the geomembranes
are being attacked chemically, and (ii) they have exceeded their service life.
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30 mil PVC seam, before acid exposure (left) & after 60 days (right) (Smith, 2004)
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Table 2.2: PVC ibiti dat
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Benzene NC B (for <1%)C,
Carbon tetrachloride C C D
Chloroform NC x D
Methylene chloride NC not rated D
Naphthalene NC x D
Ranking key C:compatible
NC:not compatible
A:little to minor effect
B:minor to moderate
effect
C:severe effect
X:no test data, likely
to have severe effect
C:fair
D:severe effect
\:to 72of
Notes: PVC base resin without plasticizer or other additives. The plasticizer agent(s) is unknown but
likelv to have more serious incomoatibilitv issues than the base resin.
2.4. The useful life was less than 30 years
The tailings cells were put in service as early as 1979,32 years ago. There is limited research on the
useful life of thin PVC geomembranes in containment applications because they have rarely been used
as such and are not used in modern containments. One authoritive study, recently updated, suggests a
useful life (defined as a loss of 50o/o of physical properties) for PVC geomembranes of l8 to 32 years
depending on geomembrane thickness, cover conditions, and resin formulation (Koemer, 201 I ). This isfor non-acid installations and therefore over-predicts useful life in a chemically aggressive
environment. Considering the service life without regard to the aggressive chemicals, a multi-industry
study of geomembrane performance measured plasticizer loss from thin PVC geomembranes at 10 sites
over 22 years. Figure 2.1 shows that plasticizer loss reached 50% in less than 20 years. Useful life is
generally taken as loss of 50%o of physical properties, and plasticizer is one of the key properties of
flexible geomembranes.
A literature search on manufacturer warranties for PVC geomembranes did not produce a single
example of a warranty for a liner produced circa 19'79 of longer than 20 years. Modem PVC liners are
of much better quality, though modem warranties are for no longer than 25 years. In the author's
experience it is uncommon for a PVC geomembrane to carry any warranty when exposed for prolonged
periods to non-compatible chemicals, especially organic solvents.
The mining industry has broadly avoided thin PVC geomembranes for acid tailings containment. A
search of the literature did not find a single other example of a 30-mil (or thinner) PVC geomembrane
used in an acidic mill tailings impoundment or for containment of organic solvents. Experience at
White Mesa suggests that these liners have exceeded their useful life. There is considerable evidence of
containment failure (nitrate and chloride plumes below Cell 1, a uranium seep to the east) and Denison
elected a much more robust system (double 60-mil HDPE) for the new tailings cells. The lack of a
reliable monitoring system (Denison's own study, submitted as Vol. 4 of the original relicensing
application, predicts nominally 250 years for a leak to be detected by the monitoring wells) compounds
the problem by given false "negative" results.
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Duration of exposure (years)
Figure 2.1: Plastisicer loss in thin PVC geomembrane canal liners (below water level) in Western
USA (1966-2004) (Stark, 2005)
2.5. Temoorary caps for Cells 1. 2 and 3 inappropriate
Civen that the liners in the first three cells have passed their useful life, and given that there is
important evidence of groundwater contamination at the site, these cells should be taken out of service
and put into final closure as soon as possible. Temporary caps will allow continued infiltration of
rainwater, and continued, even incidental, disposal of wastes will add to the total contaminate load
available to seep through the liner system. There is also no good reason to defer final closure of these
cells and the standard in the industry. The standard "encouraged" by all other regulatory entities where
the author has experience, from Nevada and Arizona to Peru and Chile, is to maximize concurrent
closure. This provides a variety ofadvantages, including:
o Reducing environmental footprint and contamination risk annually;
o Reducing the liability that may be transferred to the agency at abandonment;
o Full-scale verification of the closure concept and optimization of that design based on field
experience; and
o Better cash flow management by the owner and a reduced likelihood that the owner will not be
able to fund the full closure.
2.5. References
Cole-Palemer, "Chemical compatability,"www.coleparmer (undated)
Harmsco Filtration Products, "Chemical compatibility chart," danarnark.com/files/
Chemical_Compatibil i ty.pdf (undated)
Koerner, R. M., Hsuan, G. and Koemer, G. R., "Geomembrane lifetime prediction: unexposed and
exposed conditions," GRI White Paper #6, Geosynthetic Institute and Drexel University, Feb. (2011)
Spilltech, "Chemical compatibility guide for containment berms," u,r.vrv.spilliech.corn/rvcssktre/
Soilll'echUSCatakrg.,\ssetStr:re/AttachnrentidocumentsiccgiG EOMEMBRANE.pdf (undated)
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Smith, M. E., Thiel, R., "Concentrated acid pre-curing of copper ores and geomembrane liners," The
Mining Record, May. (2004)
Stark, T. D., Choi, H. and Diebel, P. W., "Influence of plasticizer molecular weight on plasticizer
retention in PVC geomembranes," Geosynthetics International,Y. 12, No. l. (2005)
Thiel, R. and Smith, M. E., "State of the practice review of heap leach pad design issues," GRI, Dec.
(2003)
3.0 Closure and financial suretv
3.1. Review of the Denison closure plan
Time is insufficient for a full, detailed review of the closure plan, and thus, the focus herein will be on
the capping systems and how they compare to the Monticello cap. Monticello is an important reference
project because it is nearby and in a similar climate, geologic and social-economic setting. Monticello
was also closed by a government agency and thus presents the methods (and costs) that would most
likely be applied to White Mesa in the event of an owner walk-away. Table 3.1 compares the
components of the two projects' tailings cell caps.
The White Mesa cap omits several important components used at Monticello, listed and discussed
below. All of these missing components should be included in the White Mesa caps.
o Biotic intrusion layer: this is both standard practice on closure caps and needed to prevent
deep burrowing animals from penetrating the cap.
o Geotextile & capillary break: for a +200 year closure design, as required by law and industry
practice, a water storage layer must be isolated from the balance of the system with a capillary
break. Without said break, the water stored in the upper layer will be drawn into the radon
barriers through the capillary action of the soils. Clayey soils can develop capillary suctions
approaching I atmosphere and 15-foot draws are commonly seen in the field.
o HDPE geomembrane: without this barrier, any seepage that penetrates the water storage layer
will be available to mobilize contaminates from the waste and affect the radon barrier. The
standard of care for uranium mill tailings caps is to include both a water balance cap and a low
permeability caps. There is ample research showing that compacted soil barriers fail to meet
design standards in the majority of cases, and they do so by a wide margin, producing field
permeability several orders of magnitude higher than predicted (Benson, 2007), as shown in
Figure 3.1.
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l able 3.1: (-o arison of at Monticello and White Mesa
Cap Component Monticello Thickness White Mesa Thickness
Vesetation inches inches
Erosion control 0.67 ft 0.5 ft
Water storage/frost protection 4.83 ft 3.5 ft
Biotic intrusion (sravel)r.00 none
Geotextile -100 mil none
Capillarv break (sand)1.17 ft none
HDPE seomembrane liner 60 mil none
Radon barrier (compacted clav)2.00 ft 5.0 fr
TOTAL 9.67 ft 9.0 fr
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Figure 3.1: Long-term cap performance v. as-built permeability (Benson, 2007)
3.2. Review of the White Mesa closure cost estimate
3.2.1 A review of cost estimating methods
Cost estimating can be divided into three broad categories, each commonly used in the industry and
each having an important role. These are:
o Benchmarking: costs from other sites are adapted to the target site to give guidance on total
costs. The more sites studied and the more directly applicable those sites, the more accurate a
benchmarking estimate can be. With a modest level of effort a cost estimate of +l-50'Yo
accuracy can be developed, and the author has had success with developing better than+l-l5o/o
estimates from robust benchmarking efforts. An example of the benchmarking approach is
developing a first order estimate for a new home. If homes in your target neighborhood are
selling for an average of$150 per square foot, that is a reasonable starting price for the home
you are considering, with adjustments for site-specific features (e.g., in-ground pools, 3-car
garages, deferred maintenance, etc);
o Builrup estimates: these are cost estimates developed by "building up" the costs from line-
items, generally following the engineered design. This is the most common method and this is
what Denison has submitted as its closure cost estimate. A built-up estimate can be done at a
wide-range of accuracies, typically ranging from +/-10% for a very detailed design supported
by very accurate cost estimating and usually supporting contractor bids, to +l-50Yo for a
conceptual design or a most advanced design for a distant future installation. These accuracies
apply only to the considered closure actions; for example, if groundwater remediation is not
considered in the design the accuracy percentage would be before adding possible
groundwater remediation costs.
o Bid-supported cost estimates: this is a process where the detailed design is put out to
contractor bids where firm pricing is obtained for all major components (or the entire project).
These estimates are generally very accurate (+l-15% or better) to the extent they include all
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required closure actions. Bid-supported estimates are generally only applicable when a
detailed design has been completed and the project is within a year or two of construction.
Built-up estimates can be performed at a range of accuracies depending on (i) the level of engineering,
and (ii) the reliability of the unit costs. A closure plan prepared years before closure actions are to start
should be considered no better than "conceptual" and that generally suggests an accuracy of +l-50o/o to
+l-30%. This is in part because cost estimates generally (almost universally) decline in accuracy as the
forecast period increases (Lazenby, 2010). Most built-up costs will have four basic inputs:
o Direct costs (labor, equipment and materials to perform the construction including
mobilization and demobilization);
o Indirect costs (project and company overhead, insurance, bonds, profit, etc) which commonly
run 35% to 50%o of direct costs;
o Owner's costs (the cost of the owner's team to administer the project, including bidding and
awarding the construction contracts, hiring a project management or construction management
team, performing design changes during construction, and so forth). Owner's costs generally
run 10% to 25o/o ofthe direct costs; and
o Contingency, which is reflective of the level of design and the risk of unknowns. The most
common contingency used in the mining industry is 15 to 20o/o of the subtotal of the other
three categories of costs (and, as discussed below, this is almost always inadequate). Larger
contingencies are appropriate when either the design is conceptual (as in the case of most
closure plans) or the site is subject to significant uncertainties (such as the extent of
contamination in need of remediation).
Most cost estimates do not recognize inflation or cost escalation and as such should be cited in terms of
the year the estimate was based (e.g., 2010 dollars). The estimate must then be escalated to the time
period in which the work will be completed, using forward-looking inflation factors appropriate for the
region. Common escalation factors are 3.0 to 5.\oh peryear(Zuzulokc,2004). The failure to recognize
inflation in cost estimates looking out 10 to 15 years in the future creates a strong built-in bias to
underestimate costs; all other factors being correct, the actual cost will be l5loh to 198% of the
estimate assuming there is no serious inflation. Some agencies fail to do this or presume that bond
amounts can be adjusted later, but that's not always the case. The most common scenario when a bond
is "called" is because the ownerwent into an economic downturn, and just like it's impossible to get a
home mortgage when one's wages are declining, it's hard to renew and especially to increase bonds
when a company is in financial trouble.
Even detailed built-up cost estimates, supported by detailed engineering and claimed to contain high
levels of accuruay, are generally too low. A study issued by the well-respected engineering and project
management firm Pincock, Allan and Holt in 2000 made the following disturbing observations (PAH,
2000).
o "lt is rare, not the norm, for the actual project capital cost to be within l0 percent o/ the
fe as ibi lity s tudy capital estimate." flncluding contingency.l
o "Within the 2l projects, only three came in under thefeasibility study cost estimate."
o "Site earlhworks are oflen underestimated " [Closure costs are heavily earthworks.]
o After escalating the estimates for the time between the estimate and achral construction at
3.5% annually, ll of the 2l projects considered came in at ll8%o of the estimated cost (and
those estimates included contingencies), 3 came in at 137o/o. The 9 projects in North America
averaged l24o/o of estimate.
o Smaller projects (i.e.,, under about $200 million) performed by smaller mining companies are
most likely to have higher cost over-runs.
o Other important areas that are either omitted or underestimated include owner's costs, working
capital, freight, environmental, duties and taxes.
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In another study of cost overruns, those researchers analyzed 63 mining projects and found that the
mean actual cost was 125o/o of the estimate (including contingency) and that the maximum cost was
214% of the estimate (including contingency). Nearly 10% (44) of the 63 projects underestimated the
cost (Bertisen, 2008).
Several other studies, summarized in a mining industry blog (Caldwell,2001), reached two important
conclusions:
o The average actual closure cost in Australian mining (not uranium specific) is 6.8 times the
average estimate; and
o Total US mining closure liability is up to $12 billion more than the bonded total.
In short, when a mining estimate is prepared for public purposes, such as closure bonding, a much more
robust estimating method is needed to ensure adequate funding. Such robustness should include:
o Higher unit rates to recognize the inherently more expensive delivery method;
o Full recognition ofindirect and agency costs; and
o Significantly larger contingencies than traditionally used in mining.
3.2.2 Cost benchmarking
In 2010 the author completed a broad benchmarking study of the mining industry for cost to construct
both heap leach pad liner systems and closure caps. The heap leach liner costs were determined for 37
phases of recent projects, either constructed or in advanced stages of design. The closure cost was
developed as a "typical" for tailings and mine waste in semi-arid sites, using data from a dozen sites
and several parallel studies. The results of these benchmarking studies are summarized in Table 3.2.
The Table 3.2 values can be factored to provide an estimate for a uranium mill tailings (UMT) capping
system. Considering gross volumes, a UMT cap is typically about 3m thick or three times that
considered in Table 3.2. But some of those layers are relatively cheap (i.e., random fill) and thus the
factored cost would be less than three times. The primary "expensive" component in the table, the
geomembrane liner, is about 20%o of that total cost. Removing that, tripling the remaining costs, and
then adding it back produces a factored cost of 260% of the I m thick system's cost, or $91/m2
($369,000/ac); $84.5/m2 ($342,292/ac) without the geomembrane. This compares well with the other
benchmarked sites, as the following discussion will demonstrate, and the author's personal experience.
Two authoritive sources for mine closure costs are AFCEE (undated) and Dwyer (1998). In a broad
survey of industry practices they found the following range of capping costs for tailings and waste
dumps (but not considering the more robust requirements of uranium mill tailings). The mid-value of
these two ranges, $75/m2, is consistent with the factored Smith estimate of $91/m2.
o AFCEE: $36 to $97lm2 or $145,828 to5392,926lac (ET and capillary barriers, plus synthetic
liners at the upper end)
o Dwyer: $72 to $96lm2 or $291,657 to $388,876/ac (ET and capillary barriers only)
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l able 3.2: Benchmarked Leach Pad Costs (Smtth. 2Olla & Smith. 201
Case Cost in 2010 dollars
(USD per square meter)
Base liner systems:
Mean (26 sites/37 phases) excluding drain gravel & pipe network
(4 layers. -1 m thick)
$2e
Range $16 to $59
Standard deviation s9.49
Mean cost with drain eravel $40
Cappins system (non uranium minins):
Conventional system, mean cost North America (4 lavers. -1m thick)$3s
Factored costs to -3m UMT cappins svstem s91
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During the heyday of US uranium mining, there were over 50 operating conventional mills. All but one
of those, White Mesa, is now shut down with varying degrees of attention to closure. The US DOE has
published reports (DOE, 1995 & Robinson,2004) on at least 43 of those sites, including both Title I
and II sites (10 C.F.R. Part 40), detailing the closure costs, surety levels and other issues. Most of the
closure liability comes from securing the tailings storage facilities and addressing control of radon
emissions and contamination to groundwater, surface water, and land (principally dust). In some cases,
tailings have been completely relocated, such as at Monticello, Utah. [n others, the tailings were
secured on site. About a third of these 43 sites are still the subject of on-going active controls and, to
some extent, dispute about whether the sites are secured (Smith, 2010). Table 3 .3 summarizes the costs
at those 43 US sites. Key take-aways from these studies are the median and average closure costs per
permitted acre: $350,000 and $600,000, respectively. The most directly relevant site is Monticello,
with a closure cost of $1,400,000 per acre and a total cost of $520 million (2010 dollars).
A German study of the 14 major uranium-producing countries and the associated closure costs was
completed over a decade ago. That study considered mines producing a total of 63% of the world's
uranium and as such should be considered statistically relevant. Part of the findings of that study
include: "The accumulated and estimated costs for the decommissioning and rehabilitation of the
uranium-producing plants refeted to in this study amount to about US $3.7 billion (cost basis: 1993).
The resulting specific rehabilitation costs are US $1.25 per lb of U3O8 and US $2.20 per tonne of
tailings. Omitting plants which produce/produced uranium as by-product of gold and copper
production, the specific cost per tonne of milling doubles to nearly US $4.00." (Wise Uranium,2002).
In a study of the DOE remediation projects, Robinson (2004) also calculated U.S. closure costs on a
per-short-ton (st) of tailings basis. He found that"UMTMP costs rangedfrom $18 [per short tonJ at
Mexican Hat and $19 at Monument Valley to Sl49 at Canonsburg and Sl22 at Lowman ldaho and
$123 at Naturita. The average (mean) cost of UMTRAP project activities is $73 per ton of tailings."
Escalating the German costs to 2010 dollars (at3.0%o annually) the average closure cost is $6.61 per
metrictonne($5.95/st)oftailings. EscalatingtheRobinsonstudycostsatthesamerateproducesalow
of$22.l4andameanof$89.78/st($24and$l0Spermetrictonne,respectively). TakingtheGerman
costs as the lower-bound and for an average depth oftailings equivalent to 10 to 15 tonnes per square
meter (typical values for the industry), that equates to $66.10 to $99.15/m2 or a mid-range value of
$83/m2. This compares well to the other per-square-meter benchmarks.
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P.O. Box 4049, Incline Village, Nevada 89450 USA +1.530.575.6555
able 3.3: Uranium Mill Closures in the USA (U.S. DUL,, 1995 & Robrnson,2UU4
Fac ility Permitted Site
Area (ac)
Surety as of
t994
($u1
Total Closure & Remediation
Costs
(2010 Dollars)
($M)($M/permit
acre)
Sites with Costs >$100M
Grand Junction.Co 56 9s2 17.0
Moab. Ut 439 t2.l 720 1.6
Monticello. Ut 380 520 1.4
Old & New Rifle, Co 55 223 40
Salt Lake, Ut 128 77 1.4
Naturita, Co 63 62 2.6
Duranso. Co 120 30 1.1
Mavbell- Co 316 22 0.39
Gunnison- Co 90 n t.2
Falls City, Tx 593 12.7 08 0.18
Mexican Hat, Ut 235 05 0.45
Averase of Sites >S100M 225 12.4 302 1.35
Averase of 43 Sites 180 18.9 107 0.60
Median of 43 Sites 146 I 5.5 47 0.35
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Another approach is to apply the per-tonne (or per-ton) costs directly, which first requires estimating
the tailing tonnage. The mill has been operating for nominally 30 years, with much of the 1990s
intermittently, and is planned to operate indefinitely into the future; for the purposes of this estimate
2020 has been taken as the closure date. Using the mill throughput of 2,000 tons per day (tpd) as
authorized by Permit No. UGW3700A4 the following should be a reasonable estimate of the total tons
which will require closure:
2,000 tpd x 365 x l5 years x 90% (historic, normal years) =
2,000 tpd x 365 x 15 years x 50% (historic, intermittent years) =
2,000 tpd x 365 x 8 years x90% (201 I to 2020):
TOTAL
Appling the lowest of the estimates, from the German study, produces:
27,243,000 tons x $5.95/st :
(before escalation to the (unknown) closure date)
9,855,000 tons
5,475,000 tons
5.913.000 tons
21,243,000 tons
$ 126,395,8s0
This estimate is within 2o/o of the escalated costs based on acreage (Table 3.2). Using the lowest case
history from the US DOE numbers (Robinson, 2004) produces an estimated closure cost (non-
escalated) of:
21,243,000 tons x $22.14lst:$470,320,020
This latter value may seem high but is in fact aligned with the larger of the U.S. closures including
Monticello ($520 million). The most expensive 1l sites had a mean cost (2010 dollars) of $302
million. In other words, when groundwater and other remedial actions are fully considered, there is a
very real possibility of the total closure liability will approach half a billion dollars. With the current
surety scheme, nearly all of this will be unfunded.
To summarize, the references reviewed considered a total of at least 110 sites worldwide, with most of
those in the USA. Over half were uranium mill sites. These are summarized in Table 3.4. One
conclusion that must be drawn is that a closure cost estimate significantly lower than $402,000 per acre
or $100 million total must be viewed with suspicion. Denison's latest estimate is $17.7 million or
approximately $78,000 per acre of tailings. This per-acre rate is 19%o of the average benchmarked cost,
l3% of the average closure cost for all US UMTs and 6%o of the cost for Monticello.
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P.O. Box 4049, lncline Village, Nevada 89450 USA +1.530.575.6555
able 3.4: Summa benchma data on closure costs
Source No. of Sites
Considered
Closure Cost Comments
Total. US$US$/acre
US DOE 1995 43 sites $107m s600k Per "permitted acre", all UMT
sites
GermanyAVise
Uranium 2002
l4 countries $336k Sites total 63% of world uranium
oroduction. all UMT sites
AFCEE & Dwyer
1 998
>10 sites $303k Non escalated costs, non UMT
sites
Smith 201la,2012
factored
40 sites $369k Non UMT sites
Average >110 sites s402k Not weiehted
Notes:l. Costs per acre are per are of tailings capping unless otherwise noted.2. Costs are in 2010 dollars except for AFCEE & Dwyer, where the costs have not been
escalated.
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3.2.3 Built-up estimates for closure bonding
The purpose of a closure cost estimate, from a permitting and regulatory view, is to ensure that
sufficient funds exist to properly close and secure the site in the event that the owner walks away. In an
industry-supported initiative to standardize closure guarantees, a model agreement has been prepared
and includes this language: "(a) The mine closure guarantee shall be in an amount calculated to be
necessary to implement the Closure Plan should the Companyfail to implement the Closure Plan...."
(MMDA,20ll). Given this, the method of preparing the cost estimate must assume that the project
will be under government management and that government-contracting rules apply. This was even
recognized by International Uranium (USA) Corporation (Surmejer, 1999). This means that:
o The cost-efficiencies available to the mining company cannot be recognized;
o An engineering, procurement and construction management (EPCM) firm with governmental
experience and a high bonding capacity will be used;
o Prevailing wage (Davis-Bacon Act) rules apply;
o All work will be contracted to public-works qualified construction companies with applicable
overhead and other indirect cost factors;
o The cost estimate must have reasonable consideration for unforeseeable circumstances,
including unexpected contamination;
o Agency required insurance, bonding, health and safety, independent inspection, and other rules
will apply;
o Costs must be escalated to the dates closure is planned; and
o Agency oversight costs must be recognized.
3.2.4 White Mesa mill reclamation cost estimate, Sept. 2011, Rev. 5.0
The Denison estimate fails to meet the criteria set forth in the preceding section on a variety of grounds,
as summarized below.
Equivalent earthworks unit cost: The Denison estimate does not use rates per cubic yard of earthworks,
but its costs can be converted using conventional engineering estimate methods. Taking the Denison
direct costs of $12,620,391 and dividing it by the MWH earthworks quantities (their Table 3.3-4) of
3,'724,000 cubic yards produces an average cost of $3.39/cu. yards. Anyone familiar with public works
construction will recognize this as unrealistically low. This is also below the average costs for private
works construction on mine sites. The author is the peer reviewer for a major tailings dam in Peru and
the lowest unit rate (direct costs only) on that job, in low-cost Peru, is US $5.00 per cubic yard and that
is for mass grading of a multi-million cubic yard fill. All specialized work is much more expensive.
