HomeMy WebLinkAboutDRC-2010-003212 - 0901a0688018aff5DRC- 20 10-00321.E
Uranium Watch
p. 0. Box 344
Moab, Utah 84532
435-210-0166
Via electronic mail
May 10,2010
Mr. Dane Finerfrock, Director
Utah Division of Enviromnental Quality
Division of Radiation Control
P.O. Box 144850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4850
RE: Comments on White Mesa Uranium Mill: Modification to the Groundwater
Discharge Permit No. UGW37004 and Amendment 4 to Radioacfive Materials License
No. UTI900479.
Dear Mr. Finerfrock:
The proposed License Amendment 4 to Radioacfive Materials License No. UTI 900479 is
for the constmcfion of a new tailings impoundment at the White Mesa Uranium Mill,
owned and operated by Denison Mines (USA) Corporation (DUSA, or Applicant).
Below are comments on the license amendment and the Safety Evaluation Report:
Review of License Amendment Request and Environmental Report for Cell 4B.
1. WHITE MESA ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES
1.1. The constmction of Cell 4B will impact a number of Archeological Resources at the
Mill site and in the White Mesa Archaeological District. White Mesa is in an area
adjacent to and in the vicinity of extensive tribal holdings and an area rich in
archaeological resources, which have been designated as significant and deserving of
preservation. Many Archaeological Resources on White Mesa have been found eligible
for the National Register, including resources that will be or have been impacted by
activities associated with the proposed license amendment.
The Licensee and the Utah Division of Radiation Control (DRC) have not complied with
the requirements of License Condition 9.7, which states, in pertinent part:
All disturbances associated with the proposed development will be
completed in compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act (as
amended) and its implementing regulations, and the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act (as amended) and its implementing regulations.
Utah Division of Radiation Control 2
May 10, 2010
Compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act includes compliance with
Section 106. The Safety Evaluation Report (SER) fails to discuss how the Applicant
fulfilled its responsibilities under the “National Historic Preservation Act (as amended)
and its implementing regulations, and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (as
amended) and its implementing regulations.”
A contractor to the licensee has commenced excavation of the Archaeological Resources
at the Mill, with approval of the DRC. However, excavation has commenced without the
any Section 106 consultation. The excavation of the valuable Archeological Resource on
White Mesa has taken place without informing and consulting with nearby tribal
governments and tribal Historic Preservation Officers and without an opportunity for
public comment.
Further, the Licensee commenced activities that have impacts on the Archaeological
Resources and are the subject of License Condition 9.7 requirements prior to this
comment period and prior to the issuance of the license amendment and final
environmental evaluation.
All activities that impact Archaeological Resources at the Mill should cease until DRC
initiates and completes a Section 106 consultation process, including consultation with
affected tribal governments or appropriate tribal representatives. The DRC should not
issue the license amendment without consulting with the Ute, Navajo, and other regional
tribal Historic Preservation Officers regarding the destruction of irreplaceable historic
resources.
Further, the SER must include a discussion of how the Applicant has complied with the
provisions of License Condition 9.7.
1.2. LICENSE CONDITION 9.7.
The DRC is not proposing any changes to License Condition 9.7, which pertains to the
cultural resources at the Mill. License Condition 9.7 refers to a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOU) between the Utah State Historical Preservation Officer (SHAPO), the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), and Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (a former Mill owner/licensee). The MOU was
ratified on August 20, 1979, and amended on May 3, 1983. The MOU should be
amended or replaced, since it does not reflect the current situation at the Mill.
2. SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT (SER)
2.1. LICENSEE REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES (SER, page 21).
The DRC should make the effluent monitoring reports, Semi-Annual Effluent Reports
and Quarterly Groundwater Monitoring Reports and any additional effluent monitoring
information submitted by the licensee pursuant to License Condition 11.2 available on
Utah Division of Radiation Control 3
May 10, 2010
the DRC website in a timely manner.
