DSHW-2005-001905 - 0901a0688013aef4

ATK
ALUANT TECHSYSTEMS^
March 1,200.'^
82()(J-FY0.'^-07[
Dennis R. Downs, Director
Division ol' Solid nnd Hazardous Wasle
Deparimenl of Environmental Qualily
P.O. Box 144880
Sail Lai<e Cily, Ulah 841 14-4880
Dear Mr. Downs
Alliant Aerospace Company
P.O. Box 98
Magna, UT 84044-0098
Tel [phone]
RECEIVED
%
lAR 0
UTAH DIVISIOM OF
.SOUD & HAZARDOUS WASTt
Ki:: ATK rhiokol-Promontory M-590 Incident, Written Follow up Letter
as Required under R315-9-4
On February 15, 2005 ATK Thiokol nolificd the Division of Emergency Response and
Remedialion lhal an incident had occuned at Building M-590 at our Promonloiy Jacilily.
Wc reported lhal this incident could have released a reportable quantity of a hazardous
maierial. Al ihc lime of lhe incident, we were not sure of the type and quanliiy of
iiazardous malcrial(s) lhal may have been released. Wc have since determined lhal the
c[uatuily released did nol exceed (he amounls listed iti R315-9-1. This letler is our vjv'mcn
reptiri as required under lhe Ulah Hazardous Wasle Rule R3 15-9-4.
Descripiion oflhe Incidenl
Al 10:48 pm on February 14, 2005 an explosion occurred al Building M-590 ihal
involved an esiimaicd 853 pounds of 1.3,5-lriclhoxy-2, 4,6-lrinilrobenzene (TETNB).
This material was in a vacuum filler receiver lank inside a contained production bay. The
blasl and subsequem fire caused one falalily and severely burned another operator. l"he
cause of ignilion has nol ycl been determined, bul is expected upon compleiion oflhe
invcsligalion
Thc injured operator was transported lo the Tremonton hospital, and then ti'ansferred lo
(lie University of Ulah Burn Center for treatment and care. The Trcmonion hospital was
nolificd of a chemical and thermally burned victim when lhe ambulance departed from
Piomonlory, bul ihey were nol ready to receive a contaminated palienl upon anival. This
resulted in a porlion oflhe hospital becoming contaminated with the yellow TETNB.
Thc contaminaiion was caused by residual TETNB on lhe injured employee, and yellow
slained fiie proieciion water on ihc protective gear of lhe Emergency Seiviccs employees
who iransportcd the injured employee using a company owned ambulance. The
contaminaiion caused the facilily to close down from about 4:30 am lo 12:00 noon on
Febiuarv 15" while the eoniaminaled areas were bcino elcancd.
The Bear River Valley Health Department was notified about 5:50 am of the incident
and responded to the hospital to render assistance. ATK Thiokol dispatched
knowledgeable and trained personnel to clean the hospital, along with instrumentation to
verify the area was decontaminated. All contaminated materials including the mop water,
contaminated solids from the clean-up and contaminated personal items were collected
and retumed to our Promontory facility.
Additional contaminated solids were collected at the University of Utah emergency room.
These items were bagged, and retumed to our Promontory facility.
Contamination at the Building M-590 Site
There were numerous chemicals stored at Building 590 at the time of the fire.
Investigation into this incident showed that the TETNB and associated precursor products
were the only items involved in the incident. Our best estimate is that approximately 10
pounds of this reactive product left the building during this incident. The majority of the
10 pounds is believed to have been cairied outside the building by the deluge fire
suppression system. Some materials were also thrown from the building during the
explosion.
TETNB has a low solubility in water and is heavier than water, which caused some of
the energetic material to settle in the wastewater collection sump before the sump
overflowed and discharged away from the building.
The fire suppression water eventually flowed into the storm channel. We were able to
visually determine that the water had traveled a maximum of 1,000 feet to the West in the
storm channel, and did not leave the site.
Sample Results
TETNB and its precursors have a yellow color, and tum water yellow. On the moming
of February 15'*', two yellow water samples were taken. One was near the building, and
the other was down the storm channel. Both samples were analyzed at our M-53 lab by
HPLC method, looking for TETNB and related products. TETNB, being the least soluble
in water, was not detected. However, the following related products were detected at the
levels listed below:
• Sodium nitrate - 24.7 ppm
• Trinitrophoroglucinol (TNPG) - 10.8 ppm
• Diethoxytrinitrophenol (DETNP) - 36.1 ppm
Assuming that these water samples would show the highest possible soil contaminant
levels, we reviewed the EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRG) for
residential levels for the most closely related chemicals to TETNB. Two related
chemicals were found in this table that could be used to establish a reasonable residential
risk based level for TETNB and related compounds. These chemicals include HMX at
3,100 ppm and 1,3,5-trinitrobenzene at 1,800 ppm. Soil contamination levels appear to
be well below the PRG's for closely related substances.
Soil samples were obtained from outside the M-590 bays, and tested for D003 reactivity.
Test results showed that the contaminated soil would not be considered reactive under
EPA's definition. Since this soil is neither characteristic nor listed, it will be considered a
RCRA non-hazardous waste for disposal purposes.
Clean-up and Disposal
TETNB, and solids that were visibly contaminated with TETNB in the vicinity of the fire
have been collected for disposal by open buming. Additional materials found as we
proceed with the building clean up will be collected and open bumed. Approximately 30
cubic yards of visibly contaminated soil or soil that could have been contaminated with
TETNB has been removed and placed in our landfill. The contaminated water from the
building sump, and the mop water collected at the hospital have been processed at
building M-705. As a safety precaution, the TETNB contaminated solids collected
during clean-up will also be disposed by open buming.
Post- Incident Efforts
On Febmary 28, 2005 we met with the Bear River Valley Health Department and the
Utah Department of Health to discuss their role in this incident, and how to better
communicate with these agencies. They provided some valuable information, which will
help us to improve our emergency and disaster response plan and overall communication
with these agencies
If you have any questions on this report or need additional clarification, please contact
Gene Curtis at [phone].
George E. Gooch
Manager, Environmental Services
Cc: Jeff Vandel (Division of Solid & Hazardous Waste)
Lloyd Berentzen (Bear River Health Department)