Labor hourly rates: The direct labor rates used are significantly lower than prevailing wage and do not
include fringe benefits as required. A sampling of rates used by Denison and the applicable regulatory
rates are presented in Table 3.5. The White Mesa rates average 44o/o of the prevailing wages. Based on
the detailed costs forCell 3 and assuming those are representative of the entire closure, laborrepresents
19.3%ofthetotalcosts. Thus,totalcostsshouldbeincreasedby44%x19.3o/o:8.5%.
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able 3.5: Labor rates (Der hour
Labor Category White Mesa Rate
(total)
Prevailing Wage Rate
direct + frinse (note 1)
Laborer $r2.5l $17.61 + S4.94
Mechanic $16.77 $35.10 + 512.49
Eouioment oDerator $ 18.16 to S20.65 s25.t7 + S14.41
Notes:l. According to General Decision Number: UTI00073 0913012011 UT73 for San Juan County,
Utah, adopted 91301201I (includes some older rates).
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Equipment hourly rates: Hourly rates were provided by a local equipment leasing company. The rates
include a nominal 50% discount for hours after 40 per week, and the assumption has been that a 50-
hour work-week is average, producing an average rate less than the straight rental rate. However, the
corresponding labor rates do not reflect any overtime multiplier as required by prevailing wage rules.
This means that either (i) the equipment rates are too low or (ii) the labor rates need to be adjusted for
overtime. Public works projects tend to limit overtime because of the high hourly rate penalty and thus
the safe assumption is no overtime. This increases equipment rates by 1lo/o. The price used in the
equipment cost calculations is $2.332 per gallon, representing the l2-month "off-road use" cost for
2010. The commercial price in Sept.20l1 for off-road use was $2.97lgallon. Thus, the rate used is
about $0.65/gal lower than the current market price, or 27.9%. Based on the built-up equipment unit
rates, fuel is 10.6% of the total hourly rate and thus the hourly rates should be increased by 27.9Yo x
10.6% : 3.0%. Combining the equipment overtime and fuel adjustments, the equipment hourly rates
should be increased by ll% + 3yo: 14%. Using the Cell 3 cost details as representative of the entire
project as an approximation, equipment costs are 78.8% of the total closure costs. Thus, the closure
costs should be increased by \4%x78.Soh:11%.
Quantities (labor and equipment hours): The benchmarked costs are vastly higher than the costs
produced from Denison's quantity estimates, suggesting the quantities are unrealistically low. The
quantity estimates were prepared by Denison, not by an independent party or registered engineer. The
.basis for the quantity estimates is provided in the hand-written notes following the cost tables; these
suggest a traditional mining view on economies of scale, which are not available to a public works
project. Without having a full peer review of the quantity estimates it is not possible to estimate an
adjustment.
Qualify control: The "Notes & Assumptions" section of the cost estimates for the tailings cell says
"Quality control controctor is assumed to be necessaryfor duration of material placement plus 20%for
reporting." The costs applied total about $0.014 per square foot. This is 30% to 50o/o of industry
standard. The cost basis uses $62 per hour, which is far below prevailing industry rates and especially
excludes any allowance for overtime or engineering supervision. As a reference, one of the largest
firms in the mine construction quality control business is Ausenco Vector (www.ausenco.com). Their
average quality control project hourly rate for a prevailing wage (public works) job in the USA is $125
per hour (2011). Quality control represents 4.8Yo of the total closure costs for the tailings cell, and
doubling QC costs will increase the total cost by 4.8%.
Cell dewatering costs: A unit rate of $0.48/hour has been used with no basis. The same quantity of
hours is used for each cell, though they vary in size, retained water and efficiency of the dewatering
system. Dewatering has two stages for cost-estimating purposes: that performed during the active
operating life of the mine and that performed afterwards. An approach based on a nominal cost per
hour or cost per gallon may be logical during the operating life, since there is a core staffalready on site
along with the equipment, infrastructure and administration systems. However, once operations have
ceased there will be no support. Thereafter, the dewatering program will be operated by a contractor at
a significantly higher unit cost.
Supporting quotes: Supporting price information is provided for some of the relatively minor costs
(e.g., road haulage of rip rap from the borrow source 7 miles from the site, rental rates for a gravel
screen, and so forth). None of these "quotes" (some are as informal as telephone notes) suggest that
the vendor understands that he or she is quoting a public works project with the applicable contracting,
insurance and prevailing wage criteria.
Remediation costs: There is no provision for any currently unknown contamination. It is unlikely that
the extent of surface or groundwater contamination is currently fully known and providing no such
provision is irresponsible.
Indirect costs:
o Profit: 10% is allowed and this is reasonable.
o Contingency: l5oh is allowed and is too low for the level of design and the lack of supporting
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fixed price bids. Considering the findings of the prior section on industry experience with cost
estimates versus actual costs, a contingency of 35Yo is recommended.
o License & bonding: 2.0% is reasonable for a private-works project but is much lower than
seen on public works projects.
o UDEQ contract administration: 4.0Yo is allowed. This item is equivalent to "owner's costs"
for conventional cost estimating, which run from 10% to 25o/o, with l2o/o to 15oh being typical.
o Detailed engineering, procurement and construction management (EPCM) has been omitted
and typically runs about l2o/o for non-government projects and is higher for those.
Long-term care fund: At current deposit interest rates a fund of $809,376 provides an annual cash flow
of $8,100. This provides for no on-site care and is unlikely to provide for the mandatory report filings.
A more reasonable provision is $100,000 per year, at least for the decades immediately following
closure.
Cost escalation: Costs have been estimated using a range of base dollars from 2007 to 2010. None
have been escalated to the date of closure. Assuming an escalation rate of 3.5%o, costs will escalate
from the date of the cost estimate (nominally 2009) to the completion of closure by 36% for l0 years
and 92%, for 20 years. However, the closure plan sets no dates for closure and Dension USA has
implied to the author that they intend to be in production for a very long time. Given this, a more
significant escalation period should be considered.
3.2.5 More probable closure cost
A reasonable range of closure costs can be estimated by approaching the costs from two directions:
adjusting the Denison cost estimate for the line-item corrections discussed in the prior section, and
applying the benchmarked costs to the White Mesa closure areas. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 summarize the
results of those two approaches. This creates a large range, from $36 million to $126 million in 2010
dollars, or $51 million to $169 million escalated to 2020 dollars. This excludes the US DOE per-ton-
based estimate of 5470 million.
The adjusted Denison estimate excludes allowances for groundwater and off-site soil remediation,
which is a very optimistic assumption for a site with known contaminate plumes, known off-site
contamination (i.e., Big Sage survey results), low-quality and post-service-life containment systems,
and a 32-year operating life (to date). More likely, at least some remediation will be required and a
liberal allowance for those costs should be included in the financial surety (and thus in the cost
estimate) to protect the people of Utah from the potentially substantial financial liability. The Denison
estimate also includes a capping system that is significantly less protective than the Monticello standard
and a demolition debris cell that has a very poor quality liner. Both of those should be corrected and
will increase the cost; for example, adding a 60-mil HDPE liner will add about $26,000 per acre or $6
million total and upgrading the demolition cell to a high quality composite liner will add about $l
million.
The benchmarked cost of $91 million includes an allowance for site remediation based on the average
work required at the 43 documented sites. Groundwater remediation alone could use much of the $55
million difference. As reference projects, both the Pierina gold mine (owner: Barrick) and Tintaya
copper mine (owner: Xstrata, formerly BHP) in Peru have water remediation costs of $40 and $60
million, respectively (2007 dollars); neither are uranium sites, neither have particularly unusual
groundwater issues, both have the advantages of very low costs, and both are very remote sites with no
nearby communities or water users.
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Table 3.7: Closu
A key purpose of benchmarking costs is to check the validity of a built-up cost estimate. The
benchmark estimate is within 15% of the average for all 43 of the documented US uranium mill
closures and thus checks well with industry experience. The author has used benchmarking to verify
builrup costs on over 100 sites; this has never produced a variance of greater than 50%o and generally
the values are within 25o/o. In the current case, the benchmarked cost is 2.5 times higher than the
adjusted Denison estimate and 5 times higher than the unadjusted Denison estimate, suggesting that
either the quantities are drastically in error or the cost estimate has omitted important components, orboth. Importantly, neither the adjusted Denison nor the benchmarked cost estimates have been
escalated for inflation to the anticipated closure date. That should be done in determining financial
I1
P.O. Box 4049, Incline Village, Nevada 89450 USA +1.530.575.6555
able 3.6 sted closure cost estimated Denison estimate as basis
Total direct costs (from Denison):$12,620,391
Adiustments:
Labor rates (increase total direct bv 8.5%)$ 1.072.733
Equipment unit rates (increase total direct bv 1 l%)$ 1.388.243
Fuel: add $0.65/sal (includins in eouioment adiustment)incl
Ouantities (unknown adiustment')unknown
Qualitv control (increase total direct rateby 4.8oh\$605.779
Cell dewatering (no rationale provided)unknown
Adiusted direct costs:$15,687,146
Indirect Costs:
Profit, 10%$ l,s68,7 r s
Contineencv. 35%$s,490,50 r
License & bondine. 5%$784,3s7
UDEO contract administration. l5%s2,353,072
EPCM.12%s 1.882.458
Contractors floater s82.250
Auto & GL Insurance $284.600
Long-term care fund (based on annual cost of $ I 00,000 and L2oh deposit rate)$8.333.333
Environmental remediation costs unknown
TOTAL before remediation costs $36.466.431
Notes:
1. Excludes any remediation costs such as groundwater treatment.2. Excludes upgrading capping systems to meet Montecello standard.3. Ouantitiesunverified.
: Closure cost from benchma data with escalation
Cell Area
(acres)
Capping Costs
(2010 usD)
Comments
Ce I 55 -0-To be removed
Ce 2 65 $26, r 30.000
Ce 3 70 s28,140,000
Ce 4A 40 $ 16,080,000
Cell48 40 $ 16,080,000
Demolition debris t2 $4,840.000 Excludes cost for constructing cell
TOTAL 282 ac incl. Cell I
227 ac excl. Cell I
$91 ,254,000 85% ofthe average cost for 43
UMT sites ($107 million)
Escalated to 2012 s97.753.566 Escalated @3.S%,lyear
Escalated to 2020 s128.722.779
Per-ton estimates:German studv (mean)s 126.395.850 Not escalated
US DOE (lower bound)$470,320,020
Notes:
l. Capping rate of$402,000 per acre used from benchmarkine data
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surety levels. Common industry escalation rates are 3oh to 5Yo annually and a firm set of milestones
should be tied to the final estimate and surety amount.
3.3. References
AFCEE "Conventional landfill cover cost," AF Center for Engineering & the Environment,
alcee.aflmil/r:esoirrces/lechnolog),1r'ansltrlIQglalDandinitialivgu (undated)
Benson, C. H., Sawangsuriya, A., Trzebiatowski, B., and Albright, W. H., "Post-construction changed
in the hydraulic properties of water balance cover soils," Desert Research Institute Alternative Cover
Assessment Program (DRI-ACAP) (2007)
Bertisen, J. and Davis, G. A., "Bias and error in mine project capital cost estimation," Business Library,
CBS Interactive Business Network Resource Library, findarticles.comlp/articlcs/mi 6713/is 2 5i/
ai*n2941597 1l April-June (2008)
Caldwell, J., "Mine closure bonds: are they adequate to pay actual costs?" I Think Mining industry blog
site, ithinknrining.conr/2007/08/29lnine-closule-bonds-are-the.,--adequate-to-pay-acliral-closure-costs/,
August 29 (2007)
Dwyer, S. F., 1998. "Alternative Landfill Cover Pass the Test." Civil Engineering, Sept. (1998)
Lazenby, H., "Cost model improves mine cost estimation and forecasting," Mining Weekly, Cramer's
Media, April (2010)
MMDA, "Model mining development agreement project," www.mmdaproject.org/?p:1662, March 30
(2011)
Roberts, H. R., "Request to revise the surety for White Mesa uranium mill, license SUA-1358," letter to
Mr. John Surmejer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from International Uranium (USA)
Corporation, November 9 (1999)
Robinson, Paul, "Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation Performed by the US DOE: An Overview,"
Southwest Research and Information Center, Albuquerque, NM, May l8 (2004)
U.S. DOE, "Decommissioning of U.S. Uranium Production Facilities," DOE/EIA-0592, Dist. Cat. US-
950, February (1995)
Closing Comments
This work was completed in support of the review of the White Mesa / Denison USA relicensing
application, revision 5.0, dated Sept. 201 1. It is based on a focused review of the closure plan, cost
estimates, and related documents and relies extensively on the information developed and provided by
Denison USA as well as the author's industry experience.
Best Regards,
RRD INTERNATIONAL CORP
Mark E. Smith, PE, SE, GE
President
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ffi0.7$7s
fif,AAK r. $ffitTt{
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EXHIBIT I
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Department of Energy
Washington, OC 20S95
Iir>hr,:r-., 1'1 a,/' ' t .003
Mr" Ernest House, Sr.
Tribal Chainnan
Ute Mountain Ure Tribe
P.O. Box 248
Towaoc. Cr:loracio I I 334-0243
Dear Chairman l,louse:
Thank you for your-letterdated.lanuary 17, 100g, in which you request a potentialpartnership in rnanaging the long-tenn environmental impacts ancl monitoring prog.u,r,near the White Mesa Uranium Miil in San.luan Cor.mt;,. Uta.tr. The Depanment ofEnergy. ofl:ce of Legacy Managemenr (DoE-LM1 appreciates the invitation topartioipate in thc partnership. but rnusr trecrine at this time.
D^?q-LM has a goal to protect human health an<l the environment through eflective andefficient lang-temr surv'eillance and rnaintenance, but DCIE-LM is not scherjule6 t6receive the White ilzfe-qa site until the year 2035 or later. Therefbre DOE,LM currentiyhas.no authority to address contarnination issues at this site. Typicaily, DOE-LM begins10 devote resources tc a sitc a year or two prior to the expected trimsition of th19 site intrder to facilitate a smooth transition. The site is eurrenily operating under a Iicense fromthe l'iuclear Reguiatory Commission (NRC) and is subjeci toregulaiion by the state ofLltah. which is an NRC-agreement state. Beflrre DOE-LM assurnes surv'eillance and
maintenance of the sit*, the private owner is responsible fbr acldressing the contaminatr'onoflhe air, soil, and groundwater in accordance with its operating iicenie. Discussionswith the state of Utah could be more beneficial to you atlhis time.
Shourld y<lu have further need to discuss this matter, please contact DOE-LM's Site
Manager, Tracy Ribeiro at (q70) Z4t-6621.
Michael W. Owen
Director
Olfice of Legacy Management
S. Clcrq," Ute Mountain Envircnmental Programs Depafiment
D. Finerfi-ock, Execulive Secretary of Utah Radiation Control Board
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E,XHIBIT J
UTAH WATER QUALITY BOARI)
IN THE MATTER OF
DENISON MINES
(usA) coRP.
1050 17tb Street, SUITE 950
DENVER, COLORADO 80265
DOCKET No. UGW09-03-A
AMENDOD
STIPULATED
CONSENT AGREEMENT
2.
3.
4.
This STIPULATED CONSENT AGREEMENT (AGREEMENT) is between DENISON
MINES (USA) CORP. (DUSA) and the UTAH WATER QUALITY BOARD (BOARD),
conceming requirements of the Utah Water Quality Act, (Act) Utah Code Annotated (UCA),
including ssctions l9-5,104, -106, -l I I and -l 15, and in accordance with the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act sections 63G-4-l0l to -601,
l. The BOARD has authority to administer the Utah Water Quality Act,
The CO-EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ofthe BOARD (EXECUTM SECRETARY) will
administer the terms and provisions of this AGREEMENT. UCI S l9-5-l ,l5.
The parties now desire to resolve this matter fully without further administrative proceedings
except to the extent provided herein by entering into this AGREEMENT.
This AGREEMENT does not in any way relieve DUSA from any other obligation imposed
under the Act or any other State or Federal laws, rules and regulations,
This AGREEMENT amends and adopts the January 27,2009 Stipulated Consent Agleement
(2009 SCA) entered into by the EXECUTM SECRETARY and DUSA (Docket No.
ucw09-03).
6. DUSA accepts all previously listed facts found in Sections I through 5 of the 2009 SCA.
Upon execution of this AGREEMENT, the EXECUTM SECRETARY agrees to forgo
pursuit of monetary penalties stipulated by the 2009 SCA.
DUSA accepts the following facts and stipulations:
A. On January 27,2009 the EXECUTM SECRETARY and DUSA entered into the 2009
SCA, part of which set forth the following requirements:
DUSA submit a written Contaminant Investigation Report (CIR) for EXECUTM
SECRETARY review and approval, to arnong other things, characterize the
source(s), physical extent, transfer mechanisms and characteristics of the Nitrate
contamination of the shallow aquifer at the White Mesa facility; and
if determined by the EXECUTM SECRETARY that a Conective Action Plan
(CAP) is required to address and resolve the Nitrate contamination, DUSA would
then enter into a new SCA for submittal of a CAP, for EXECUTM SECRETARY
review and approval. Said CAP would be required to set forth required perforrtance
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standards and an implementation schedule for groundwater corrective actions.
Pursuant to Item 6.4' of the 2009 SCA, DUSA submitted to the EXECUTTVE
SECRETARY a CIR which had been prepared by their consultant INTERA, INC, The
CIR was dated December 30, 2009 and entitled o'Nitrate Contamination Investigation
Report White Mesa Uranium Mill Site Blanding, Utah" (2009 CIR).
On October 5, 2010 the EXECUTM SECRETARY issued aNotice of Additional
Required Action (NARA) letter that notified DUSA of the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY'S determination that the 2009 CIR was incomplete and that, as a result of
this determination, under Item 7,C of the 2009 SCA, DUSA was to remedy such
omissions in the 2009 CIR.
On December20,2070 DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY entered into a
Tolling Agreement (Tolling Agreement (Rev. 0)) to defer any monetary penalties that
might accrue under the 2009 SCA, and provide a time period (Tolling Period) for
completion of the following items:
l) DUSA was required to prepare and submit a plan and schedule (Plan and Schedule)
by which to conduct additional investigations to resolve open issues identified in the
October 5, 2010 NARA. Said Plan and Schedule was to be submitted to the
EXECUTM SECRETARY on or before February 15, 201l,
2) The EXECUTIVE SECRETARY was to provide his initial comments on the Plan
and Schedule on or befbre March 15,2071, and DUSA and the EXECUTM
SECIfETARY would cooperate to finalize the Plan and Schedule as expeditiously
thercafter as reasonably practicable, and
3) DUSA and the EXECUTfVE SECRETARY would cooperate to negotiate and
finalize and execute a revised or replacement Stipulated Consent Agreement (SCA)
that incorporates the Plan and Schedule, as soon as reasonably practicable after the
Plan and Schedule has been finalized and approved by the EXECUTM
SECRETARY,
In addition, thc Tolling Agrecment (Rev. 0) required that:
l) The Tolling Period be extended from January 4,2010 (submittal of the 2009 CIR to
thc IIXECUTM SECRETARY) until April30, 2011; and
2) The revised or replacement SCA include a provision to the effect that DUSA pay the
EXECUTM SECRETARY reasonable fees for consulting services rendered by the
URS Corporation (URS) for review of both the Plan and Schedule and the Revised
CIR.
Pursuant to the Tolling Agreement (Rev. 0), DUSA submitted a Plan and Schedule on
February 14,201I and a revised Plan and Schedule on February 18, 201 l, and by
agreement of both parties, the EXECUTM SECRETARY provided his comments on
the revised Plan and Schedule on March 21,2017.
In an April 20,2All meeting, DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY agreed that
the Plan and Schedule to conduct additional nitrate investigations would be composed of
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at least four (4) and possibly five (5) phases of study, including:
1) Phase lA through C - including geoprobe drilling, and soil sampling / analysis of
soils to investigate:
a) Possible natural nihate salt reservoir in the vadose zone beyond the mill site area
(Phase 1A);
b) Potential nitrate sources in the mill site area (Phase lB); and
c) Other potential nitrate sources (Phase 1C).
2) Phase 2 - including groundwater quality sampling and analysis of existing monitoring
wells for non-isotopic analytes.
3) Phase 3 - including deep bedrock core sampling / analysis of possible natural nitrate
reservoir and potential nitrate source locations, with similar objectives as Phases 1A
through C.
4) Phase 4 - including stable isotopic sampling / analysis of groundwater in existing
monitoring wells. Details of this investigation were to be determined at a later date,
and approved by both parties.
5) Phase 5 - including stable isotopic sampling / analysis of soil/core samples, if needed,
On April 28,2011, DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY entered into a Revised
Tolling Agreement (Tolling Agreement (Rev. l), to extend the Tolling Period through
June 30, 201I and adopt the agreements made in the April 20,2011 meeting. Under the
Tolling Agreement (Rev. 1), DUSA agreed to submit a Revised Phase I (A through C)
Work Plan on or before May 6, 201I and a Revised Phase 2 through 5 Work Plan and
Schedule on or before June 3, 201 1.
Pursuant to the Tolling Agreement (Rev. 1), DUSA submitted a May 6,2009 Revised
Phase I (A through C) Work PIan and Schedule for the Phase I A - C investigation
prepared by INTERA, for EXECUTM SECRETARY review. On May I1, 201l, the
DRC: l) provided via email, comments on the May 6, 2011 INTERA document, which
included a May l l, 2011 URS memorandum, and 2) requested that DUSA resolve all
DRC comments before initiation of field activities.
All comments were resolved, and DUSA conducted field and laboratory work for the
Phase lA-C study in May and June, 2011.
Pursuant to the Tolling Agreement (Rev. l), DUSA submitted a June 3,2011 Revised
Phase 2 through 5 Work Plan and Schedule (Phase 2 - 5 Work Plan), prepared by
INTERA, for IIXECUI'M SECRETARY rcview, In a letter dated June 23,201I DRC
provided comments on this DUSA document in the form of a URS memorandum, dated
June 23, 201 l. In the June 23,2011 letter, the EXECUTM SECRETARY advised
DUSA that in ordcr to revise the 2009 SCA to incorporate the deliverables and timelines
set out in an approvable Phase 2 through 5 Work Plan, it would be necessary to provide a
level of detail in revisions of that Work Plan for Phases 2, 3, 4, and 5 comparable to the
level of detail for Phase I contained in Attachrnent I of the Tolling Agrcement (Rev. l).
On June 30, 201 l, DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY entered into a Revised
Tolling Agreement [Tolling Agreement (Rev. 2)] to extend the Tolling Period to August
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31,2011, in order to facilitate the revision of the Phase 2 through 5 Work Plan to provide
the level of detail required tp construct a rcplacement SCA.
L. Pursuant to the Tolling Agreement (Rev.2), DUSA submitted a separate July l, 201I
detailed Work Plan and Quality Assurance Plan ("QAP") for the Phasc 2 investigation
only (Phase 2 Plan, Revision 0), EXECUTM SECRETARY comments on this
document were provided in a July 7, 2011 DRC letter to DUSA.
M. Pursuant to the Tolling Agreement (Rev. 2), DUSA provided a revised July 12, 2011
Phase 2 QAP and Work Plan (Phase 2, Revision 1.0). DRC conditionally approved this
document in a letter dated July 18, 201 l.
N. On August I and2,20l I DUSA submitted by email preliminary laboratory results for the
Phase lA-C study to the EXECUTM SECRETARY.
O. Pursuant to the Tolling Agreernent (Rev. 2), in a submittal dated August 4,2011, DUSA
provided a revision to the Phase 2 - 5 Work Plan (Phase 2-5 Work Plan, Revision 1.0),
prepared by INTERA, for EXECUTM SECRETARY review, DRC comments on the
Phase 2-5 Work Plan, Revision 1.0 and on the August 1, 201 I preliminary laboratory
results for the Phase 1A-C study, were provided to DUSA on August I l, 201 I as part of:
l) a conference call, and 2) a DRC email, which included an August I1,2011 URS
memorandum (August 11, 201I URS Memo).