2.3. LONG TERM IMPACTS
UCA R313-24-3D: Environmental Analysis – Long Term Impacts, Safety Evaluation,
states that, pursuant to UAC R313-24-3, a major license amendment should include
"consideration of the long-term impacts." The SER discussion addresses long-term
impacts. However, the SER and the UCA section do not define long-term and leave the
issue of long-term containment of the mill tailings and their associated emissions to be
addressed in a future Reclamation Plan. Under current federal regulation (40 C.F.R. Sec.
192.32(B)(1)(i)1), consideration of the technical requirements for long-term containment
of the tailings is limited to "one thousand years, to the extent reasonably achievable, and,
in any case, for at least 200 years." The SER (page 30) gives states that Cell 4B has been
designed to provide "reasonable assurance that radiological hazards will be suitably
controlled for 1,000 years, to the extent reasonably achievable, and in any case for at
lease 200 years."
So, we have "reasonable assurance" to the extent that suitable control is "reasonably
achievable." What does this vague language mean over the long-term? The public, the
licensee, and the DRC do not really know.
The tailings will remain on White Mesa in perpetuity, that is, forever. Therefore impacts
from 200 to 1,000 years are short-term impacts, not long-term impacts, given the time
that the tailings will continue to release radon and will be a radioactive and hazardous
material requiring physical and regulatory control for as long as there are individuals and
entities capable of exercising that control.
1 40 CFR Sec. 192.32(B)(1)(i).
(1) Disposal areas shall each comply with the closure performance standard in Sec. 264.111 of
this chapter with respect to nonradiological hazards and shall be designed to provide reasonable
assurance of control of radiological hazards to (i) Be effective for one thousand years, to the
extent reasonably achievable, and, in any case, for at least 200 years, and, (ii) Limit releases of
radon-222 from uranium byproduct materials to the atmosphere so as to not exceed an average \2\
release rate of 20 picocuries per square meter per second (pCi/m2s).
\2\ This average shall apply to the entire surface of each disposal area over periods of at least one
year, but short compared to 100 years. Radon will come from both uranium byproduct materials
and from covering materials. Radon emissions from covering materials should be estimated as
part of developing a closure plan for each site. The standard, however, applies only to emissions
from uranium byproduct materials to the atmosphere.
Utah Division of Radiation Control 4
May 10, 2010
Eventually the liners will break down, eventually the tailings cover will erode, and
eventually the tailings and the associated radioactive and non-radioactive contaminants
will disperse into the air, water, and soils.
Any evaluation of the long-term impacts of the proposed licensing action must address
the potential impacts of the dispersion of the tailings from natural forces over the
thousands and millions of years that the tailings will remain in place.
2.4. PERMANENT ISOLATION WITHOUT ONGOING MAINTENANCE (SER, page
24)
10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, Criterion 1, states that tailings should be disposed of in a
manner that no active maintenance is required to preserve conditions of the site.
There is no doubt that over the years, active maintenance will be required to preserve
conditions of the site. The Department of Energy (DOE) has already discovered that
active maintenance is required at some of the uranium mill sites that have been reclaimed
and that DOE have responsibility for, due to erosion. The DOE is actively looking at
different cover and tailings design systems because of the problems they have
encountered at these sites.
No matter what the design is, eventually the cover, tailings, and White Mesa itself, will
erode, as demonstrated by the geological landscape in the region. Any claim to continued
long-term isolation of the tailings--without active maintenance--via a man-made design is
not supportable.
The DRC should consult with the DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and take
into consideration recent studies and data regarding the effectiveness of tailings system
designs and materials to update the final cover design and materials requirements in order
to achieve the maximum long-term isolation of the tailings with minimal maintenance.
The DRC should not mislead the public and licensee into thinking that isolation of the
tailings for 1,000 and for the long-term future can take place without active maintenance.
