DSHW-2015-011876 - 0901a068805b081d

Orbital ATK
November 19,2015
8200-FY16-046
Div of Waste Management
and Radiation Control
NOV 1 9 2015
Scott T. Anderson
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste
PO Box 144880
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-4880
Subject: ATK Launch Systems- Promontory Facility; EPA ID Number UTD009081357; M-590
Spill Report
Dear Mr. Anderson:
In accordance with R315-9-4, ATK Launch Systems is submitting a written report for the spill of
sodium hydroxide that occurred on November 5,2015 at building M-590. Questions concerning
this event can be referred to Jason Wells, Environmental Engineer, ATK Launch Systems, (435)
/ certify under penalty of law that this document and all attachments were prepared under my direction or
supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and
evaluate the information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person or persons who manage the
system, or those persons directly responsible for gathering the information, the information is, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, true, accurate, and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties
for submitting false information, including the possibility offine and imprisonment for knowing
863-6895.
violations.
Sincerely,
George Gooch
Manager, Environmental Services
c: Jeff Vandel, DSHW
Jason Wells, Orbital ATK
Orbital ATK, Inc. • P.O. Box 707, Brigham City, UT 84302-0707 • 435-863-3511
November 19, 2015
Mr. Scott T. Anderson, Director
Utah Division of Waste Management and
Radiation Control
ATK Launch Systems, Report for November 5,2015 M-590 Sodium Hydroxide Spill
The name, title, address and telephone number of the person reporting:
Jason Wells
Environmental Engineer
P.O. Box 707, MS 301
Brigham City, UT 84302-0707
[phone]
A description including the date, time, location and nature of the reported incident:
On November 4,2015, at 8:20 am, a technician was preparing to transfer 2800 gallons of 50%
sodium hydroxide solution from the existing holding tank to a tank in an adjacent bay of building
M590. The tank outlet spigot broke away at the bulkhead connection as the technician was
threading a hose connection fitting onto spigot. Approximately 2800 gallons of the material was
released into secondary containment. Emergency response personnel were dispatched to the
building to decontaminate the technician exposed and to ensure the material was contained. At
approximately 9:30 am the incident commander confirmed the spill was contained and the
technician was being transported to Bear River Hospital for treatment of a minor burn to the lip.
Building personnel spent the afternoon developing a plan to transfer the sodium hydroxide from
the containment area to the intended tank. The plan was finalized by late afternoon. However,
since the transfer would take several hours, the decision was made not to begin the transfer until
the following morning. Building personnel arrived on November 5 to begin the transfer. At
approximately 7:30 am personnel noticed the liquid level in the containment area had dropped 10
to 12 inches. Spill response was contacted and an investigation began to determine the amount
of material lost and its location. A physical search of the area offered little evidence to the
material's location. Facility drawings were reviewed to determine if the containment area was
plumbed to a sump. When drawings indicated the containment had no outlet, it was concluded
the material had breached the containment and leaked under the building. The volume released
was estimated at 1500 gallons, or 19,000 lbs of sodium hydroxide. When it was realized the
release exceeded the reportable quantity, the EPA National Reporting Center, Utah Division of
Environmental Remediation and Emergency Response, and Utah Division of Waste
Management and Radiation Control were immediately contacted. A post-spill investigation
revealed two areas where the containment liner was degraded. One area was in a blind sump
located on the east side of the bay. A noticeable crack was observed in the cement beyond the
liner.
Extent of injuries, if any:
The technician exposed during the initial tank bulkhead failure was dressed in adequate personal
protective equipment. He received a small, minor burn to his lip from droplets of material that
splashed under his face shield.
The name and quantities of material(s) involved in the spill:
Approximately 1500 gallons of 50% sodium hydroxide was released.
Orbital ATK 4>
November 19, 2015
Mr. Scott T. Anderson, Director
Utah Division of Waste Management and
Radiation Control
An estimated quantity and disposition of the recovered material:
Approximately 1300 gallons of 50% sodium hydroxide remained in the containment area and
was transferred to an adjacent tank. An additional 100 gallons was recovered when material
began seeping back into the blind sump located on the east side of the bay. The material
recovered was transported to an offsite disposal facility.
An assessment of actual or potential hazards to human health and the environment where
applicable:
The material is believed to be located under the building and a large asphalt pad to the east of the
tank bay. No exposure risks have been identified.
Clean up status:
Sodium hydroxide remaining in the secondary containment area was transferred to a holding
tank and adjacent storage bay. The containment area was washed thoroughly with water while a
sump pump transferred the wash water to the adjacent holding tank. No cleanup has been
initiated for material under the building and asphalt pad, and potential future corrective action is
pending further discussion with the Division.
Steps taken to prevent recurrence:
The following our corrective actions were identified during the investigation:
• Review secondary containment design and inspect for integrity. Construct a plan and
schedule to restore integrity of containment areas, where needed.
• Review and update planning to include additional steps for verifying tank integrity prior
to loading tanks
• Require building owners with processes that store bulk chemicals to develop a
containment transfer plan that can be quickly implemented. The plan would define the
required steps, safety precautions, equipment and personnel required to remove material
from secondary containment and place into suitable storage containers.
• Determine an improved material and design for the spigot's bulkhead connection to the
tank. Eliminate any potential structural and/or chemical failure of the part.
Orbital ATK