P. Under a cover letter dated August 18,201l, DUSA submitted a revised Phase 2-5 Work
Plan (Phase 2-5 Work Plan, Revision 2.0) for EXECUTM SECRETARY review, in
response to the comments provided to DUSA on August 11, 2011, in accordance with the
Tolling Agreement (Rev. 2).
Q. In an August 25,2011 DRC letter, the EXECUTM SECRETARY advised that:
l) per review of the Phase 2-5 Work Plan, Revision 2.0, the EXECUTM
SECRETARY has determined it evident that a finalized Plan and Schedule, that
meets the satisfaction of the EXECUTTVE SECRETARY, and which would allow
the preparation of a replacement SCA, is not possible at this time;
2) bascd on the identified deficiencies in the Phase 2-5 Work Plan, Revision 2.0, the
development of a replacement SCA for continued contaminant investigation activities
is not supported, and
3) based on the August l,20ll DUSA preliminary results of Phases 1A through lC, it
appears that it will be extremely difficult for DUSA to demonstrate that the White
Mesa Mill Site has not caused at least part of the contamination found in the nitrate
and chloride plume(s) beneath the mill.
R. At a meeting between DUSA and DRC representatives on August 29,201I to discuss the
EXECUTM SECRETARY's August 25,2011 findings related to the Phase 2-5 Work
Plan Rev. 2,0, and the approach forward, the parties agreed to the following:
l) After over two years of investigation it has been determined that there are site
conditions that make it difficult to determine the source(s) of the contamination at
the White Mesa site;2) As a result, resources will be better spent in developing a CAP in accordance with
UAC R317-6-6.15(D), rather than continuing with further investigations as to the
source(s) of the contamination;
3) The EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and DUSA agree that activities related to the
White Mesa Nitrate CIR will cease and that conclusions regarding the nitrate
ground water contarnination source(s) will remain unresolved and undetermined.
4) The EXECUTIVE SECRETARY has determined that a CAP is required at the
DUSA White Mesa facility, pursuant to UAC R3l7-6-6.15(C)(l);
5) DUSA agrees to develop, secure EXECUTIVE SECRETARY approval, and
implement a CAP;
9. Based on the above facts and findings, DUSA and tho EXECUTwE SECRETARY
acknowledge that it has not been possible to date to determine the source(s), cause(s),
attribution, magnitudes of contribution, and proportion(s) of the local nitrate and ohloride in
groundwater, and thereby cannot eliminate Mill activities as a potential cause, either in full or
in part, of the contamination. As a result, DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY
agree that resources will be better spent in developing a CAP in accordance with UAC R3l7-
6-6.15(D), rather than continuing with further investigations as to the source(s) and
attribution of the groundwater contamination.
10. The EXECUTM SECRETARY has therefore determined, and DUSA agrees, that DUSA
will submit a CAP, pursuant to the requirements of the Utah Ground Water Quality
Protection Rules [UAC R317-6-6.15(C - E)].
I l. DUSA agrees to:
A. Submit a CAP for EXECUTIVE SECRETARY review and approval, on or before
November 3 0, 201 I that meets the CAP related requirements of UAC R3 I 7-6-6. I 5(D.2, 3
and E). The CAP will include at least 3 Phases of activity, as set out below:
l) Phase I - to include a control for the soil contamination observed at the
Ammonium Sulfate Crystal Tanks, a potential source of groundwater
contamination, Pursuant to UAC 317-6-6:15 (EX4Xb) this control will include at
a minimum:
a) Determine, to the satisfaction of the Executive Secretary, the physical extent
of the soil contamination observed at the Ammonium Sulfate Crystal Tanks
near borings GP-25B (Nitrate + Nitrite (as N) 1,530 mg/kg'dry at depth of 6
feet) and GP-26B (Ammonia (as N) 1,590 mg/kg-dry at a depth of l6 feet)
that were part of the Phase IB nitrate investigation. Such effort shall include
an estimate of the volume (the "Contaminated Soil Volume") of the
contaminated soils down to but not including bedrock, and an estimate of the
surface area (the "Contaminated Surface Area") at dr above the estimated
location of the Contaminated SoilVolume; and
b) Either:
(i) Submit a Plan and Schedule on or before January 1,2012, for
EXECUTM SECRETARY approval, to cover the Contaminated
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Surface Area with at least six inches of concrete, to the extent not already
covered by concrete or existing buildings, so as to prevent infiltration of
surface water into the contaminated soils; and/or
(ii) Submit a Plan and Schedule on or before January 1,2012,for
EXECUTM SECRETARY approval, to remove the Contaminated Soil
Volume and dispose of such contaminated soils in the Mill's tailings
impoundments.
If DUSA chooses to cover the Contaminated Surface Area with concrete, as
contemplated by subparagraph (i), above, DUSA will remove the Contarninated
Soil Volume at a later date on or prior to site closure, and will submit a revised
surety estimate on or before March 4,2012 to include future costs to remove the
Contaminated Soil Volume.
Phase II - to include near term active remediation of the nitrate contamination by
pumping contaminated water into the Mill's tailings cells for disposal. Said phase
shall also include: l) the developmbnt, implementation, operation, and monitoring
requirements for a pumping well network designed to contain and hydraulically
control the nitrate groundwater plume to maintain concentrations at or below the
Utah Groundwater Quality Standard (10 mg/L), i.e., prevent physical expansion of
said plume, and 2) monitoring of chloride concentrations. DUSA will
demonstrate hydraulic containment and conhol of the nitrate groundwater plume
in the vicinity of the mill site, to the satisfaction of the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY. The CAP will address any required increases to the surety for the
Phase II activities, in accordance with Item I LE below.
Phase III - to include a comprehensive long term solution for the nitrate
groundwater contamination at the White Mesa Mill Site, This phase will not be
determined at the outset, but will be undertaken at a later date after public
participation and EXECUTM SECRETARY approval. Phase III may include,
but is not limited to: continuation of Phases I and II activities alone or in
combination with monitored natural attenuation, evaluation of additional
remediation and monitoring technologies / techniques, determination of any
additional hydrogeologic characteriz-ation, groundwater contaminant travel times
and directions, determination of ultimate points of exposure to the public and/or
wildlife, appropriate risk analysis, a cost i benefit analysis, and the possible
development of and petition to the BOARD for altemate corrective action
concentration limits pursuant to UAC R3 l7-6-6.15(G).
It is expected that the CAP will not speciff the details of Phase III, at this time.
Any Phase [Il preliminary plan and schedule for the evaluation of altematives, for
the completion of any further studies, analyses, applications and petitions, and for
the ultimate definition of Phase III, may be proposed by DUSA at a later date,
after completion of such studies and evaluations, followed by submittal of a
proposed CAP revision to the EXECUTM SECRETARY. Upon satisfactory
review, the EXECUTM SECRETARY will solicit public participation and
may modifu the CAP pursuant to UAC R3 17-6-6.15(D and E). Until such time,
the activities of the Phase I and Phase II remediation will continue as stipulated in
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the approved CAP.
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The CAP is not intended to address cqntamination located outside the Mill's restricted
area and that is not contiguous with groundwater contamination inside the Mill's
restricted area. The CAP will therefore evaluate which of the existing monitoring wells
will be maintained and which wells (including certain upgradient and off-site wells) can
be abandoned, subject to prior EXECUTM SECRETARY approval.
At a minimum, the CAP shall meet all of the requirements found in UAC R3l7'6-
6.15(DX2) and (3), including but not limited to, an affirmative and defensible
demonstration of the following findings [pursuant to UAC R317-6-6.15(E)]:
1) Completeness and accuracy of the CAP,
2) That the action is protective of public health and the environment, including
consideration of future impaots of the nitrate pollution on land and water resources
not owned and controlled by DUSA.
3) That the corrective action shall meet the State Ground Water Quality Standards,
pursuant to UAC R3l7-6-6.15(F). Alternatively, DUSA may petition the BOARI)
for apprbval of an Alternate Corrective Action Concentration Limit as part of the
CAP, pursuant to UAC R3l7-6-6.15(G).
4) That the action will produce a permanent effect,
5) That the action meets any other additional measure required by the EXECUTM
SECRETARY under UAC R317-6-6.15(EX5). These additional measures shall
include, but are not limited to:
a) Remediation guidance found in the April,2OO4 EPA Handbook of Groundwater
Protection and Cleanup Policies for RCRA Corrective Action (EPA530-R-04-
030) or equivalent, to the extent applicable, as determined by the EXECUTM
SECRETARY;
b) Determination of corrective action performance standards, objectives, and criteria
for groundwater remediation system design, construction, operations and/or
maintenance, as approved bythe EXECUTM SECRETARY in accordance
with applicable regulations;
c) Determination of long term operation, maintenance, system performance and
groundwater quality monitoring requirements to evaluate effectiveness of the
approved corrective action(s), at a frequoncy, and by methods approved by the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
d) Submittal of written quarterly DUSA reports of pumping and monitoring well
system performance and groundwater quality monitoring information for
EXECUTIYE SECRETARY review and approval. In the event that additional
information is required of any report, DUSA shall respond to and provide a Plan
and Schedule for EXECUTryE SECRETARY approval to resolve all issues /
concerns within 30 calendar days of receipt of written EXECUTIVE
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SECRETARY notice;
e) Timely DUSA verbal and written notification of process or equipment failures,
and corrective actions taken, or a timely schedule by which corrective action will
be taken to return the facility to full compliance with CAP performance standards,
objectives, and criteria; and
0 Periodic DUSA review, summation, and report submittal, for EXECUTM
SECRETARY approval, to demonstrate if the approved corrective action is
protective of public health and the environment. The interval of said report period
shall not exceed five (5) years, In the event that additional information is
required, DUSA shall respond to and provide a Plan and Schedule for
EXECUTM SECRETARY approval to resolve all issues / concerns within 30
calendar days of receipt of written EXECUTM SECRETARY notice.
Participate with the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY in a public comment period and
public meetings to present information and teceive public input or response regarding the
CAP, pursuant to UAC R317-6-6.15(E). Said meetings will be held at a location and
time determined by the EXECUTM SECRETARY.
Within 30 calendar days of the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S approval of the CAP,
pursuant to UAC R3 17-6-6.15(E), DUSA shall commence implementation and execution
of all corrective actions required under a future CONSENT ORDER to be issued by the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY that incorporates the approved CAP.
Within 60 calendar days of the EXECUTM SECRETARY'S issuance of a future
CONSENT ORDER regarding the approved CAP, pursuant to UAC R317-6-6.15(E),
DUSA shall submit a revised Reclamation Plan and financial surety cost estimate
(Revised Surety), for EXECUTIVE SECRETARY review and approval. Said Revised
Surety shall:
1) be for the groundwater corrective action, with the swety sufficient to recover the
anticipated cost and time frame for achieving compliance, before the land is
transferred to the federal government for long-term custody. At a minimum, the
DUSA surety shall:
a) Provide for all costs for Phases I and II of the approved CAP for a period of
time until EXECUTM SECRETARY approval of Phase III of the CAP to restore
groundwater to the established site specific groundwater cleanup standards pursuant
to UAC R3l7-6-6.15 before the site is transferred to the federal government for long-
term custody; and
b) Address and resolve any required future adjustments to the Surety for Phase II
activities specified in the approved CAP that are consistent with the foregoing; and
2) Compty with all other requirements mandated by the Utah Radioactive Materials
License No. UT 1900479, including, but not limited to Condition 9.5.
F, Reimburse the EXECUTM SECRETARY for reasonable costs incurred for:
l) Consulting services rendered by URS for review of the CAP, including any document
submitted to the EXECI/TIVE SECRETARY under Item 1l of this AGREEMENT
prior to and in connection with approval of the CAP. The costs shall be based on
estimates approved in advance by both DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY;
and
2) All future costs incuned by the EXECUTM SECRETARY or his staff, in review
and administration of the CAP, and all future compliance activities related to the
CONSENT ORDER, as required by the current fee schedule set by the Utah
Legislature, presently reflected in SB 2, 201 l, and subject to annual reevaluation by
the Utah State Legislature. Presently, this rate is $90.00 per hour.
12. If, after review of either the CAP (Items 11.A and 11.B) or Revised Surety (Item 11.D), the
EXECUTM SECRETARY determines additional information is needed, DUSA shall
provide all requested information within a reasonable period of time, as specified by the
EXECUTM SECRETARY, after receipt of written notice from the EXECUTM
SECRETARY.
13. DUSA agrees to pay sripulated penalty amounts for non compliance with this AGR-EEMENT.
If DUSA fails to comply with the terms in Itcm I 1.A or I LB, above, DUSA agrees to pay the
stipulated amounts set forth below within 30 calendar days of written demand by the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY:
A. If DUSA fails to submit a CAP for EXECUTwE SECRETARY review and approval by
the deadline specified in Item 1 1.A, DUSA will pay stipulated ponalties in the amount of
$ I ,250 per calendar day, pursuant to UAC R3 I 7- I -8-8.3, Category C.
B. If the EXECUTM SFICRETARY determines that the CAP has omitted any information,
content requirements, or failed to meet the performance standards or objectives mandated
by Items 1l.A or 11.B, the EXECUTM SECRETARY will so advise DUSA bywritten
notice and DUSA will remedy such omission or failure within a deadline determined by the
EXECUTM SBCRTARY, lf DUSA fails to remedy such omission or failure by the
deadline determined by the EXECUTM SECRTARY, DUSA will pay stipulated
penalties in the amorrnt of $2,000 per calendar day for every day after such period that the
CAP remains incomplete, pursuemt to UAC R317-l-8-8.3, Category C.
C. If DUSA fails to submit the Revised Surety cost estirnate by the deadline in Item 11.E,
DUSA will pay stipulated penalties in the amount of $ 2,000 per calendar day, pursuant to
UAC R3l7-1-8-8.3, Category C.
14. DUSA agrees to pay any required penalties within 30 calendar days of written notice from the
EXECUTM SECRETARY, in the form of a check, made payable to the State of Utah,
and delivered or mailed to:
Mail Address:
Division of Radiation Control
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
P,O. Box 144850
salt Lake ciry, utah 84114-4850
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Street Address:
Division of Radiation Control
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
195 North 1950 West
salt Lake city, Utah 84114-4850
15. DUSA agrees to pay the EXECUTM SECRETARY for services rendered under Item
I l,F, above, within 30 calendar days of receipt of written invoice. Payment will be made in
accordance with the requirements of Item 14, above.
16. The BOARD will view completion of the requirements as outlined in this AGREEMENT as
compliance with both this AGREEMENT and the 2009 SCA.
17. The deadlines stipulated in ltem I l, above and elsewhere in this AGREEMENT may be
amended by prior written mutual agre€ment of the parties. The parly requesting the
amendment must write to the other party 14 calendar days before the stipulated deadline and
request an amendment of the deadline. The other party will either agree to or deny the
amendment in writing within l0 calendar days.
18. Nothing contained in this AGREEMENT shall preclude the BOARD from taking additional
actions to include additional penalties against DUSA for permit violations not resolved by
this AGREEMENT.
19, If an agreement between DUSA and the EXECUTM SECRETARY cannot be reached in
a dispute arising under any provision of this AGREEMENT, DUSA or the EXECUTM
SECRETARY may commence aproceeding with the BOARD underthe Administrative
Procedures Act to resolve the dispute. A final decision in any adjudicative proceeding shall
be subject to judicial review under applicable state law,
20, Nothing in this AGREEMENT shall constitute a waiver by DUSA to raise in defbnse any
legal or tbctual contention for future allegations of noncompliance.
21. Nothing in this AGREEMENT shall constitute or be considered as a release from any
claims, to include natural resource damage claims, cause of action, or demand in law or
equity which the STATE may have against DUSA, or any other person, firm, partnership or
corporation for any liability arising out of or relating in any way to the release of pollutants to
waters of the State.
22, While the BOARD is presently not considering additional enforcement actions for any past
or ongoing violations, nothing in this AGREEMENT shall preclude the BOARD from
taking such actions to include other penalties against DUSA for violations of the ACT or
permit violations not resolved by this AGREEMENT.
AGREED to this d\^rof Septembe r,20tt.
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DENTSON MrNES (USA) CORP.
t0
UTAH WATER QUALITY BOARD
AglSglzg|l 14:14 9742458198'-
o9/30/2011 14:0? trAX 8015388111
DT]TJBLETREE
aolz/01?
Begulaiory Affairs and
ll
Exhibit K
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UTE MOUNTAIN UTE TzuBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit K to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML Renewal
Re: Description of the White Mesa Water System
The White Mesa Community water system has two deep supply wells in the Navajo
Formation. The Navajo Formation begins at approximately 900-1000 feet depth on this part of
the mesa, based on well driller's reports and local knowledge. (Randee Bayles, 201l). The two
wells are connected to a 4-inch water main that connects two 100,000 gallon storage tanks to the
distribution system. The tanks can be isolated individually or run in parallel.
The north well has a total depth of l5l5 feet, with some obstructions below 1300 feet.
There is a slotted casing from a depth of 1039 to 1153 feet. The pump is rated at 30 GPM and
the static water level is approximately ata depth of 445 feet. (Randee Bayles, 1997). The south
well has a total depth of 1726 feet. The casing goes to a depth of 1277 feet. The pump is rated
at 30 GPM and the static water level is approximately 483 feet. (Randee Bayles,2001).
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Scott Clow, Colin Larrick, 2011
Exhibit L
(Provided on Disc)
Exhibit M
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UTE MOUNTAIN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit M to December 16,20ll Comments on DUSA RML Renewal
Re: Bioavailability, Bioaccumulation and Food Chain Transfer of Airborne
Radionuclides
The Ute Mountain Ute (UMU) Tribe is concemed that the airborne deposition of
Radioactive Material from the Denison USA's White Mesa Mill has resulted in the
contamination of surface water, soils, and vegetation, and it may be indirectly contaminating
livestock, wildlife resources, and other indirect pathways that impact human health.
Significant research has been conducted in the field of bioavailability, bioaccumulation
and food chain transfer of radionuclides. Selected studies that demonstrate the transfer and
bioassimilation of radionuclides, both direct and indirect pathways, are summarized in this
document to exhibit theTribe's concerns.
The existence of direct and indirect pathways of radionuclides to living organisms
including humans is not debated in scientific communities; the debate is about the models that
predict the transfer mechanism accounting for a large list of variables. A series of handbooks
published by the International Atomic Energy Agency, including the Handbook of Parameter
Values for the Prediction of Radionuclide Transfer in Terrestrial and Freshwater Environments,
compiles the studies and the prediction models from the world's scientific community in an
attempt to "... provide IAEA Member States with data for use in the radiological assessment of
routine discharges of radionuclides to the environment," and "covers radionuclide transfer in the
terrestrial and freshwater environments. The data collected here are relevant to the transfer of
radionuclides through food chains to humans..." (IAEA,2010),
While the IAEA's handbook widely covers the world's radioactive releases of many
isotopes, studies on uranium decay series conducted near the uranium mines and processing
facilities give more detailed pictures applicable to the Tribe's concerns for the White Mesa
Community. In Northern Saskatchewan, Canada, where agricultural harvests are not very
promising and wild food hunting and foraging are frequent, uranium decay series have been
studied in terms of their distribution in the food chain.
"Principal factors governing the transport and biotic uptake of radionuclides in the terrestrial
environment are their persistence in the environment, their solubility, their capacity to compete
with nutrients as analogs (compounds behaving similarly to nutrients), and the location and
trophic level of biota within the ecosystem. Knowledge of these principles helps in the selection
of radionuclindes, organisms and site locations for study designs and monitoring programs (p. 9,
Thomas, 1995)"
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The connection between the caribou and/or reindeer meat and bioaccumulation of the
radionuclides in human bodies was established in 1966. Polonium-210 concentration "in human
placentas collected in Northern Canada ranged up to 27.8 picocuries per 100 grams, or 80 times
the average United Kingdom value. High levels are related to the inclusion of reindeer or caribou
meat in the diet" (Hill 1966). The radionuclides that accumulated in wildlife traditionally hunted
by the tribal members in Northern Saskatchewan have also been studied extensively. Airborne
Uranium-series (Uranium-238, Radium-226,Lead-210 and Polonium-210) in terrestrial
ecosystems were surveyed and analyzed for: (1) plants-small mammals food chain in prairie
environment (Thomas 1995); (2) ecological distribution and bioavailabity in terrestrial food
chain (Thomas, 1997); and (3) dose assessment of caribou tissues (Thomas 1999). Those studies
presented that these Uranium-series radioisotopes were present in environment, and
consequently in many species of wild plants, grains, birds, small mammals (such as voles, deer
mice and house mice) and large mammals (such as caribou).
These studies show the cascading effect of radionuclide transfer from the soil and plant
litters, and then from one organism to the other by establishing and calculating the transfer
coefficients for each species and each location sampled. These research projects illuminate the
fact that most radionuclides accumulate in the soil, and the concentration of radionuclides in
plants or animals have a linear relationship with that of soil in most cases. This supports their
data that the ground resuspension of radionuclides is much higher than direct depositions.
The researchers' success in catching airbome materials dispersed in the atmosphere
comes from collecting wind-blown samples at the ground level. Therefore air samples that are
taken high above the ground may not be taking the representative dust in the ambient air. They
also discuss pronounced fugitive dust dispersion in late spring from tailings and storages piles as
freeze-dry cycles increase the surface area and reduce cohesion ofparticles, thereby rendering
them erodible in wind.
The four radionuclides discussed in the studies are likely present in the environment surrounding
the White Mesa Mill, and the tribal members traditionally harvest wildlife and plants for
consumption and ceremonial purposes. Diversity of other radionuclides that were sampled for
and speciated in these studies also could be present in the environment surround the White Mesa
Mill. In order for the Tribe to protect the health of the tribal members and the environment of the
tribal lands, rigorous monitoring, regular radiochemical speciation analysis, and strict regulation
of the Radioactive Materials are necessary.
References:
Hill, C. R. 1966. Polonium-210 Content of HumanTissues in Relation to Dietary Habit. Science.
1 s2 (3726). Pp. t26t -t262.
Intemational Atomic Energy Agency. 2010. Handbook of Parameter Values for the Prediction of
Radionuclide Transfer in Terrestrial and Freshwater Environments. Technical Report Series, No.
472. http ://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/trs472_web.pdf.
Thomas, Patricia A. 1995. Radionuclides in Small Mammals of the Saskatchewan Prairie:
Including Implications for the Boreal Forest and Arctic Tundra.
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Thomas, Patricia A.1997. The Ecological Distribution and Bioavailability of Uranium-series
I tr:!;;f:;:f:;in rerrestriat Food chains: Key Lake uranium operations, Northern
I Tf;frT;,';:::il?,t;],lli' Dosesfrom Radionuctides in caribou rissues: (Iranium citv Region'
()lj
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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFTICE
Posr Office Box 968
Santa Fr. New Mexico 87504'868
827"?,841
rOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
June 17, 1986
SAf,lTA FE, l{Ei{ HEXIC0 E'levated radionucl ide
that grazed in the vicinity of uran'ium mines
of a study recently completed by the New
0ivision.
EIO 0irector Oenfse Fort said the
increased in cattle groups that
uranium mine deratering effluent
COI\TACT:
l.tichael Bro*n 8?7-?959
,Iere t{i I'lard 827-2957
leve'ls have been found in cattle
and mil'ls, according to resu'lts
I'lexi co Envi ronmental Improvement
study dernonstrates that Ievels of radionuclidos
consumed vegetation and soil contam{nated by
and xind bloxn tailings. oThe report documents
(rnore )
The 1983 Heu* ilexico legislature apprdpriated $90,000 for EI0 to study potential
Iivestock contamination and to assess the potential health risk to humans from
eat'ing cattle raised flear uranium mines and mills. II0 conducted the study
in conjunction nith the ller Mexico Tumor Registry.