2.5. IMPACTS OF DEWATERING OF THE TAILINGS CELL (SER, pages 25 – 26)
The discussion of the permanent isolation without ongoing maintenance (10 CFR Part 40,
Appendix A, Criterion 1) and the Reclamation Plan refer to the dewatering of the tailings
cell after the operational life of the cell. However, there is minimal discussion about two
of the primary problems encountered at uranium mills once operation has ceased and cell
dewatering commences. Once dewatering commences, the result is an increase in the
release of radon from the cell and an increase in windblown tailings. The SER mentions
the possibility of the use of "platform fill," but provides little information and analysis of
the use of fill or other means to minimize the emission of radon, hazardous and
radioactive particulates to the atmosphere and the environment.
Utah Division of Radiation Control 5
May 10, 2010
The SER should discuss in more detail the impacts of cell dewatering on the emission of
radon and other gases and hazardous and radioactive particulates and how these impacts
will be mitigated during the estimated 5.5 years between the cessation of cell operation
and the placement of an interim and final cover.
2.6. OFF SITE MEASURING DEVICES
The February 12, 2010, letter to Dave Frydenlund, DUSA, from Senes Consultants Ltd.,
states (page 2): Due to the inaccuracy of the radon measurement devices the mill is not
required to sample for environmental radon under its license."
The Application for Cell 4B and the SER fail to provide supportive documentation
regarding various types of radon measuring devices and their supposed “inaccuracy” to
justify the failure to measure environmental radon from Cell 4 B and other radon sources
at the Mill. This would include on- and off-site monitoring of radon.
The SER should include a full justification, with supporting documentation, of the on-
and off-site radionuclide monitoring programs, including monitoring of radon. If DUSA
is not required to sample for environmental radon and other radioactive releases on- and
off-site, the public must know why and have supporting technical bases.
2.7. EFFLUENT CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS (SER, pages 59 - 60)
The SER discusses compliance with 10 C.F.R. 40, Appendix A, Criterion 8, with respect
radioactive effluents from the mill and tailings impoundment. Criterion 8 includes the
requirement:
Milling operations producing or involving thorium byproduct material
must be conducted in such a manner as to provide reasonable assurance
that the annual dose equivalent does not exceed 25 millirems to the whole
body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other organ of
any member of the public as a result of exposures to the planned discharge
of radioactive materials, radon-220 and its daughters excepted, to the
general environment.
The SER fails to discuss how compliance with the above requirement for exposures to the
public will be measured and compliance will be assured with respect the release of the
discharge of radioactive materials from Cell 4B and other sources at the mill during the
operation of the tailings cell.
The SER should explain exactly how the Applicant will demonstrate compliance with
Criterion 8 with respect the emission from Cell 4B.
2.8. COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATIONS
Utah Division of Radiation Control 6
May 10, 2010
The SER does not discuss required compliance with other state and federal regulations
prior to the commencement of construction of Cell 4 B. This would include compliance
with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart A. Section 61.07 requires that
DUSA submit an application to the Utah Division of Air Quality (DAQ) for Cell 4B as a
new 40 C.F.R. Part 61, Subpart W regulated source and receive an approval from the
DAQ, pursuant to Section 61.08. Recently, DUSA was issued a Notice of Violation by
the Environmental Protection Agency for failure to comply with the Subpart A
application/approval process for the Arizona 1 uranium mine. Therefore, the DRC
should remind DUSA of their Part 61 responsibilities. Additionally, DUSA may be
required to amend their air quality permit for the non-radioactive emissions from the
uranium mill.
The White Mesa license should contain a condition that states that DUSA must comply
with all applicable federal and state regulations and statutes and a license condition that
states that DUSA cannot commence construction of Cell 4B until DUSA receives the
required approval as a new 40 C.F.R. Subpart W regulated source from the DAQ.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment.
Sarah M. Fields
Program Director
Uranium Watch
And on behalf of:
Glen Canyon Group
Sierra Club
P.O Box 622
Moab, Utah 84532
Harold Shepherd
Executive Director
Red Rock Forests
P.O. Box 298
Moab, Utah 84532
435/259-5640