Cattle chosen for the study were frorn Ambrosia Lake and Churchrock. Extensive
underground uranium mininE has occurred at, Ambrosia lake whfch is also the site
of two Iarge urunium mill tailfngs piIes" At Churchrock, an accidental tailings
spill occurred in 1979. Crownpoint, a sfte northwest of Ambrosla Lake, which
does not have uranfum mining or millfng development, Has used as a control site
in the study,
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Under current federal and state standards, lead-?10 and polonium-Zl0 are not
included in calculating annual radiation doses to an individual, although findings
of the study identify them as the major dose contributors to an individual,
tort said. "fhese longer lived radionuclides should be included in the federa't
regulations because the study shons that under ex'isting regulations they could
eontribute to an unacceptable annual radiation dose to an individual,o fort
said, "The problem also could be more effectively controlled if Ioxer effluent
limits for the radionuclides were adopted,u she added. The agency alto recorxnends
that federal agencies establish a lor*er Iirnit for uranlum based on radiological
toxicity, she noted.
Fort aJso said EI0 will ask the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission to enforce their
regulation requiring cleanup of all soils contaminated by uranlum mill tailings
as part of a long term reclamation and stabilization plan. *For areas affected
hy uranium de*atering effluent, too little scientiflc data exists on the long-term
environrental effects to make a policy recommendationr' Fort said. n!&re research
needs t0 be conducted to determine the degree 0f the problem and the possible
need, ultimately, for controls on land use or clean-up of the soils.u
*30-
EXHIBIT N
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GREG BELL
Lieutenant Ooventor
TO:
THROUGH:
THROUGH;
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
4rt,"
a ulrr/rt
Department of
Environmental Quality
Amanda Smith
. Executive Dire(or
DTVISION OF AIR QUALITY
Cheryl Heying
Direttor
MEMORANDU.M
Denison White Mesa Source File
Reginald Olsen, Permitting Branch Manager
DAQE-MN0I120500i8-10
Tim Andrus, NSR SectionManager ;VAL-rrrr.,
Maung Maung, NSR Engineer
Feb24,2Oll
Response to comments on DAQE-IN0l12050018-10
An Approval Order (AO) for the Denison Mines White Mesa Mill was proposed with a public conunent
period from September 29 to October 29,2010. The proposed AO allows a modification to add a
baghouse, to allow the use of either propane or liquefied natural gas (LNG) fuel, and to document work
practice standards to control fugitive dust for tlre White Mesa Mill. Written comments were received,
Each comment was considered before final issuance of the AO.
The written cornments received are identified below along with the Utah Division of Air Quality's (DAQ)
response to the comment.
l. Comment: The DAQ should conduct compliance testing more often than every 5 years, The
mill circuit has gone through a number of operational changes, and testing at least every 2 years
should be required. Denison Mines (USA) Corporation (Denison), the White Mesa Mill owner
and operator, has a history of not cornplying with health, safety, and environmental regulations.
As explained in the application documents, Denison operated the baghouse for who knows how
long, without DAQ approval. The Mine Safety and Health Administration cited Denison or its
contractors for 28 health and safety violations for two inspections of the Mill in 2010. The
August inspection cited the Mill for some of the same violations that were found during the
January inspection.
DAQ response: The stack-testing interval is reviewed and determined based on the permitted
quantity of emissions released. At the levels in the permit (PMl0 = 10.95 tpy on vanadium
scrubbers, J.75 tpy on yellowcake dryer scrubbers), a five-year interval was determined to be
appropriate in 2006 and has not been changed in this modification. DAQ also considered the fact
195 North 1950 West. Salt Lake City, UT
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 144820 . Salt Lake City, UT 841 14-4820
Telephone (80 I ) 536-4000 . Fax [phone] . T.D.D. (801 ) 536-44 I 4
www.deq.utah.gou
Pnnted on I 00/o recycled paper
Page2 DAQE-MN0112050018-10
that the Division of Radiation Control requires substantial stack testing for radionuclides under
State of Utah Radioactive Materials License No. UT 1900479. Based on this information, no
changes will be made to the approval order.
Comment; The DAQ should request that Denison conduct modeling of the dispersion of the
pollutants from the Mill stacks, because such modeling has never occurred and because the Mill
is close to the communities of White Mesa and Blanding in San Juan County. The DAQ and the
communities should know how well the gases and particulates from the Mill are being dispersed
and the direction of that dispersal.
DAQ response: To date, Denison White Mesa has not triggered the modeling thresholds in
UAC R307-410, so there is no requirement for the source to perform air dispersion modeling.
Accordingly, no changes will be made to the approval order.
Comment: The DAQ should justify the consumption limits in the amount of Iiquefied natural
gas in section II.B.l.b.2) and 3).
DAQ response: Liquefied natural gas has approximate ly 9l?oof the heating energy that
propane (LPG) contains. In this condition, the source is allowed to use the same heating value
using either fuel. The condition is being revised to limit the total heat content used. Each
allowed fuel will have a heat content per gallon Iisted in the AO, and the total heat content will be
determined by multiplying tle quantity of each fuel by the respective heat content factor, then
summed. It will be veritjed ar each inspection by DAQ.
Comment: Denison should be required to identify the other sources at the Mill that are venting
to the stack that is connected to the baghouse. The January 2009 Denison submittal (Form 2)
references an attachment that supplies that information, but that attachment appears to be missing.
DAQ response: The DAQ apologizes for overlooking the inclusion of the attachment in the
information provided to the commenter. Upon review, the DAQ determined that this information
does not aft'ect the proposed approval order, but lists the sources here for completeness: a 4 x 6
inch jaw crusher, a cone crusher, a bowl crusher for final grinding and the sample blending area.
Comment: Section I.3 of the draft AO states, "Unless otherwise specified in this AO or in
other applicable state and federal rules, records shall be kept for a minimum of two (2) years."
The purpose of retaining records is so that the DAQ staff can review those records at the Mill
during an inspection. However, the DAQ usually inspects the Mill about every 3 years. Therefore,
some of the relevant compliance documents might not be available if Denison does not have to
retain them between inspections. Therefore, all records referenced in the AO should be retained
for at least 5 years.
DAQ response: The two-year interval is the standard interval for minor sources in Utah and the
DAQ Compliance staff has experienced no problerns obtaining the needed information required
for inspections. If a federal standard or requirement called for a longer retention period, Denison
would have to comply with that standard or requirement. No changes will be made to the
approval order.
Comment: When the Mill is operating, the DAQ should conduct unannounced inspections of
the Mill operation at least every year. Although not regulated by the DAQ (and not mentioned in
the AO), most of the dust and particulates generated by the Mill operation contain uranium and
uranium progeny. So, the dust and particulates regulated by the DAQ are both hazardous andradioactive-and pose a hazard to the health of the public and the Mill workers. Therefore, it is in
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the interest of the public and Mill workers that dust and particulate releases are kept to a
minimum. The way to assure that such emissions are kept to a minimum is for the DAQ to
conduct more frequent inspections.
DAQ response: This comment addresses our inspection procedures and does not address the
proposed approval order. Under UAC 19-2-107{2)(d), DAQ staff can inspect a source at any
time. No changes will be made to the approval order.
Comment: In Section III, Applicable Federal Requirements, the AO should also list: 40 C.F.R.
Part 190 and l0 C.F.R. Part 40, Appendix A, Criterion 8.
DAQ response: These two citations are for programs for which the DAQ does not have the
authority to implement. No changes will be made to the approval order.
9.
Comment: The final Approval Order should indicate the expiration date of the current Air
Quality Permit.
DAQ response: Under Utah air quality rules, approval orders do not expire. No changes will
be made to the approval order.
Comment: The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe believes that the language in ILB.4.f is insufficient to
prevent fugitive dust. Tribal members and Tribal employees have frequently observed dust that
appears to be coming from the ore piles. Please see attached photographs. The tribe has
expressed previous concerns about fugitive dust to your office, and found the lack of substantial
data made it difficult to rcsolve the issue. There is no infrastructure available on the ore pads tor
watering except for the roads, and it is generally very dry at the mill location. The tribe would
urge the Secretary to require watering of ore pads on a routine and specified time frame,
installation of a sprinkling or other watering system, and submission of water records to your
office on a monthly basis. The tribe also believes that it would be in the public interest to make
thesc watering records publicly available on the UDWR's website. These actions would provide
objective and verifiable data to evaluate any fugitive dust issues, and would help alleviate the
Tribe's concerns about fugitive dust,
DAQ response: The approval order requires the source to activate a water-spray whenever the
situation exists that the opacity may exceed \OVo. To require a fixed schedule without regard to
weather or material conditions could have detrimental effects (such as water being applied during
freezing conditions), No changes will be made to the approval order.
10. Comment: Regarding Section ILB.4.h, Tribal staff have observed that when unloading, ore
hauling tmcks create a large cloud of dust which could cause off-site migration of uranium laden
dust. This leads the Tribe to believe one of two things. Either the standard of 4Vo moisture by
weight is not stringent enough, or it is not being properly implemented. The Tribe would like to
offer additional comment" on this issue. However, in order to do so the Tribe needs additional
information about the implementation. The Tribe has reviewed multiple documents available on
the UDWR's website and has not been able to obtain how this information on how this standard
of 47o moisture is implemented. The Tribe now requests that your office provide the Tribe with
information on how this standard is implemented, and offer an opportunity for additional
comment on this issue.
The Tribe's Environmental Programs Department has been working with the U.S. EPA and the
U.S. Geologic Survey, among other partners, on s Scientific Investigations Report concerning
environmental conditions around White Mesa that is currently in peer review and will likely be
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published in January of 201 l. There are parts of that report that we think the Utah Air QualityDivision will find informative regarding particulate transport, and deposit and off-site migration
of these deposits. The Tribe believes that the report will help in designing an air monitoring
program and refining the current water quality program to enhance the protection of human health
and safety. The Tribe therefore respectfully requests that the decision-making process regarding
this permit and the related fugitive dust requirements be extended to January 31,2011 to allow
your agency time to review the report and incorporate its information into your decision.
Scientific Investigations Report (underlying data)
l.Both the USGS sage sampling and the sediment sampling indicate off-site migration of
uranium and vanadium laden pafliculate has occurred. Accordingly, either the
monitoring program is not detecting the migration, or the monitoring results are not
triggering an appropriate response. Either way, the failure to address migration of
uranium and vanadium laden particulate matter does not engender confidence that the air
program in place at the facility is sufficient to protect the environment, or hurnan health
and safety. The Division of Air Quality should conduct a comprehehsive review of the
air program to assess whether there is a failure in monitoring or responsiveness, and
redesign the air program accordingly.
Financial Costs and Cleanup
The evidence of off-site and on-site migration means there is more financial liability
associated with this facility. Specifically, the onsite migration means that closure costs
are likely to be higher than previously estimated, since closure costs rvere based on on-
site migration. Additionally, the appropriate regulatory agency should require Denison to
pay for costs associated with clean up of areas outside of the property. such as on
adjacent public lands, with elevated uranium readings.
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3. Sediment Sampling
The scientific Investigations sediment sampling demonstrates a need for continued
sediment sampling. The Division of Air Quality should require sediment sampling, and
monitor to ensure that uranium and vanadium levels are decreasing.
Vegetative sampling not robust enough
The detection of uranium and vanadium in the sagebrush indicates that a broader variety
and range of vegetative sampling must be required. Based on the Tribe's review of
previous semi-annual effluent reports it is not clear what vegetative is being sampled, or
whether the vegetation sampling being conducted is taking into consideration the
physical properties of the plant species being sampled, and its value in measuring
chemical constituents. As noted in the Scientific Investigations Reports, sagebrush was
chosen in part because of its historical use in establishing geochemical baselines, its
extensive root system which can accumulate trace chemical constituents from soil and
groundwater containing mobile ions associated with ore deposits, and the rough surface
texture and resins on the leaf structure which have been found to be efficient at trapping
dust. The Division of Air Quality should identify target species for vegetative sampling,
and should also require random sampling of non-target species to ensure that the target
species are adequate indicators.
Quality control5.
Page 5 DAQE-MNOr r2050018-10
As a general issue, the Scientific Investigations Report demonstrates a define need for
quality control in regards to the monitoring and regulation of the Denison White Mesa
Uranium Mill. We have two immediate suggestions for quality control; (l) The Division
of Air Quality should require outside external review for all permits and approved orders
associated with this facility. This type of external review is common in the industry, and
in some cases is required by law, and, (2) An employee of the Division of Air Quality
told our environmental staff that the Division of Air Quality does not have a copy of the
Mill's quality assurance program plan, or standard operating procedures, and that the
state generally requires the Mill to retain these documents. The Division of Air Quality
should be regularly reviewing these documents to ensure that they are being
implemented.
DAQ response: The 4o/o moisture content of the ore is no longer a condition of this approval
order. This approval order continues to prohibit opacities from any source above20Vo. As long
as the tugitive dust opacity is below 207o,the source is in compliance. The method of
determining compliance is contained in the proposed approval order. There is no additional
information from DAQ to comment on at this time.
As of 2l24ll l, DAQ had not seen or received this report. The particulate in the air below 20Vo
opacity may migrate. However, it is not within the jurisdiction of DAQ to require water, soil or
vegetation sampling. It is also not within the jurisdiction of DAQ to address financial
responsibility tbr remediation work due to contamination.
With regard to the concern over quality control, there is no provision in the statutes or rules for
the NSR program to require or allow external review of approval orders beyond the scope of the
public comment process in UAC R307-401-7. The compliance staff inspects against this
approval order.. DAQ does not have the authority to monitor or modify a source's daily
operations beyond compliance with the terms of this approval order. No changes will be made to
the approval order.
The comments were noted. As no technical issues were raised with respect to the conditions of the Intent
to Approve, no changes were made to the Approval Order as a result of these comments. However, the
fuel limit and monitoring have been moditied to eliminate any confusion regarding separate limits on
propane and LNG by converting those limits to a single heat-input limit as described in the response to
comment #3. This was not a relaxation of the limit,
Multiple comments were also received during the public comment period regarding the public
commcnt process:
I l. Comment: The commenter never received notice tiom DAQ regarding the Intent to Approve
and public comment period, despite the fact tliat DAQ is well aware of the commenter's long-
standing interest in this issue and desire to receive notices so we can submit coffments. It is our
understanding that residents living on the White Mesa Ute Community reservation that is
immediately adjacent to the White Mesa Uranium Mill may not have received any notice of the
proposed DAQ action or of their ability to provide comment to DAQ.
In addition, relevant documents were not readily available for review by the people most
impacted by emissions from the Uranium Mill - White Mesa Ute Community residents who
mostly do not have computers.
Page 6 DAQE-MNOl r2050018-10
As a result of DAQ's failure to provide notice as described above, DAQ must reopen the public
comment period and provide meaningful and direct notice to people and organizations that have
expressed interest in this issue as well as to the people living next to the Uranium Mill. We
request a new 60 day comment period be noticed and widely publicized.
DAQ response: All requirements of the public notification process in UAC R307-401-7 were
met for this project. Notice of this project was published in the San Juan Record on September
29,2010. Additionally, our web site identified this project as being available for public review
during the review period. All documents are public information and are available if requested as
provided in the notice. DAQ will not reopen the public comment period for this project. DAQ
NSR managernent is unaware of any standing requests from this commenter to be notified of
every permitting action. The commenter is welcome to contact DAQ with such a request and that
information was emailed to the commenter.
Comment: DAQ should not approve any facility emitting uranium next to where people live. In
fact, most tribal members do not even know and have never been told by DAQ or other agencies
that uranium, particulates and other pollutants are emitted from the stacks. No human being
should be exposed to uraniurn and toxic and particulate emissions without being informed of this
reality, and DAQ and other agencies have violated the human and civil rights of White Mesa
residents by failing to inform them of the serious pollutants being emitted right next to their
communitv.
While DAQ may try to claim they are not responsible for regulating the radioactive emissions, the
truth is that the dust and parliculates regulated by the DAQ are likely both hazardous and
radioactive*and poses a hazard to the health of the public and the Mill workers. DAQ thus has a
responsibility to disclose, evaluate and regulate all the emissions and contaminants associated
with the dust and particulates.
DAQ response: The Division of Radiation monitors and regulates the White Mesa Mill for the
pollutants described in this comment. In adclition, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and/or the Mine Safety and Health Administration have jurisdiction over worker
safety. The public has access to the records retained by those organizations. Radioactive
emissions are not an "air contaminant" under UAC R307-401. No changes will be made to the
approval order.
Comment: Denison Mines (USA) Corporation, the White Mesa Mill owner and operator, has a
history of not complying with health, safety, and environmental regulations. Denison apparently
operated the bag- house without DAQ approval. The Mine Safety and Health Administration
cited Denison or its contractors for 28 health and safety violations during two inspections of the
Mill in 2010. The August inspection cited the Mill for some of the same violations that were
found during the January inspection.
As there has never been a modeling of the dispersion of the pollutants from the Mill stacks, and
because the Milt is close to the cornmunities of White Mesa and Blanding in San Juan County, no
further emissions should be allowed at a minimum until there has been thorough scientific
analysis that can show lhat the emissions are safe. The DAQ and the communities should know
how the gases and par-ticulates from the Mill are being dispersed, the direction of that dispersal
and the true nature and quantity of the emissions.
DAQ response: DAQ Compliance staff found two violations in 2008 and both have been
addressed and corrected. The results of inspections tiom other agencies with other regulatory
authorities are not typically made available to DAQ, and would not be considered as DAQ has no
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Page7 DAQE-MN0I12050018-10
authority over other agencies' regulations. With regard to dispersion modeling, please see the
response to Comment #2.
14. Comment: DAQ's Violation of Title VI of the US CivilRights Act of 1964
As a recipient of federal funding, the DAQ is subject to the requirements of Title VI of the United
States Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funding to take actions
that have a discriminatory and/or disproportionate impact on low-income and people of color,
such as the residents of the White Mesa Ute Community. and nearby Navajo communities.
tn addition to polluting the air of residents, emissions contaminate and desecrate the sacred and
culturally significant sites at White Mesa including burials and ceremonial and archaeological
sites.
By failing to provide notice to these nearby residents, and by allowing continued operation of a
polluting uranium mill that contaminates the air and environment and desecrates Native American
sacred and culturally significant sites, the DAQ is violating Title VI and must therefore cease
permitting of the equipment at the Uranium Mill that emits pollutants into the air.
DAQ response: The White Mesa Mill has been in its current location since 1979. Information
regarding its location and initial permitting can be found at the following Iink:
http://www.r'adiationconlrol. utah.sor,/Uranium lvtills/lUC/Denisun lLiC/UCW rene}'al.htrnl.
In this docurnent, local impacts were evaluated, and the findings can be found in the document
entitled: "Final Environmental Statement Related to Operation of White Mesa Uraniurn Project
Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., 1979;'
This permitting action is not for initial construction, but for an amendment to a current permit that
already allows White Mesa to operate. The question of whether the facility has a right to exist as
a general matter is not a question that the DAQ has the authority to consider in this permitting
action. Sources regr.rlated by the DAQ (such as White Mesa), are subject to compliance actions if
they fail to comply with the terms and conditions of their approval orders. However, DAQ does
not prohibit sources from engaging in lawful activities. It is DAQ's opinion that White Mesa
Mill has complied with the requirements to receive the amendment to its approval order.
Therefore, any questions regarding White Mesa's compliance status should be directed to the
Compliance Section of the DAQ, as such questions are not the sLrbject of this pemitting action.
The DAQ makes every effort to follow applicable law in all its permitting decisions. With
respect to the notice provided to the public in this action, the DAQ believes it has followed all
applicable rules for providing notice to the public of this permitting action (see Response to
Comment #11). DAQ's permitting rules have been approved by EPA, thus EPA is satisfied that
DAQ's actions in compliance with those rules satisfy all legal requirements.
Accordingly, the cornmenter should direct any complaints, comments, or questions regarding
Title VI compliance to the appropriate authorities at EPA Region 8. Contacts for the EPA Region
8 environmental justice program can be found at this link:
http://wwrv.epa. qov/re-qionSlej/contacts,lrtrnl.
Comment: We also, again, request to be notified of the opportunity to comment on any and all
DAQ actions regarding the White Mesa Uranium Mill.
Page 8 DAQE-MNOl12050018-10
DAQ response: DAQ is required to publish notices of any intents-to-approve and accept public
cornments in accordance with UAC R307401-7. DAQ NSR management is unaware of any
standing requests from this commenter to be notified of every permitting action. Any member of
the public is welcome to contact DAQ with such a request.
l6' Comment: When the DAQ posts a public notice on its website or publishes a notice in a local
newspaper of an opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed agency action, the DAQ
should also post the application (Notice of Intent), additional information, and associated
documents on the DAQ website. For a public notice on a proposed agency action related to the
White Mesa Mill, the DAQ should also place a copy of the application documents and draft
Approval Order in Blanding Public Library.
There are a number of pcople who are impacted by the operation of the Mill and the emissions
from that Mill who do not use computers or do not have easy access to computers. An interested
member of the public should not have to submit a Government Records Access and Management
Act (GRAMA) request in order to have access to those documents or travel to Salt Lake City to
view the pertinent records. During a public comment period a person should not be expected to
bring forward all the issues that may later become the subject of a Request for Agency Action-if
the pertinent documents are not readily available.
DAQ response: Presently, DAQ is not required to publish documents related to the application
as the commenter as requested. However, as a note, the DAQ is currently reviewing its web
procedures for possible modifications to possibly include the posting of project-related
information as resources allow.
17. Comment: A 30-day comment period is not sufficient time for a person to have to request the
records and have thc DAQ respond to those requests, before making comments.
If the DAQ does not want to make the application and related documents readily available to the
public, then it should provide an extra l5 days to give a member of the public time to submit a
GRAMA request. and receive a respouse to that request.
DAQ response: The 30-day comment period is specified in rule at UAC R307-401-7.
However, DAQ has been responsive to requests for information and has allowed for adclitional
time to provide corrunents, as was the case with this project when DAQ continued to accept
comments until November 4 instead of closing the comment period on October 29. Extensions of
the comment period such as this are made upon request and approval of DAQ management in
consideration of the circumstances. Extending the public comment period beyond the 30 days in
the rule is not typically necessary, and mandating such an extension would cause additional
delays to many projects that are not necessary.
18. Comment: The DAQ should place a copy of the final AO and response to comments in the
Blandi ng Public Library.
DAQ response: Copies of Notices of Intent, public comments and Approval Orders are public
infbrrnation and open for public review. Copies are available on request. It is not currently
feasible to make all copies available for the public libraries. However, DAQ has noted the
concern and will consider it during the current procedural review, as noted in the response to
comment #16.
The additional comments were noted. As no technical issues were raised with respect to the Intent to
Approve (ITA), no additional changes will be made to the Approvar order.
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EXHIBIT O
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State of Utah
GARY R. HERBERT
Goventor
GREG BELL
Lieutenanl Governor
Department of
Environmental Quality
Amanda Smith
Executive Director
DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY
Cheryl Heying
Director
DAQE-ANOr 12050018-l I
March 2,2011
Jo Ann Tischler
Denison Mines (USA) Corp.
Independence Plaza
1050 lTth Street, Suite 950
Denver, CO 80265
Dear Ms. Tischler:
Re: Approval Order: Approval Order Modification to Acld a Baghouse, to Allow Alternate Fuel
Usage and to Incorporate Work Practice Standards
Project Number: N0l 1205-00 18
The attached document is the Approval Order for the above-referenced project. Future correspondence
on this Approval Order should include the engineer's name as well as the DAQE number as shown on the
upper right-hand corner of this letter. The project engineer for this action is Maung Maung, who may be
reached at [phone].
Sincerely,
1^" t{\ u^.
M. Cheryl Hey ing, E/ecutiv{Se./trr\
Utah Air Quality Board v
MCH:MM:sa
cc: Southeastern Utah District Health Department
195 North 1950 West . Salt Lake City, UT
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 144820 . Salt l;tke City, UT 841 14-4820
Telephone [phone]. Fax [phone]. T.D.D. [phone]
www.tlcq.ukth.gov
PriDted otr 100% recycled paper
STATE OF UTAH
Department of Environmental Quality
Division of Air Quality
APPROVAL ORDER: Approval Order Modification to Add a
Baghouse, to Allow Alternate Fuel Usage and to
Incorporate Work Practice Standards
Prepared By: Maung Maung, Engineer
Phone: [phone]
Email: [e-mail]
APPROVAL ORDER NUMBER
DAQE-AN01120s0018-11
Date: March 2,2011
Denison Mines (USA) Corp.
White Mesa Mill
Source Contact:
Ms. Jo Ann Tischler, Compliance Specialist
Phone: [phone]
km,b
Executive Secretary
Utah Air Quality Board
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Abstract
Denison Mines (USA) C-'orp. has requested a modification to add a baghouse, to allow the use of either
propane or liquified natural gas (LNG) fuel and to document work practice standards to control fugitive
dust for the White Mesa Mill. The Mill is located six miles south of Blanding on Highway 191 in San
Juan County.
San Juan County is an attainment area of the NAAQS for all pollutants. White Mesa Mill is subject to
NSPS 40 CFR Part 60 Subpart Dc (Standards of Performance for Small Industrial-Commercial-
lnstitutional Steam Generating Units). NESHAP 40 CFR Part 6l Subpart W (National Emission
Standards for Radon Emissions from Operating Mill Tailings) applies to this source. MACT regulations
do not apply to this source. Title V of the 1990 Clean Air Act for an area sources applies to this source.
This area source does not require a Title V operating permit at the present time. The emissions, in tons per
year (tpy), will increase as follows; PMro (including PM25) = 0.16 and PM2.5 = 0.08. The change in
emissions will result in the following, in tons per year, potential to emit totals: PMle (including PM25) =
34.07, PM25 = 17.08 (not accounted for before), SOz - 2.91, NO* = 39.61, CO = 10.49, VOC = 4.03,
hexane = 0.63 and formaldehyde = 0.03.
f'his air quality AO authorizes the project with the following conditions and failure to comply with any of
the conditions may constitute a violation of this order. This AO is issued to, and applies to the following:
Name of Permittee:
Denison Mines (USA) Corp.
Independence Plaza
1050 lTth Street, Suite 950
Denver, CO 80265
UTM coordinates:
SIC code:
Permitted Location:
White Mesa Mill
6 Miles south of Blanding
on Highway l9l
San Juan County, UT 8451 I
$2,204 m Easting,4,155,400 m Northing, UTMZone 12
1094 (Uranium-Radium-Vanadium Ores)
Section I: GENBRAL PROVISIONS
The lirnits set forth in this AO shalI not be exceeded without prior approval. [R307-401]
Modifications to the equiprnent or processes approved by this AO that could affect the
emissions covered by this AO must be reviewed and approved. [R307-401-1]
All rccords ref'erenced in this AO or in other applicable rules, which are required to be kept by
the owner/operator, shall be made available to the Executive Secretary or Executive Secretary's
representative upon request, and the records shall include the two-year period prior to the date of
the request. Unless otherwise specified in this AO or in other applicable state and federal rules,
records shall be kept for a minimum of two (2) years. [R307-401-81
At all times, including periods of startup, shutdown, and malfunction, owners and operators
shall. to the extent practicable, maintain and operate any equipment approved under this AO,
including associated air pollr"rtion control equipment, in a manner consistent with good air
pollution control practice for minimizing emissions. Determination of whether acceptable
operating and maintenance procedures are being used will be based on information available to
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DAQE-AN0r 12050018-11
Page 3
II.A
II.A.1
II,A.2
II.A.3
II.A.4
II.A.5
the Executive Secretary which may include, but is not limited to, monitoring results, opacity
observations, review of operating and maintenance procedures, and inspection of the source.
All maintenance performed on equipment authorized by this AO shall be recorded.
[R3074014]
The owner/operator shall comply with R307-150 Series. Inventories, Testing and Monitoring.
1R307- t50l
The owner/operator shall comply with UAC R307-107. General Requirements: Unavoidable
Breakdowns. [R307-107]
All definitions, terms, abbreviations, and references used in this AO conform to those used in
the UAC R307 and 40 CFR. l]nless noted otherwise, references cited in these AO conditions
refer to those rules. [R307-1011
Section II: SPECIAL PROVISIONS
The approved installations shall consist of the following equipment:
Uranium Mill
Uranium Drying and Pollution Control
(Yellowcake Circuit)
One (1) Yellowcake South Dryer YC
Dryer Type:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Wet Scrubber Model:
Design Flow Rate:
Estimated Emission Rate:
One (l) Yellowcake North Dryer
Dryer Maker:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Six hearth rotary Skinner dryer
Propane or Iiquified natural gas
3 MMBtuihr
Air Pollution Equipment for the South Dryer - One ( l) Ducon Dry Cyclone followed by one
(l) Ducon scrubber with cyclonic separator
IfW4. Size 36, Scrubber with Demister
3,800 acfm (150 degrees F)
0.016 grldscf PMro
0.02 grldsci PM
Six hearth rotary Skinner dryer
Propane or liquified natural gas
2.4 MMBTL/hr
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DAQE-ANOl12050018-l
Page 4
II.A.6 Air Pollution Equipment for the North Dryer - Dry cyclonic separator followed by one ( l)
Ducon Venturi scrubber with Ducon packed demister
II.A.7
II.A.8
tLA.9
Packaging Area Baghouse; Both dryers (south & north) discharge into a common hopper
located in the enclosed packing area. The packing area is under negative pressure and all the
generated dust discharges through a baghouse.
Vanadium Dryer and Pollution Control
One (1) AmmoniumMeta-Vanadate (AMV) Dryer
Design Flow Rate:
Estimated Emission Rate:
Design Flow Rate:
Estimated Emission Rate:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Furnace Type:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Dryer Make:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
One (l) Mist Eliminator
3,160 acfm (140 degrees F)
0.016 grldscf PMro
0.02 grldscf PM
5,000 acfm (68 degrees F)
<0.01 grldscf, PM
Propane or liquified natural gas
7.74 MMBtU/hr
Single Burner for each furnace
Propane or liquified natural gas
up to 1.8 MMBtU/hr
Barlett/Snow Rotary Multi Burner
Propane or liquified natural gas
4.0 MMBtU/hr
II.A.IO Two (2) Fusion Furnaces and casting wheels vented through the AMV Dryer
II.A.I t Air Pollution Equipment for AMV Dryer & Furnaces: Dry cyclone followed by the Sly # rr
Ducon Venturi scrubber. The scrubber is connected in parallel to a mist eliminator and a fan
which discharges to the final stack.
Scrubber Flow:7,910 acfm (370 degrees F)
II.A.I2 Trvo (2) Multi Hearth Dryers serve as back up for the fusion furnaces. Controlled with a
Kice Dry Cyclone followed by a Ducon Venturi wet scrubber. The scrubber is connected in
parallel to a mist eliminator and a fan which discharges to the final stack.
Scrubber Flow:27 ,800 acfm (440 degrees F)
II.A.13 One (l) Rotary Calciner. Controlled by the Sly #6 Ducon Venturi scrubber listed above
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DAQE-AN0I12050018-i 1
Page 5
II.A.I5
II.A.I6
II.A.I7
Leach Process Control
Leach Mist Eliminator
Boilers
One (l) Superior Boiler - Pre-NSPS (Manufactured in 1987)
II.A.I9 One (l) Low NO* Superior Boiler Works
Fuel Type:
Type of Bumer:
Heat lnput Capacity:
II.A.l8 One (1) Cyclotherm Boiler
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Propane or liquified natural gas
. 66 ppm NO^
up to 23.5 MMBtU/hr
Propane or liquified natural gas
up to 5.0 MMBtu/hr
6X-5-3000-5 I 5 l -PF-LPG
Propane or Iiquified natural gas
tp to 25.2 MMBtU/hr
5,000 acfm
0.02 gr per acf
12,500 acfm
0.0014 grlscf
1,000 acfm
0.005 grlscf (estimated)
IT.A.20
II.A.2I
II,A.23
It.A.24
TT,A,22 One (l) Baghouse for Yellowcake Dryer Enclosures and Hoppers
Emrssion Rate:0.02 grldscf PM (0.73 lb/hr)
0.16 grldscf PMro (0.58 lbihr)
Dry Soda Ash Silo Bin Baghouse (Scientific Dust Collectors), and Packing Area Vents
Baghouse
Cartridge Filter Baghouse with 24 cartridges
Model:
Fuel Type:
Heat Input Capacity:
Baghouses
One (l) Grizzly Baghouse
Design Rate:
Grain Loading:
Design Rate:
Grain Loading:
Design Rate:
Grain Loading:
Anaiytical Laboratory Sample Preparation Room (Bucking Room) Baghouse (new addition)rI.A.2-5
I
I B*}:-^tt'r r2osool8-11
I II.A.26 Leaching and Vanadium Demister Scrubberl-__-_-----o
Process Rate: 250 tons/year
I
Design Rate: 0.07 lb/hr of SOz
lT.A.27 Fire PumpT [:::J#". IJ.3:H1,,
I II.A.28 Emergency Generatorr ------E----J
Fuel Type: #2 Diesel
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Electrical Output: up to 565 kW
f II.B Requirements and Limitations
I II.B.I uraniumgiil
I II.B.l.a Denison Mines (USA) Corp. shall notify the Executive Secretary in writing when theI installation of the baghouse in Bucking Room has been completed and is operational. To
ensul'e proper credit when notifying the Executive Secretary, send your correspondence to the
I
xecutive Secretary, attn: Compliance Section.
lf the installation has not been completed within l8 months from the date of this AO, the
I Executive Secretary shall be notified in writing of the status of the installation. At that time,
I the Executive Secretary shall require documentation of the continuous installation of tlre
operation and may revoke the AO. [R307-401-18]
I II.ts.l.b The tbllowing procluction and/or consumption limits shall not be exceeded:r "-or-----"
l) '120,'720 tons of ore processing per rolling l2-month total
I 2) Total267,960 MMBtu heat input per rolling l2-month total for the entire source
except the Superior Boiler Works outlined below.
I 3) Totat22O|7.5?-YYB,y^h^"1t ill{j:.1'olling l2-month total for the Superior Boiler
Works model X6-5-3000-5 I 50-PF-LPG
To determine compliance with a rolling l2-month total, by the first day of each month a new
l2-month total shall be calculated using data from the previous l2 months. Monthly
calculations shall be made no later than 20 days after the end of each calendar month.
Records of production/consumption shall be kept for all periods when the plant is in operation.
Ore production shall be determined from plant records. The records of production shall be
kept on a daily basis. Propane or liquified natural gas consumption shall be determined from
purchase order receipts and monthly inventories. The annual total heat input shall be
calculated by using heat value of 82,265 Btu per gallon for LNG and 90,500 Btu per gallon for
propane. Records of purchase orders shall be maintained. [R307-401-8]
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DAQE-AN0I12050018-l r
PageT
II.B.1,C
II,B.I.d
II.B.2
ILB.2.a
Visible emissions from the following emission points shall not exceed the following values:
l) Ore loading Areas - L5Vo opacity
2) Vanadium Circuit - l57o opacity
3) All baghouses - llvo opacity
4) All diesel engines - ZAVo opacity
5) Conveyor drop points -20Vo opacity
6) Plopane or liquified natural gas-fired, low NO* boiler - l07o opacity
7) All other points - ?)Eo opacity
Opacity observations ofemission from stationary sources shall be conducted in accordance
with 40 CFR Part 60, Appendix A, Method 9, [R307-201-3]
Emergency generators shall be used for electricity-producing operation only during the periods
when electric power from the public utilities is interrupted, or for regular maintenance of the
generators. Records documenting generator usage shall be kept in a log; and they shall show
the date the generator was used, the duration in hours ofthe generator usage, and the reason
for each generator usage. [R307401-8]
Limits ancl Test Procedures
Ernissions to the atmosphere at all times from the indicated enrission points shall not exceed
the following ratings and concentrations:
Source: Vanadium Circuir scrubbers
Pollutant
PMro
grains/dscflb/hr (68 degrees F,29.92H9)
2.5 0.02
Source: Yellowcake Dryer scrubbers
grains/dscfPollutant lbihr (68 degrees F,29.92He)
PM,o 0.4 0.003 each
[R307-401-8]
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DAQE-ANOI 12050018-1r
Page 8
rI.B.2.b
II.B.3
lI.B.3.a
Stack testing to show compliance with the emission limitations stated in the above condition
shall be performed as specified below:
Compliance Test: A compliance test shall be done at least once every five years subsequent to
the initial compliance test on the Vanadium Circuit Scrubber and Yellowcake Dryers. The
Executive Secretary may require testing at any time. If an existing source is modified, a
compliance test is required on the modified emission point that has an emission rate limit.
Notification: The Executive Secretary shall be notified at least 30 days prior to conducting any
required emission testing. A source test protocol shall be submitted to DAQ when the testing
notification is submitted to the Executive Secretary.
The source test protocol shall be approved by the Executive Secretary prior to performing the
test(s). The source test protocol shall outline the proposed test rnethodologies, stack to be
tested, and procedures to be used. A pretest conference shall be held, if directed by the
Executive Secretary.
Sample Location: The emission point shall be designed to conform to the requirements of 40
CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 1, or other methods as approved by the Executive Secretary.
An Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) approved access shall be provided to the test location.
Volumetric Flow Rate: 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 2 or other testing methods approved
by the Executive Secretary,
PMle: For stacks in which no liquid drops are present, the following methods shall be used: 40
CFR 51, Appendix M, Methods 201,20|a. or other testing methods approved by the Executive
Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be tested using the method specified by the
Executive Secretary. All particulate captured shall be considered PM1e.
For stacks in which liquid drops are present, methods to eliminate the liquid drops should be
explored. If no reasonable method to elirninate the drops exists, then the following methods
shall be used: 40 CFR 60, Appendix A, Method 5, 5a, 5d, or 5e as appropriate, or other testing
methods approved by the Executive Secretary. The back half condensibles shall also be tested
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary. The portion of the front half of the
catch considered PMle shall be based on information in Appendix B of the fifth edition of the
EPA document, AP-42, or otiter data acceptable to the Executive Secretary.
The back half condensibles shall not be used for compliance demonstration but shall be used
for inventory purposes.
Existing Source Operation: For an existing.source/emission point, the production rate dufing
all compliance testing shall be no less than 90?o of the maximum production achieved in the
previous three (3) years. [R307-165]
Fuel
The owner/operator shall use propane or liquified natural gas as fuel in the two yellowcake
dryers, vanadium multi hearth dryer, rotary calciner, AMV dryer, fusion furnaces and boilers.
[R307-401-8]
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DAQE-ANol12050018-l I
Page 9
ILB.3.b
II.B.4
ILB.4.a
ILB.4.b
II.B.4.c
II.B 4.d
Number 2 or better diesel tuel shall be used in the mobile equipment, emergency generator and
fire pump engine.
The sulfur content of any fuel oil or diesel burned shall not exceed 0.05 percent by weight for
diesel fuels consumed in all other equipment. The sulfur content shall be determined by
ASTM Method D4294-89 or approved equivalent. Certification of sulfur content oil shall be
either by Denison Mines (USA) Corporation's own testing or test rcports from the fuel
marketcr. [R307-40 I -8]
Roads & Fugitive Dust
Denison Mines (USA) Corp: shall comply with all applicable requirements of R307-205 for
Fugitive Emission and Fugitive Dust sources. To be in compliance, the source must operate in
accordance with the most current version. IR307-2051
Visible fugitive dust emissions from haul-road traffic and mobile equipment in operational
areas shall not exceed 207o opacity. Visible emissions determinations from traffic sources
shall use procedures similar to Method 9. The normal requirement for observations to be
made at 15-second intervals over a six-minute period, however, shall not apply. Visible
emissions shall be measured at the densest point of the plume but at a point not less than half
vehicle length behind the vehicle and not less than half the height of the vehicle. [R307-205J
All unpaved roads ancl other unpaved operational areas that are used by mobile equipment
shall be water sprayed and/or chemically treated to control fugitive dust. Treatment shall be of
sufficient frequency and quantity to maintain the surface material in a damp/moist condition.
The opacity shall not exceed 20Vo during all times the areas are in use or unless it is below
freezing. If cliemical treatment is to be used, the plan must be approved by the Executive
Secretary. [R307-401-8]
Any section of paved road under the orvner/opel'ator's jurisdiction shall be periodically swept
or sprayed clean as dry conditions vvarrant ol as determined necessary by the Executive
Secretary. Records of cleaning paved roads shall be made available to the Executive Secretary
or the Executive Secretary's representative.
All records shall include the following items:
Date
Number of treatments made
3) Rainfall received, if any, and approximate amount
4) Time of day treatments was made
1R307-20s-71
Unpaved hauUaccess road shall have at least one inch ofgravel as road-base surface or will be
watered and/or chemically treated as needed to meet the 207o opacity requirement.
tR307-401-81
II.B.4.e
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Page l0
Ir.B.4.f
II.B.4.g
II.B,4.h
II.B.4.i
II.B,4.J
II.B.4.k
Incorporates
Incorporates
Supersedes
Is Derived From
Additional Information dated August 26, 2010
Additional information dated June 23,2010
DAQE-ANO112050017 dated May 10, 2010
NOI dated January 5, 2009
The storage piles shall be watered to minimize generation of fugitive dusts as dry conditions
warrant or as determined necessary by the Executive Secretary. [R307-401-8]
Fugitive dust from the disturbed areas shall be controlled through the use of watering as dry
conditions warrant or as determined necessary by the Executive Secretary. The speed of
compactors shall not exceed three (3) miles per hour (mph) at any time. [R307401-8]
For front-end loading operations and truck-dumping operations, the drop distances shall be
kept as small as practicable. The speed of the scrapers shall not exceed three (3) mph while
loading and twelve (12) mph while dumping. The moisture content of the materials shall be
no less than four percent by weight during these operations. The moisture content shall be
tested if directed by the Executive Secretary using a test method approved by the Executive
Secretary. [R307-401-8]
The ore grizzly shall be enclosed on three sides and have wetting agents applied at the apron
feeder and the conveyor discharge as needed. Additionally the baghouse dust collection
system shall be utilized atthe grizzly and apron feeder tunnel. tR307401-81
The tailings retention areas shall be sprayed with water or a crusting agent when dry
conditions exist or as determined necessary by the Executive Secretary. [R307-401-8'l
I'he mill area shall be graveled and shall be sprayed with rvater to minimize fugitive dust as
dry conditions wan ant or as determined by tlre Executive Secretary. [R307-401-8]
Section III: APPLICABLE FEDERAL REOUIREMENTS
In addition to the requirenrents of this AO, all applicable provisions of the following federal programs
have been found to apply to this installation. This AO in no way releases the owner or operator from any
liability for compliance with all other applicable t-ederal, state, and local regulations including UAC
R307.
NESHAP (Part 6l), A: General Provisions
NESHAP (Part 6l), W: Radon From Operating Mill Tailings
NSPS (Part 60), A: Ceneral Provisions
NSPS (Part 60), Dc: Small Indus Com InstitnSteam Generator
I
PERMIT HISTORY
I This Ao is based on rhe following ctocumenrs:
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DAQE-ANOI120500i8-l l
Page Il
ADMINISTRATIVE COPING
The following information is for UDAQ internal classification use only:
San Juan County
CDS B
Attainment Area, NESHAP (Part 6l), NSPS (Part 60)
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DAQE-ANOl120s0018-11
Page 12
ACRONYMS
The following lists commonly used acronyms and associated translations as they apply to this
document:
40 CFR
AO
BACT
CAA
CAAA
CDS
CEM
CEMS
CFR
CO
COz
COze
COM
DAQ
DAQE
EPA
GHG
GWP
HAP or HAPs
ITA
LB/HR
MACT
MMBTU
NAA
NAAQS
NESHAP
NOI
NO*
NSPS
NSR
PMro
PMzs
PSD
PTE
R307
R307-401
SOz
Titlc IV
Title V
TPY
UAC
UDAQ
VOC
Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Approval Order
Best Available Control Technology
Clean Air Act
Clean Air Act Amendments
Classification Data System (used by EPA to classify sources by sizeltype)
Continuous emissions monitor
Continuous emissions monitoring system
Code of Federal Regulations
Carbon monoxide
Carbon Dioxide
Carbon Dioxide Equivalent - 40 CFR Part 98, Subpart A, Table A-1
Continuous opacity monitor
Division of Air Quality (typically interchangeable with LTDAQ)
This is a document tracking code for internal UDAQ use
Environmental Protection Agency
Greenhouse Gas(es) - 40 CFR 52.21 (bX49Xi)
Global Wanning Potential - 40 CFR Part 86.1818-12(a)
Hazardous air pollutant(s)
Intent to Approve
Pounds per hour
Maximum Achievable Control Technology
Million British Thermal Units
Nonattainment Area
National Arnbient Air Quality Standards
National Ernission Standards for Hazardous Air- Pollutants
Notice of Intent
Oxides of nitrogen
New Source Performance Standard
New Source Review
Particulate matter less than l0 microns in size
Particulate matter less than 2.5 microns in size
Prevention of Signi ficant Deterioration
Potential to Emit
Rules Series 307
Rules Series 307 - Section 401
Sulfur dioxide
Title IV of the Clean Air Act'fitle V of the Clean Air Act
Tons per year
Utah Administrative Code
Utah Division of Air Quality (typically interchangeable with DAQ)
Volatile organic compounds
E,XHIBIT P
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UTE MOLINTATN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit P to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML RenewalRe: Deficiencies in DUSA's Environmental Monitoring Program
Currently, DUSA's environmental monitoring lacks the ability to intercept pollutants in
air, soil and vegetation. Water monitoring also continues to have significant deficiencies in
quality control and quality assurance. Past and current environmental monitoring for radioactive
materials in air, soil and vegetation conducted by DUSA and its predecessors has indicated no
significant levels of pollutant above what has been determined to be local background levels.
This means either: (l) there is no significant amount of radioactive materials in environment; (2)
the radioactive materials are not present or not concentrated enough at the sampling points; or (3)
that the monitoring methods and quality assurance program supporting them are insufficient to
collect representative data about environmental pollutants.
Methodolo gy for Environmental Monitoring
Environmental monitoring programs require an understanding of the local geology,
hydrology and meteorology supported by data; a set of hypotheses that are justified by the data
and that are testable; an understanding of peer-reviewed guidance documents to explore and
justify the selection of sampling locations, sampling methods and analyses; and periodic
evaluation of locations and methods to determine if the sampling and assessment program is
representative of the risks being evaluated.
Omission of Certain Radionuclides in DUSA's Environmental Monitoring
Currently, DUSA's air samples are analyzed for U-natural, Thorium-230, Radium-226
andLead-210, its vegetation samples for Radium-226 andLead-2l}, and its soil samples for U-
natural and Radium-226.The omission of two important uranium decay series chemicals,
Thorium-230 and Polonium-210, from these environmental monitoring must be corrected. Spikes
above the standard were observed in air for Thorium-230 in the past and Polonium-210 accounts
for up to 50%o of internal exposure in humans (Holtzman 1966). Polonium-210 is mobile in the
body and has a higher dose rate than either Radium-226 or Plutonium-239 due to its short half-
life (Thomas 1994). The inclusion of these two additional analyses in the monitoring program for
airborne particulates, soil and vegetation would be more protective of public health and
environment.
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SoilMonitoring
At the outset of radionuclide monitoring in soil, a baseline survey in basic soil quality
parameters (texture, moisture content, organic/inorganic content, etc.) as well as radiochemistry
speciation and concentration analyses is necessary. This requires collecting soil samples from a
variety of surface geologic formations and at various distances from the sources of contaminants
using a grid sampling pattern or other scientifically accepted systematic patterns to cover a large
area. The final selection of sampling locations; the timing and frequency of sample collection;
and sampling methodology should be based on the result of the baseline survey, so that sampling
and assessment is representative and provides the information to determine the risk to public
health and environment posed by the levels of pollutants in soil (see Lenth 2001 for discussion of
sample size determination).
DUSA's soil samples have been collected at five high volume air monitoring stations
distributed on the Mill property and one off-site towards Blanding. Selection of these locations
would be justified if the data analyses from pilot studies concluded that those six locations
represent the surface soil within the Mill property with the regard to radionuclide composition
and concentrations. But there is no record indicating that such analyses have been applied to
justify the locations. Also unclear are the basic soil parameters of the samples, the depth of
where the sample is from, and what other pollutants are in the soil. As soil is dynamic and its
ability to retain, remedy and/or release toxins depends on its dynamic ecology and interaction
with elements (Tamponnet et aI2008), the baseline analyses of soil quality, composition,
radiochemistry speciation and concentration are necessary.
Recommendations
a. Soil should be collected on the surface if there is no vegetation, and soil sampling should
be repeated for sub-surface samples if the vegetation nearby is found to be accumulating
radionuclides to look into the pathways of pollution. Reevaluation of sampling points,
sampling depth, methods and number as the monitoring progresses is absolutely
necessary.
b. Analyze the soil samples for Uranium-238, Thorium-230, Radium-226,Lead -210, and
Polonium-210.
c. A baseline survey of soil for a distribution of radioisotopes covering a large area and
variety of land forms and environmental aspects following an established sampling
method such as grids, making sure that sampling points are placed evenly between the
sources, such as the ore storage pads, stacks and transportation paths and the Mill's
boundary.
d. Regularly, collect a sample for radiochemistry analysis to find a// radioisotopes present in
soil, so that radionuclides other than that of uranium series may be detected.
Vegetation Monitoring
The same systematic approach in baseline surveying described above applies to
vegetation monitoring. Radionuclide monitoring in vegetation should include all species present
at the baseline survey, and the species that contain the target pollutants should be selected for the
monitoring program. Futhermore, this selection of species should take into account other factors,
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such as whether those species are: (l) used by local residents as food sources or for ceremonial
purposes, and/or (2) foraged by small or large herbivores. If those species are foraged by
herbivores, the approach should consider whether those animals are hunted and ingested by the
public. Also essential to vegetation monitoring is the availability of populations. If the area to be
sampled were not densely vegetated, repeat monitoring would become challenging. If the sample
area is not densely vegetated, extending the sampling area outside of the Mill property may be
necessary.
Three sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata) populations appear to have been selected to
monitor radionuclides in vegetation by DUSA, though species composition of samples is not
clear as DUSA's Semi-Annual Effluent Reports do not specify sampled species. It is assumed
that those populations were chosen after the Environmental Assessment (EA) was completed in
1978. However, the EA did not analyze radionuclide composition and concentration in the
vegetation. Thus the use of the EA's vegetation survey as a baseline in monitoring radionuclides
in vegetation is not appropriate. Further, if sagebrush is the only species sampled, it would be
grossly inadequate to represent the vegetative uptake of radionuclides in the Millproperty, as
accumulation of the metals in plants differ from one species to another, and so would the
consequent predictions to assess ecotoxicins' pathways to higher trophic levels (see Saric et al
1995, Soudek et al 2004, Thomas 1997).
Recommendations
a. A baseline survey of soil and vegetation for a distribution of radioisotopes covering a
large area with a variety of land forms and environmental aspects is recommended
following an established sampling method such as grids, making sure that sampling
points are placed systematically between the sources, such as the ore storage pads, stacks
and transportation paths and the Mill's boundary.b. Analyze the vegetation samples for Uranium-238, Thorium-23}, Radium-226,Lead-210,
and Polonium-210.
c, Regularly, collect a sample for radiochemistry analyses to find a// radioisotopes present
in vegetation, so that radionuclides other than that of uranium decay series may be
detected.
Air Monitorine
DUSA's air monitoring program uses high volume air samplers at six locations (with five
currently operating). It is questionable whether these locations are effectively sampling the
representative amount of radionuclides present in ambient air. Studies reveal that body dose
factors are greater closer to the ground (Arberg 1989) and that the ground resuspension of
fugitive dust laden with radioactive materials influences internal exposure (Thomas 1997). Most
radionuclides end up in soil and remain mobile. As wind, hooves, or shoes resuspend them in air
the radioactive particulates could adhere to body, be inhaled, or be ingested by anyone in the
zone. Therefore, an additional sampling strategy to assess the risk due to resuspended
radionuclides closer to the ground level is needed. This sampling consideration is especially
important due to children's elevated susceptibility to environmental carcinogens including
radionuclides (see http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/childrens_supplement_final.pdf), and the younger
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the children, the closer their activity zone is to the ground. Furthermore, most species of small
mammals, birds and insects, are active and forage at the ground level.
There is an alternative method successfully used in the baseline survey for detecting
radionuclides, where one square meter vinyl adhesive papers are utilized suspended in three
positions, horizontal, vertical and inverted horizontal at approximately one meter above ground
(Thomas 1997). The last was shown to collect the most radionuclides. By placing these dust
collectors systematically throughout the Mill's property using an established method such as a
grid or transect to cover the large area, there may be a trend in the movement of the radionuclide
laden fugitive dust. Sampling should be repeated in different durations and in different seasons
that represent high wind (spring), hot and dry (summer), and freeze and dry (winter). If the
results reveal a higher concentration in a certain areaat certain time of the year,it would be
necessary to relocate the high volume air samplers to these locations.
As for the rnonitoring data interpretation of direct gamma measurements, or the estimate
of annual gamma exposure using thermolumnescent dosimeters (TLDs), DUSA's practice in
subtracting "background" gamma measurement (BHV-3) frorn the result is not acceptable. The
gamma measurement from the TLDs needs to be reported as is and the Curnulative Semi-Annual
Dose must be estimated without subtracting the "background'n as recommended in the Guidance
on Implementing Radionuclide NESHAPs.
The explanation that DUSA provides for this practice has been published in Semi-Annual
Effi uent Repofts, repeatedly.
With regard to background monitoring. the Mill previously operatecl a continuous high volume air
sarnpling station (BHV-3) which was located approximately 3.5 miles west of the Mill site. With
the approval of NRC, this station (BHV-3) rvas removed from the active air monitoring program
in November 1995. At that time, NRC detennined that a sufficient air monitoring data base had
been compiled at BHV-3 to establish a representative airborne radionuclide backgrouud fbr the
Mill. lt should be noted. however, that while air sampling rvas discontinued at this location,
galnma measurements and soil sarnpling continue to be collected at BHV-3 (Denison Mines
usA,20ll).
'fhe determination by NRC in 1995 to use the BHV-3's air monitoring database as a
background value was not reviewed nor located by the Tribe. A detailed explanation, along with
supporting documents, such as the database that has allowed such claim needs to be made
publicly available.
Recommendations
a. For sampling air, vinyl adhesive paper squares are recommended by suspending them in
three positions, horizontal, vertical and inverse horizontal at one meter above the ground.b. Analyze soiland vegetation samples for Uranium-238, Thorium-230, Radium-226, Lead
-210, and Polonium-2 I 0.c. Regularly collect a sample for radiochemical analysis to find a// radioisotopes found in
air, so that radionuclides other than that of the Uranium series may be detected.
d. Report the semi-annual air monitoring results without subtracting "background gamma".
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e. Justify the reason for using the past database compiled from the BHV-3's air monitoring
as a background gamma values along with the database.
Water Oual ity Monitoring
The water quality monitoring program for the DUSA White Mesa Uranium Mill has
multiple systematic deficiencies. These deficiencies have resulted in groundwater pollution and
lack of corrective action by DUSA as a result of the manner in which data are collected,
assessed, and provided to regulators, including the Utah Division of Radiation Control (DRC).
These issues are described here in three sections, all of which have contributed to the current
situation of multiple groundwater contaminant plumes and the probability of increasing trends in
pollutants that have the potential to negatively impact public health and off-site environmental
conditions.
Sample Collection. Analysis Protocols. and Standard Operating Procedures
DUSA has consistent difficulty with sampling and analysis protocols. In almost every
aspect of the groundwater monitoring program, samples are collected in a manner that causes
non-representative samples to be taken; cross-contamination due to ignorance of standard
operating procedures (SOPs); and a general lack of continuity in water quality monitoring staff
and their abilities. Almost every sampling event has issues with quality control. This type of
problem is not unique to DUSA, but it is very unique that their corrective actions never seem to
correct their issues.
Misunderstanding of SOPs is often cited by DUSA as an explanation of why samples are
misrepresentative and cross-contaminated. SOPs are inherently meant to be simple to
understand. There are some fundamental aspects of water quality monitoring that have not
changed in many years-the concept of equipment decontamination; the concept of field blanks
and duplicate samples; the concept of equipment calibration; the concept of consistency between
sample events to produce representative and comparable data. DUSA and some of its staff have
been doing this type of work at many of the same wells for decades, yet they make the same
mistakes over and over. [See example, Internal DRC Memorandum from Phil Goble to Loren
Morten, January 19,2010 RE: review of 2009 Routine Groundwater Monitoring Reports GDP
UG370004, Section 8.0, p. 8-91.
One main issue with this situation is that DUSA is in the business of mining and milling,
not in the business of water quality monitoring. They do it, but they do it reluctantly and poorly.
DUSA has not committed to paying a qualified individual to do quality monitoring work.
Training is minimal, and employee retention is difficult. It may be more practical in the long
term for DUSA to simply hire actual water quality (or comprehensive environmental) monitoring
professionals to do the work and not task staff with other production-oriented duties.
Data Anal),sis and Interpretation
DUSA operates on the premise that pollution in the ground is not the result of their
operations, despite the fact that it operates a large industrial facility with dozens of different
chemicals that can be mishandled at any time. All data analysis and interpretation is assumes
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this premise, making objectivity nearly impossible. Their consultants operate under the same
premise, creating similar difficulties with objectivity.
For decades, chloride was identified as the primary, conservative indicator of tailing cell
impoundment leakage because of its mobility in groundwater and concentrations in tailings
solutions [Letter Report Assessment of Groundwater Quality White Mesa Project Blanding ,
Utah, D'Appolonia Consulting Engineers, Inc., September 9, l98l,pp.2; Groundwater Study
White Mesa Facility Blanding, Utah, UMETCO/PEEL Environmental Services February 1993,
pp.5-22; Hydrogeological Evaluation of the White Mesa Mill, Energy Fuels NuclearlTitan
Environmental Corporation, July 1994, pp.23; Points of Compliance White Mesa Uranium Mill,
Energy Fuels Nuclear/Titan Environmental Corporation, September 1994, p.6-7; Permit No.
UGW37004'4, Utah DRC, February 15,201l]. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated this
plainly during its regulatory oversight, it was clearly identified by DRC, and was often touted by
the DUSA's (IUC's) former environmental manager, Michelle Rehmann, as supporting the
effectiveness of their pollution prevention measures to ensure public health and protection of the
environment. No chloride, no leakage. Now there are significant increasing trends in chloride
concentrations in the water, but DUSA is deflecting responsibility away from their operation and
denying any leakage from the tailings impoundments. In the application for a groundwater
permit modification to make Cell 4A operational, DUSA states, "The addition of monitoring
wells MW-24}lW-27 MW-28 MW-29 MW-30 and MW-31 together with the existing
monitoring wells at the site provides comprehensive monitoring network to determine any
potential leakage from Cells 1,2 and 3." IWHITE MESA URANIUM MILL RENEWAL
APPLICATION STATE OF UTAH GROUND WATER DISCHARGE PERMIT No
UGW370004 September 2009, (DUSA)1. If the intention of monitoring groundwater for
increasing trends in pollutants is to determine any leakage from the cells, then why does DUSA
deny responsibility of increasing trends of pollutants in their monitoring wells?
In general, DUSA collects samples marginally and eliminates half of the sample for
quality control reasons. Then they postulate'New Theories" and plead with DRC to change
compliance standards and to exercise "enforcement discretion." The data assessment and
interpretation process is clearly flawed and must be corrected to prevent further degradation of
groundwater on White Mesa and to protect public health and environment.
Ouality Assurance and Decision-making Processes
The concept of a Quality Assuronce Plan is to ensure that data are collected in a manner
that answers the questions for which a monitoring program is designed and that those data are of
sufficient quality to make decisions based on them. The U.S. EPA describes this very clearly in
their guidance for the preparation and use of Quality Assurance Plans: "The QA Project Plan
integrates alltechnical and quality aspects of a project, including planning, implementation, and
assessment. The purpose of the QA Project Plan is to document planning results for
environmental data operations and to provide a project-specific "blueprint" for obtaining the type
and quality of environmental data needed for a specific decision or use. IEPA Requirements
for Quality Assurance Project Plans, EPA QA/R-S, p. 11. Thus a Quality Assuronce Plan is
supposed to be a system for sound decision-making. That is part of the reason why quality
assurance plans in general are stand-alone documents, separate from actual field manuals and
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standard operating procedures. Corrective actions are derived from the Quality Assurance Plan,
and changes are then made in the field manuals or standard operating procedures to fix them,
perhaps even in the personnel themselves. Two documents are managed by at least two separate
individuals to reach one goal: quality data to make sound decisions. The combination or
inclusion of quality assurance provisions within standard operating procedures is not
unreasonable, in fact it is good to have overlapping concepts, but it does not take the place of a
separate Quality Assurance Plan. There is just too much ambiguity if the two are combined.
Bias is hard to overcome in any decision-making process, but that is why, for example, a
Quality Assurance Plan is required of all federally-funded data quality programs. The ability to
assess a potential problem with all of the tools available objectively is very important.
Accountability is required for important decision-making, especially when public health and
environment are at risk from flawed decisions. A Quality Assurance Plan identifies who makes
decisions and the minimum amount of and quality of data to make those decisions. Currently,
the approved Quality Assurance Plan for groundwater quality monitoring does not accomplish
these objectives. Data is collected, but incorrect decisions are made.
Responsibility of DRC in the Monitoring Program at the White Mesa Mill
Ultimately, DUSA will not perform monitoring at their own expense in a quality manner
until DRC requires them to do so. This is a fundamental flaw in the regulatory mechanisms of
DRC overseeing this facility. DRC must take action to correct problems with all aspects of the
DUSA White Mesa Mill monitoring program because despite the kind assurances to the
Blanding and White Mesa Communities about how well they monitor their pollution, DUSA is
not collecting data in a manner that identifies the pollution identified by other studies. Just as
important, DUSA does not make sound decisions because of their flawed data and biases.
An example: In an effort to duplicate the renowned air monitoring program at the White
Mesa Mill at the recommendation of the U.S. EPA, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe's Environmental
Programs Director requested standard operating procedures and quality assurance plan for
radionuclide air quality monitoring from DUSA; no response was made by DUSA. When this
same request was made of DRC and DAQ, it was stated that the standard operating procedures
were retained at the facility and that there were quality assurance provisions in those standard
operating procedures. Two questions stand out in this situation: (1) How can DRC have any
assurance that corrective actions take place in the radionuclide air monitoring program if they
don't have a current copy ofthe standard operating procedures and quality assurance plan in
hand for comparison to inspector observations?; and (2) how can DRC determine that the
sampling results and statistical analyses provided in semi-annual effluent reports are protective
of public health if they do not have the documents that define the quality of the program that is
being regulated. Considering the well-documented failures of the groundwater quality
monitoring program, that is a false and dangerous assumption.
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References:
Arberg, R. 1989. Evaluation of Skin and Ingestion Exposure Pathways. Office of Radiation
Safety Programs. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC. P. I 1.
Denison Mines (USA) Corp. 201 l. White Mesa Uranium Mill. Radioactive Materials License
UT900479.2nd Semi-Annual Effluent Monitoring Report (July through December, 2010). Pp.7-
8.
Holzman, R. B. 1966. Natural Levels of lead-210, polonium-210 and radium-226 in humans and
biota of the arctic. Nature 210: 1094-1097.
Lenth, Russell V. 2001. Some Practical Guidelines for Effective Sample-Size Determination.
www.stat.u i owa.edu/techrep/Ir303. pclf
Saric, M. R, Stojanovic, M., Babic, M. 1995. Uranium in Plant Species Grown on Natural Barren
Soil. Journal of Plant Nutrition. l8(7): 1509-1518.
Soudek, P,, Podrack6,E.,Ydgner, M., Van, T, Petlik, P., Tykva, R. 2004. 226Ra uptake from
soils into different plant species. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry.262(l):
1 87-1 89.
Tamponnet, C., Martin-Garin, A., Gonze, M. A., Parekh, N., Vallejo, R., Sauras-Yera, T.,
Casadesus, J., Plassard, C., Staunton, S., Norden, M., Avila, R., Shaw, G.. 2008. An Overview of
BORIS: Bioavailability or Radionuclides in Soils. Journal of Environmental Radiation.99(5):
820-30.
Thomas, P. A. 1997 . The Ecological Distribution and Bioavailability of Uranium-series
Radionuclides in Teruestrial Food Chains: Key Lake Uranium Operations, Northern
Saskatchewan. P. 2l-42.
Thomas, P. A. 1994. Dosimetry of zro Po in Humans, Caribou, and Wolves in Northem Canada.
Health Phys ics. 66(6): 67 8-690.
United States Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Requirements for Quality Assurance
Project Plans, EPA QA/R-5,EPA1240/B-01/003, March 201 1.
http:i/ww'w.cpa. gov/re gi on8iqa/OAHPAT5 -fi nal.pdf
United States Environmental Protection Agency. Guidance on Implementing the Radionuclide
NESHAPs. A-10 (Appendix A). July 1991.
http ://epa. gov/radiati on/docs/neshaps/nesh inrplernent_O7-9 I .pdf
United States Environmental Protection Agency. Supplemental Guidance for Assessing
Susceptibility from Early-Life Exposure to Carcinogens. EPA/630/R-03/003F, March 2005.
http ://wn r.r,.epa. govlttn/atr,v/ch i I drens_supplerment*tl nal. pdf
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EXHIBIT
THROUGH: Bitl Sinctair, Director E6
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Michrcl O. LcrvitrGoYffi
Diu nnc R. Niclson. Ph,D.
Erccctivc Oirdr
Witliem J, Sir*lrlrDirff
DEPARTMET.IT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
IvIEMORANDUM
" r.Nqon cEMr N r- sE NIUIIV-E
ATTORNiIYJCLIENI PRI W LEG"E
Dianne Nielson, Executive Director
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Division of Radiation Control
Rob Hcrbcrt, Hydrogeologist
Division of Radiation Control
April 16, 1999
Request for Acccptability Detcrmination for CERCLA Off-Site Rulc
Intemational Uranium (USA) Corporation flUSA) White Mesa Mill
Ttris'moming, I received {:telephone call from Terry Brown, the CERCLA Regional Off.Site
Coordinator for Region I of the U.S. Environmental Protcction Agency (EPA). Mr, Brown callcd
me to acknowledge receipt of the DRC letter dated Arril 7, 1999 from Bill Sinclair in reference to
the subject request. A copy of this DRC lettcr is attached. During the telcphone call, Mr. Brown
inquired about the State of Utah's application rcquest to IUSA for a ground water discharge permit.
I explained to Mr. Brown that the State and IUSA have entered a voluntary informal permit
application proccss that IUSA insisred upqn being nonbinding. This informal proccss is a last-ditch
effort by the Staic to demonstrate to IUSA what permit requirements thcy will be subject to beforc
they formally submit to a legally binding permit, Mr. Brown inquired about any Notices of
Violation (NOV) that the State has issued to IUSA related to the White Mesa Mil[. According to
Mr. Brown, unless IUSA has received any NOVs from the State of Utah, the information providcd
to him from the NRC teaves him no choice but to issue a leuerto IUSA finding the Whitc Mesa Mill
acceptabte for the CERCLA Off-Site Rule. I have attached a copy of the Mr. Brown's letter to the
NRC requesting information about tlre White Mesa Mill.
Frorn rny discussion with Mr. Brown this moming, it appears that EPA will grant acceptability status
ro rhe Wl1ite Mesa Mill for the CERCLA Off-Site Rule unless the Stste of Utah issues an
NOV/Order to IUSA for a ground water dischargc pcrmit. This acceptability status may be
detrimental to the State's cturent position regar ing n'Sharn disposal" of alternate feed materials. It
is recommended that we discuss our options bcfore EPA issues its determination.
ct Denise Chancellor and Fred Nelson, Utatr Attomey General's Office
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lvlichncl O, LcavirtGortrtq
l)iirnur: R. Niclsoo, Ith.D.l{\r'.!rii'. Dir(tor
Williutn l. Sinclairl)ir(r0
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL qUALITY
DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
168 Nonh 1950 Wcst
P,O. Box 144850
Salt Lalsc City, Utsh 8.1 I l4-4E50
(801) J364250 Voicc
(801) 533'4097 Fa.r
(801 ) 536-41 14 r.D.D,
April 7, 1999
'["crry [3row
C ERCLA Regional Off-Site Coordinator
tl.S. Environmental Protection Agency - Region 8
999 lSth Srreet - Suite 500
l)cnver, Colorado 802A2-2466
SUBJECT: March 29,1999 Letter to Mr. N, King Stablein, Acting Chief
U,S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornnrission Uraniurn Recovery IJranch
Dear Mr. Brown:
'l'h'-. Utuh Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Radiation Control (DRC) has receivedl copy of thc subject leuer in reference to lnternational Uranium (USA) Corporation's (IUSA)
rcqucst for an Acceptability Determination forthe White Mesa Uranium Mill in accordance with the
CERCLAOff-SireRule(OSR). AsRobHerbertofmystaffindicatedtoyouviatelephone,rhcstatc
ol'l-ltah cunenl ly has an appeal before the Nuclear Regulalory Conrm ission regarding the legitimacy
ol'FUSIL{P materials from Tonawanda, New York as alternate feed materials for the White Mesa
llrlriiurn Mill. The Commission has-extendcd thc appeal tevicr",to April 29, 1999 for making a
rrtlin-u. ln relation lo the "sham disposal" issue cunently under appeal with the Commission, the
Statc o f Utalr lras serious concerns regarding ground water protection from potential seepage from
rhc tailings inrpoundments at the White Mesa Mill. These concems include rhe:
( I ) design, construction and performance of the tailings impoundment liner systems;
( 2 ) design, construction and efficiency ofthe tailings impoundmcnt liner leak detection systems;(.1) I'ailure to include secondary permeability from joints and fractures in transport models; and(.{) inadequate leak detection ground watcr moniloring program,
'l'o clarify these State concerns, I have enclosed the following items:
. Summary table of polential listed hazardous waste constituents identified in the last four
altematc feed materials requcsted by IUSA;. March 9; 1999 Mcmorandum to update Denise Chancellor ofUtah Attomey General's.Office
regarding altemate feed materials at the White Mesa Mill;. Februaryr I l, I 999 DRC letler to Dave Frydenlund of IUSA explaining the State's concerns
related to groundwater protection from potential seepage from the tailings impoundments;. January 21, 1999 DRC lecer to Michetle Rehmanh of IUSA questioning the validity of
assumptions made in analytical modeling of tailings inrpoundrnent liner system. February 12, 1999 Knight Piesold LLC letter to Michelle Rehmann of IUSA in response to
the DRC's January 21,lggg letter to Michelle Rehmann.
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Mr. Terry Brown
April 7, 1999
Page 2
Because of tlre concerrrs describcd abovc. rlre State of Utah has requesled that IUSA subnrit a permit
applicatio* to the Stare for a ground water discharge pernrit. At this time. IUSA and the State have
etrrercd il)to a voluqtary pennit application process. Hopefully the end result will be a groundwater
irennir rhat satisfies 6in the needs of IUSA and the State of Utal'r. The State of Utah will be
prcpared to pursue furthe.r enforcement rnechani^sr-ns_if the voluntary process should fail-
\\re believc that OSR acceptabi,liry should be carefully evatuated. in regards to the White Mesa Mill
irr lieu of the srate of utah's concems regarding adequate-groundrvater prolcction. lf you have anY
qucstions, please call me or Rob Herbert at (801) 5364250'
S ittcerel
Llf
, ,William J. Sinclair,Virector
Division of Radiation Control
l. xl [. r{ullrr tvt{wlllrli ralsA\lil'^.(
c: Fred Nelson and Denise chancellor, Attorney oeneral's office
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THROUGH: Bill Sinclair $5
RobHerbcrt tr*
Michrcl O. LcrvinCrrffi
Dirnnc R. Niclron. Ph.D.Erodrr'Dim
\l'illienr J. Sirrleir
Drrraor
TO:
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DryISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Denise Chancellor
FROM:
DATE:March 9, 1999
SUBJECT: Altemate Feed Malcrials
Tlre purposc of rhis mcmorandum is to update you oo rhc status'of alternate feed materials associatcd with
Internarionat Uranium Corporation's rrrfiitc Mcsa Mill. Eneloscd arc thc following:
( l) Fcbruary 3, 1999 NRC approval lencr and anached Tcchnicat Evaluation n?T to sllow IUC to
rcccivc and proccss FUSd,Ap matcrials from thc Ashland I and Scaway Arca D sitcs locetcd at thc
Tonawandl Ncw York site'
(2) March 2, t999 covcr tener to IUC's Amendmcnt Requesl to process altcmate fccd matcrial from tht
St. Louis FUSRAP Sitc at the Whitc Mcsa Uranium Mill'
(3) Graph of IUC altcrnatc fecd volumes vcrsus Nveragc U'23t wcight Pcrcent'
A cursory review of Anachment 4 of $c Sr L,ouis arncndmenl requcst (Rcvicw of Constituents in St.louis
Sitc Uranium Mglcriats to Dcterminc Potential Prcscncc of Lisred Hazardous Wastcs) indicarcs thc-prcscncc
of the samc hazardous wastc indicator constituents that were prcsent in the Ashland 2 urd Ashlurd l/Sceway
Arca D matcriats. Howcvcr, IUC is relying on thc tack-of-cvidencc stratc8y to discount thcsc constitucnts by
sraring that:
...,'{suftcicnt tnlormation ls nol wailoble to determine conclusively thot a contaminant or uaslc i.v
d"ri"ei/ro^ o icn tJtttrd sotrce, the waste is to be considered not a RCf'/. listed waste- Since the
origi,ts'o/contomination in thelitl od site background hove nol becn determined, thesc should not
beionsidercd RCP#. lhted sowces al thb time'"
Wc may nccd to involve Don Verbica to rcview IUC's evaluation and conduct an indcpe_ndcnt rcvicw of the
availab'le data. Don informcd us ycstcrday that he is not comfortablc with IUC's drafl protocol for listcd
harardous wastcs and thsrcforc hi is not willing to sgrec with it in its currcnt form.
As shown by thc cnctosd graph, thc volumc of IUC's altcmate fced rcquests has incrcased dramatically sincc
thc Concr Conccntrate. ff.,-is c"-c graph shows an invcrsc relationship bctween volume and uranium contcnt
*tcn comparingthc Cotar Conc"nltraic, a lcgitimatc altemalc facd matcrial, to the Tonawanda end St- l,ouis
FUSRAp ,rt.rtls. tn othcr words, the uranium conrcnr has decrcased significantly with a dramatic incrcase
in altemate feed volumcs.
(luorrad 1q6laarr) 8iU-n aEule'\V
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lrlich;rct O. LcavittOoYff
Dirnnc R. Nislson. Ph.D.treutirr Dirrc
Willisnr l. SinclairCh?(rd
e
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
l6E Nonh !950 Wcst
P.O, Borl{4tJ0
srlr Lrta ciry. ut:i t4l l4dtro
(t0ll Jl642J0 Voice
(t0l) Jl3a097'Fu
(801) 516441{ T.D.D.
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January2l,1999
lvlichellc R. Rehmann
Environmental Managcr
I nte rnational Uranium (tJSA) Corporation
lndependence Plaza, Suite 950
I 050 Sevcnteenth Strect
Denver, CO 80265
SUBJECT: Methodology Assumptions used for Calculation of Flux Tkough The Cell I Liner
White Mesa Uranium Mill
Dear Ms. Rehmann:
The Urah Deparrment of Environmental Quality, Division of Radiation Control (DRC) has
received the subject report prepared by Knight Piisold LLC and datcd Deccmber 31, t998. A
rer.ierv of rhis reporr by DRC staffindicates that a numbcr of assumpticins were made without
appropriate supponinj documentation, These assumptions have critical imptications associstcd
,tiit th. analytical modet inputs and conesponding output lincr leakage Predictions, I/ithout the
supporling documenrarion, these assurirptions arrd thc modcl predictions cannot be confirmed.
To cnable rhe DRC ro procccd with a review of thc modeling effort and veriff the predictions
rendcred, please prouidc thc following information .
. The geomembrane defect frequencies and sizcs used in the modeling cffort assumcd
inreniive qualiry assurance/quality conrol (QA/QC) monitoring during liner construction.
To validate this assumption, extensive documcntation of construclion QA/QC is needcd.
Please provide rhe DRC with thc consEuction QA/QC documentation to cnsurc &c
following:
- Quality control was provided by the geomcmbrane installer following a rigorous
construction guality control manual;
- Quality assurance was providcd continuously by an third party indcpendent firm;
- All geomcmbrane panel seams were tested aftcr installation to find and rcpair all
seam defccts;
- Dcscription and documenlation of steps werc taken in preparation of thc soil
subgradc betow the 3O-mil synthetic PVC liner. [n particular, please provide:
r)
2)
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Michelle R. Rehmann
Jauuury 21, 1999
Poee 2
Maximum and average panicle size allowed on lhe soil subgrade prior to
installation of the i0-mil synthetic liner. Please provide gradation t€sting
results lo support said claims.
Description of equipment and methods used to remove over'sizcd
materials (e.g. rock ctasts, ioil clods) from the soil subgrade prior to
placement of thc 30-mil synthetic lincr.
- m6nitOring Of mOiSture, ambient temperature, seaming temperature, seam
contamination by dust or dirt, and remcdial activities were conducted and
documentedl and
- all connections betwccn geomcmbranes and appurtenances werc testcd ro find and
repair dc fectivc connections.
As stated in the Summary of ModelAssumptions on Page I of the subject reporl, "1nf,e
soil layer underlying the geomembrane has a salurated hydroalic conductivlty ranging
/rom lxl0t (for sand) to lrlc/. cm/s (or reworked bedrock moterials)." Bccatsc the soil
layer beneath the geomembrane is thc controlling soil layer, thcre needs to be some
quanrirative jusrification for using thcse vatues, particularly for the rervorked bedrock
nrarerials of rhe Dakota Sandstone. Plcase provide the DRC rvith documentation for
quanritarivc resulrs of permeability and compaction tests to justify the hydraulic
conductivity values uscd in the analytical modeling effort.
As indicated abovc, the DRC qucstions thc validity of the hydraulic conductivity uscd for
the soil layers undertying the geomembranc. Consequently, the DRC questions whether
rhe appropriate Geomembranc lincr Design Case and conesponding equations of
Schroeder and others (1994) was applied in the modeling cffort. Pleasc justify the Design
Case that was used in the leakagc analytical modeling cffort-
Accelcrared travel times of tailings pond leakage via secondary permeability from joints
and fractures was not addrcssed in cither the Novcmber 23, I998 or the Decembcr 31,
1998 furight PiCsold reports, However, site-specific well tcst data from a previous
groundwater srudy of the Whitc Mesa mill indicated the presence ofjoints and fractures.
please justify why the potential cffccts ofjoint and fracturc flow were not incorporated in
the seepage analytical modeling effort.
ir,lichelle R. Retrnrann
January 21, 1999
Page 3
we appreciare rhe opportunity to review the lfuight Pidsold report and look fonvard ro working with
you in'the future. liVou hare any questions aboirr this letter, plcase call mc or Rob Herbert at (801)
536-4250.
c: ^^-.-1.,
Lop$sQ-
Wi I I iam I. Sincl{ig/Director
Division of Radiation Control
WJS:RFH:rh
cc: Don Ostlcr, P.8., Director, DEQ'DWQ
F Rlltr'!ttnu1^wxrrE ilei^ttrf30(.o.Lll
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Knisht Pidsold LLC
Loxsut Yina ExGtilEIRE rtlo txvliorlraExl^L SclErllltr$
FE3-iZ-il Ii:5? FrcnrlliTlil{ATl0llA'. URAlllr'ltl
Fchrur:ry' I3. 1999
l0rA Srurnrccnrh Streer, Suirc 5A0
Denve n C alorado 80265 -0500
khphone lJ1J) 629.E788
Telofat (JiJ) 619-8789
Youn FETEaE\tE 1:o;c
Oun nErEnENC! t.'Dl)Q!.rpl
\'licheUe Rchnunn
I ntc rniillo nal Urlnium (UsA) Corporatlon
105{) Sevcntuenth Street, Suitc 950
Dcnver, CO 80365
Re: Rcsponsc ro L.IDEQ Commens on lvlethodology Assumptions
Deur tvlir'helle:
Ar your rcqucsr. we hqvc rcrics'cd thc lctter trom rhc Utoh Dcportmcnt olEnvironmcntol QuuUty
(UDEQ) dated Junuary I l, 1999. This letter contuineC tour conrnrcnt.s regiudin-e the UDEQ's review
oi modcUng rvc rrccntly l'omplctcd lbr the \lhitc lUcsu Uranium itlill, Thc purposc o[our modelin-e
el'lbrr ws to estimate the water l'lur thar could reasonubly be expected to pass rtrough Cell 3. rr
PVC.l,rn:d inrpotrndment at your thcility. Previous cell nrudcling hy others uliliecd hygorhcricul
cu-ses involvln-g unrcalistic assunrptions of mrsstvc lincr tiilurc. Eightccn years of opcration havc
indicated that the.se hlpothctical useurnptioru ate unwafiantcd. Our objcctivc has bccn to review
avadublc date rird approximate uctuul sitc conditioirs. We huve used engincering judgemcnt ro
quuntiil' thc hydraulic conductivity ot'tle soils bencath the PVC liner. We inl'er thar UDEQ
.lcn..ruU.v agrces with the mod:[ing but is questionirr-s specilic nput values used in rhe model.
AtJilitir:nally. UDEQ seems l0 purpr)rt lhrt unslturuted tlorv in lhr un,Jerlying Dakota Silndsrone is
tiucrurc contro[cd. We have sunutarirtd the UDEQ communts and our responses us t'ollows:
Comment l: UDEQ queslions the conclusion thut thc lincr was instulled under hrensir.c qualiry
assurrnce/quality control (QA/QC) and. therefore, our assumprions regardhg Iiner
dctbct frcqucncics'arc invalid.
Rcsponsc I : Our revicvr and analysis of ccll construclion activitics as rcportcd h our lctrcr to
Androny Thompson. duted Novemter 23, 1998 concluded that the lincr was, h fact,
installed in accordarce witlr iniensire QAIQC procedures. This repon cites numerous
specificadons, conslruction repons, Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission (NRC)
inspections, and third party reviews used to afiive at lhb conclusion. Shoutd UDEQ
qucstlon our englneerhg rcvicw of the QA/QC <locumenudon, these documenB &re
parr of tha public rccord utd can be reviewed by UDEQ as required. Thcse rcports
conuin rhe factory serm tes$, quality control tesu, licld seam tcstsi bcdding gradation
tests, snd liner reprir reporu requesrcd by UDEQ.
i"r:::3'll 2;I-?23 P.0,1/0i Job-{6{
r#HEMEEB OF
AMEBICAN CONBULTING
ENGINEESS COUNCIL
Msbl$lseW
GROUP
Knislit Piisold
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F::-12-gg tir52 trocrlltTEilllllr]l{ll llRAtllUUoi
30i335. I t5 I.223 P,03/0t lob'l6l
Fchruirry l?. 1999lvlir:heUc Rchntunn
Internllittnul Llrlrniunr I US,\) Corptlrutiun
Comment 2:
Response 3:
A.r rr.c srared in our letrcr reporr titled rllrdro dolog'; for Culruluion ol FltrtThrough
rha Ccll -l Lintr, dated Decemhrr 31. 1998:
"sensirivity unillyses were conducted to determine the eltecr of detect
ussumprions. tncrciuing thc frcqucncy of pinholcs and instdlution
rjet'cuti by iu ordcr oI magnitude (i.a., I0 in1.$ resultcd in only u l{l7c
increase in the eitimilleg tbr riveruge llur through the linef. TheSe
nnal,r-scs indicatc thur pinhOle und delect tlux licqucncies are a minor
lllctor in the eStimaiion o[ totu] volum'rtric tlux through the li;1sr,"
Busc<J on our rer.icrv olconsrrucrion documentttion. rve judgc it improbable that there
c.ould be l0 tim.rs rhc instirUution dcltcts *'e asstlmed. Thus,:tlthough UDEQ
quesriorrs rhe Q.VQC &rsumprions. rhese parumctirs do not signilicuntly chunge our
conulusions.
UDEe qucsrions rhe assumed hydraulic conducti!'ity ot'the regrlded materiab benea$
(hc liner.
No r1oqumcrurit)n is available lbr the saturuted hydraulic conductivities of dke or
bgr(on milrertuls und.rlying rhe gconlembrunc. In our etlbns tu approxlmap actual
secpirgr *'c uscd engineering judgemerrr to estinile rhe hydrurrlic propenies of lhe
Uner tte,t,tln.l murcriuJ. We assumed thut thc suturulcd hydrautir: conductivity of thc
I J-in sand lu;'er behind rhe line r on thc south dike of CeU 3 was lx l0'r cny's because
rhis is a tlpical valuc lbr rhc cleal sand lhat was used lbr the underdrain malerial. The
valuc of lxl0'6 cm/s wts uscd for thc compacted soih behind the other three sides
(dikcs) of Ccll3, f}A samc value rlso was used for the compacled, reworked Dalota
formation beneath the bortom of Cell 3. However, as shown by our response lo
Commcnt 3. thesc assumprions arc no! critical to thc cstinrated flux vslucl cdcubtcd.
Comncnr 3: UDEQ commenr rhat a change in assumcd hydraulic conductivity would requirc
modellng thc sysrem undcr I diflcrcnt Dcslgu Case'
Responsc i; The modcl we apptied providcs for six Design Cases u dcfincd by Schroeder utd
orhers (1994). fres" Design Casos vrry dcpcnding on tho a:tangement of tho
composire tiner and the hydraulic conductivity of its constitucnls. Our modcl
conscrvatively ignored tha low conductivity tqqgt overlying thc geomcmbranc. Thc
appropriare 6"Jien Ca.se for ttrh arrangement is Dcsign Case 34. This casc is forued
o rr !&su l,aarlltDf gl.rra
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Fi3-12'99 l5:!3 From:lllTER.'iATl0t{LL Utll{lUl{o'3033$5{ll6 I-a!9 P.06/!I Job-{61
Februury 12. 1999tvtichellc Rchmlnn
1 11.' J11;1tlr) firrl U rurlium ( U SA] Cttrptlriit ion
Comment 4.
Responsc 4:
hy u Ngh cont!uctiviry nrutcriu.l (pure rvater) ovcrlyin-t.thc gcomembrune rvith a lorv
cjnOucrivir5,luyer lrervorked Dekora bedrock) undcrlying thc geomcmbrant. In this
cuse, rhe liner bedding muterial ac$ as the controlling soil.
Thc UDEe i.l c.orrccr rhat chunging rhc usumcd hydroulic conductivity lbr the lhcr
bedding mirerial wouttl chunge the appticable Design.Case.. However, as ths UDEQ
poinrs
-out. thc appropriure dlsign carrc is dctcrnirhcd by thc controlling soil. lf the
LOfq t'uuls rhui ine
'hyOruuUc conductivity of the nighlY compacted liner bedding is
gr.orei than l0'6 cm/s, thc low conductivity tailing ovcrlying thc lincr would become
rhe controlting soil.
Our enginecring cxperience lnd rhe observed perlbrrnirnce o[ the existing tailing
undcrdpin indiclre rhar rhis ruiting is lincly grortnrl wirh .resulting hydraulic
conducrivities mosr likely wcU bclow llli cny's. This casc is most appropriately
nror1clod by Design Clsc Ja, De.si-en Case Ja Ls a ntirror irnrrge of our modcled casc
rvirh a lorv conductiyity tuyer (railing) uverlling thc geumembranc and a Ngh
conducriviry layer tre*'orl.'c-d Dulcotu bedrock) undertying the geomembrane. Thc tlux
equrrions lor borh Design Cuscs 3u unrl 4u urc identical as ore thc hcads on thc
.ecomenrbrane used in the llur model. Tharelbre, the Design Case uscd for thc Uux
model is conecr no msncr rvhich assumptions uc used lbr the saturated hydraulic
co nd uc tivit y o f the railin g/bedrocUgeo mc mbra ne le y'ers.
Dcrlvirrion oI rhc t'lux moCel rcquires thut one olthc soils (i.c., uPPcr or lowcr) bc the
cr\nrrolling soil. ln rhis r;irsc. rhc tlux is controUed by eirhcr the tailing tbove or the
be6drng niureriul benearh. Reg:udles ot'rhe rssumption, the modelindicatcs thc same
r1ux rrrc rnd travet tin:c lbr both Design Cesas. As such, protracted discussioru wilh
respect ro proper hydraulic conductiviry esdmate do not chungc thc conclusions of our
study,
UDEQ asks lbr jusriticarion u ro why fracture llorv was nor incorPoratcd into the
rrsuel time modeling.
Fracture flow w.ls nor incorporated lnto thc llow modaling because our review of
boring logs, pumpint tcsrs, and prcvlous hydrogcologic rcports tavc no lndlertlon that
any signifrcant fractures exisl, We are aware thur qu:slions regarding tqrqk
tialruis have bcen raised in rhe past. Our review of available dau conctrs with tha
conclurion rcached h Tirrn Environmental's 1994 repcrt ritlcd Hydro gdoglc
Evaluation of Whitc Mem Uranium Mill:
ct t r.oilla:LtrrtpCAr.iyd
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tEE-ll'3! 15r53 froo;lllTERttAIlOllAL UtAlllUlt
Krrielit Piisatd I
i-9#
3033i3d l16o i-?13 ?.01/01 Job-.6r
Fcbruary l?, l9Y9irlichellc'Rehmunn
Internlt'ionul Uruniunt (USA) Ct:rporation
"[t could be posrulirtcrJ thut lt hypgthg(icul tiacturc bcneath thc wet
ruilings cell woutd reduce the tirne of inl'rltratiun Ihrgugh the vadose
zone. However, no signitiCant liUcture/,h:inls h1ve been documented in
the subsuduce in the upProximately 45 rvetls and borings at the site. In
adrtition, Disposal Ccit'No, 3 has bcen in opcration lbr ovcr l4 ycars
with nO evidince of conSriruenrs mi.erating tlrouSh the vtdose zone."
(Titun. Plge 40)
Our inrcnr has bccn ro rnodel actual r,'onditions and not elcvatc thc hypothcdicaj to
reality. Frlcture tJow was nor considercd in our model becluse we found no basis to
bclicvc rhut it cxisrs. The UDEQ comment rel'ers to '.sitc-spccilic wcll test dutr"' If
UDEe is awarc ot'rvcU resring thut indicatcs fructure llow. it would he benel'tcial tbr
them to cite their reference.
Ir is imporranr ro realize rhar minor adjusrnrcnrs ro modelassumplions do not sig.nificantlychange
rhecsrlmarcd t.](){)ycarsrcquircdbclirrcanyl)uxttuoughthclincrcouldreachthcperchedwatcr
zonc, Changing modll resulri by cven a fcw hundrcd. pirrs.does not negute the.conclusion thal CtU
3 or,er[es sivciat layers ol cxrrimcly low r.'onductiviry bedrock that scvcrcly tirnil thc potcmial tbr
ruilings solurion to rcach thc perched walcr zonc or impact the deep regional uquifer.
we ue pleared ro assisr you tn rcsponding ro UDEQ quesrtons regarding our modellng ctl'ors. *s
aliuny5. t'ccl riee r0 cidl ilyou should necd titrthcr issistance.
tfoeK,JL
U.n"rR. Kunkgl, P.E', PhD.
Senior Engineer
Sincerely,
lllin,
o.1 r rdtg\ r .l'a.{rrtUDSOr'trd
Exhibit R
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UTE MOUNTAIN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit R to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML RenewalRe: Particular Concerns with Alternative Feed Material
1. DUSA is Not Properly Monitoring Disbursement of Components of the Alternative Feed
Material
DUSA's semi-annual effluent monitoring program fails to detect, diagnose, and disclose
information pertaining to alternative feed material components and their effects to the health and
welfare of the public and environment. DUSA's semi-annual effluent monitoring program is
limited to measuring gross gamma radiation, natural uranium (U-238) and its progeny Th-230,
Ra-226, Pb-210 andRn-222 (l(hite Mesa Uranium Mill Semi-Annual Effluent Monitoring Report
2010). Radionuclides other than natural uranium and its decay products may be of more concern
in particulate matter form from the delivery, storage and processing of alternative feed materials.
A link to the deficiency is apparent in DUSA's current practice with alternative feed material on
the ore storage pads. When alternative feed material has a percent uranium concentration greater
than Arizona I ores (0.637% U:Os), the policy is to cover the feed with "less" radioactive
materials. SER at p. 10. This policy does not make sense when there are two separate circuits
for alternative feed material and conventional ore and where there exists the possibility for cross
contamination in storage (unless a policy exists for strict regulation to segregate the storage of
alternative feed and conventional ore in this regard). Also, if lower activity (than Arizona I Ore)
grade alternative feed material is delivered and left uncovered, the material is more than likely to
be less coarse than conventional ore, enabling a higher rate of wind dispersion. ,See Section 2,
infra. With the possibility of cross contamination during ore storage, DUSA is hampering the
ability to discern the components of alternative feed material and conventional ore. DRC should
require DUSA to customize the semi-annual effluent monitoring to include radionuclides
characteristic of alternative feed materials and DRC should prohibit DUSA from mixing
alternative feed material and conventional ore on the ore storage pad.
2. Alternative Feed Material is More Susceptible to Wind Dispersion than Other Licensed
I M"t*@
NRC Regulatory Guide 3.59 states that: "compositions and physical and chemical
characteristics, particle size distributions, site characteristics, and operational procedures are
among the factors that affect the degree to which dust is dispersed into the atmosphere" (NRC
Guide 3.59, Methods for Estimating Radioactive and Toxic Airborne Source Terms for (Jranium
Milling Operations, p.21 1987). Because alternative feed material has different compositions
and physical and chemical characteristics from conventional ore, modeling efforts to track air
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dispersion of alternative feed material and efforts to control radioactive fugitive dust should be
tailored to the altemative feed materials.
Although the Tribe does not have complete access to the composition of alternative feed
material allowed into the WMM facility, DUSA's Environmental Report In Support of the
License Renewal Application Table 3.13-24, p. 130, provides a list of alternative feed materials
licensed to date for processing at the Mill. This list includes soils contaminated with uranium
and other radionuclides and with Monazite sands and soils, which indicates that the alternative
feed material contains a more diverse mixture of fine grade radionuclide-laden dust. The
Fugitive Dust Control Plan for Moab Mill Tailings, which controls materials comparable to some
of the alternative feed materials stored at the WMM facility, states that, "the physical form of
the radioactive contaminants (i.e., uranium mill tailings) at the Moab Site is primarily best
described as a fine-grained, sand-like material, which is highly susceptible to wind erosion"
(emphasis added). Moab Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan, p. 7 (Attached as Exhibit I to the
Tribe's RAA, which is attached as Exhibit B to these comments). This indicates that alternative
feed material at the WMM facility is more susceptible to wind dispersion than other materials
stored at the WMM facility.
Because radioactive dust is the main concern at the Mill site (section 4.4, Appendix E of
the RML Renewal),' DRC should require DUSA to implement stricter procedures for dust
minimization practices for alternative feed materials based upon alternative feed materials'
susceptibility to wind dispersion.
3. DUSA is Not Properly Modeline the Dose Assessment of Alternative Feed Material
The MILDOS-AREA code is used to estimate potential radiation doses to members of the
public from the processing of Colorado Plateau and Arizona 1 Ores at their respective activity
levels and process rates (Dose Assessment in Support of the License Renewal Application and ER
for Wite Mesa Uranium Mill, section 3.3). The MILDOS-AREA model utilized by DUSA does
not include activity levels, process rates of alternative feed materials, orprocess emission factors
and bulk density of the ore. Although altemative feed material has its own Derived Air
Concentration (DAC) value, it is not utilized for area sources on the Mill site (including the ore
delivery and storage pads), and it is not utilized in the MILDOS-AREA model.
The DAC for various radionuclides at the Mill sets the maximum level of radioactivity in
air particulate that full time employees breathe for an entire year as not to exceed the Mill's
ALARA regulatory limit of l,250mrem lyear. This DAC is a primary component of the
MILDOS-AREA model. The DAC set for conventional ore, the primary source of offsite
migration of radioactive dust, is much more restrictive than the yellowcake area because of the
diverse radionuclide mixture (although the yellowcake area is much more radioactive).
Alternative feed material at the WMM facility likely has a diverse radionuclide mixture, but no
additional monitoring for alternative feed is performed because the Mill's ALARA standards of
l250mremlyear are met. SER at p. 10. The MILDOS-AREA code holds assumptions for the ore
' This is consistent with Appendix A in the Environmental Protection Agency's Guidance for Implementing
Radionuclide NESHAPS, Section 1.1, p. A-l l99l(stating thatU-234 and U-238 are of most concern in particulate
matter form).
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storage pad, including very coarse material and 50Yo control of fugitive emissions for the
delivery and storage of conventional Colorado Plateau and Arizona I ore. These assumptions
are inappropriate estimates of the fine ore dispersion qualities of alternative feed material. ^9ee
Section 2, supra. The MILDOS-AREA model also includes estimates of bulk density of ore for
both Colorado Plateau and Arizona I Strip Ore, but does not include that measure for alternative
feed materials. See Dose Assessment in Support of the License Renewal Application and ERfor
DUSA, Section A.2,5, p.A. DRC should require DUSA to correct the deficiencies in the
assumptions and estimates made in the MILDOS-AREA code to properly model radiation doses
from altemative feed materials to the public.
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4. Specific Requests
DRC must require DUSA to initiate stricter control,
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of radionuclide laden dust, with special regard to alternative
mitigation, monitoring and modeling
feed materials as requested below.
DRC must require DUSA to install a windbreak to prevent offsite migration of
radionuclide-laden dust for alternative feed around the storage pads.
DRC must require DUSA to monitor for the longer-lived radioisotopes present in
all assayed alternative feed material.
DRC must require DUSA to have fugitive dust standards, action levels, and
response actions in place for real time meteorological monitoring times of high
winds for alternative feed material and other stored ores. See Moab Site Fugitive
Dust Control Plan p. 17.
DRC must require DUSA to increase the meteorological stations datalogger
collection frequency for wind speed and direction to be every l0 minutes, to be
included in emissions and MILDOS-AREA modeling for more precise estimates
in dose assessment levels to the public.
DRC must require DUSA to include and disclose specific activity levels in pCi/g
for all deliverable alternative feed material to be included in MILDOS-AREA
modeling for dose assessment levels to the public.
DRC must require DUSA to include bulk density estimates for all alternative
feed material in MILDOS-AREA modeling when estimating radioactive
particulate emission rates and dose assessment levels to the public.
DRC must require DUSA to have strict work practice standards in place for the
storage of varying grade alternative feed materials, and work practice standards in
place for mitigating wind dispersion of differing grade ores and materials based
on acquired bulk density estimates.
DRC must require DUSA to utilize the strictest alternative feed Derived Air
Concentration (DAC) value for the alternative feed material for delivery of and
storage of in MILDOS-AREA modeling for dose assessment levels to the public
and workers safety.
DRC must require DUSA to utilize empirical data from the existing High Volume
PM10 monitors to assess Total Effective Dose Limits (TEDEs) to the public.
DRC must require DUSA to include Radon and its 'daughters' to be included in
the annual release rate calculation for the ore storage pads, for both alternative
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feed material and conventional ore, as opposed to just U-Nat and its decay
products and Radon, for compliance with l0 CFR 20.1301.
References:
Denison Mines (USA) Corp. Dose Assessment in Support of the License Renewal Applicotion
ond Environmental Reportfor the White Mesa Uranium Mill. EnvironmentalReport.
Richmond Hill, Ontario: SENES Consultants Limited,2007.
Denison Mines (USA) Corp. White Mesa Uranium Mill Environmental Monitoring Report
in Support of License Renewal Application. Denver, Colorado, 2007.
Department of Energy. "Moab Project Site Fugitive Dust Control Plan." 2002.
United States Environmental Protection Agency Office of Radiation Programs. Guidance on
Implementing the Radionuclide NESHAPS. Washington, D.C., 1991.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Regulatory Guide 3.59, Methods for
Regulating Radioactive and Toxic Airborne Source Terms for Uranium Milling Operations."
1987.
E,XHIBIT S
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Wllli:rlrl J. $rPrlairtlidio{
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Dcnallment of Environmental Qualtty
itiiiriun of Radiatinn Control
168 lurxtli l'lX{} l$c,i
I'0" Bur l*1US0
Sui, rrf* CirY' Urah 84114''1t(50
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March ?8, 2003
I{r'" HarCIld Ratrerts
Vicr; President * Corp*rate l)*vclclp$!en{
lnternttional Urani um Corporation
Indetrxrrdence Plaza. Suite 950
lo-50 l?th Struct
Dcnver" C(} 8S?65
&*: I,lovernbcr ?6,hOOZILC Sampling Results fmn: the Pas*ive DiffusiCIn Bag San:plers,
Augusl 14, 30fl2 Gr*uRdu,arei Sptit Samplirig Event at lhe IUC White Mesa Uranium
Mill: DRC llesullt, Findixgs, and X*quest for Action.
I)*arMr. Robert*.
We have revi*wed ths IUC subn:ittal rsferenced rbovc. Initially, the Fas;ive Dilfusion Bag
(IlnB) sampl*rs rvere deployed in l2 differ*nt grc*ndwatcr r*onitoring wells at the IIJC White
Mcsa ur*nium n*ll facility &s pnfl of an on-going chlor*forrn ($ntarninatitn investigation. The
purpose of the PDB san:plcrs wil$ to detennine if any organic contaminanr free pmdu*t $r dense
non-aqueous phase liquid (DNAtll-) wus presen[ in lhe subsurface in any of rhnse wells. Thirww imporlant because the presence *f DNAPL* w*uld grearly complicate groundwa{*r
remediation e$tivitiss 6t the site.
On July 9, 2{rO2,IllC and DRC sraff drp}oyed the PDB samplers &r or near th* trase of rhe well
${re&n in eaeh of the l2 IUC well* testcd at ths faciliry, including wells TW4-i rhru TW4*} I,and MW-4. Ab*ut 36 days later, the PDB sa*rplers wsre rcrrjeved on August 14. 2S02, and splitsumplcd by both DRC and IUC staff. Ati the wells terted were split sur*pied with onc axccprion,well TW4-6, where insufficieni volunm was available for rhe DRC sampie. Omissign of thisv"ell w*s acceptable in that past chloroforRr concentrfiti{}ns there showed the well to be b*y*ncl
the southem-rnost b*unrfary of the chlorofonn plume, as evidenced by unclerectable chlcrofi:nn
concentralions collected prcviou*ly.
Ths IUCI split sample$ were appucnlly anallzed by Snergy l,atrorarories Inc. (ELI) of Csspsr,Wyor*ing. Tl're Dfi.C sanrples rvere analyzrd by rhe Utah Srare I-IeaJth lxborarory (SHI-) in Satr
I-ake City. ll'hc SHL results from this s*mpling are attached below for y**r r*ference.
Fr*rn review of brxh the IUC and DRC PI)B resulrs, we h&ve mrde the severalconclusions. andrcqucst your coslxration in several arcas, as follcws:
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Mr. Harold Roben.s
Msrch ?8, 2003 Page 2
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3.
4.
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p3 * prcviously ruC proposed an<J weagrced that volatile organic.u*pn,rn,t* (vocfrouni iJrrre-rnn saraplers ar concenrra*onsat err abnve lvq a{ a c*ntamin*nis soluhility limit waukr h,e rtcen:ed as an jndicator ofPNAPL in rhe graundwaler $y$rsm {see sriyazluc pDB samprer weirk pran, p. 3).Review of the IUC and DRC rcsults inclicates thar all the voe contaminants eletsctcd in thsPDB sarnplers were rvcll belorv this I % solubility criteria (sec nttached pRC sprcad*h*etPDBags.xls, tabsheet Comp*re2). As a resufuu we have coneluded that rhe VOCcOnrarninarion found in rhe i 2 IUC weils rcsted in Auguxt, ?fi)2 are rh" ;;p;;on of ndissolved c$ntaminanl plume at these Islcarions. rr,ris?r*d,n; greatly simplifies design andope ratien of a groundwilter rernsdiation sy$trem at the*c rsicaiions"
Neqd rq lmp.r$yp v.oe Analsiqql.Mgth.ads _ eomparisnn of rhc IUC and DRC vocaralytical rcsults shows that IILI fnilecl to implement minimum derecrion limits {MDl,s) in itsanalysis that were belnw the respective Srate Croundwater Quality Standard (SweS). SuchMnL failure ellected rhe IUC rcsults for six (6) differenr V()C pnrameters. inelueling:
dichlorcrmeth*ne, bromr:dichl*r*methane, carbon tetrachloriele, benzens, chlorcrneth&ne" andvinyl chloride (see attached D&C spr*adsheet FDBags.xls, rabshccr Cornpare}), As r resulr
of this prohlem, the IUC PDB rcsults wer6 unable to deternrine if rhe $ram OWQ$ had txcn
exceeded fr:r the six (6) f)flffime{ers listed above in many wells at t}'l* facilily. l$e rcqucst
that this *rror br correeli;tl t"clr all future deteetion and complianee rnonit*ring for VOC
paramerers ar the IUC facility.
ThrqgXeY YqC Plump Cojltpminqnt$-tp Mqnitqr * revi$w of the DRC August, ?002 PDB
resutrts indicates that small quantitics of lhree (3) new VOC contaminants may exist in the
chlorgform plume, including: h*n?ene, naphthalenc, and vinyl shl*ride (see aHached DRC
sprea6shcet PDBags.xls, tabshe*t fornpare?). This finding is important in that:
A. ?h*sn 16rce t3) VOCs have Ror txen tletectecl befcrre at the faeilily using traditinnel
gruundwater samPli*g methods, end
B. The vinyl chloride cnneentration det*c[ed in rvcll MW*4, 3 ugll, exceeded the 2 ufl State
ffwQS.
In lrghr nf ftese finrlings, we request that future VOC analysis of groundwnter at the IUC
facility r:onrinue ta include these three (3) VOC pararneter$"
ta*k nf &pmodighlqrqmethanlin-fD.p Spmples - lhr trUC PDB sarnples detected
,r**u"ti.-* of u tfi'uto**thu* Ef'**tt eornp*und, br*m*dichlor$nrethane' in six (6)
tJitlercnr wells at rhc facility ffW4*1, TW4-?, TW44, ru4*7,TW4'9' axd TW{-}1).
However, the DRC split sarnpl*s showed no detectable quantitics of this contamin*nt werc
iound in any of the fnf samptes. Cnnsequently, Ie have concluded thst the August, 2002
llic pDIS results for this cgrn;muncl are spurious. We have alsr sonsidered y*ur explanation
fur how bromotlichloromelhan€ camc to bre fnund in the ruC fllB samples, i.e-, that bromide
p..***,*O the ?DB mernbrane ;rnd complexed with chlorr:meth&ne compounds' By way of
inforrnation, we pass along the opinian of the i*venlor of PDB samplers ct the USCS' who
concluded that it charged iot*r*u, like hrornine, cannoi lKrmeste the polyethylene membrane
cf rhc ?$B sarnpl*r {see atta*hed *mail fr*rn Mr. I}sn Vroblcsky).
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Mr.l{aro}d Rotxrts
h{arch 2S, ?m3
Page 3
5. Imp"ljt{uign*:ttlFrgrrrrdicitlggr:mqtharre r::n Chlorqfo&l Ad Hoc.fiYSfi * e$ yrru will rec*Il,
the DRC set un ad hac GWQS for chloroform on the basis of an EPA Drinking Warer MCL
for Total TI{Ms (80 ug/l). B*causs chlor*forrn is a prrt *f this class of compounels, the
appt:arancc of any other 1l'1{&{ compound in groundwater a[ the facility wcultl require thut the
IJltC decrea$e the ad hoc CWQS for rhlorrfonn, in order to ensure that the T*tal TH&{
cnncen{ruti*n in groundwater not exce*d the 8{i ug/l HPA criteria. Consequently, we reque$t
thal IUC continue l& monilnr for ali THM cnmpounds in all VOC sample* coll*cted in the
future at the facility. Said compounrls include: brornulichlclrom€thans, bromoforn,
chk:roform, rnel dibromochloranrcthane.
ln sumn:ary, from the August, :m2 PDB sampling evenl the ORC has coneluded that the VOC
c{lnlamirrant plurne, inclueling ehlerof*Rx, eibserved in wells TW4-l thru TW4-l I at the IUC
facility ccnsists of dissolved comp*unels ancl nct a DNASL. Sde aiso request that VOC
*nal3tical detee ti*n limits be tleereased and future groundwcter sampling sCIntifius to include
several VOC paramsters, as outlined ab*ve. Also please bc advised that the DRC may rsque$t
tirat telditional PDB sampling be conductcd on other iUC wells recently installed at the facility,
e.9,, wells TW4-l? thru'I1M4-19.
We apprcciere your #$&tinued cooprrfiliorr in the eharacterization and clcanup of th* VOC plurne
er ].our lYhite Mesa facility" If you have any qus$,lions or coneerns aboul the ah:ve lindi*gs tx
n:{:lu*$ts, p}**,se co&t&ct Mr. l-oren Monon of my staff .al 801-536-4?62.
Sinccrely,
L*tulE2-
Wiltiam J. SinclaHDirector
WJSILBM:lnt
Attachments (4)
ec: Don 0stler, DWQ
Dennis Frederick, OV/Q (wlattachments)
Bill von Till, U,S. NRC (w/altachrnents)
F:r', .. lPtlBappr*val'&
Filc: IUC Whilo Mee*. PDB Srmpling l'rqiect
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{ost Code 1!?
Send Reporl ?a:
UT.,trV . I.'KL
Altlt:
1fi8 S 1350 1'{ S},DG
SALT I.A}(E CI"Y IIT
E8&_MsIEgp 5?3 . : I res_o!_gg/"ry9
l'urgeabJ.es
La.b S: 200106,&L2
Otah Divlalon of Lab*rratory Servic**{6 l{ort,h MedJca} Srivesalr Lake ctty, 0T 84113
tr{ater
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Bace/fim€ c*ll"ecred: 98/13l-Q.2. gg:_?2collected B-v; rs!!8$_B i,toRTp-ll
sanple M*trix:
sar{r5:l"j.ng $ieta rD*scri.ption cf $ampling P*int r IIIC-FSB Yl{{-?
Analysr | )8D ;)ate Recel,ved' q811913-Q-84 Date Analyz*d:'#
==== = *=;; = - .: -:5:= g= E3===*:3: - : i =====E==BEB=====n3a;E= ======!&AAAE*ggiABA AC-3==
Bense&eCarbon Tetrachlerride
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Exhibit T
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UTE MOLTNTAIN UTE TRIBE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT
Exhibit T to December 16,2011 Comments on DUSA RML Renewal
Re: Reclamation Plan Deficiency List
1. The Reclamation Plan Provisions for Reclaiming Cell I Are Insufficient.
a. The proposed clay liner under the"area of contaminated materials disposal" is
insufficient to protect from groundwater contamination as proposed in Section 3.3
of Attachment A, Plans and Technical Specifications for Reclamation for White
Mesa Mill Facility, Blanding Utah (Attachment A). The minimum liner system
for municipal solid waste has at least one synthetic flexible membrane liner of 60
mm thickness over 24 inches of clay. See RRD Letter $ L3. DUSA is treating
radioactive pieces of the deconstructed mill as if they were normal
uncontaminated construction and demolition debris. The design is really not even
a "cell," but more of a pile along the south edge of the old Cell l.
b. It is not sound planning to build a storm water sediment retention basin against
the disposal cell as proposed in Section 1.3.e of Attachment A. It is industry
standard to keep water from accumulating on disposed of radioactive materials.
The proposed sediment basin has an area of approximately 40 acres with a flat
bottom against the debris disposal (cell) area. The storage of accumulated storm
water is likely to seep through the contacted cap materials and into the proposed
disposal cell area. [White Mesa Mill Tailings Reclamation, Sediment Basin
Design, sheet REC-3, MWH, 09l20lll
2. The Storm Water Discharge Channel West of Cell I Violates the Storm Water
Management Plan and Risks Contaminating Westwater Creek with Radioactive Material
from the Mill Yard.
a. The Reclamation Plan indicates that storm water from within the mill area will
drain out the drainage ditch from the sediment basin west towards Westwater
Creek once the Cell I contents, liner and contaminated soil from beneath the liner
have been removed. The Plan also indicates that such drainage will occur prior to
reclamation of the mill, which means that the water washed towards Westwater
Creek could be contaminated with Radioactive Material and other hazardous
waste from the Mill Yard that would continue to drain into the Cell I footprint
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area. This portion of the Reclamation Plan is not compliant with the storm water
management plan, which is a component of the license that DUSA must comply
with during reclamation. Accordingly, DUSA cannot comply with the Iicense and
also discharge storm water in this manner.
Drainage patterns from Storm Water Management Best Practices Plan, Figure 2:
NOTE DRAINAGE FROM MILL AREA INTO CELL I.
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Proposed discharge channel to Westwater creek watershed in White Mesa Mill Tailings
Reclamation, Sediment Basin Design, sheet REC-3, MWH, 0912011:
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3. The Reclamation Plan Needs Clarification on Placement of Contaminated Soils
a. Section I .3.g of Attachment A states that contaminated soil will be placed in the
last active tailings cell or Cell 1. Cell I will no longer exist, so the Plan should
clearly state that all contaminated soils should go into the last operational tailings
c.
disposal cell.
Section 7.3.6 of Attachment A states that "contaminated soil or sand will be
placed outside of the items..." Iin the disposal cell, with "items" being mill parts].
This directly contradicts Sections 7.2.3 and7.3.3 that state that the contaminated
soil will be placed into "tailings cells." Once the Plan is amended to remove the
"area of contaminated materials disposal, it should also be amended to require
that all contaminated soil be placed in the last operational tailings disposal cell.
The Reclamation Plan 5.0 and its supporting documents alternately use different
terms to describe where radioactive materials are to be disposed of. One concise
and consistent term should be used that is reflective of the DUSA and DRC
understanding of phased disposal defined in 40 CFR Part 6l Subpart W and the
definition of when a cell is "operational." Section 1.3.c of Attachment A
describes "the last active tailings cell." Section7.2.2 of Attachment A describes
the "tailings disposal area." Section 7.2.3 of Attachment A states, "The
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contaminated soils... [and] ... Soils excavated from Cell I shallbe placed in the
tailings disposal cells." It should be clear exactly where the contaminated soils,
raffinate crystals from Cell I and other radioactive materials are to be disposed of
permanently. Reclamation Plan 5.0 offers too much flexibility in the locations of
radioactive material disposal.
4. The Scoping Survey Is Insufficient.
a. The scoping survey in the S pattern shown on Figure A-l and described in Section
6.6 of Attachment A states that DUSA will only scan l07o of the ground within
the restricted area and (inherently) less on the 50m x 50m grids outside of the
restricted area. That leaves 90% of the facility unscanned at best. That is
insufficient to protect public health and environment for the future in perpetuity.
The scoping survey describes work in areas o'expected to have contamination."
This may be too reliant on subjective decision-making to be protective of public
health and environment. The scoping survey should be conducted across the
entire facility and adjacent property such as the highway right of way. The
proposed halo pattern in Section 6.6 makes unreasonable assumptions about the
potential extent of contaminated soil because it fails to take into consideration the
potential for migration of contaminated soils from original deposition areas via
wind and water. 50m x 50m grids are described but they are not referenced
geographically or as a distance from the restricted area or the property boundaries.
It does not specify how many of these grids outside of the restricted area will be
scanned.
Section 6.6 of Attachment A also relies on antiquated data to determine the
radium "background" as 0.93 pCilg from 16 years of monitoring conducted
during the 1980's and 1990's when there was limited or no quality control that
can be verified. DUSA, IUC, Umetco and Energy Fuels monitoring personnel
have all demonstrated an inability to follow standard operating procedures or a
thorough quality assurance program. The data that has been used over the past
two decades as "background" may be flawed. It is unreasonable that the final soil
scan and sampling program would rely on such limited quality as its fundamental
baseline.
5. The Soil Sampling Plan is Insufficient
a. The results of 30m x 30m grid sampling for the soil samples that might be
initiated by the l0% effective scoping survey are proposed to then be averaged
over "any" 100m2 area to determine compliance with the threshold for differing
depths at those locations as described in Section 7.2.3 of Attachment A. This is
difficult to fathom because it seems the potential number of calculations to
comply with this averaging over areas (not defined here) would be infinite.
6.
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Without a reference point to start and a system to follow, it will be difficult to
measure compliance. A clear system of defining geographic reference laterally
and vertically is critical to conduct this survey with scientific integrity. In order
to protect public health and environment from exposure to radioactive particulate
matter and related indirect pathways of exposure, the soil sampling program
should be redesigned.
The Animal Intrusion Analvsis is Weak
a. Section D.5.2 of Appendix D to the Reclamation Plan concludes that prairie dogs
would be the most likely rodent to burrow into the earth in the area around the
mill at a depth of concern to the integrity of the cap. However, D.5.2 states: "The
potential for prairie dogs colonizingthe tailing cells is very low because plant
cover and stature will not match their habitat requirements." Because the
caplcover is designed to last for centuries (over which time native vegetation will
likely repopulate the area), the reclaimed cell caps will likely become good
habitat once again. The animal intrusion layer should be added to the final cap
design.